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In this illuminating study of two literary mile­
stones in the history of our civilization, a noted 
Rousseau scholar examines for the first time 
the nature of, and the inspiration for, the 
symbolic language that informs Rousseau's two 
great masterworks. Though Rousseau himself, 
in the pedagogical novel, invites such a study 
by including an aesthetic profession of faith 
and by warning the reader more than once that 
he is using the language of symbolic expression, 
Rousseauist criticism has, beyond noting the 
presence of a few symbols in Emile, produced 
as yet no systematic inquiry into the emblem­
atic conveyance of ideas therein. 
Professor Ellis's scrupulous collation of the 
texts of the two books and her adroit use of the 
Old and New Testaments and the Platonic 
dialogues reveal for the first time that not 
only is the Social Contract an "appendix" to 
Emile, as Rousseau says it is, but also that the 
two together constitute a Rousseauist version 
of Plato's Republic and Symposium trans­
figured by Judeo-Christian and biblical tradi­
tion. Although once again Rousseau himself 
invites such a comparison by calling both 
Christ and Socrates, or Plato, his "master," a 
distinction he accords to no one else, scholars 
have consistently ignored this invitation as they 
have the first. Dr. Ellis's study conclusively 
demonstrates that the imagery of these ancient 
writings, which is also Rousseau's, is the real 
clue to the relationship between the pedagog­
ical novel and its political appendix. She cites 
as but one example that, in the Republic, 
Socrates also tells a "story" about the educa­
tion of heroes and, moreover, includes a polit­
ical treatise as well, the two being one and the 
same treatment of citizenship. Socrates' ob­
jective is Rousseau's: to portray man's nature 
and duties, and to describe the nature of justice 
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Foreword

Without going so far as agreeing with Diderot, who called 
the Emile "une espece de galimatias," critics have gen­
erally had difficulty in appreciating this work fully, view­
ing many of its sections as digressions, paradoxes, or 
outright contradictions. The same can be said for parts of 
the Contrat social, which usually are dismissed as mere 
"padding." What is even more typical in modern Rousseau 
criticism—and an author such as he seems to provoke it— 
is the tendency to interpret these texts from a twentieth-
century viewpoint, anachronistically ascribing to the author 
motives he could not even have conceived in his time, or 
pushing some of his statements to conclusions he never in­
tended. Not that such studies are invalid: there are in the 
works of all great authors implications of which they them­
selves were not always aware. That is why, for example, 
Diderot could refute Voltaire's objections to the material­
ism in the Lettre sur les aveugles by reminding him that his 
own statements in the Lettres philosophiques substantiated 
the blind Saunderson's position. That is why both Voltaire 
and Rousseau were regarded as heroes in the French Revo­
lution despite their comparative political conservatism. 
And a monumental work like Cassirer's The Philosophy of 
the Enlightenment does not lose its validity or utility be­
cause he imposes a systematic, Hegelian "synthesis" on 
an author like Diderot even though it does not correspond 
to the Encyclopedist's own temperament or methodology. 
But there comes a time in the explication of any signifi­
cant work when we must ask ourselves, What was the 
ix 
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author's intention when he wrote it? Has he given us any 
clues as to what plan he followed or as to how we are to 
interpret his writings? Not to do so is to risk misinterpret­
ing or overlooking passages that are essential to that plan 
and to understanding their artistic and philosophical sig­
nificance. It is to these questions that Professor Ellis 
addresses herself. Rousseau more than once claimed that 
his Emile and Contrat social were of one cloth and formed 
an organic whole; but critics have either taken him at his 
word or dismissed it as another Rousseauistic paradox. It 
is not surprising that no one until now has fathomed that 
unity and proved it. The task requires a painstaking colla­
tion of texts, a complete familiarity not only with Rousseau's 
works but with those of the classical sources on which he 
relied, and, finally, a dispassionate, scholarly will to 
understand the author whether one agrees with him or not. 
This last requirement is particularly difficult to achieve 
when dealing with an author like Rousseau who somehow 
brings out the polemicist in some critics and leads them to 
write either hagiography or demonology. Not the least of 
this book's merits is its calm, matter-of-fact approach that 
is neither advocacy nor condemnation but explication in the 
highest sense. One reads its "revelations"—for that is 
what they are—with a sense of discovery that, because of 
the tightly reasoned and convincing evidence, compels 
assent. 
Professor Ellis has found the key not only to Emile and 
the Contrat social but to the central core of Rousseau's 
writings. Through her lucid and entirely convincing dem­
onstration, she has come as close to the intentions, meth­
odology, and meaning of these texts as anyone can hope to 
do. She captures the Genevan's mythical (and mystical) 
bent and clarifies many an obscure and heretofore baf­
fling allusion that can only be understood in the context of 
the master plan he followed. In so doing, she gives us a 
new insight into the artistry of this author who so person­
alized Socratic and biblical imagery that without Dr. Ellis's 
FOREWORD 
quotations of chapter and verse we would not have recog­
nized them as such. There will always be new and "con­
temporary" interpretations of Rousseau's works; but Dr. 
Ellis has brought us once and for all back to the intentions 
and sources of the author himself, without which knowledge 
much of what he wrote remained for us enigmatic and ob­
scure. Her book was sorely needed! And it will necessitate 
the abandonment or reevaluation of many an ingenious but 
henceforth untenable interpretation that our profession had 
hitherto taken for granted. 
Words like masterful or brilliant are so often used in con­
texts such as this that they tend to lose their meaning. Yet 
how else underline the importance of Dr. Ellis's impressive 
accomplishment, which represents years of thorough prep­
aration? Rousseau's Socratic Aemilian Myths is not just 
another book on Rousseau. It is bound to become required 
reading for anyone wishing to understand him; for it is a 
touchstone for the comprehension of the Genevan's alle­
gorical language and, thus, to a truer interpretation of what 
he himself regarded as the summa of his writings: Emile. 
John Pappas 
Fordham University 
XI 

Acknowledgments

The author wishes to express her appreciation to the pub­
lishers of this book, especially the director of the Press, 
Mr. Weldon A. Kefauver, and the editor, Mr. Robert S. 
Demorest, for their thoughtful consideration and editorial 
advice. She is also profoundly grateful to friends and col­
leagues who helped handle many practical problems en­
countered in the work of publication. They are: Dr. Otis 
E. Fellows, professor at Columbia University; Dr. Wallace 
S. Lipton, professor at the City University of New York; 
and more especially, Dr. John N. Pappas, professor at 
Fordham University, who moreover generously offered 
to read the manuscript and kindly accepted the author's 
invitation to write a Foreword to the book. 
She also takes pleasure in acknowledging her indebted­
ness to other friends and colleagues whose good offices 
facilitated the progress of research during the many years 
of work that culminated in the book. They are: Dr. Henri 
M. Peyre, professor emeritus of Yale University, who, at 
an earlier stage in the study, graciously consented to read 
the Introduction; the late Dr. Charles Z. Wahl, professor 
at the City University of New York and a lifelong friend, 
whose invaluable services, including bibliographical as­
sistance, the loan of books, and occasional replacement of 
the author in various professional capacities during periods 
of intense research were terminated only by an untimely 
death in 1972; and finally the late Dr. J. S. Will, profes­
sor emeritus of the University of Toronto, whose illumin­
ating conversations on literary method and the problem of 
xiii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
form in the French novel never failed to open up vast per­
spectives in the spheres of aesthetic creativity and the na­
ture of beauty, which are hardly alien to the theme of 
this inquiry. 
In fine, she would record her deepest debt of gratitude 
to Lilian Fitzmaurice Ellis, whose lively interest in Plato, 
stimulating enthusiasm, and patient self-sacrifice, played 
a major role in the genesis of the work and without whose 
support it is certain that this book would never have been 
written. 
x i v 
The story of human nature is a fair romance. Am I to blame if 
it is to be found only in this book? It ought to be the story of 
mankind.—Rousseau, Emile. 
Come then and let us pass a leisure hour in story-telling and our 
story shall be the education of our heroes.—Plato, The Republic 
All these things spake Jesus unto the multitude in parables; and 
without a parable spake he not unto them.—Gospel of Saint 
Matthew 
My treatise on the Social Contract. .. being cited several times 
and even summarized in the educational treatise must pass as a 
sort of appendix to it, and the two together make a complete 
whole.—Rousseau to Duchesne 
Such is the good and true City or State and the good and true man 
is of the same pattern, and if this is right every other is 
wrong.... The same principles and habits... pass from the 
individual into the State.—Plato, The Republic 
For behold the kingdom of God is within you.—Gospel of Saint 
Luke 

I 
Introduction 
By neglecting the language of symbolic expression 
that speaks to the imagination we have lost the most 
energetic of languages.1—"Emile" 
A CAUSE CEXEBRE 
After two centuries of constant subjection to the tireless 
scrutiny and merciless probing of scholars, Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, who discloses the intimacies of his life so freely, 
still hides the secret of his thought. For unlike most of his 
contemporaries he understood the value of mystery and of 
poetry, not only to express more effectively the intricacies 
of his own personal apprehension of truth, but also to allure 
the minds and souls of his readers. He hints that his reti­
cence is intentional when he says: "I do not write for those 
who must be told everything." Again he adds significantly: 
"He who tells all tells little, for in the end no one is listen­
ing."2 He consciously declines to lend himself to a neat 
positivistic interpretation that simplifies the critic's task. 
Yet his purpose is clear enough, and it never varies. In 
all his works the same question is raised over and over 
again. "Where is wisdom? Where is happiness?" is the 
Sphinx-like riddle propounded by him from the beginning 
of his career when the Discourse upon Arts and Sciences 
won him fame in Paris and all Europe in his fortieth year. 
Precisely the same question provides the major theme of 
a decade of writing including other pieces written in the 
French capital, like his Discourse upon Inequality and the 
article on Political Economy, as well as famous books com­
posed at Montmorency, such as the letter to d'Alembert 
on the theater, the novel Julie, and the political and peda­
[3] 
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gogical treatises of the Social Contract and Emile that 
were supposed to bring his literary career to a virtual 
close at the age of fifty.3 
In each work in turn the author asks: Is it the lover of 
knowledge who possesses the secret of happiness? Is it 
the worshiper of Mammon, or the devotee of power and 
glory? Or is it the man committed to some indescribable 
pleasure of the body? By merely posing such problems, 
he unsettled people and cast doubt upon common assump­
tions that lie at the foundations of a materialistic society. 
As he pondered these assumptions in his mind, his own 
view of life slowly took shape as the very antithesis of cur­
rent beliefs about the value of power, wealth, and self-
indulgence for the attainment of felicity. His ideas are quite 
fully defined in Julie, which, as I have shown, synthesizes 
the content of all his previous publications.4 But his phi­
losophy is best expressed in the two works intended to be 
his last, especially Emile, to which the Contract, or trea­
tise on citizenship (a summary of a projected work on 
Political Institutions) is by his own admission a sort of ap­
pendix. He wished the latter to precede the main volume 
in the bookshops, although it actually followed. His desire 
was that Emile, a production of the first magnitude, might 
appear as his definitive answer to the problem of happi­
ness, to be succeeded only by memoirs reserved for re­
tirement and posthumous publication.5 
But Emile and the Contract shattered his dream of repose 
and brought in their train a host of other works that he felt 
obliged to write "to defend his honor and ideas." For he 
found to his dismay that to stir the conscience of the age 
is a dangerous undertaking, as many another imprudent 
idealist has also discovered from the time of Socrates or 
Christ down to our own day. In Rousseau's case perse­
cution and exile immediately followed the publication of 
the two treatises. A Parisian decree of 9 May 1762, di­
rected against the author of Emile and especially the un­
orthodox profession of religious faith contained therein, 
[4] 
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and an analogous Genevan decree directed a week later 
against the writer of both books made him into a religious 
and political martyr at once. Yet only a few months after 
the blow had fallen and while wounds were still fresh, he 
wrote to a correspondent thus: "It mattered little that a 
band of children should not act out their tawdry comedy, 
but it mattered greatly that what I have said should be 
said. Thank heaven, my task is done. I shall have no more 
anxiety on that score."6 Here he alludes particularly to 
Emile, which touched off the disaster. Apparently his 
distress did not preclude a sense of relief since his book 
had gone abroad with its message to the world. 
Rousseau pleads on his own behalf nowhere more fer­
vently than in the hitherto neglected Levite of Ephraim.1 
Except for the ending, it was written in the coach as he 
took leave of his adopted land and fled to the Swiss coun­
tryside north of Geneva. It is important because of the 
light it sheds upon the author of Emile''s attitude toward 
his own work. 
The brief prose-poem in four cantos is partly inspired 
by the concluding chapters of the Book of Judges in the 
Old Testament, but mainly by the circumstances of its 
composition. The writer turns the biblical narrative into a 
myth to adapt it to his true theme, which is the story of his 
own spiritual life, and tells how the culminating achieve­
ment of his career brought persecution and the threat of 
death upon him. Moved by these iniquities, he begins 
the poem by denouncing "crimes" that God's people must 
avenge and from which the enemies of inhumanity, how­
ever "debonair," may not avert their eyes without de­
serting the cause of justice. The biblical theme becomes 
Rousseauist. 
Indeed, the Levite in the poem is Rousseau. The latter 
endues himself with the office and garb of a minister of the 
Lord who is dedicated to the service of a spiritual temple. 
Elsewhere too he is similarly arrayed. For example, in 
Emile he assumes the vestments of a Savoyard vicar. 
[5] 
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Moreover, at the moment when he completed the poem, 
he donned the Armenian costume, popular a century ear­
lier. It appears as a sort of pilgrim's cloak or philosophic 
pall, reminiscent of the robes of Socrates, or perhaps of 
Christ, or the medieval monk, as well as the Levite whose 
role he borrows in the poem. 
Rousseau's Levite, like the one in Judges, belongs to 
the tribe of Ephraim. Now Ephraim is used in the Old Tes­
tament as a synonym for the twelve tribes of Israel, which 
in the poem typify Christendom. Like the ancient Levite, 
the modern one leaves the hillsides of his own country 
and finds a bride in Bethlehem-Judah. But she is not a 
"concubine" as in the sacred text. The reader who is on 
intimate terms with the writer already begins to see in her 
a reincarnation of the Rousseauist "Sophia," or wisdom, 
a new vision of divine wisdom born in the city of Christ 
two thousand years ago and comparable to the image of 
the Solomonic bride in the Book of Wisdom or the Socratic 
Lady Philosophy in Plato's Republic. At once the Levite's 
soul is knit with hers. But, since she is not of his tribe, 
he may not marry her according to God's law. This impedi­
ment in the poem has no equivalent in the biblical source, 
and Rousseau admits it in a footnote, as if he considered 
the innovation significant. The note reads: "I know that 
the children of Levi were free to marry in all tribes, but 
not in the case supposed here." He forbears to explain 
further, but his thought is not unintelligible. If the bride 
of the poem is indeed a concept of divine wisdom, no man 
may lay exclusive claim upon her. The mystic union is con­
summated nonetheless. The fruits of this union in Rous­
seau's life would presumably be his early discourses, 
which, together with Emile, he esteemed as his finest 
productions.8 In the poem, as in the biblical verses, the 
Levite then conducts his lady to his mountain home, where 
he remains for four months. Similarly the writer of the 
second Discourse, after professing to woo wisdom in his 
work, journeyed to his native land, to which he dedicated 
[6]
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the piece, and there he remained for the same space of 
time. 
But the Levite of the poem finds the soil of that coun­
try inhospitable to his bride. She sighs for Bethlehem-
Juda, or the city on high that is her birthplace and proper 
abode. Unlike her biblical analogue—and henceforth I 
shall refer to the sacred text only in the case of deviations 
from it—she does not "play the whore against her lord." 
The bride in the new version tires of him who has allegedly 
renounced all else to follow her, and finally eludes him. 
Here the writer betrays disenchantment with his native 
Geneva and Calvinist faith and perhaps personal remorse 
as well. For after his return to France he became enam­
oured of a worldly "Sophia" in the person of Sophie 
d'Houdetot. At that moment in time he was faithless to 
the real one, like Socrates' errant philosopher who is led 
astray from his calling and abandons his lady.9 Rousseau's 
return to the cult of wisdom is also indicated in the poem 
where the Levite returns to Bethlehem to be reconciled 
with his bride, whom he woos and wins once again. 
In the second canto he sets out on his journey through 
life by her side, making his way "to the house of the Lord" 
and to his "mountain dwelling," where the writer of Emile 
professedly longed to withdraw. The Levite's lady newly 
recovered now appears as an image of that book where a 
definitive vision of Rousseauist wisdom is enshrined. On 
the road to his final resting-place the servant of the Lord 
tarries awhile, not in a city of infidels, says the poet, but 
among God's people, his own brethren. There a kindred 
soul, a fellow Ephraimite, befriends him. But as darkness 
falls, fiendish men, reminiscent of the wild-beast natures 
from whom the Socratic philosopher takes refuge, demand 
that the stranger be delivered into their power. For, we 
are told in another passage unparalleled in the sacred 
text, he is an uninvited guest in their country. So was 
Rousseau in France. To humanize them, he offers them 
the bride for whom he had dispossessed himself of all else. 
[7] 
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In the same spirit the author professes to have given 
Emile to the world. But the offering is vain. The diabol­
ical men of the poem, suggestive of the "unworthy per­
sons" who dishonor the Socratic Lady Philosophy, "tear 
her away from each other like beasts." Rousseau's words 
here represent a new departure from the biblical verse 
that reads: "They knew her, and abused her all night." 
The modification lends further weight to my view of his 
theme, since evil men could hardly be said to "know" 
divine wisdom in any sense. According to the modern 
Levite, they cannot even dishonor her since her misfor­
tunes only sanctify her. The writer said virtually the same 
thing of Emile in a defense of the work.10 At last the priest 
in the poem finds his bride lying lifeless on his path. In 
rage and despair the "barbarous" man takes her back to 
his home in the mountains, mutilates the body, and sends 
the flesh far and wide to all God's people. Then he goes 
on his way to the "house of the Lord" and calls upon the 
justice of heaven. Again he appears as an image of the au­
thor pleading in favor of his crowning achievement. 
In the third canto the chosen race gathers together be­
fore God, coming "from all the cantons," says the Swiss 
writer, again taking leave of the scriptural text. In the 
divine presence they swear to avenge innocent blood, 
whereupon the new Levite, unlike the biblical prototype, 
dies. He therefore does not share in the ensuing vengeance. 
The story of revenge adheres quite closely to the Old Tes­
tament version. But it is employed by Rousseau to show 
the futility and tragedy of all religious conflict, considered 
as a form of fratricide. 
The last canto, written at Motiers in the Swiss moun­
tains, is less inspired by the Old Testament than the New, 
and bears witness to a mitigation of bitterness wrought 
by the passage of time. It contains an incident of his own 
invention. A fresh generation of Ephraimites—evangelical 
Christians, if we wish—makes new sacrifices comparable 
to the Levite's in an effort to redeem the brutish natures 
[8] 
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of their fellows. The poem ends on a note of pardon and 
Christian charity, contrasting with the outcry of despair 
and demand for justice that precede. The ending is remi­
niscent of the Sermon on the Mount, where the writer fre­
quently found images and ideas: "Love your enemies, bless 
them that curse you, do good to them that hate you " 
Of course, he never did witness a union of Christen­
dom in his defense like the scene imagined in the Levite. 
But he could hardly have been surprised, since in the 
greater part of the poem he envisages his fate in a dra­
matically tragic light and emphasizes the curious cleavage 
between his own view of his life and that of his detractors. 
He does the same elsewhere. For example, on the eve of 
exile he wrote to a friend that "the only man in France 
who believes in God is doomed to be the victim of the 
defenders of Christianity."11 A fortnight later he wrote 
to a Swiss journalist: "Sooner or la ter . . . reasonable men, 
perhaps finally Christians... will see with surprise and 
indignation that a disciple of their divine master is treated 
among them like a scoundrel." Two months afterward 
when the archbishop of Paris condemned his book as the 
work of the Antichrist, he replied in the following vein: 
"The defender of the cause of God . . . (dishonored, exiled, 
driven from state to state without regard for his poverty 
or pity for his infirmity... ) is forbidden fire and water 
in almost the whole of Europe." In fine, telling the story 
years later in the Confessions, he speaks of the "outcry 
of malediction raised against me with unexampled fury 
in every part of Europe . . . . I was impious, an atheist, a 
madman, a wild beast, a wolf." In all these contexts he 
underlines the discrepancy between public reaction to him­
self and to his work, and the character of both as he 
sees it. 
During his exile the discrepancy grew as fresh attacks 
were made upon him. It is true that, after he renounced 
his Geneva citizenship on 12 May 1763,12 his compatriots 
made formal representations on his behalf, but they were 
[9] 
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easily silenced by the government of the city-state. In 
the autumn of 1763 the latter published a book entitled 
Letters from the Country to justify itself against him. A 
year later he replied in his Letters from the Mount, the very 
title of which recalls what he terms Christ's "greatest ser­
mon."* In the letters he alludes to the evangelical saying 
that "a prophet hath no honor in his own country." He vin­
dicates himself as the apologist of religion, and calls the 
Gospel "the rule of the master," and his own works "the 
commentaries of a scholar." Why, he asks, is the former 
"citizen of Geneva" now dubbed the destroyer of religion 
and of all governments? He contends that it is the rulers of 
the city itself who are overthrowing its constitution by their 
arbitrary decrees.13 Inevitably public hostility overtook 
him at his country retreat. Again he who saw himself as a 
disciple of Christ was identified as Antichrist and used ac­
cordingly,14 being driven from place to place until persecu­
tion mania robbed him of peace of mind for the rest of his 
days. 
Throughout these vicissitudes Rousseau, posing as a 
spokesman of religious and moral order, presents himself 
personally and not merely ideologically as a follower of 
Christ in the conduct of life, and at the same time evokes 
memories of Socrates. As Malesherbes once observed, he 
made a point of cherishing poverty and suffering like the 
evangelical teacher. And again like the latter he proved, as 
he says, that a prophet goes unrecognized at home. On the 
other hand, his friends identified him with Socrates, who 
also honored poverty and simplicity of life. The death of 
the Greek sage, like that of the Son of man, occupied Rous­
*To be exact, one ought correctly to write "Jesus Christ," since Rousseau 
most frequently uses both names, as he does in the context to which I refer 
here. Indeed, out of thirty-three references to the founder of Christianity in 
"Emile" and related works in O.C., Pleiade, vol. 4, the author writes "Jesus 
Christ" twenty-six times. However, for practical purposes I have decided 
to use the shorter form "Christ," since the meaning is always made clear by 
the context. Regarding the expression "Son of Man" occurring below, I have 
used the capital S, although Rousseau himself writes "son of man": see "Morceau 
allegorique," O.C., 4:1053. 
[10] 
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seau's thoughts from the moment he achieved fame, as 
though he half expected to meet a similar fate.15 Five years 
before tragedy befell him, a young admirer of his compared 
the life of the new Socrates to that of the old. More than 
three years later, a friend warned him to prepare himself 
to drink the hemlock. When he was finally forced to do so 
figuratively speaking, the comparison was commonplace.16 
Indeed, we ourselves, as we contemplate the role he plays 
in the Emile case, are reminded of the Socratic philosopher 
described in a passage of the Republic where the "wisest 
of the Greeks," having deplored the grievous manner in 
which the best men are treated in their own states, enumer­
ates those who, in spite of adverse circumstances, may yet 
become worthy disciples of philosophy17 By some strange 
coincidence Rousseau fits into every category: the exile, 
the invalid, the man born in a mean city whose politics he 
contemns and neglects, one who leaves the industrial and 
mechanical arts in favor of philosophy, or, finally, one who 
is possessed of the inner sign of a genuine vocation. Such 
a man, says the sage, "holds his peace and goes his own 
way." These very words recur at the end of the Letters 
from the Mount where Rousseau takes leave of Geneva for 
the last time. Whether or not, as he contends in Emile, he 
was not a man of his century—and he says the same of 
Socrates and Christ—his fate was not unlike that of the two 
figures in the past whose lives held most fascination for 
him. And it was brought upon him mainly by a work that, 
in his eyes apparently, was not unworthy of a professed 
disciple of both. 
ENIGMAS AND CLUES 
Emile has emerged as one of the milestones of Western 
culture. With more insight than authors usually have in the 
appraisal of their own compositions, Rousseau saw it from 
first to last as his "most useful, best," and "most impor­
tant" work, the one "most worthy" of himself, by compar­
[in 
ROUSSEAU'S SOCRATIC AEMILIAN MYTHS 
ison with which all his other works are mere pamphlets.18 
He was hardly mistaken. In spite of the reservations of 
many modern readers, it is recognized by our best critics 
as his most complete book and one of the major produc­
tions of our civilization. Small wonder if he was at a loss 
to explain public response to it. 
He was all the more bewildered since, in his words, all 
his works convey the same message, though they are vari­
ously interpreted. Emile and its "appendix," the Contract, 
which is cited and abridged in the pedagogical treatise, form 
according to his letters a complete whole. So do Emile and 
the Discourses, which he calls "inseparable."19 In the 
Confessions he pleads further that everything daring in the 
Contract was already said in the Discourse upon Inequality. 
Thus he joins together in a single body of thought Emile, 
the Contract, and the Discourses, as he also does Emile 
and Julie. Yet he lived in comparative tranquillity in France 
until his masterwork made its appearance to rock the foun­
dations of Europe, whereas the Contract created hardly 
more than a few slight tremors, except in Geneva.20 Why? 
If his ideas are dangerous, are they not just as dangerous 
in one book as in another? Perhaps so in their quality as 
ideas, provided we succeed in recognizing them as the same. 
Nevertheless, there is a vast difference. Emile possesses 
a power to which the reader responds in a way that sets it 
apart from the Contract and from all Rousseau's previous 
writings with the exception of Julie. That power lies less in 
the ideological content than in the attractive form of the 
work that gives potency to ideas. Although the subtitle of 
Emile, Concerning Education, suggests a philosophical 
study and is analogous to the title of the appendix, Con­
cerning the Social Contract, yet the main title of the peda­
gogical treatise is that of a literary work wherein abstract 
concepts are presented by way of myths or images. The 
latter make it far more readable and hence more liable to 
criticism than the companion volume and are far more pro­
vocative than the ones in Julie. 
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Emile, as opposed to the Contract, abounds in highly ex­
pressive visual imagery that serves a serious intellectual and 
spiritual purpose. I am not speaking of a few metaphors 
scattered here and there to illustrate a point in the story. I am 
referring to vast symbols and allegories that spring from the 
book itself and are an intrinsic part of it as they are of all great 
literature. They constitute an important aspect of the 
content of the work and not merely the form. But here let me 
explain my use of these terms that are by no means inflex­
ible. The form may be conceived as the measure of the 
artist's craftsmanship, his patience, his command of his 
medium, his knowledge of technique, stylistics, and syntax. 
The content may be seen as the measure of his imagination 
and vision and may be said to consist of both body and soul, a 
material content and a spiritual one that correspond in­
timately to each other. The visionary and imaginative aspect 
of literature provides a fine clue to meaning in a book like 
Emile and hence is of primary concern here. 
In the past the images therein have been accorded one of 
two varieties of treatment on the part of critics. Either they 
have been regarded as whimsical and childish, absurd and 
insipid, with the result that the writer often emerges as an 
incredibly stupid and boring pedant. Or else they have been 
altogether ignored in an attempt to go directly to the ideo­
logical core of the work. This method can foster the impres­
sion that the book is full of sophisms and contradictions and 
that, in spite of some valuable contributions to knowledge, it 
has serious flaws that make it hardly more than a document. 
Such attitudes are decried by monsieur Burgelin in his 
introduction to the Pleiade edition. 
Fortunately, today some critics are beginning to suspect 
the presence of at least two or three weighty symbols in its 
pages, and their attitude toward it is therefore more sympa­
thetic. Nevertheless, they still confine their investigations 
mainly to historical research or moral and philosophic spec­
ulation. Their work is extremely valuable, but it does not 
exclude the need for a thorough examination of the author's 
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use of imagery and its implications. 
This is all the more true since the meaning of the most fun­
damental literary motifs of the book still remains strangely 
enigmatic. Rousseauist criticism includes serious studies of 
other literary problems, and even of this one in the case of 
works like Julie or the autobiographical writings. But it has 
not yet scratched the surface of the emblematic conveyance 
of ideas in Emile, as compared with the abstractions of the 
so-called appendix. My purpose here is simply to set out in 
this new direction with the conviction that it is a valid one. I 
shall do so by inquiring into the mythical expression of 
thought in Emile in the same way as critics have done, for 
instance, in the case of Plato. Without hoping to exhaust the 
theme, I shall attempt to come to grips with the writer's 
artistic imagery as well as his ideology and then face the 
double challenge of aesthetic appreciation and philosophic 
interpretation at once. Thus I shall consider Emile as the 
work of a thinker whose methods are essentially artistic ra­
ther than philosophical. 
An exploration of the myths of Emile proves to be vastly 
rewarding aesthetically and ideologically too. When the 
images are penetrated and relieved of their spiritual con­
tent, the book turns out to be a concrete allegorical presen­
tation of doctrines communicated in a more theoretical way 
in the Contract as well as in the sequels of both and in ear­
lier works. The discovery of this fact makes it possible to 
shed fresh light upon the ideas of the two books in question. 
In order to accomplish this purpose while examining the 
myths of Emile, I have chosen to give to my study the form 
of a collation of the masterwork and its appendix. The col­
lation testifies to the truth of Rousseau's own judgment 
about their essential identity and shows that they evolve 
according to one and the same plan. By virtue of a pene­
tration of symbols, the relationship of texts rises to the 
surface quite naturally and easily ­
This aspect of my work is also admittedly unconven­
tional. Many commentators see a serious cleavage between 
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Emile and the Contract. They believe that the one sets 
forth the philosophy of individualism and the other that of 
collectivism, that the one represents solitary, isolated man 
whereas the other defines social man, integrated into an 
ideal community.21 However, there are exceptions among 
critics, especially recently. Some writers now believe that 
the two works complement each other and that Emile de­
scribes an artifically produced "natural" man to match the 
city of the Contract. They recall that for Rousseau true 
pedagogy implies politics—etymologically, "citizen­
ship"—just as, according to the Confessions, politics im­
plies pedagogy. However, they visualize the political ideal 
as the theoretical and rather irrelevant culmination of edu­
cation in Emile instead of its very essence from the begin­
ning. They therefore conclude that the author temporarily 
isolates pedagogy and politics, especially since in his view 
society that ought ideally to perfect man's nature actually 
corrupts and destroys it. Yet it is conceivable that the myth­
ical Emile does indeed abide in the imaginary city from the 
moment of his birth and that training in citizenship is the 
real theme of both books. This idea springs from a collation 
of the two, which in turn is made possible by a study of 
the allegorical forms of the pedagogical treatise actually 
reflected in the appendix. 
However subtle he may be, Rousseau confesses in 
Emile that he is not overlooking the resources of art. He 
admits that, like Julie, the book is a novel, though a peda­
gogical one, and he is not speaking only of the so-called 
storybook ending. This is true whether or not he planned 
it as such in the beginning and whatever conclusions we 
may deduce from the first version extant in the so-called 
Favre manuscript. The definitive Emile is the story of hu­
man nature, the romance of the soul that, according to the 
author, ought to be the record of the race. He draws at­
tention to the literary nature of his work by providing there­
in a thorough and methodical exposition of his literary pro­
fession of faith.22 This aesthetic doctrine, supplemented 
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by reflections contained in the Essay upon the Origin of 
Languages, the Dictionary of Music, and books 9 and 11 
of the Confessions, furnishes a key to the secrets of his 
art. 
Although in the two books of the autobiography he is 
really speaking of Julie, he invites a comparison with 
EmHe, and so his words may be taken as applying to both. 
Besides, he confesses elsewhere that Emile like the ro­
mance of Julie is full of his usual daydreams and is the 
final outgrowth of his country walks of which the first 
fruits were the love story.23 
The memorialist's description of the creation of Julie 
is well known. The writer, surrounded by the splendors of 
nature in Montmorency wood, weaves for his fancy an en­
chanted world of perfect beings, descending from the em­
pyrean, or rather, constructed from within the self. Such 
are the "daydreams" that reappear in his work from Emile 
to the Dialogues, which by his own admission took shape, 
like the Discourses, in a similar manner. Those dreams are 
the substance of what Formey called, with more truth than 
he perhaps intended, the mythical "world of Emiles."24 
And to borrow the autobiographer's words about Julie, 
the vision in Emile is the setting for a painstaking analysis 
of the human heart, intended to be comparable in psycho­
logical truth to great literature of the previous century, 
in spite of the "perfection" of his creatures. The charac­
ters are outwardly the same as in the love story, though 
fewer in number. Apart from the "divine Sophia," there 
is a tutor or governor and his disciple, both of whom like 
the corresponding characters in Julie mirror the author 
himself, at the same time as they represent sensitive, con­
templative humanity in search of wisdom and happiness. 
Both works are therefore autobiographical novels used to 
convey ideas. The passages in the Confessions relating to 
the one are valid for the other. 
Rousseau's aesthetics set forth in Emile and the other 
works already mentioned shed light upon the creative 
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process described in the memoirs. In the educational trea­
tise he defends the use of imagery and formally declines to 
communicate his thought by transporting us suddenly to 
the sphere of pure intellect. He censures his famous con­
temporaries for relying too much upon cold reason "as if 
we were all mind." He reproaches them for neglecting the 
most energetic of languages, that of signs which address 
themselves to the imagination and heart through the eyes. 
This language is also described in the Essay upon Lan­
guages. It is the utterance of "genius" conceived in the 
Dictionary of Music as rendering ideas through feelings, 
to convince the mind and sway the soul at once. He illus­
trates the point in Emile by taking examples from biblical 
and ancient Greek writers. He admires their skill in en­
duing reason with a body to make it felt. In his own words 
he too has recourse in his book to "the language of sym­
bolic expression," that is, to parables, allegories, legends, 
and visible forms that are the hallmark of the artist.25 
He goes still further to emphasize the importance of aes­
thetics and the value of taste to convey ideas. In the peda­
gogical novel and in the Dictionary too he defines taste 
as "the power to judge what is pleasing to most men." In 
Emile he recognizes that this power is indispensable to one 
like himself who hoped to be of service to others. But al­
though he associates the two issues, he does not confuse 
them. He is careful to separate the agreeable, which is the 
realm of taste, from the useful, which is for him the domain 
of ethics, and takes pains to distinguish moral beauty from 
physical. But he also hints at a link between them. For 
instance, he says that taste opens the mind to all beauty 
including moral ideas. But, as was ever his wont, instead 
of theorizing about these affinities, he leaves us to dis­
cover them for ourselves in the figures and events of Emile-
By doing so we can see how he, whose professed desire 
was to devote his life to spiritual truth, approaches his task 
by appealing to our love of beauty. If the appeal was less 
effective in Emile than it was in other books, it is because 
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of the gravity of the message entrusted to its myths. 
The author has more to say about the matter of pleasing 
and about the form and content of beauty. All true models 
of taste, he warns, are to be found in nature and not in the 
whimsical imagination of extravagant artists. Nature is 
therefore the subject of the art he favors, as he says in the 
Confessions too. He adds that a knowledge of its ways and 
modifications is to be cultivated by the frequentation of 
refined society since social life develops an understanding 
of the heart and trains the thinking mind to make discrim­
inating observations and judgments. This means that he 
appeals to reason and the intuitive imagination rather than 
to unbridled fancy as the appropriate faculty to explore 
the natural theme. It also confirms the fact that the nature 
he visualizes is that of man, to which his most ecstatic land­
scape pieces serve as a background, or whose moods they 
transcribe. In fine, his ideal is indeed the psychological 
truth of Boileau and the "classics,"26 which incidentally 
provides a key to the riddle of wisdom and happiness. 
The author of Emile is well aware that, by scrutinizing 
the intimacies of nature, he is walking in the footsteps not 
only of the great seventeenth-century French writers but of 
their immortal precursors of ancient Greece and Rome. 
The governor in the book chooses both Plutarch and La 
Fontaine to discover the secrets of men's hearts. But in 
general, like Boileau he favors the ancients as models in 
all genres. He mentions history, eloquence, and poetry 
both dramatic and lyric. To these we might add the 
"Socratic" variety, if we may so describe the prose dia­
logues of Plato, such as the Symposium, which is used 
for a study of aesthetics in the fourth part of Emile and is 
not indifferent for an understanding of the fifth. 
Yet although Rousseau's aesthetic doctrine may be 
dubbed "classical," in actual practice he transcends Boileau 
and the ancient ideal of objective truth to favor the inward 
personal spirit of Christianity. In fact, medieval Christian 
tradition is the source of his so-called romantic tendencies 
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to introspection and lyricism, and he deliberately brings 
it to terms with Greek culture of twenty-five hundred years 
ago. For example, in the Discourses he emphasizes the 
bonds between Platonic or Socratic philosophy and Chris­
tianity. These bonds can be seen throughout his work from 
his denunciation of the theater, as closely linked with Ter­
tullian and Bossuet as it is with Plato or Socrates, to the 
later autobiographical writings like the Confessions, with 
its echoes of Saint Augustine in what is substantially a 
"classical" analysis of the human heart. To illustrate fur­
ther, the heroine of Julie, whose creator openly profes­
ses to be a disciple of Plato and Socrates, is compared by 
the author of the Confessions to the seventeenth-century 
Princesse de Cleves, which conforms to the Greek ideal. 
Yet she is also "the new Heloisa" whose prototype be­
longs to the Middle Ages and whose lover, Saint-Preux, 
bears a name synonymous with the chivalry and passionate 
dedication of the medieval knights-errant, to whom, inci­
dentally, Emile is also compared. In the pedagogical novel 
and its appendix, Plato, or rather that old master of Plato, 
is still Rousseau's. For in Emile he as usual repairs mainly 
to the literature of thought for his ancient models. But they 
never stand alone. The whole of Emile, as well as the 
Contract, which is synthesized in the conclusion of the 
main work, is dominated by two figures, namely, Socrates 
as introduced by Plato, and Christ, whose evangelical 
image is set in the context of all biblical literature. The 
association of the two is discernible in the Levite of 
Ephraim. Besides I have already cited a passage in the 
Letters from the Mount wherein the author calls Christ 
his "master." He does the same in the letter to the arch­
bishop of Paris. He accords this distinction to none but 
Christ and Socrates, however much he is indebted to sev­
enteenth- and eighteenth-century thinkers whose influence 
only underlines his own originality. His chosen models 
are the two whom he represents as the leaders of his 
spirit.27 
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Moreover, he achieves a certain success in reconciling 
them and in uniting Greco-Roman and Judeo-Christian tra­
dition in general. This was no easy task since the kingdom 
of Christ, which as we are reminded in the Contract is not 
of this world, had become falsely alienated from the king­
dom of nature and natural man. Rousseau was well qualified 
to assume the delicate task of compromise by favor of his 
sympathetic attachment to the evangelical and biblical writ­
ings as well as to some of the best works of pagan philoso­
phy. Of course, the idea that Christ has long been regarded 
as mystically foreshadowed by the Socratic picture of the 
"just man" in the Republic furnishes him with an initial 
link between the two. But he is chiefly enabled to bring 
them together by his very personal vision of the "divine" 
master whose "divinity" consists for him in what might be 
termed his divine humanity. He overlooks the ascetic and 
militant image of Christ against which he openly rebels in 
the Contract, and throws into relief the deeply human qual­
ities of the Son of man.28 Thus he succeeds in accommo­
dating the wisdom of Christ to humanistic and especially 
Socratic tradition. 
The great virtue of such accommodation for the present 
purpose is that it furnishes valuable analogies to enhance 
our appreciation of Emile and the Contract. Both tradi­
tions are clearly visible in the imaginative and intellectual 
content of the pedagogical novel in particular. In fact, the 
author of the latter openly expresses his admiration for the 
Platonic dialogues, especially the Republic, which he re­
gards as a pedagogical romance. There the chief speaker, 
who is Socrates, tells a "story" about "the education of 
heroes."29 The writer of Emile who tells a similar story is 
steeped in the ancient one. He is also steeped in the Bible, 
to which he repeatedly alludes. Since both abound in figur­
ative imagery, parables, myths, and allegories used to con­
vey thought, it is not surprising that he too has recourse to 
the same visual devices to shadow forth his ideas. In explor­
ing these devices, I shall attempt to disclose the verifiable 
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affinities of the two works under discussion with the Pla­
tonic dialogues and the Scriptures and to establish concrete 
correspondences between these great landmarks of our 
culture. 
Indeed, the imagery of those ancient writings reflected 
in Rousseau provides a useful key to the relationship be­
tween his pedagogical novel and its political appendix. For 
example, in the Republic, to which he compares the two 
books, we have a "pedagogical" and "political" treatise 
together. Socrates' object therein is to portray the nature 
and duty of a good and honorable man, to describe the es­
sence of justice and injustice and their effects upon the soul, 
and to determine the rule of human life so that men may 
know the way of happiness.30 To achieve his purpose, he 
deals at one and the same time with the soul and the city. 
The two are fused into a single vision where the state is used 
as an external image of the inner man. With a view to seeing 
the nature of justice in the individual soul, he looks at it on 
a large scale in the city-state, which is his political ideal as 
it is Rousseau's and where, being magnified, that elusive 
virtue is more clearly seen. He makes no distinction be­
tween the two entities, finding the same principles in both: 
the will, reason, and gainful faculties in man correspond to 
guardians, rulers, and people in the state. "The good and 
true City or State, and the good and true man" are "of the 
same pattern," says he; for cities are made out of the human 
natures in them, and governments vary as men's disposi­
tions xary. Conversely, "as the government is, so will the 
man be."31 Thus Socrates continually reverts to the soul, 
beginning with it and concluding with it. The reason is, he 
explains, that it is better to be ruled by divine wisdom dwel­
ling within ourselves rather than by an external authority. 
But if this cannot be, then we must submit to the latter so 
that we may be all, as far as possible, under the same gov­
ernment, "friends and equals." He observes that such is 
the intention of the law, as seen in the education of chil­
dren, whom it refuses to set free "until we have established 
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in them a principle analogous to the constitution of the 
State, and... have set up in their hearts a guardian and 
ruler (Rousseau would say "sovereign and governor") like 
our own... ," meaning like those of his imaginary city. 
Then they may go their way. In other words, we must es­
tablish a "city within" them to be their own, one that ful­
fills in its ordered beauty the true nature of the soul in her 
original purity. The Socratic man of understanding is 
"statesman and ruler" in that mysterious city whose pat­
tern, we are told, exists nowhere upon earth but is "laid up 
in heaven." Yet he succeeds in fixing his eyes upon it with 
a view to setting in order his own house and his own city 
and living after the manner of the celestial model in private 
and in public life called "politics" and the "warfare" of 
the spirit.32 In the opinion of the Greek sage true educa­
tion must therefore reveal to us "the kingdom of God," 
which is not of this world but lies within us. Christ's teach­
ing has no other object. The author of Emile and the 
Contract could hardly escape the effects of these doc­
trines whose themes and forms turn out to be his own. 
Indeed, in both books he takes up the Socratic and Chris­
tian imagery of the soul and the city. We see this in many a 
passage of each where the nature and constitution of a city 
and a man are compared.33 Occasionally, it is true, he is 
led by the mode of the day to draw a parallel between the 
state and the human body. However, he does so mainly in 
his early article upon political economy, but never in Emile 
and only in a rare passage of the Contract when it suits his 
purpose. This occurs when he wishes to emphasize the dif­
ference between them or where the theme is death and the 
spiritual metaphor is inappropriate for a man like himself 
who believes in a future life.34 The distinction he makes be­
tween the body of a man and the state is that the former is 
the work of nature and the latter the work of art. He had 
shown this in 1756 in a fragment dealing with the state of 
war. There he also says that the body politic, unlike the 
human body, is not limited in size and strength. He says 
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the same thing of the mind and soul in Emile.35 In the past 
most of us, in discussing his similitude of individual and 
state, have simply affirmed or denied that he accepts the 
validity of the "organic" parallel in the Social Contract,36 
but have failed to explain his special use of it. Nor have we 
discerned the Socratic and Christian spiritual metaphor 
that pervades both books throughout. 
In the majority of cases this is the suitable one. In Paul­
ine terms the city is a "mystical body" or, as Rousseau 
says, a rational, moral being. So is the soul. Of course both 
city and soul are based upon men's natural needs and re­
lationships, as he never wearies of reminding us.37 But just 
as a rightly ordered city, in spite of its natural basis, is a 
work of art and not of nature, a creation of reason and not 
of instinct, so is a rightly ordered soul. This explains why 
Rousseau employs quite as much artifice in its formation as 
he does in that of the city. They are as equally "artificial" 
as they are "natural," art being for him a means to fulfill 
nature's purposes in civilized life.38 Like Socrates he poses 
as a sculptor, a painter of constitutions—in fine, an artist. 
His creative artistry is clearly visible in Emile, where we 
shall behold the human soul bearing an image of a celes­
tial city or "order," to which she quite naturally responds 
and which is proposed as a pattern of life upon earth in any 
milieu, even the most disordered. He is also a creative 
artist, though to a lesser degree, in the Contract, which 
possesses the austere beauty of mathematics, closely re­
lated to the antique simplicity of Emile. The beautiful city 
is a counterpart of the beautiful soul.39 It is magnified into 
a faithful likeness of its spiritual prototype who must remain 
true to herself reflected therein and avoid all innovations, 
according to both Rousseau and Socrates. My collation 
serves to bring out this imagery. 
In the light of it, both books turn out to be treatises of 
education or, if we wish, legislation, since all laws are but 
"trifles... of the one great thing, namely education and 
nurture." Moreover, both deal with "politics," or citizen­
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ship, as a Socratic symbol of moral life. And both face the 
problem of spiritual "warfare" created by opposing forces 
within the world of man and outside. These three themes, 
"military tactics, politics, and education" that are the 
"chiefest and noblest subjects" of the Republic,40 are also 
those of Rousseau's two books. The "legislator's" aim 
in both is to discover a reasonable constitution of nature 
in the realm of the soul and of human affairs, and thus to 
bring man into harmony with himself and with the divine 
will manifest in him. As a result Emile turns out to contain 
all the laws of the Rousseauist city of the Contract. As the 
author explains in the former, the hero learns to rule him­
self without external laws and government, which will 
never exist in their "true" form in the objective world. To 
paraphrase a Pauline text favored by Rousseau, he replaces 
the written letter of ordinances carved upon stone by a 
spiritual rule engraved in the heart to release men from the 
external yoke of their "tutor the law"41 
Indeed, he is well aware that he has no alternative but 
to spiritualize his city as his masters did their own. Its only 
hope of realization would be within the precincts of the heart 
through the action of the mind and will, or perhaps within 
the family through a process of outward diffusion. In both 
books he is therefore an explorer of the inner world and of 
human truth rather than a political or pedagogical theorist 
in the strict sense, whatever terminology he uses. That is 
why he places the Contract within the context of the soul 
in Emile. Moreover, even though his imaginary order will 
never materialize as a city in the usual meaning of the word, 
yet for him it still remains the pattern of both public and 
private life, "politics" and "warfare," the life of man and 
the citizen who is natural man in the social and civil state.42 
For the principles at work in the inner world and in external 
conduct must be identical if men are to be consistent with 
themselves. Thus even in an anti-society the hero of Emile 
will live after the manner of the Rousseauist city and no 
other.43 
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This view of Rousseau's two books is confirmed by a 
study of the preface to each. In what, to coin a word, I 
would call the Aemilian one, added at the last minute as 
prefaces usually are, the writer pledges himself to the art 
of forming men. This he calls the first of all public "utili­
ties," using the word not in the usual pragmatic sense but 
in the Socratic one, with all its moral and spiritual over­
tones. In the preface of the Contract he professes to seek 
a lawful and safe rule of administration to govern men. The 
purpose thus defined in both is the same, since "forma­
tion," or education, is a kind of "government" or admin­
istration by law. The point of departure in each case is that 
of Socrates; but it is also that of Christ, who in Rousseau's 
eyes is the archetype of the legislator-educator. To proceed 
with the preface of Emile, the author promises to accom­
plish his purpose by studying the child and his growth to 
manhood and to adopt a method that follows the course of 
nature. In the preface to the appendix he proposes what 
amounts to the same thing, namely, to "take men as they 
are and the laws as they may be." The mode of procedure 
in both cases is Socratic. In the pedagogical preface he adds 
that, although his method is based upon the natural order 
of things, his readers will see in it nothing more than the 
dreams of a visionary. This idea recurs in Emile itself and 
in the Letters from the Mount, where it is also applied to 
the Contract. In the Letters he imagines the novel and its 
appendix relegated, together with the Republic, to the 
land of chimeras.44 Socrates had no illusions either about 
the judgment of his contemporaries who saw in him a "star­
gazer," a "dreamer," and a "visionary." And Christ too 
was so regarded by his own people. Thus in this aspect of 
the Aemilian preface, Rousseau joins company with his 
masters and faces the charges laid against them. He ex­
plains why he takes the risk. It is allegedly because he is 
dealing with principles that determine the happiness or 
misery of the human race. This phrase is repeated in the 
autobiography, where it refers however to the Contract. 
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But, he asks in the same preface—and Socrates raises the 
question too—is his system really impracticable? Of course 
so, he replies, if we try to combine it with existing evil and 
create thereby dangerous inner tensions in man. That is why 
he would, in the familiar evangelical phrase, sweep the 
threshing-floor clean. Socrates does so by clearing the tab­
let of the mind before he begins his task of education. Christ 
likewise warns against putting a patch on our old habitual 
life and evil ways, or pouring the new wine of his wisdom 
into "the old Adam."45 The Rousseauist system is also 
chimerical if the will is weak, says the author of the preface 
to Emile, explaining that the will determines the feasibility 
and success of all spiritual effort. However, he adds, such 
practical applications of the pedagogical art are not his con­
cern in the book, which sets forth an ideal rather than the 
actual conditions of life. The same is true of the Contract, 
which aims to define general principles. Since he is not a 
moralist as he is called,46 he does not deal with practical 
problems and specific cases. But whether his system is 
called feasible or fanciful, he defends it as suited to "men 
as they are"—the criterion in both texts—and well adapted 
to the human heart. These latter words, which occur in the 
Aemilian preface, are used in reference to the Contract in 
the Letters from the Mount and Considerations upon . . . 
Poland.41 The conclusion of the two prefaces is also sim­
ilar, and again recalls Christ and Socrates. It runs thus. 
What he suggests in Emile is "best for men themselves and 
for others too," a constantly recurring preoccupation in 
the Republic** and also reminiscent of the Mosaical and 
Christian "Love thy neighbor as thyself." What he pro­
poses in the Contract is the same: to ally what justice per­
mits with what human interest prescribes. The two prefaces 
prove clearly that in both books Rousseau, like the masters 
of his choice, advocates a system or order of life designed 
to advance and enrich the nature of man and bring human 
beings into a truer communion with each other through the 
practice of justice. And like the same masters he is con­
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vinced that there is only one form of city or soul and that 
is his own. All others are "false." 
In fine, in both prefaces, as in both books, the author 
is asking the same questions that he had posed at the begin­
ning of his career: "Where is wisdom? Where is happi­
ness?" His reply, like Plato's, is essentially an artistic and 
intellectual scheme of man and of the world in its relations 
to human conduct and to the question of justice and inner 
truth. Although that reply has a literal relevancy to the 
problems of politics or pedagogy—an aspect that has been 
repeatedly examined—it also constitutes a whole philo­
sophy of life, a "theory" of reality in the etymological 
sense of "vision." Some critics are beginning to realize 
that Emile at least is more than a pedagogical manual 
and that it is really a framework for philosophical research, 
although, of course, they confine their investigations to 
the development of human nature therein since their pur­
pose is not to study allegorical figures or to trace the con­
sistent parallelism between the novel and its appendix 
and their counterparts in antiquity. In truth, even though 
Emile was begun at the request of a mother, both it and 
the Contract are directed to the same audience as the 
Republic, which has the same theme and object as Rous­
seau's books and is the fruit of the same passion for wis­
dom49 conceived as the knowledge of good and evil. 
That the subject of Emile is indeed wisdom as opposed 
to knowledge in general explains not merely the author's 
delight in the conversation of Socrates and Christ or the 
teaching of Solomon50 but also the anti-intellectual tone of 
numerous passages in the book. Here we are confronted 
with a treatise of education written by an autodidact who, 
like Socrates, professes to be neither a scholar nor a philo­
sopher, although he pretends to be "a friend of truth."51 
Yet he boasts of teaching "the art of being ignorant," 
warns against "the perilous paths of vain knowledge," and 
seems bent upon convincing men that they know nothing at 
all. Moreover, he advises against answering a child's 
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questions and declines to discuss the teaching of reading or 
writing, for he is "ashamed to toy with such trifles in a 
treatise of education." He even declares that he hates 
books and brands them as "the scourge of childhood." 
Furthermore, he considers research in cosmography and 
physics as a form of "amusement," forbears to trace 
courses of study of any kind, and accuses speculative 
learning of preparing men for a "life of contemplation in a 
solitary cell." In fine, he regards only one book as 
indispensable, this being neither Plato nor the Bible but the 
"book of nature." Not that he excludes intellectual toil. 
But that is achieved, if at all, outside the philosophical 
framework. For him real education is not concerned with 
"such trivialities."52 He intimates as much in his prefaces. 
Indeed, in all his work, from his first youthful essays upon 
education53 and earliest Discourse onward, he is concerned 
exclusively with wisdom, the discernment of good and evil, 
as the only key to happiness. This concern underlies the 
intellectual humility he preaches, whether he practices it or 
not. He cites the example of Christ and especially of 
Socrates, the wisest of men who regarded himself as "a 
hesitating inquirer" in the search for wisdom.54 
The litterateur approaching the text of Emile is puzzled 
by its strange proportions. The five component parts vary 
so greatly in length that it appears unbalanced, and es­
pecially by comparison with the author's other works. 
Without speaking of Julie, the six parts of which are sym­
metrical, consider the four parts of the Contract, the 
content of which corresponds to the first four of Emile. 
In the former Rousseau has even been suspected of insert­
ing "irrelevant" material as a pretext for illustration but 
really to balance and "fill out" the treatise.55 In fact, 
balance is quite as significant in a book as it is in a build­
ing, and the arrangement of the inside ought to be visible 
from without. What then does the apparent imbalance of 
Emile mean? There are five parts in the definitive ver­
sion, the first three being relatively short, even the rather 
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longer second one that originally included the first and 
was subsequently divided into two.56 These three parts 
cover the period from birth to fifteen years. Then come 
two massive ones that begin again from birth, but this 
time it is birth into "life," as opposed to "existence." 
The writer even says that everything previously treated 
was merely a preparation for education—presumably what 
Socrates calls the preamble. Indeed, as we shall see, the 
themes of the first three parts are closely related to three 
great "waves" that the Greek sage must overcome before 
he can establish his city. This would suggest an ideolog­
ical reason for the separation of the first two parts and 
the curious formation of the whole. But anyone concerned 
with literary problems as a key to thought must look 
further, especially in view of the very different shape of the 
Contract, which nevertheless has essentially the same 
content according to the promises of the preface. 
As I have said, the two books contain an ideal image 
of the human soul that is the prototype of the Rousseauist 
city. In one the city has the austere shape of a fortress 
or citadel. In the other the kingdom within is conceived 
as a tabernacle or temple of the divinity and is therefore 
designed as such with a triple approach to the main struc­
ture. In Rousseau's words the soul, or rather, the heart, 
that mainspring of the human spirit, is the only true tem­
ple of the Godhead. The imagery is biblical, by analogy 
with the body considered as the temple of the soul and 
consequently of the spirit of God.57 The scriptural figure 
makes the fabric of Emile intelligible. But although the 
temple of the book occasionally recalls the shrine of Solo­
mon or of Justinian, it is basically of Greek design and 
resembles the sanctuary of Apollo at Delphi with its har­
monious natural setting, or else the Parthenon in Athens, 
a vision of ordered beauty amid the disorder of an anti-
society. The first three parts are like the three steps of 
the raised foundation of a Greek temple. In Emile this 
threefold foundation, to which the first three parts of 
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the Contract will be seen to correspond, represents the 
main concepts suggested in the two prefaces: the nature 
of man, its lawful engagement, and the government of 
reason. 
The temple proper of Emile, like that of Delphi or 
Athens, has Ionic elements inside but a Doric exterior, 
comparable in character to the citadel of the Contract. 
Indeed, in the Aemilian temple, as at the Delphic one, 
the Spartans that filled Rousseau with republican fervor 
at the age of six occupy a privileged place. At the thresh­
old of both is inscribed the legend "Know thyself," al­
though in Emile it is gradually transmuted into the Chris­
tian "Forget thyself." The main body of the book is also 
disposed like the Greek shrine. It is split into two unequal 
parts, the second rather smaller than the other. Passing 
through them, we make our way first into the ideal social 
order of the Contract; then into the equivalent civil order, 
which for Rousseau is a source of sanctifying grace and 
where all elements of the appendix are gathered together. 
Both parts, like those of the Greek temple, have three 
naves. And just as the main chamber of the ancient sanc­
tuary contained an image of the godhead in its midst, and 
as Apollo the sun god of Delphi stands in the midst of 
the Republic, so the deity in whose likeness man is made 
occupies a similar place in Emile, in the profession of 
faith of the Savoyard vicar. Before it is a Rousseauist 
version of the Delphic sacrificial hearth where the eternal 
fire burned at the navel of the earth. In the pedagogical 
novel the sacrificial fire is the offering of the soul to the 
divinity by the purification of the passions. And as the 
Pythian oracle spoke from the innermost point of the Del­
phic shrine, so in Emile the oracular "celestial voice" 
of conscience or of law utters the dictates of wisdom in 
the secret places of the soul. Nearby rise two statues 
like those that once surrounded the figure of the god at 
Delphi. They are images of Socrates and Christ who dom­
inate the world of the spirit, a world reflected in the city 
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of the Contract. 
Finally, in the Aemilian temple we are admitted into the 
inner sanctum of the small room beyond, which has no 
corresponding part in the citadel. It is filled with treasures 
and votive offerings consecrated in honor of Sophia, priest­
ess of the soul, as the heroine appears in the book and as she 
was reportedly conceived in its projected sequel.58 The 
Rousseauist tabernacle, like the Delphic shrine of the god 
of light and the Parthenon of Athena-Minerva, is dedicated 
to divine wisdom whose name Sophia bears. At this stage 
in the hero's progress, the force of the emotions transforms 
what seemed like a pagan temple into a Christian church 
dedicated to Saint Sophia. The Parthenon itself underwent 
a similar change in the early Middle Ages before it became 
a mosque. But like it the fabric of Emile remains basic­
ally Greek as the shape suggests. 
There are so many points of contact between Rousseau's 
imagery and the Greek temple that there can be no doubt 
about the pattern of his work, which cannot be overlooked 
in a literary study. Emile heralds the neoclassical move­
ment in art that was already under way when it appeared. 
The movement received impetus from the author's thought 
that impelled France to seek in antiquity a new ideology 
and a new aesthetics through a fresh study of ancient liter­
ature and art. Emile and its appendix are among the most 
significant creations of that trend. 
In my collation I shall follow the writer step by step 
while he constructs the temple or stronghold of the soul or 
city. Thus we shall see that the spiritual shrine of the novel 
is governed from the first by the same principles as the vis­
ionary fortress-like city of the Contract. In the larger work 
these principles are expressed in concrete forms to illustrate 
their nature and interrelationships until they are finally 
merged into a vast synthesis in the fifth part that empha­
sizes the artistic and philosophical unity of the whole and 
accentuates its fundamental idealism. In that part the tem­
ple appears as a living reality, the dwelling-place of Sophia, 
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through the ministry of one in whom we must recognize 
the Rousseauist Levite of Ephraim who finally withdraws 
in favor of the priestess herself. The same idealism is trans­
lated in the Contract into an austere architectural design. 
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All the myths of Emile have their origin in the opening part 
that contains the exposition of the novel and the first foun­
dation of the mythical sanctuary therein.1 However, they 
are subtle and elusive since the writer's artistry always 
remains unostentatious and even deliberately concealed 
until it becomes the quiet handmaid of ideas. His images, 
being quite suited to the task assigned to them, fulfill it 
almost self-effacingly. Yet if we ignore them, the words 
are paradoxical and perplexing. To some extent they must 
be. This is true not only because a certain ambiguity or 
mystery resides in all genuine art, but also because the 
symbols in Emile lend themselves to more than one mean­
ing. They retain their natural, apparently obvious values at 
the same time as they transcend them to burst the bounds of 
literal interpretation and evolve into vast metaphors and 
allegories of much larger significance. The writer provides 
many hints of their presence along the way. However, in 
the more mystifying passages we are required to make that 
"willing suspense of disbelief' for which the poet pleaded 
and defer judgment until all available evidence has been 
pieced together. The main advantage of such effort is that 
in the end it affords a deeper and broader understanding of 
Emile, its appendix, and the sequels to both than might 
otherwise be possible. 
THE SOUL AND THE CITY 
The first pages of the novel have no specific equivalent 
in the appendix. After a brief introduction the book opens, 
like the second Discourse, with a moving dedication to 
the only mother the author ever knew, the city of Geneva, 
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which he always declared to be his model in the Contract. 
Although he had been disenchanted by his birthplace 
since 1754, nevertheless at least until 1762, when that city 
became for him the crudest of stepmothers, she still re­
mained in his mind a symbol of something far more than 
he had actually found there. And so Emile is dedicated 
to a new Geneva existing "in his heart," his own appre­
hension of a "wise order" of things that finally appears 
in the form of the eponymous hero's bride, Sophia. 
In the past, of course, we have interpreted the dedi­
cation only literally, without regard to the litterateur's use 
of art forms. We have identified the mother in the dedica­
tion with another in the first phrase of the preface, the 
"good mother" for whom he began the pedagogical work 
as he says in that text and repeats in Letters from the 
Mount and whom he names in his memoirs as madame de 
Chenonceaux.2 But apart from the fact that the mother in 
the preface is not necessarily the one in the dedication, 
in the first page of Emile she is expanded into a symbol 
extending far beyond the proportions of an individual. 
There is plenty of evidence to support this contention. 
The dedication, incorporated into the substance of the 
book, is introduced by a famous battle cry directed against 
our social or unsocial if not anti-social institutions. It 
reads thus: "Everything is good as it emerges from the 
hands of the creator of things: everything degenerates in 
the hands of man." It is man, we are told, that disfigures 
nature's beauty, especially the soul, which, in the manner 
of Fenelon, Rousseau likens to a frail plant that must be 
lovingly tended. This image, dear to his "masters," recurs 
at intervals throughout the book.3 The plant must be 
hedged about, says he at this point, by the devoted mother, 
whom false laws rob of the authority that is rightfully 
hers. Just when the puzzled reader is beginning to wonder 
what meaning he is attaching to the term mother, he prom­
ises to explain it later. The mystery is less recondite than 
it appears to be. He loves to identify the motherland or 
[38] 
FOUNDATION 
city-state of his dreams with a vigilant and affectionate 
mother and frequently does so in other works, particularly 
political pieces of the 1750s. So do his masters and their 
followers. Take the example of Socrates, who teaches his 
heroes that their country is "their mother and their 
nurse."4 There is also the case of the Christian "Holy 
Mother Church" that in some respects is not unlike Rous­
seau's spiritual city. And so we may, if we choose, expand 
our view and see in the tender mother to whom Emile is 
addressed a new avatar of the Rousseauist city where the 
soul allegedly beholds herself as she really is and where 
the subjective and objective worlds meet in one. The book 
closes in a similar manner, with a sort of divinization of 
woman as the personification of the author's hopes for 
humanity visible in Sophia. 
Before setting forth his aspirations, Rousseau sketches 
a curious image of the so-called zero degree of natural 
human ignorance, reminiscent of Condillac's statue of a 
man possessed only of disconnected sensations.5 It evokes 
an imbecilic creature unacquainted with his own powers 
and their uses and distinguished from a newborn child 
only by size and brute strength. He is therefore not a 
newborn child, nor yet the primitive man of finely trained 
instincts seen in the second Discourse. He is untrained 
and unintegrated man, even though he lives surrounded 
by others. He is therefore the soul of modern man, stripped 
of his seductive trappings. This is the starting point of 
the spiritual ascent that is the theme of Emile. 
Rousseau next visualizes the ascent itself and discovers 
the range of his lofty ambitions in the book. Anyone who 
desires to leave that uncivilized state and make his way 
to the heights has a threefold need. He requires strength 
of faculties and organs; the society of others to teach him 
to use those resources; and enough experience of the world 
to form a mature, discriminating judgment. Now, if he is 
to enjoy the singleness of purpose necessary to progress, 
he must perforce be guided by the first of these, since it 
[39] 
ROUSSEAU'S SOCRATIC AEMILIAN MYTHS 
is regulated by nature and lies beyond the scope of human 
power. He must be governed by the faculties of body and 
soul, which are latent in men at birth and which must 
grow and perform each one its proper function in relation 
to the others, according to the designs of nature herself. 
The author now describes her in the most engaging terms 
that strike an imposing contrast with the picture of the 
solitary brutish creature described above. It is she who 
bids us, untrammeled by false opinion or otherwise im­
peded, select among the objects round about us those that 
are agreeable in the first instance; then those that we deem 
suitable or meaningful for ourselves; and finally those that, 
in our considered judgment, promise us a happiness or 
perfection matching the idea of both furnished by reason. 
This view of nature unfolds before us a vast spiritual and 
aesthetic evolution leading from the lowest instincts to the 
highest intellectual ideals. The author's ultimate goal is to 
minister to the full flowering and fruition of all potential 
faculties. Such are the perspectives suggested to the mind 
by his triple-tiered view of nature's genuine tendencies that 
determine the whole course of Rousseauist education. 
Having disclosed the infinite possibilities within man, 
he then hints in enigmatic terms that they can be fully 
realized only in his own idea of moral order, which corre­
sponds to his own view of social and civil order since the 
one is born of the other. He does so by describing the per­
fect city or moral person of his fancy. But he sets it within 
the framework of contemporary society and immorality 
to provide an impressive contrast between them. 
Thus he begins by denouncing our anti-society that 
molds a man not for himself but for "others" who are 
consequently opposed to himself and embody conflicting 
private interests prevailing in our midst. Like Socrates he 
despises such a society for shaping man to please the shift­
ing tastes and tempers of the motley multitude, as he 
charged in the opening lines of the book. In his eyes a 
forced and false cleavage is thereby fostered between the 
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soul and the semblance of a city, man and the so-called 
citizen, the world of man and the world of men. 
By way of antithesis to this state of affairs, he proceeds 
to define his dream. This freeman of the new Geneva as­
sumes the person of an ancient Roman or Spartan to ex­
pound the inner, moral discipline that his concept of social 
life entails, as opposed to our presumably anti-social ways. 
The ideal Rousseauist moral being is painstakingly shaped 
by the lawful claims of others that are identical with his 
own and alone can call his entire nature into play and 
bring it to full growth. But that "larger growth," as 
Socrates also says,6 is possible only in "a State which is 
suitable to him" and in which he may find and recognize 
himself as he essentially is. This means that the city must 
be patterned after the human soul and become an inte­
grated whole, as closely knit together as its spiritual pro­
totype. In that case it excludes individualist eccentric 
instincts, considered by Rousseau as a perversion of na­
ture but favored as a rule of life by many of his contem­
poraries. In his view, as we have seen, both city and soul 
are fashioned by the processes of art; and infinite skill, 
rather than spontaneous impulse, is necessary to preserve 
the true spirit and aspirations of natural man within the 
fabric of the social and civil order. 
In a fresh antithesis with the ideal, Rousseau looks 
again at contemporary society. Warning anew that instinc­
tive feelings cannot be trusted in a true civil order, he 
shows that if they are, as is the case in actuality, they are 
distorted into egoism and are at variance with the human 
will seen as an expression of nature's highest dispositions. 
The result is that the soul is a kingdom divided against 
itself, belying her own real nature and useless to the world 
as well. In his belief men can no longer be true to them­
selves and at the same time "citizens" of the earthly 
"cities" of their birth. 
The conflict between an anti-society and our true nature 
that ought to find its plenitude in social life creates an 
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abyss between domestic education, such for example as a 
youth might receive in his father's house in some distant 
province, and public education, which is that of public 
opinion in the modern "city." Rousseau deplores the con­
tradiction between the two types of formation, which ought 
ideally to be one. To give an idea of public education as 
it should be, he cites Plato's Republic, paying tribute to 
it in a passage that corresponds harmoniously to another 
in the last part of the book. In what is much more than 
a "passing greeting," as it is still being called, he de­
scribes the great classic as the finest treatise of education 
ever written rather than a political work in the usual sense. 
True, he goes on to say that the type of education of which 
he speaks as exemplified therein is no longer possible. 
But this does not mean that he takes leave of the book or 
his masters. For Socrates says the same thing: until the 
famous republic comes to the birth in objective reality— 
an assumption that has as little political validity as it does 
in the case of the Contract—the system of formation pre­
scribed by the sage must be confined to the inner world or 
"city of just souls." Public education, successful in Sparta 
centuries before the age of the Greek philosophers, who 
took that example for their model as Rousseau himself 
did, was as pernicious and fatal in their time as it was in 
his. Socrates says so, warning continually against the evil 
effects of contemporary opinion incompatible with the 
ideal order he proposes as a spiritual entity. The author 
of Emile heeds the warning. He explains that since, in the 
actual chaotic state of human affairs, there exists and can 
no longer exist in the world of actuality either city or citi­
zen as he has just defined them, public education or the 
education of public opinion is out of the question.7 He is 
therefore unable to have recourse to it to supplement that 
of the home as he does in the idyllic sphere of the Letter 
to d'Alembert or in his work on the government of Poland, 
where he is himself the chosen legislator. According to his 
correspondence, that was the kind of education by which 
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he had profited personally in the city of Geneva, consist­
ing of traditions and maxims handed down from generation 
to generation. He adds that ideally he would favor a form 
of education midway between the Greek-Spartan public 
kind and the monarchic domestic type, combining the edu­
cation of public opinion with that of the family.8 But in 
Emile he is obliged to reject prevailing opinion as false, 
and to resort to "domestic education" exclusively, which 
might turn out to be the kind of self-discipline to which 
Socrates has to resort in the end. In Rousseau's own 
words he proposes to form "natural man" for himself 
alone, that is, to fulfill and consummate his entire nature 
and thereby render him better prepared for life with others 
in their anti-social state than if he were fashioned accord­
ing to their wayward hearts and fitful passions.9 
The tribute to the Republic is only a harbinger of things 
to come. Indeed, there is a constant and consistent paral­
lelism between Rousseau's two works and the Platonic 
dialogue of which he provides a complete personal inter­
pretation. However, the parallelism emerges only from the 
second part onward where he deals with the formation of 
the self-conscious being. Yet the first part of both works 
contains many allusions to the Republic, which, together 
with the Bible, was clearly his vademecum,. 
In undertaking to form natural man for life in our society, 
he describes his task in Socratic terms. He must, he says, 
emulate the pilot who casts anchor in order to hold firm 
and avoid being carried away by the high seas. The image 
conveys an idea of the overwhelming flood of popular 
opinion that he, like another Socrates, is compelled to 
resist. The symbol of the pilot is an ever recurring one 
in the novel and is linked with a famous allegory in the 
Republic, that of the "true pilot" or governor, reason, 
who rules over city and soul and who "must and will be 
the steerer whether other people like it or not."10 Sim­
ilarly Rousseau would stem the tide of prejudice in his 
book by means of reason. He adds the image of the anchor 
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to suggest further that he will do so by having recourse to 
the stability and permanence of basic principles. 
This idea leads to the next. His "natural man" will, 
says he, be formed to endure the good and evil of the 
"human condition" from which none of us is dispensed, 
whatever our rank may be. He confesses that for him 
"natural man" is "abstract man" whose entire being must 
grow and mature in an ever more precise adjustment to 
reality in the pursuit of life's loftiest aims. In other words, 
he proposes to create, in the Socratic manner, an IDEA 
of man corresponding to the IDEA of the city in the 
Contract and sometimes called Socratically the "real" 
one. It is intended as an absolute prototype of which all 
individuals are mere counterparts and, by comparison, 
mere semblances of men, but which as an inextinguish­
able, unalterable essence survives in each one of them. 
For he believes with Montaigne that "each man bears 
within himself the whole form of the human condition." 
Thus he visualizes as the object of his work the human 
self as distinguished from a disordered one. His "man" 
is intended to be timeless and no more a man of his cen­
tury than the portraitist who paints him.11 In him we are 
expected to find a common denominator and a promise 
of fulfillment as we do in humanity or, better still, as the 
Spartan did in Sparta or the Roman did in Rome. Indeed, 
he is later compared to both. Even though he has been 
modernized and christianized, he is reminiscent of the 
generalized man of humanistic art who belongs to a race 
of beings finer than the ones we know, and who is visible 
in the noble archaic statues of Greece or the classical 
carvings of Phideias, the "canon" of Polykleitos or the 
gentle forms of Praxiteles to whom the author of the first 
Discourse pays tribute. Since Socrates compares his "her­
oes" to those serene beings, so unlike the passionate 
souls of Greek tragedy, it is not improbable that his dis­
ciple was thinking of the same sculptures as contrasted 
with Condillac's statue evoked above. Emile is his own 
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"canon." Like the ideal state of nature of the Discourses 
and the ideal city of the Contract, the ideal man of the 
novel portrays a hypothetical state that, even if it never 
existed and even if we can never attain it, is still proposed 
as a criterion for comparison and judgment.12 This por­
trayal, based partly upon abstract reason and partly upon 
observation of our deformities, constitutes the main value 
of the book. 
The author mentioned that he would fashion his model 
by means of domestic or natural education. Resorting to 
artistic methods, he next evolves the symbol of the home 
to express his views about the role of society in man's 
formation, its actual and ideal relationships to the human 
spirit. Significantly enough, it is precisely at this point 
that the Contract joins company with Emile, and the two 
books then proceed according to an identical pattern 
throughout the four parts, the fifth part of the novel being 
a synthesis or culmination of all that precedes. 
The same fifth part, anticipated in the first, throws 
light upon the present context. There family society is 
ideally pictured as a "little city" or homeland, a reflection 
of the political order of the Rousseauist city-state sym­
bolized in the mother whose sanctuary is the home and 
who is therefore the link between the miniature city and 
its larger counterpart.13 This symbol was present in the 
dedication. Family affection, he explains in the end, must 
be the natural ground and motive of all conventional bonds 
and love of state, and that first of all societies is the basis 
of the other, on condition that it is held together as it should 
be, not merely by natural instinct but also by just such 
conventional bonds. That being the case, the city of his 
desires will materialize only if the family is first akin to 
the soul, and results from the happy self-expansion of 
human nature fully consummated by art. He did not think 
so in his earlier years when, under the influence of Soc­
rates, he excluded the family as an educational institution. 
But now he passes beyond his Greek masters and the 
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whole classical world, including his revered Spartans, 
through the profound influence of a Christian ideal of the 
home and family life, conceived as securing and enhancing 
the ancient model of ideal human formation. For in the 
mythical fifth part he allows himself to fancy that the 
"little city" of the family may, if dreams come true as 
they do therein, not merely exteriorize an inner life of ex­
quisite order but also expand beyond its natural bounds 
through some unlikely communion of men of good will 
until the blessed "city" enshrined in the hearts of its free­
men is born. Then that city would be, as it were, an ex­
pansion of the home and of all the sentiments of home, 
its intimacy, dignity, and security translated into unity, 
freedom, and equality. The vision of the last part is anti­
cipated at the juncture we have now reached in the first 
where contemporary actuality is juxtaposed with the ideal 
and belies it. 
There is an abyss between them. The author, contem­
plating what he regards as the shaky foundations of our 
weary world slowly sinking into the mire of human error 
and vanity, suddenly bursts forth in a famous outcry: 
"Civilized man is born, lives and dies in slavery: at his 
birth he is bound in swaddling clothes; at his death he is 
nailed down in a coffin; all his life long he is imprisoned 
by our institutions." These words have a matching pen­
dant in the vigorous beginning of the Contract where 
the subject is defined: "Man is born free and everywhere 
he is in fetters."14 What, asks the writer, could possibly 
justify such a scandalous mutilation of human nature on 
the part of brute force? Yet in the same text he adds that 
in his system there is no question of resorting to force to 
oppose force. On the contrary, says he, he intends to show 
how submission to constraints may be lawful and indeed 
the only way to social order—an orderly life in society— 
that is men's "sacred right" and consummates nature's best 
intentions by means of social conventions. He does so in 
both books. 
[46] 
FOUNDATION 
In actual society, however, submission always appears 
as a form of slavery. It is betokened in the novel by a 
vivid literary image, that of swaddling clothes which al­
legedly impede physical and spiritual growth. Rousseau 
knows full well that this is not the logical place to deal 
with the question, to which he reverts later to treat it in 
its proper sequence. In the present passage he uses the 
"barbarous" custom of swaddling an infant as a concrete 
portrayal of social duress, in a manner somewhat similar 
to Locke, who, however, approves of such constraint as 
protecting rather than increasing the child's weakness.15 
Rousseau is also familiar with an impressive allegory in 
the Republic of a comparable nature. There Socrates, 
who is as I have said the chief speaker, sees men who are 
ignorant and require to be educated as prisoners in a den 
where they are confined from their childhood and have 
their legs and necks chained so that they are unable to 
move or turn their heads toward the light. The metaphor 
in Emile, though more familiar and domestic, is quite as 
effective as the ancient one. It serves to project artistic­
ally the wretched state of those who are victims of both 
ignorance and social oppression. This symbolic interpre­
tation finds support in Rousseau's article on political 
economy where he deplores the condition of men whose 
life and liberty are reportedly at the discretion of power­
ful overlords with the result that they cannot even use 
their own strength to defend themselves. In the same con­
text he protests that the members of a state should be 
treated with the same honor as the limbs of a man's body. 
Here domestic images illustrate political views exactly as 
in Emile.16 
In the latter he pursues further the allegory of the mini­
ature city in its present state of decline. Reflecting upon 
the modern family where the mother is replaced by hire­
lings, he constantly alludes to the larger counterpart of 
the home in the great society. The child's bands, he ob­
serves, are a contrivance of paid nurses whose sole inter­
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est is mercenary and who seek only to spare their own 
pains and live in peace. He says the same of modern laws 
and rulers whose object is the peace that safeguards prop­
erty instead of virtue that is the aegis of the soul.17 He 
adds that nurses resort to the expedient of bands on the 
pretext that an unfettered child may in some way injure 
itself. In a similar vein, in the Letters from the Mount, 
he accuses the despotic Genevan government of fettering 
the nation under the same pretext. The juxtaposition 
of texts gives to Emile a new breadth of meaning hither­
to unsuspected. 
The symbolism becomes more conspicuous as the writer 
proceeds. A true mother, he asserts, does not engage hire­
lings. She nurses her own children, not merely to provide 
them with material sustenance, but to give them the ten­
der care to which their hearts cannot fail to respond 
throughout life. In the article on political economy and 
in various political fragments, he applies the same idea to 
the mother city, "the common mother of her citizens," 
who wins their love by watching over their constitution 
and keeping it intact. She rules their hearts, he says, not 
by indulging their whims for material goods that fix men's 
attachments on inanimate objects, but by devoting her­
self to their entire happiness, which does not come from 
bread alone though they may not live without it.18 Again, 
scenes of private life are used to express a political phil­
osophy as in Emile. 
In the novel he carries forward the theme of maternal 
neglect in phrases with the same political overtones that 
shed further light upon the allegorical scope of the work. 
For example, he says that although mothers have the 
power to transform our world, they never will. Just as he 
said earlier that there no longer exists nor can ever again 
exist city or citizens, so now he mournfully prophesies 
that women will nevermore be mothers and that there 
can be no more children either in the true sense of the 
term, with its connotation of filial devotion present too 
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in his concept of the citizen. He also bewails the oppo­
site excess that makes no less havoc of human life, ma­
ternal overindulgence that forbears to temper the soul by 
plunging it metaphorically in the waters of Styx to make 
it invulnerable. Sparta, of course, was in his view guilty 
of neither of these excesses. Their effect upon the child 
is said to be either tyranny or slavery, both of which grow 
into inhuman passions to starve and stifle the rich resources 
of his nature. 
To make matters worse, says the writer, the woeful re­
sults of the mother's transgressions are intensified by those 
of the father, who, prompted by her example, fails to ful­
fill his office as true teacher. She alone, we are told, pos­
sesses the power to restore him to his duty as educator 
and legislator, or the embodiment of law that begets men 
and citizens. Rousseau warns of the remorse in store for 
the man who fails in his responsibility to train his children 
to be both.19 In fine, he declares that a new order can 
emerge only if both parents watch over the child from birth 
to manhood. Otherwise, in his belief, lawlessness steals 
into all hearts to make its way gradually into conduct 
and undermine at last the foundations of our world. 
This dismal picture of the home is reportedly drawn 
from life and is the antithesis of the myth of the fifth part 
which is reminiscent of the Letter to d'Alembert and Julie. 
It is also the antithesis of a delightful evocation of the 
homeland in the first few chapters of the Considerations 
upon the Government of Poland, SL work in which Rous­
seau displays considerable empirical skill in applying the 
principles of the Contract to a hypothetical constitution 
of Poland. This new tableau, by reflecting every trait of the 
somber one in reverse, underlines the symbolism of the 
home in EmHe as an image of the city, both being an en­
largement of the soul. In the text of the Considerations in 
question, he urges that order in human affairs can be se­
cured against brutish passions only if it reigns supreme 
within the hearts of men who are their own most vigilant 
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watchmen. And it will reign in their hearts most effec­
tively, he says, if it prevails in their homeland and if they 
find in her a good mother who dispenses the simple joys 
of life that can be shared with others. The order and har­
mony he extols would emanate from institutions like those 
of Moses, the Spartan Lycurgus, and the venerable Numa, 
whose laws trained men—as does the ideal father in 
Emile—by creating bonds between them and the home­
land. Such bonds included traditions and burdensome for­
malities that were an inextricable part of the fiber and 
fabric of their lives. Those ancient symbolic usages were 
sanctified by religious associations, by reciprocal devo­
tion and the charm of exclusiveness that set men apart 
and instilled in them a pious concern for the land of home 
as a prime motive in human behavior. That land, says the 
writer, christianizing the ideal with lyrical feeling, is like 
a good and true mother who watches over her children at 
work and at play and never leaves their side from birth 
to death, nursing them as a mother should and winning 
their love for herself and each other. This text with its 
constant but discreet allusions to Emile adds fresh jus­
tification to the broader interpretation of that book openly 
suggested by Rousseau himself in the fifth part. 
The imagery of parental authority in Emile is also So­
cratic, even though the Greek sage excludes the image of 
the family. Speaking of his heroes, the citizens of the re­
public, he refers quite freely throughout the book to their 
country as their "nurse and mother," as I have said. He 
refers just as freely to "their father the law"20 The dif­
ference between the two thinkers is that Rousseau is 
swayed by his emotions and likes to imagine both country 
and laws as a material possibility—however unlikely—in 
his precarious dream of idyllic family life. 
The parallel of the home or family and the homeland or 
city is also developed in the second chapter of the Con­
tract, "Concerning the First Societies." The author re­
flects upon the family as the most ancient of all societies 
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and also the most natural in the sense that it is bound to­
gether by the natural authority of the father, at least dur­
ing the minority of children. But even within the miniature 
city here as in Emile, he sees a father's sway restricted 
to the child's "preservation," which for him is that of the 
human constitution both physical and spiritual, and the 
advancement of what he called in the first chapter men's 
inalienable right to a well-ordered life in society. More­
over, he says clearly what he illustrates later in the novel, 
namely, that at the age of reason children are free, by the 
very nature of man, to pursue that goal for their own best 
advantage and that if they remain subject to the father, 
they do so voluntarily by some solemn though tacit agree­
ment designed for the same purpose. The implication is 
that the father is morally bound by some such engagement 
from the first. The author then draws the obvious analogy: 
"The family is therefore... the first pattern of political 
societies: the ruler is the image of the father and the nation 
is the image of the children, and all born free and equal 
alienate their freedom only for their own good."21 
Rousseau's view of paternal authority prevents him from 
assimilating it to arbitrary monarchic power as many mon­
archists have done.22 He opposes them in the same chap­
ter of the Contract. His conception of a father's rule here 
as in Emile is closer to Socrates' thought and exempli­
fies the divine right of "natural and political law," which 
is that of man's entire constitution and lies at the basis of 
the philosophy of Emile and the Contract, supposedly 
ensuring human freedom. Paternal rule as he sees it has 
nothing in common with absolutism. 
In a half-facetious, half-ironic passage at the end of the 
chapter he makes light of the pretensions of kings and mon­
archists. Since he is himself, so he says, a descendant of 
king Adam and of the emperor Noah, whose sons divided 
the universe among them, he has as much right as anyone 
to claim to be the legitimate monarch of the human race. 
We may infer that every descendant of our common sire 
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is sovereign and king like his father before him. But the 
writer adds that Adam was king of the world, as Robinson 
Crusoe was king of his island, as long as he was the only 
inhabitant. In that case, since he was king not of the race 
he was later to father but of the "world" where there 
was no other inhabitant but himself, he could hardly have 
exercised his kingship beyond the kingdom that lies within. 
We are supposed to conclude that his descendants, if they 
would preserve their birthright, must be rulers of self and 
make as few claims as possible upon others. If they fail 
to observe this discretion and self-discipline, the results 
are presumably such as we have seen in the home: dis­
orders that breed tyranny and slavery first in the soul, then 
in the miniature city, and finally in the larger one. 
According to Rousseau tyranny and slavery in public and 
private life thwart the best aspirations of nature as vis­
ualized in the perfect human pattern of us all. This is the 
theme of the next two chapters of the Contract, "Con­
cerning the Law of the Strongest" and "Concerning 
Slavery." 
The first one, like the whole treatise as he said at the 
outset, is directed against the so-called law of the strong­
est, the law that might is right, which he calls the "estab­
lished one." In the second Discourse too he contends that 
it is the law of our society. He now warns that it is no law 
at all because it frustrates "lawful powers" or faculties 
that a man is morally bound to respect by the very nature 
of his being. To discredit it is also the object of Emile, 
where he rebels against violence masquerading as "jus­
tice" and "subordination" and denounces laws devised 
for the sake of the strong. Socrates' purpose as presented 
in the Republic is the same. The entire book grows out of 
his protest that a truly just man cannot harm others and 
that justice cannot be defined as obedience to laws made 
in the interests of the stronger. This thesis carries him 
through to the end where he shows that such "laws" are 
nothing but lawlessness, and make desire "lord of the 
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soul" so that individual men are robbed and oppressed 
and the best elements in them are enslaved to the worst.23 
Rousseau's chapter on slavery complements the other 
and betrays the same spiritual preoccupations. He begins 
by saying that all lawful authority (excluding none, not 
even a father's) is established through agreements or moral 
engagements. In that case no such authority can be 
founded upon slavery—the basis of the anti-society in the 
second Discourse—since a man of sound mind could 
hardly consent to renounce everything in exchange for 
nothing and live in slavery that divests him even of the 
moral rights and duties belonging to humanity. A state of 
slavery is incompatible with his nature that endows him 
with the freedom of will necessary to morality, thereby 
enabling him to follow his preferences and judgments, 
make moral decisions, and assume responsibility for his 
acts. Rousseau denies that slavery can be lawfully estab­
lished by war as his adversaries said.24 For him a state of 
war cannot exist among persons either in a hypothetical 
primitive condition where there is supposedly no reason 
for enmity or in a true social and moral order where law 
reigns. War, says he, can exist only among "states" or 
ideological entities. And in time of war a "just prince" 
does not rob "individuals" of physical existence or moral 
life, which depends upon freedom, unless they are caught, 
arms in hand, intent on robbing others of the same rights. 
Again he has taken leave of our familiar world where, in 
his opinion, men live in a perpetual state of war. His 
thought is akin to that of Socrates, for whom external 
"warfare" is a symbol of inner conflict. For the Greek 
sage the real problem is that man is at war with himself, the 
selfish desires of individuals within us being at strife with 
spirit and reason called the "guardian" and "just prince" 
of the soul. All faculties are personified. And his treatment 
of "individuals" is similar to that prescribed in the Contract. 
He distinguishes between lawful and lawless ones. The 
former, limited to necessary desires, must be not enslaved 
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or plundered but tamed by reason, and only the latter may 
be constrained by force and dealt with as "barbarians." 
Rousseau's concept of order is similar to the Socratic one 
and proceeds, like the master's, from some solemn commit­
ment that can motivate men to cultivate their superior 
faculties and control the others, bringing all into a single 
harmony through the most attentive self-direction. The 
commitment can be no different from the one to which the 
father is morally bound in Emile as educator of "men and 
citizens." 
A COVENANT OF FRIENDSHIP 
Such an engagement is, in the author's belief, the only 
hope for those who would find happiness amid the vicis­
situdes of life as it is. He proposes the same solution in 
both Emile and the Contract. 
The exposition of the novel leads very gradually to that 
solution. He finally introduces the characters, a governor 
and his disciple. They are not father and son in the biolog­
ical sense in spite of those impassioned words about the 
vocation of a father as the child's true teacher. The gov­
ernor is an ideal creation whose person the author as­
sumes, calling himself Jean-Jacques. In this office he rises 
above himself, like one of the Socratic kings come to life 
at last. Possessed of their sublime virtues, he appears as 
the reason that is friendly to human nature and ministers 
to its needs. Like the same heroes who forgo all gold and 
silver for the sake of the diviner metal within, he takes 
no fee in return for his service. In this respect he also 
resembles the writer's two masters. Socrates despised con­
temporary philosophers for exchanging their wares for 
money, and the evangelical Good Shepherd would not be 
confused with the hireling. Yet the Rousseauist governor 
later seems well enough endowed with this world's goods. 
Small wonder if we are disposed to believe, as we are in­
formed, that he is "more than a man." 
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We are further told that not only must he be formed es­
pecially for the disciple but so must the whole setting of the 
story. Thus the author combines the action of the milieu 
with that of reason to foster and serve human nature. In the 
sphere of "domestic" education, he is characteristically as 
preoccupied with the power of environment as Socrates is. 
The idea that society can make or mar the individual, lead 
him astray or redeem him, always appears in his work as a 
Socratic version of eighteenth-century determinism. It is 
presumably to save men from the fatal influence of con­
temporary life that Jean-Jacques descends from the famous 
republic, or Sparta or Rome or the new Geneva, to bring 
them a safe rule of life and restore them to themselves. But 
he assumes his task as reluctantly as the Socratic kings,25 
for, like them and unlike the monarchs of this world, he is 
aware that kingship is a form of ministry to others. 
His mission is defined in terms that suggest the condi­
tions of success. He will "conduct" a creature of the 
writer's fancy from birth to manhood when, at the end of 
the book, "the law" sets the hero free. The child, who 
remains anonymous in the first version until the third 
part, is now in the definitive version called Emile or 
Aemilius, a name hardly conferred upon him at random, 
for Rousseau was convinced with Plato that the name of 
a thing expresses its nature and may not be arbitrarily 
chosen. In this case it casts light upon the governor's 
intentions. "Emile" means "industrious," but for the 
author it has other associations too. He elsewhere con­
veys his veneration for the "tomb of Cato and the ashes 
of Aemilius," the latter being identified as the son of the 
wise legislator of Rome, Numa Pompilius, from whom the 
family of the Aemilians, illustrious Roman patriots, was 
descended. Emile is to be one of them. The governor's 
purpose is, we are told, best assured if he is as close as 
possible in age to his pupil. Moreover, the latter must be 
his only one and is yet to be born when the book opens. 
This fact assures Jean-Jacques of making a fresh start, to 
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build life anew and avoid the pitfalls of the preface in ac­
cordance with the teachings of Rousseau's masters. The 
Greek sage erases the past and begins with a clean sur­
face by taking only those of ten years of age or younger and 
training them in the habits and laws of his city.26 His 
professed disciple takes even less risk by seeing that Emile 
is trained from birth in the habits and laws of the 
Rousseauist order of things. 
In fact, Jean-Jacques, like the author's masters, aims, we 
are told, to teach nothing but the duties of man, and these 
include those of the citizen as he sees them, even in the 
midst of a chaotic world. This aim is closely allied to that 
of Socrates, who vows, according to the Platonic dialogue, 
to "leave every other kind of knowledge and seek and 
follow one thing only... to learn and discern between 
good and evil." The Greek thinker ponders the effect of 
all worldly goods and natural and acquired gifts upon the 
soul, and selects or excludes them according to their bear­
ing upon justice and virtue. Passages of that kind are akin 
to Rousseau's text. So are similar ones from the Sermon 
on the Mount where the speaker urges his listeners thus: 
"Seek ye first the kingdom of God, and his righteousness; 
and all these things shall be added unto you." The latter 
phrase explains why, in spite of Rousseau's exclusive pre­
occupation with moral rectitude, Emile is in the end cul­
turally enriched beyond the average, although that is not 
the present theme.27 Since Jean-Jacques is, so to speak, the 
leader of his spirit, he is called his "governor," and as 
such he conducts him without instructing him, in accord­
ance with Socratic principles. The term governor is the 
one applied to Socrates' noblest heroes, called philosopher-
kings in the Republic because they embody man's highest 
faculties.28 This fact adds weight to the suspicion that the 
Rousseauist ruler is one of them. The term has the added 
literary advantage of carrying forward the image of the 
pilot. This is the helmsman (gouverneur) who manages 
the helm (gouvernail) and steers the vessel of the soul on 
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its course toward wisdom and happiness. Again he calls 
to mind the true steersman in Socrates' allegory of the 
ship of the soul in the guise of the ship of state, who is 
guided by "the stars" and has the same goal as he has. 
The presentation of Emile follows that of the governor. 
He is natural, abstract man of whom we spoke before, ex­
isting within Jean-Jacques, the author himself, and sup­
posedly in all of us. He is said to possess a "common 
mind" and to be a very ordinary human being, at least at 
first, though not as he grows older and his differing edu­
cation takes effect. Nevertheless, his nature is the well-
favored, felicitous nature of man, instinct with all the 
infinite possibilities of growth glimpsed earlier.29 The habi­
tation chosen for the child contributes to the symbolism of 
the figure. This inhabitant of the earth lives in a tem­
perate zone, preferably in France, which Rousseau twice 
called "the native land of the human race."30 Less under­
standable perhaps than the choice of an abode is the infor­
mation that Emile is rich and highborn. But of course he 
is a king, a descendant of king Adam and, as such, shares 
in the sovereignty and kingship of the soul, though perhaps 
not in the other sovereignty that rightfully belongs to the 
common man, according to the author's persuasions.31 If 
"man is king of the earth," as he is later called, he has 
been divested of that kingship. He has also been defrauded 
of his inheritance of which he nevertheless retains moral 
possession in the book, even though that may not save 
him from starvation. If he also has an inheritance in the 
land of his fathers, as the author says of Emile, it would 
conceivably be that land itself to which, however, he may 
not lay claim. If we interpret the hero's endowments other­
wise, Rousseau seems determined to bestow upon him all 
the privileges that both his masters deemed perilous for 
the conduct of human life. In that case he is resolved to 
make the exercise of spiritual kingship as difficult as pos­
sible. For such is the destiny to which Rousseauist man is 
called, as we have already seen. 
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At this juncture the nature of the curious society of char­
acters is disclosed. Emile is called an "orphan" to indicate 
his rather detached relations to his parents according to 
the flesh, for we soon discover that they are alive.32 
Whether or not he is an orphan in the literal sense is im­
material because he must obey only Jean-Jacques, who is 
gravely invested with all the rights and duties of the sire 
and his spouse. We are informed that this is the governor's 
only "condition." But for a man with Rousseau's ideas 
on slavery, it necessarily implies volition. This implica­
tion is confirmed by the "essential clause" of their as­
sociation specifying that they must never be separated ex­
cept with their own consent. Obedience and consent are 
correlatives. But in the author's conception Jean-Jacques 
and Emile regard themselves as so indivisible as to con­
sider their happiness in life together as an object common 
to them both, providing them with a powerful motive for 
mutual affection and fidelity. The "essential clause" is 
therefore the one and only "clause" of the "treaty" that 
unites them in lifelong friendship. 
The "treaty," as it is specifically termed, gives rise to 
a number of problems. First, what is the real clue to the 
riddle of Emile's orphanhood? Why is Jean-Jacques not 
his father in every sense rather than only spiritually as 
minister of the law? The truth is that the author means to 
accentuate artificial or conventional, social or moral ra­
ther than "natural" ties between them, and to portray in 
a mythical manner his idea of lawful authority, which orig­
inates in a spiritual commitment and not in nature even if 
it fulfills nature's loftiest designs on man's behalf. Some 
recent critics have seen this, but then they explain that 
the governor is thereby freer than the father would be.33 
But this hardly accords with Rousseau's view of paternal 
authority. For him that authority, if it is "lawful," is no 
different from any other. From his standpoint Jean-Jacques 
might well have been the natural father and still served 
the author's purpose. But this would have caused ambi­
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guity, for many thinkers of the time, failing to understand 
the true nature of paternal authority, regarded it as the 
origin and image of monarchic absolutism, as we saw 
above. Consequently he decided in favor of a conventional 
relationship. However, Emile, like Socrates' citizens, 
comes to see himself as bearing a filial kinship to the 
Rousseauist city and its laws visible in the principles and 
powers under whose parental authority he is brought up. 
That is why he and his governor often address one another 
as "father" and "son."34 As for the orphan's "parents," 
they are probably the "semblance of order" and "false 
laws" of his birthplace, in accordance with the same 
Socratic image. 
The "treaty" or "contract" upon which the governor's 
authority is based is that upon which the mythical temple 
of Emile, like any other structure, is to be built. This cov­
enant takes the form of friendship that becomes an impor­
tant leitmotiv in the book to symbolize the contractual 
quality of the union of the two characters.35 Indeed, their 
friendship is called "the most sacred of contracts" and is 
the foundation of the child's religious faith and the source 
of all grace in his life.36 The contract of friendship is also 
the one that unites Socrates' citizens, for whom "friends 
have all things in common" and whom he binds together 
under the guardian and ruler by giving the "wealth or 
power or persons of the one to the others" to create a 
"wise order" in "the greatest of states," however small.37 
The Rousseauist covenant of friendship is the same, al­
though the two have never before been compared. It may 
also be likened to that of the chosen people in the Old 
Testament. For example, Abraham, we are told, became 
God's friend by favor of a "covenant of promise" which 
is the law. The same covenant unites the members of the 
"mystical body" of Christ or society of the church.38 The 
engagement upon which Rousseau's whole novel is based 
is not unlike the sacred promises of Socratic and Judeo-
Christian tradition and envisages an analogous simple, 
[59]

ROUSSEAU'S SOCRATIC AEMILIAN MYTHS 
patriarchal, or evangelical life, comparable to that of his 
imaginary city. 
The comparison is far from inappropriate. There is a 
certain mysticism or religiosity in the Rousseauist or 
Aemilian covenant. Jean-Jacques does not contract with 
Emile as another person, or with Emile's "parents" as 
some of us have supposed in the past.39 There is no evi­
dence at all to that effect. He enters the agreement at 
the moment of his ward's birth. This is a figurative or 
literary way of saying that the child is literally born of 
the covenant and is tacitly committed by his very nature 
to the law of reason that endows him with moral life and is 
indeed the Socratic father that begets him. Likewise the 
author in the person of the governor is morally born of the 
same vow made years before on the way to Vincennes 
and effective at Montmorency. By this vow he means to 
break away from a disordered past. The self that is "more 
than a man," or reasonable will, enters a bond of friend­
ship and agrees to minister to the "Emile" or ideal human 
prototype within himself and presumably within us all.40 
The fact that, as we were told, the two must be as close 
in age as is feasible means that this must occur as early 
as possible. Rousseau contracts with himself under two 
different forms that appeal to the imagination so that the 
characters are essentially though not artistically one. At 
the same time he identifies himself with all mankind and 
presents the story of his own supposed redemption as an 
ideal story of the race, since in his eyes the friendship 
of reason for human nature is the society into which we 
all are born without exception. Thus he proposes to pro­
vide for that self-culture which is the one truly effective 
force in the cultivation of the species, pledging his faith 
to a humanistic ideal whose obligations are mythically il­
lustrated and fulfilled in Emile's education. In doing so, 
he enters into a spiritual communion with what he consid­
ers to be the best leaders of the human conscience, among 
whom he chose Socrates and Christ to be his own. At the 
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same time he intends to "hand down to posterity a 
Rousseauist way of life," as Socrates would phrase it;41 
for in following the teaching of his masters, he fully ap­
propriates it to himself. 
At the end of Emile, Jean-Jacques describes his pledge 
to the hero: "My young friend, when at your birth I took 
you in my arms and called upon the Supreme Being to bear 
witness to the engagement that I dared to contract, and 
vowed to devote my life to your happiness, did I myself 
know what engagement I was assuming? No: I only knew 
that in rendering you happy, I was ensuring my own feli­
city. By making this useful inquiry for your sake, I made 
it common to us both."42 The results of the said inquiry 
are incorporated not merely into a summary of the Con­
tract, which this very passage serves to introduce, but 
especially into the whole of Emile itself, as the wording 
clearly implies. 
In fact, Jean-Jacques' oath in Emile is that of the Social 
Contract, with which it has previously been compared 
but never identified.43 The purpose of the pledge is 
stated in the fifth chapter of the Contract, entitled "That 
It Is Always Necessary to Go Back to a First [or fun­
damental] Covenant." There the author says that a true 
association of men is born of a common unifying interest 
to which they adhere freely by an act of total, unanimous 
commitment.44 This is exemplified by Emile's governor, 
who voluntarily takes as the law of his life what he believes 
to be the interests of human nature, which he regards as 
identical with his own. He thereby works diligently to win 
the conscious consent of Emile until the disciple enters the 
covenant as freely as himself and the two appear as a 
perfectly integrated whole. With the same idea in mind 
Socrates defines his object as the common happiness, 
before formulating the terms of the covenant of friendship.45 
The covenant is the theme of the sixth chapter of the 
Contract, "Concerning the Social Pact." Rousseau begins 
by observing once again that men who live according to 
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instinct find themselves in a state of warfare and that this 
"primitive state can no longer last," for the race would 
perish if it did not change its ways. Many political theorists 
see in his words an evocation of some chaotic prehistoric 
past. They protest that a contract can be effected only in 
civil society and that to use it as an explanation of society is 
to bring forward the effect as an explanation of its cause. 
This is, of course, true. In spite of his imagery, the author is 
not speaking of the past, and that is why he uses the present 
tense. He is referring to what he regards as the primitive 
ways of present-day anti-society and the prevailing state of 
civil war in which men actually live, and suggests a mode of 
deliverance. This interpretation emerges clearly in the light 
of literary symbols and a collation with Emile, which 
contrasts external anarchy with what is meant to be the 
inner harmony of a well-ordered life. 
According to the chapter on the pact, men can "pre­
serve themselves" or ensure the integrity of the human 
constitution by uniting together in peace and friendship 
and combining their strength to protect the person and 
property of everyone; but in so doing, each associate 
must "obey only himself" and remain as free as before. 
This latter stipulation poses a problem. It implies that 
there is a hierarchy within the self—that there is a self 
made to rule and another made to obey, and that their re­
ciprocal action ensures freedom and must not be impeded 
by the proposed union of powers. The solution advocated 
by Rousseau is the social contract. Before defining its 
clauses, he says that they have "perhaps" never been 
enunciated, though of course they have, by Socrates and 
biblical writers. Nevertheless, in actuality they have in 
his view been replaced by the spurious historical contract 
of slavery regarded in the Discourses as the origin of ex­
isting political aggregations. If the lawful one exists, we 
see no trace of it. It is as much a myth as Socrates' "royal 
lie" designed to teach men that their country is their 
mother and their nurse, and that they are all brothers. 
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This famous ancient lie or "audacious fiction"—to which 
I alluded in discussing the symbolism of the family—imme­
diately leads the sage to define his object as the common 
happiness and to formulate the covenant, and is the first 
of three "waves" that he must overcome to found his 
city. The author of the Contract, like that of Emile, having 
approached the pact in the manner of his master, formu­
lates it after the same example. It demands, he says, the 
total commitment of every "associate" with all his rights, 
his person, and his power to the supreme direction of the 
sovereign will in an august communion of the just wherein 
each one consecrates himself to all as an indivisible part 
of the whole. The tempting idea that this is a doctrine of 
"extreme collectivism"46 simply vanishes in a psycholog­
ical interpretation of the book, which its affinity with the 
novel and the Republic requires. It is the doctrine of hu­
manism whereby a man obeys only his own reasonable will 
or human self instead of his senses and passions or those 
of other people. The act of association or Socratic friend­
ship in the Contract, like the one in Emile, gives birth, 
says the writer, to a "moral, collective [or composite] 
body" and endows it with "unity, a sense of self, a life 
and a will of its own." The complex social person, visible 
in Emile in the friendhip of its heroes, is here called a 
"city" or "republic" and "state" or "sovereign power." 
According to Rousseau, the moral person, or active think­
ing being, can alone make men into "citizens" and restore 
them to their rightful "sovereignty," provided they "sub­
ject" themselves to its laws. Thus in the novel Jean-
Jacques as citizen of this mythical society shares in its 
supreme power to whose will he subjects his relationship 
with Emile in order to play the role of a Socratic king 
and to secure man's original constitution by serving the 
true aspirations of nature47 with respect to the human 
person as well as property. 
The seventh chapter of the Contract, "Concerning Sov­
ereignty," contains more abstract reflections that also find 
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an outward equivalent in the society of friends in Emile. 
The author of the chapter shows that the act of associa­
tion or friendship is a reciprocal pledge of the public or 
moral person with private individuals who do not contract 
with one another but with themselves, as members of the 
sovereign toward individuals, and as subjects toward the 
sovereign. If the sovereign is the enlightened will serving 
nature's ends, like the Socratic guardian and ruler, then 
individuals would correspond to individualist desires as 
they do in the Republic. This confirms again the spiri­
tuality of Jean-Jacques' engagement in the novel whereby 
the various elements within him are integrated under the 
rule of the best. The idea is entirely Socratic. 
The author of the Contract says further that, although 
the covenant, including deliberation resulting therefrom, is 
binding upon individuals in their relations to the sovereign, 
it cannot bind the latter to himself and could therefore—at 
least theoretically—be dissolved by him. Consequently, in 
the novel Jean-Jacques, entering the friendship that unites 
him with Emile, acknowledges the freedom to dissolve it 
and thereby makes his act of commitment a truly moral 
one. But the possibility of dissolution is remote since he has 
totally identified his own happiness with Emile's, and 
pursues it as the object of the bond of friendship that he 
uses to vindicate the purposes of human nature as already 
defined. As long as he participates in sovereignty, he 
cannot do otherwise, according to the doctrine of the 
chapter of the Contract under discussion. There we are told 
that since members of the moral body cannot be hurt 
without injury to the whole, the sovereign who by definition 
seeks the latter's advantage can have no interest contrary 
to theirs. Consequently he need give no guarantee of his 
engagements toward "subjects." It is said to be impossible 
that a body would want to harm its own members. We may 
be tempted to question the logic here48 and imagine that the 
sovereign will may indeed choose to harm itself, since in 
the next part of the book we are told that "if it pleases a 
nation to hurt itself, who has the right to prevent it?" But in 
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fact, there is no contradiction between the two texts since a 
nation's "pleasure" is not the sovereign will but the slavish 
caprice of individuals who stray from the pledge to Socratic 
"divine wisdom" in man and jeopardize the welfare of the 
entire moral person and human creature. In the novel such 
caprice is represented as alien to the idealized Jean-
Jacques, who remains true to his role as minister or servant 
of the enlightened will of the society of friends. 
The conclusion of the chapter in the Contract is consis­
tent with his demand for obedience in the novel, a demand 
that is logical enough if indeed, in the words of Socrates, 
"the pilot must steer whether other people like it or not." 
The writer declares that since the "private wills" of "in­
dividuals"—vagrant desires for gain or power—may con­
flict with a man's own will as member of a moral person, 
whoever refuses to obey the latter will be "forced to be 
free." This applies, of course, only to those who choose 
to honor the humanistic commitment. Thus Emile is con­
strained, by the persuasive power of friendship that favors 
his happiness, to obey the reasonable will, born of the 
promise as he, by his nature and destiny, also is. By learn­
ing to obey, he learns to reign in the future kingdom 
within.49 In both texts Rousseau teaches not the divine 
right of the people, as one might think, but the divine right 
of man, for in theory at least he is a genuine humanist. 
The covenant of friendship in Emile presupposes, says 
Jean-Jacques, a "robust constitution." Since he enters 
the engagement before the disciple's birth, the constitution 
must be that of man, the potential powers of nature that 
are activated and fostered by the moral force of friend­
ship, as the strength of the city made in man's image is 
generated and intensified by a union of men. The stipula­
tion of strength leads to a violent diatribe, comparable 
with others in the Discourses, against the art of medicine 
as practiced in contemporary society by charlatanical phy­
sicians. The outburst is inspired as critics are agreed, by 
Socrates in the Republic. The point we have hitherto over­
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looked, however, is that Rousseau's text implies the same 
distinction between the good and bad physician as the an­
cient one, and is quite as symbolic as the other where the 
two are an image of the true and false statesman.50 Phy­
sicians, warns Jean-Jacques, who doctor disease, and are 
therefore imposters, make a man "useless to himself and 
to others," since excessive care of the body makes its 
demands tyrannical, and inimical to the cultivation of the 
soul. Like the Greek sage he would avoid doctors who al­
legedly turn men into cowards and remove them from so­
ciety and their duties. He will permit no such people— 
or philosophers or priests either—"to spoil his work," 
says he, adding that the quest for truth is as fatal as the 
art of medicine. A man who heeds these warnings will, he 
affirms, "live more for himself and for others," a famil­
iar phrase used by Socrates to define his object in the 
Republic, as I have observed. The luminous language of 
this famous passage of Entile betrays the underlying sym­
bolism of the book. The protest against physicians, philo­
sophers, and priests "meddling in his work" shows that 
Jean-Jacques, like both the author's masters, represents 
all three in another, "truer" form, and means to minister 
not to disease but to health of body and soul in the manner 
of the Socratic physician or statesman. His disciple will 
not go abroad for his law or physic, to cite the sage whose 
imagery Rousseau adopts not only here but in the Con­
tract too. In his opinion the true statesman is like a true 
physician and uses the most fundamental ordinance of all, 
that of the covenant, to preserve the human constitution, 
physical and spiritual, implanted in man at his birth and to 
prevent disorders from occurring to overthrow the delicate 
balance of powers. His thought is closely akin to that of 
Socrates in a passage following the oft-quoted diatribe 
and accentuating its symbolic value.51 The sage declares 
that it is only charlatans who go about making and mend­
ing peoples' laws and lives, doctoring and complicating 
disorders; whereas the true physician and statesman makes 
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men sound in body and mind through discipline and aus­
terity of life, and guards against excesses that are the root 
of all evil in soul or city. In Emile Jean-Jacques, like the 
Greek master, undertakes to anticipate maladies of body 
and soul and ensure the robust constitution of faculties 
that is his primary concern. 
With this in mind he transports the child to a country 
retreat at Montmorency village that was the author's own 
refuge from the world and whose simplicity and rusticity 
of character are comparable to those of his ideal city. 
Emile and his governor live there for a dozen years or 
more. Indeed, the setting of the whole work is rural life, 
except for the second half of the third part and the end of 
the fourth. The two friends reside in the cottage of a nurse 
who is intended to typify the blessings of that life still 
possible today. She is described as healthy in body and 
heart, a countrywoman of country-grown habits. At her 
side the "tender plant" springs up in a not unfavorable soil. 
True, we are still in actual society; but its flaws are less 
visible and more readily concealed by the governor, who 
constantly provides against the spectacle of coarseness and 
vulgarity. 
The choice of a rustic scene represents a compromise 
for Rousseau, who is unwilling to withdraw the child al­
together from our familiar world, as many of us in the past 
have thought that he did.52 To paraphrase his preface, the 
good he proposes is here allied, not with existing evil, 
but with whatever traces of beauty and goodness he is able 
to discover in the world about him. His reverence for the 
country and naive faith in its felicitous moral effects are, 
of course, characteristic of the modern spirit. These quali­
ties, which also link him with the pastoral poets of an­
tiquity, distinguish him from his Greek master. Socrates 
had no illusions at all about the country. On the contrary, 
he sends all persons over ten years of age into that unciv­
ilized place which matches their fierce natures, and then 
educates the remainder in his city. Jean-Jacques takes 
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the opposite course with Emile, for whom the country is 
the setting of an image of the Rousseauist city visible in 
the society of the hero and his governor. 
In that simple bucolic scene the hero's life unfolds, much 
as the author's spiritual life unfolded in the same place, 
or so he says. In the book the governor, who has already 
professed to teach only the duties of man and citizen and 
nothing else, is solicitous for both physical strength and 
personal cleanliness, for he sees a moral and spiritual ad­
vantage in bodily health. Accordingly Rousseau protests 
once more, though in a less sweeping symbol, against 
swaddling clothes that trammel both body and soul. He 
would allow the organs and faculties to expand to the full­
ness of their powers as he enacted in the beginning, in 
order that nature's highest purposes may be fulfilled in 
the disposition of human and social life. 
Broaching the story of Emile's evolution, he again vis­
ualizes the spiritual ascent that is the subject of the book 
as it is that of the Contract, and he does so in words that 
are echoed at this point in the latter. His object in the two 
cases is to describe the advantages of the covenant, and 
both texts are evocative of Socratic and Judeo- Christian 
tradition. 
In Emile he proceeds from the aforementioned starting 
point, the monstrous image of unintegrated man, in order 
to trace in his own experience and allegorically in the 
hero's the natural genesis of humanity gradually emerg­
ing from a "primitive state of ignorance and stupidity" 
toward a future full of unlimited possibilities for the liber­
ation and expansion of human powers. In the Contract he 
contemplates the same spiritual ascent at the beginning 
of the penultimate chapter of the first part, "Concerning 
the Civil State." He will show, he says, how a "stupid 
and ignorant animal" may be transformed into an intelli­
gent being, a man, and he uses the language of the novel 
to describe the transition from instinct to morality and 
justice. He imagines how the impulses and appetites of an 
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unintegrated creature are gradually replaced by the voice 
of rights and duties through the counsel of reason guiding 
the inclinations, with the result that human faculties are 
exercised and developed, ideas are expanded, and feelings 
ennobled.53 This is also the theme of the Republic where 
Socrates' heroes are "compelled" to emerge from dark­
ness and imprisonment (that is, ignorance and slavery) in 
an underground den, "reluctantly dragged up a steep and 
rugged ascent," and "forced into the presence of the sun 
himself" in "the upper world." The same theme is also 
biblical, suggestive of the chosen people led from the 
"house of bondage" toward the promised land under the 
guidance of great lawgivers and educators like Moses and 
Christ, whom Rousseau admired as such. 
The idea that integration into a perfect moral and social 
framework can alone save the human constitution is en­
tirely in accordance with the spirit of Rousseau. It is to be 
found even in the second Discourse, which contains the 
famous but enigmatic picture of the serene savage. In that 
work the life of hypothetical natural man in an indigenous 
state is called simply "amoral" and "not unhappy." This is 
in conformity with the Socratic idea that moral powers, 
pictured in the Republic as "soldiers" and "rulers," are 
called into action only to purge an unhealthy state, but not 
at the origins of society. Rousseau has the same idea in the 
Discourse. It must be admitted, of course, that in that work 
man's "amoral" and "not unhappy" condition appears 
idyllic by comparison with the author's tableau of modern 
anti-social and uncivil life wherein people are perpetually 
embroiled in a state of civil war. But in the dedication of 
that work as in Emile and the Contract, we are supposed to 
see how vastly superior to both is the life of natural man in 
the Rousseauist order of wisdom and happiness. 
In the last two chapters of this part of the Contract, 
where the benefits of the covenant are more specifically 
set forth, the author acknowledges the difficulties of the 
projected ascent. In the penultimate one, which I broached 
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above, he warns that progress from the prevailing instinc­
tive state to his ideal order that pretends to preserve in­
tact the spirit of natural man in society is possible only if 
the two advantages implied in the covenant itself are in 
fact assured. They are freedom and property, and are in­
tended to safeguard physical and moral life, which is the 
whole purpose of the pact. He explains that natural free­
dom, which is necessarily limited by an individual's 
strength, must give place to civil liberty exercised under 
the direction of the sovereign will. He adds that the un­
limited right to all a man covets and can get by force and 
first occupancy must be replaced by the ownership of what 
a man really possesses. The question of liberty is han­
dled in this chapter, and property in the next. 
In discussing the value of civil liberty, he observes that 
the civil state also affords moral freedom and that this 
alone makes one really "master of himself," a phrase that 
occurs in the same context of Emile, as we shall see in a 
moment. Moral freedom, he says, is that of one "who 
obeys the law he has prescribed for himself," meaning one 
in whom desire obeys the enlightened will. He calls this 
the "philosophical" or, as we say, psychological meaning 
of the word. But it is really a definition of civil freedom 
in his own city, where a man obeys only himself. In other 
words, the difference between civil and moral liberty is 
that the former would exist in the external world in an im­
aginary and impossible ideal order, whereas the latter 
would obtain exclusively in a just soul or communion of 
just souls and would be the only course open to men in 
our chaotic society. And so he says that moral freedom 
is not his subject in the Contract, where the city is fig­
uratively or allegorically exteriorized. But in the same 
text he implies without any irony whatsoever that such 
freedom may compensate less fortunate men than the free­
men of his city for the loss of both natural and civil lib­
erty too, since in actuality, as he sees it, both forms of 
freedom are replaced by civil servitude. His real preoccu­
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pation is the moral or spiritual liberation of all potential 
faculties that enables men to perform their natural func­
tions, overcome external obstacles, and reach the "rational 
idea of perfection and happiness" proposed at the outset. 
In accordance with these principles, the training of 
Emile's will begins at birth with sensorial education. The 
experience he undergoes is reminiscent of that of Socrates' 
prisoners as they first appear in the lowest sphere of the 
underground den. The Rousseauist governor regulates the 
child's sensations of pleasure and pain with a view to 
preventing him from being fettered by habit or enslaved 
to new and false needs. He thereby follows the recom­
mendations of the author's projected work on Sensitive 
Morality, described in the ninth book of the Confessions. 
He applies these rules to teach Emile to reign as "master 
of himself and "to do his will as soon as he has one," 
fostering in his soul vague notions of the freedom and 
equality of the Aemilian city. Numerous and varied sense 
impressions of objects and animals too are used to make 
him intrepid in the presence of the unknown. The same 
sensations presented in a suitable, logical order also serve 
to cultivate his perceptive powers. For the early educa­
tion of the senses anticipates, however remotely, not only 
the action of will but the exercise of reason too, long before 
either one has begun to wake from the drowsy sleep of 
childhood. 
This education of the receptive and perceptive powers 
is accompanied by an awakening of the child's capacities 
for expression that grow in proportion as his needs 
increase. The delicate question of need brings us to the 
second advantage of the covenant without which the spiri­
tual ascent of both books would be threatened. This is the 
one that safeguards physical life, substituting property, 
regulated by the sovereign will, for the lawlessness of 
desire. Property is the theme of the last chapter of the 
first part of the Contract, which can be best understood 
if it is read in the context of Emile. 
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The chapter on property is entitled "Concerning the 
Real Domain [or Property]," as opposed to the personal 
domain of freedom. It has shocked many of us. The same 
writer who fiercely vilifies private property in the second 
Discourse here gravely discusses it as a right, protected 
by the sovereignty. However, in all fairness we must admit 
that in the Discourse of 1754 he is attacking not the in­
stitution itself but what he considers to be a scandalous 
abuse of it. On the other hand, in the Contract he presents 
it in a fair and noble form, such as might exist in a perfect 
world of perfect beings or in the kingdom within some ex­
alted spirit of well-ordered life. But even if we failed to 
understand the mythical character of his city, we should 
hardly be justified in concluding that he subjects property 
rights to the sovereign or enlightened will for the purpose 
of favoring a tyrannical form of collectivism. The very idea 
is contrary to the spirit of Rousseau and the Contract. 
The property rights he defends are not, as some of us 
might think, based upon the "right" of first occupant au­
thorized by work and cultivation.54 They are based upon 
the needs of life. Indeed, he shows the fallacy of the so-
called right defined above when he says that the sovereign, 
in relation to other states, has no other claim over the ter­
ritory it occupies except that of the first occupant. He 
intimates that this is no claim at all. He explains that it be­
comes one only through the establishment of property in 
its natural form based primarily upon need, a fundamental 
condition illustrated in Entile from the first and supple­
mented later by other conditions, especially work. A key 
passage in the Contract reads: "Every man has a natural 
right to what is necessary to him." Contrary to what we 
have long believed, property is indeed for Rousseau a nat­
ural right if the indispensable qualification is met. He adds 
that the positive act or law that makes a man the proprietor 
of such goods as he needs to live excludes him from all the 
rest. This, he says, is why the right of first occupant is 
honored in civilized society. The reason is that in such an 
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ideal society it is restricted to need. He adds: "The right 
of first occupant cannot be extended beyond need and 
work." In his view the claims of labor without need do not 
suffice. As he says in the second Discourse, why should 
a man appropriate the fruits of his efforts if he exceeds 
his needs at the expense of other people's? In that case the 
human race goes wanting, and men like Emile in the end 
are robbed of a dwelling place on earth and the blessings 
of the soil that nature bestows upon all. In his own city, 
on the other hand, property, based upon a natural right to 
the necessities of life, is subordinate to the sovereign will, 
which ensures the fidelity of subjects to their promises by 
confirming that right as lawful. To make his meaning 
doubly clear, he adds that, if men are in the process of 
forming a union (as in the case of the Aemilian city or 
that of the Contract), then they have a right to occupy 
only the amount of land sufficient to provide for the needs 
of all. He explains that property in this form replaces nat­
ural inequality of strength and intelligence by moral and 
lawful equality. But he admits in a footnote that the cities 
of the earth are otherwise. His meaning is further accen­
tuated when he concludes by saying that the social state 
is advantageous to men only as long as all of them have 
something and no one has too much.55 Thus if property 
provides all men with the necessities of life, he regards 
it as a lawful institution endorsed by the enlightened will. 
So does Socrates, whose heroes are confined to need 
from the first and whose "man of understanding" finally 
regulates his own property to provide against disorder in 
the city within him, such as might arise either from super­
fluity or from want.56 But no nation will ever do likewise, 
and Rousseau knows it. His city is an allegorical one 
meant as a pattern of a harmonious life. Consequently in 
the Contract there is no question at all of distributive 
action on the part of an autocratic state, as one might 
imagine, but only of self-control in a few rare souls. In fine, 
in the matter of property he holds out no hope for the poor 
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and the oppressed, as he does in the case of liberty. Moral 
freedom is possible even under a despotism. So is moral 
equality, which does not, however, prevent a man from 
starving to death. To say this is to anticipate the conclu­
sion of Emile where the hero, faced with a choice between 
freedom of spirit and the needs for which our society al­
legedly makes no provision, chooses liberty as the better 
part and is ready to die for it if he must. 
The principles of the Contract providing for freedom 
and the necessities of life, or Rousseauist property, are 
those of Emile's governor in responding to the child's 
needs. The latter are expressed by cries and gestures, or 
tears if needs go unfulfilled. The author sees tears rather 
than cries of joy as "the first link in the long chain" of 
the social order since it is to the former that men respond 
most readily through pity or sympathy. If that order cor­
responds to the one illustrated in the relations of governor 
and child in the book, then the "chain" is regarded as a 
bond of friendship. Emile is gradually being enmeshed in 
it and prepared for the author's idea of a happily consti­
tuted life that later takes shape as a shrine of the soul 
or fortress of the city. That life is foreshadowed here. 
When the infant feels some need and pleads for help, the 
governor satisfies the need if possible; but if not, he for­
bears to brutalize the child and offend its inborn sense of 
justice or even to act at all, since in his opinion such is 
the way of nature and of order. Moreover, in providing for 
needs, he never exceeds the bounds of physical necessity 
or yields to unreasonable desires that would violate the 
same concept of order even before his ward is aware that 
it exists. He limits himself further by ministering only to 
needs with which the child cannot cope alone. The latter 
is left free to do so, in order that his physical strength 
may be as far as is possible the extent of his desires, and 
his claims upon others reduced to a minimum. These rules 
are elementary applications of what is meant by liberty 
[74] 
FOUNDATION 
and equality in the two chapters of the Contract just 
discussed. 
The governor adheres dispassionately to them even when 
Emile develops facility of speech. Far from being soli­
citous, he attends only to words perfectly articulated and 
corresponding to the restricted realities of a young life. 
In doing so, he continues to confine his action to neces­
sity that gave birth to the Aemilian city and that of the 
Contract. It is likewise the mother of Socrates' "inven­
tion," as the great sage himself says. 
The reader is by now aware of the value of the Republic 
for an understanding of the interrelationship of Rousseau's 
two books. The first part of both contains elements scat­
tered throughout the great classic from the beginning al­
most to the end. The author's description of the ideal city 
in the opening pages of Emile and his tribute to the Pla­
tonic dialogue were priceless clues. But even more reveal­
ing was the imagery! the image of the educator as hus­
bandman and pilot come to the aid of men hampered in 
their growth and frustrated by currents contrary to their 
nature; and the image of the bands from which he frees 
them to place them under the parental care of their mother 
who is the city and their father who is the law. For like 
Socrates, Rousseau in both books is stirred to action by 
"false" laws, made in the interests of the stronger and 
creating tyranny and slavery, and is thereby motivated to 
go in search of the true law of justice. Like the master he 
finds it in the covenant of friendship that frees its par­
ticipants from charlatanical statesmen, portrayed as sham 
physicians and philosophers, and that allows men to live 
for themselves and for others as well. And again like the 
sage he envisages a spiritual ascent made possible by 
that law which bids a man obey his highest faculties and 
confine the desires to bare necessities. 
We are now prepared to move upward to the second part 
of the temple foundation or understructure of the city. As 
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Socrates' prisoners rise from the lowest to the highest of 
four spheres of human knowledge, so do the friends of the 
Aemilian city or freemen of the Contract. And just as 
Emile and its appendix are linked and interlocked in the 
first phase, so they are in the second and its sequels. Both 
works are expressive of the same idealism in personal or 
social life. This parallelism is Rousseau's most powerful 
and eloquent plea against the alleged actual cleavage be­
tween man's inner disposition of himself and the conduct 
of his affairs in social and civil life. The same parallelism 
also brings out the distinguishing mark of Emile where an 
intellectual formula is translated into mythical terms 
through attractive situations and characters that make a 
powerful appeal to the mind through the medium of the 
imagination. 
1. Although Rousseau calls the divisions of Emile and the Contrat social 
"books," I have found it easier to refer to them as "parts" in order to avoid 
ambiguity in my own text. Moreover, since the collation follows the order of 
Rousseau's text, page references to the two works are given only if passages are 
cited out of context. 
2. "Lettres de la montagne," O.C., 3:783. Cf. "Confessions," O.C., 1:409. 
For the dedication to Geneva see "Lettres de la montagne," loc. cit., p. 809. 
3. "Emile," O.C., pp. 245-46, 331 ff., 643. Cf. Fenelon, Les Aventures de 
Telemaque (Liege: Grandmont-Donders, 1865), p. 47. Ulysses, speaking of his 
son, says: "Qu'il soit comme un jeune arbrisseau encore tendre, qu'on plie 
pour le redresser." Cf. The Republic 6. 491-92. Cf. Matt. 13:3 ff.; Luke 6:43-44. 
The opening sentence of Emile quoted above reads: "Tout est bien, sortant 
des mains de l'auteur des choses: tout degen6re entre les mains de l'homme." 
4. The Republic 3. 414; 5. 470; 8. 549. Cf. Rousseau's "Discours sur l'eco­
nomie politique," O.C., 3:258; the fragment "De lapatrie," ibid., p. 534 and 536, 
where he calls the motherland "a tender mother"; and "Considerations," 
ibid., p. 962. 
5. Rousseau alludes to it in "Lettres morales," O.C., 4:1096. 
6. The Republic 6. 496-97. 
7. Yet in his opinion a man must be a citizen: "Emile," pp. 262, 469, 655, 
667, 669, and throughout the fifth part. For the "passing greeting," mentioned 
above, see J.S. Spink in O.C., 4:lxxxiii. 
8. C.C., 5:241-42, letter to Tronchin, 26 November 1758 (reply to Tronchin's 
letter of 13 November, ibid., pp. 219-21). Cf. O.C., 4:xlii-lxxviii, 248 n. 4. 
In "Considerations" he says that public education is possible only for free 
men. He means that in an ideal city, where laws would prevail instead of indi­
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viduals, the education of public opinion could be combined with formation 
within the family since in such a case opinion would be true. But in his view 
this is not so in our society, whose public educational institutions he deplores. 
R. Grimsley suggests that he does so because he was deprived of "regular 
studies": J.-J. Rousseau: A Study in Self-awareness (Cardiff: University of 
Wales Press, 1961), p. 39. 
9. He promised in the preface to do what is best for men themselves and 
others too. 
10. The Republic 6. 488. Cf. "Emile," pp. 251, 440, 489-90, 567, 652. Broome 
is the only critic to remark upon the extent of the image: Rousseau: A Study 
of his Thought (London: Arnold, 1963), pp. 91, 202. 
11. "Emile," pp. 378-79, 459, 550, 762, 860. Rousseau differentiates between 
the natural object (the human constitution as it is organized) and the natural 
means (instinct that cannot be trusted in social life). He distinguishes between 
the instinctive individualist who must be disciplined and the human self which 
is his whole object and which, in the Socratic manner, he calls "divine" or 
"the divine in man." 
12. Cf. d'Alembert's comments on Rousseau in his "Jugement sur la Nouvelle 
Heloise" and "Jugement sur Emile," Oeuvres posthumes (Paris, 1799), 1:121, 
123, 125, 128, 133-34. Cf. Einaudi, The Early Rousseau (Ithaca, N.Y. Cornell 
University Press, 1967), p. 99. See also the preface to the second "Discours." 
Regarding the Greek sculptors mentioned above, Rousseau names two of them 
(Praxiteles and Pheidias) in the first "Discours," O.C., 3:22. 
13. "Emile," pp. 699-700. Cf. dedication of the second "Discours" and the 
text itself in O.C., 3:119-20, 168. For the influence of Christianity on Rousseau's 
view of the family, see "Emile," p. 739. Burgelin sees that the family is a 
little city founded upon a contract and having its own laws and moral code 
but without viewing it as an artistic image of its larger counterpart: O.C., 
4:cl.. 
14. "L'homme est n6 libre, et par-tout il est dans les fers." Cf. Emile: " 
"L'homme civil nait, vit et meurt dans l'esclavage: a sa naissance on le coud 
dans un maillot; a sa mort on le cloue dans une bi6re: tant qu'il garde la figure 
humaine il est enchaine par nos institutions." Broome and Burgelin connect 
the two outbursts: J.H. Broome, op. cit., p. 81; Burgelin, O.C., 4:253 n.3. 
The latter also sees that swaddling clothes are a symbol of human destiny, 
but he expounds the whole passage literally rather than figuratively. 
15. O.C., 3:352 n. 3. (erroneously marked n.2). 
16. Loc. cit., pp. 255-56. For the Socratic allegory see The Republic 7.514. 
17. "Emile," p. 245 n. 
18. "De la patrie," loc. cit., pp. 534-36; "Discours sur l'6conomie poli­
tique," loc. cit., p. 258. 
19. "Emile," pp. 262-63; cf. "Confessions," loc. cit., pp. 357, 415-16, 594-95. 
Cf. C.C., 2, letter to mme de Francueil, 20 April 1751; 9:67-68, 89, 92, letters 
between Rousseau and mme de Luxembourg, 20 July, 7 and 10 August, 1761. 
20. The Republic 7.520; 8. 548, 569; 9.575. 
21. "La famille est done.. . le premier modele des societ6s politiques; le chef 
est l'image du pere, le peuple est l'image des enfans, et tous 6tant n6s 6gaux et 
libres n'alienent leur liberte que pour leur utilite." 
22. "Emile," p. 838; cf. second "Discours," loc. cit., p. 182; cf. "Discours 
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sur l'6conomie politique," loc. cit., pp. 242-43; first version of the "Contrat 
social," pt. 1 chap. 5, pp. 297 ff.; cf. also the definitive version, p. 352 
and nn.4 and 5 (erroneously marked nn.3 and 4). Rousseau's adversaries here 
are, in his view, Grotius, Hobbes, and Aristotle. Burgelin sees that for Rous­
seau the father is bound by a convention from the first: O.C., 4:310 n.3 and 
838 n.2. 
23. See books 1 and 9 in particular. Cf. "Emile," pp. 524-25. 
24. For example, Grotius, Hobbes, Pufendorf. For Socrates' ideas on 
"warfare" described below, see The Republic 5.469-71. Cf. 8.554; 9.571-72, 575. 
25. Cf. Fdnelon, op. cit., 6, 99 and especially 21, 377. 
26. See chapter 1 above and The Republic 3. 405-8; 4. 426; 6. 501; 7. 540. 
For the reference to Aemilius, see "De la patrie," loc. cit., p. 535. For 
Rousseau's interest in names and their meaning see "Essai sur l'origine des 
langues," especially the end of chapter 4. There he refers to Plato's views on 
the subject in the dialogue, the Cratylus. For explanations of the hero's name 
see L.P. Shanks, "A Possible Source for Rousseau's name 'Emile,'" Modern 
Language Notes 17 (April 1927): 243-44; P.D. Jimack, La Genese et la redaction 
de I'Emile de J.-J. Rousseau (Geneva: Institut et musee Voltaire), p. 191; 
and Burgelin in O.C., 4:265 n. 1. Sources suggested are La Bruyere and Plutarch. 
27. The theme is defined in "Emile," pp. 262, 266, 311, 469, 483-84, 550-51, 
654-55, 662, 667, 669, 764. 
28. The Republic 4. 445; 7. 520, 540. The Pleiade editor, who also compares 
Jean-Jacques with the Socartic philosophers, sees him as the embodiment of 
wisdom, of the impersonality of law and reason (4:263 n. 3) or the reasonable 
will (p. 319 n. 2); cf. p. 343 n. 1; see also pp. 362 n. 2, 539 n. 1, 639 n. 1, 652 n. 1, 661 
n. 1, 789 n. 1,866 n. 1. Cf. pp. cxii-cix, cxxvii, cxxx-cxxxi. However, he does not 
distinguish between the governor and the lawgiver as do Plato and Rousseau. Cf. 
Broome, op. cit., p. 95; and Crocker, Rousseau's Social Contract: An Interpre­
tive Essay (Cleveland: Case Western Reserve University Press, 1968), p. 26. 
29. Cf. "Emile," pp. 465, 502-3, 536-37, 665, 794, 832. He is an average 
man, not a genius, though "well born." 
30. "Lettre a m. Philopolis" (1755), O.C, 3:235; and "Les Prisonniers de 
guerre" (1743), O.C, 2:870. 
31. Regarding the kingship of Emile or of man, see "Emile," pp. 423, 458, 
469, 471, 582, 583, 665. For his wealth, p. 691. 
32. See pp. 325-26, 358, 379, 434, 470, 505. 
33. See, for example, O.C, 4:cxxx, 268 n. 1. 
34. See pp. 649, 765, 820, 857, 867; cf. 884, 917 (in "Emile et Sophie"). Cf 
F6nelon, op. cit., pp. 71-72. 
35. "Emile," pp. 522, 539, 639, 648-49, 653, 660-61. 
36. Ibid., p. 520 n. Cf. "Contrat social," pp. 363, 468, where the author 
speaks of the sacredness of the social contract. 
37. The Republic 2. 375-76; 3. 402; 4. 423. There Socrates conceives the 
contract exactly as Rousseau does. 
38. Eph. 2 and 4. For the "covenant of peace" or of "promise" in the Old 
Testament, see Ezek. 34:25; 37:26; Ecclus. 39:11. Cf. Heb. 8:10; 10:16. 
39. See, for example, O.C, 4:lxxxvi-lxxxvii. 
40. Rousseau insists that this agreement—the basis of self-education— 
occur as early as possible. 
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41. The Republic 10. 600. For the identification of Jean-Jacques, Emile, 
and the author, see "Emile," pp. 633-34, 772, 820, 858. The book contains 
many traces of the author's own experiences and anticipates the "Confes­
sions" in pages inspired by his life at Bossey and Turin; his pedestrian expe­
ditions; his joy and disillusionment at Annecy and Chamb6ry; the idyll of the 
Charmettes, however chastened; his tutorships at Lyons and Paris; the Venetian 
interlude; the tragic events of his sojourn in the French capital; and his re­
treat to Montmorency. 
42. "Mon jeune ami, quand a ta naissance je te pris dans mes bras, et 
qu'attestant l'Etre supreme de l'engagement que j'osai contracter, je voiiai mes 
jours au bonheur des tiens, savois-je moi-meme a quoi je m engageois? Non, 
je savois seulement qu'en te rendant heureux j'6tois sur de l'etre. En faisant 
pour toi cette utile recherche je la rendois commune a tous deux" ("Emile," 
pp. 814-15). 
43. See, for example, O.C., 4:649 n. 1. 
44. Rousseau insists upon unanimous commitment, and a unanimous, har­
monious soul or city. Cf. "Contrat social," pt. 4, chap. 2, and "Consid6r­
ations" loc. cit., pp. 440, 996. Cf. "Emile," pp. 839-40. Cf. The Republic 4. 
422-23; 8. 554, where Socrates does the same. 
45. "Emile," pp. 424, 539, 639, 649, 660. Cf. The Republic 4. 419-21. For 
the governor's action on Emiles will, see "Emile," pp. 320-21, 362-63, 651-52, 
661, andcf. 765. 
46. See Vaughan's edition of the Contrat social, p. 128, and of the political 
writings, 1:61 ff. Cf. S. Cotta, "La Position du probleme de la politique chez 
Rousseau," in Etudes sur le Contrat social de J.-J. Rousseau (Paris: Les Belles 
Lettres, 1964), pp. 177-90; Crocker, op. cit., pp. 90-91 and passim. Rousseau's 
"royal lie" has posed a problem for many of us in the past. Incidentally, 
studies on the origin of Rousseau's contract never go back to The Republic. 
Some go back to the Bible however. 
47. It does not and may not violate nature. See "Lettres de la montagne," 
loc. cit., p. 807, and R. Derathe's note 3 on p. 1444. Cf. "Contrat social," 
p. 393. Cf. "Emile," p. 837. The fact that Rousseau really envisages the 
sovereignty of the soul is, of course, visible throughout "Emile," sometimes 
conspicuously. See, for example, pp. 476, 544 and note. 
48. See, for example, Vaughan's edition of the political writings, 1:70 n. 2. 
Cf. "Contrat social," p. 394, and cf. p. 369; also p. 363 n. 2; and "Emile," 
pp. 586, 841. Cf. Crocker, op. cit., pp. 63 ff. One should note that vouloir 
is used in pt. 1, chap. 7, and plaire in pt. 2, chap. 12. 
49. See "Contrat social," pt. 3, chap. 6, p. 411. Cf. Fenelon, op. cit., pp. 25, 89. 
50. O.C., 4:269 n. 3. For the parallel between Rousseau's attack on doctors 
and Plato's, see, for example, ibid., n. 2. The image of the physician-statesman 
recurs in "Contrat social," pt. 1, chap. 3 at end. 
51. The Republic 4. 425-26, and cf. 7. 536; 8. 564, 567. 
52. See, for example, O.C., Pldiade, 4:xciv-xcvi, cv-cvi, cix-cxi, 550 n. 1. 
53. Cf. the language of "Contrat social," pt. 1, chap. 8, p. 364, and "Emile," 
pp. 280 ff. For the evolution of the "intelligent being," see the second "Dis­
cours." Cf. political fragments, O.C., 3:504-5; "Emile," pp. 548-49; "Lettre 
a C. de Beaumont," O.C., 4:936-37. 
54. This has been suggested on the basis of the garden scene in "Emile," 
pt. 2. See O.C., 4:330 n. 1, and cf. 331 n. 1 and 688 n. 2. But the symbols 
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seem to indicate that there the child comes into brutal contact with the disorders 
of actuality, contrasted with the order and justice of the Aemilian city taking 
shape within the soul. See chapter 2 below. 
55. Cf. the second "Discours," loc. cit., pp. 176-80 
56. Regarding "private" property, Socrates removes possession from the 
rule of desire and places it under that of the highest powers. 
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Stylobate 
In Emile and the Social Contract the same meticulous 
preparations are made before the temple or citadel begins 
to take shape. Just as the genesis of both structures can 
be traced to a single commitment, so the foundations of 
both are laid in an identical rigorously disciplined forma­
tion, subject to the same canons or laws for the ultimate 
fulfilment of that engagement. The evolutionary character 
of the Contract, hitherto unrecognized, is heavily empha­
sized in the second part. One of the advantages of a col­
lation with Emile is to accentuate this.1 The term stylobate 
is suited to convey the idea of an evolutionary process, 
and in fact might well be applied to the first three parts 
of both works. It is properly used of the triple-tiered foun­
dation from which the pillars of the Greek temple arise. 
Since it comes from two Greek words meaning "pillar" 
and "to walk," it is suggestive of the stability of eternal 
principles and the progressive dynamic movement of life 
toward their fulfillment. 
The second part of both books is devoted to the rela­
tionship of happiness to wisdom and law. We have not 
previously seen that such is the theme of this part of 
Emile, but a collation of this kind leaves no room for 
doubt on the subject. It shows that there the novel has 
two main divisions and it reveals clearly the real nature of 
each. It proves that the first division sets forth the basic 
principles of Rousseauist education, the virtues to be fos­
tered in the soul and the laws needed to ensure them, and 
it discloses thereby that this section of the book contains 
the substance of the entire second part of the Contract 
and for that reason is necessarily the most theoretical. It 
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proves further that the second division of the same part of 
the novel depicts a type of education governed by the laws 
of the first and calculated to produce the virtues defined 
therein. Indeed, the great value of a collation here is that 
it leads to an understanding of the plan and purpose of 
the pedagogical work at this critical point and a realiza­
tion that the second part of both treatises, and not merely 
the Contract, is in fact the book of the law. 
IN SEARCH OF SOPHIA OR THE LAWS OF WISDOM 
This part of Entile traces the child's development from 
the moment he becomes conscious of his own identity un­
til he reaches the age often or twelve years. When it opens, 
he has just learned to speak and walk, at the cost of a few 
bruises and as many tears that provide lessons in courage. 
As soon as a sense of self awakens, the child becomes a 
moral being capable of happiness or unhappiness, where­
upon Jean-Jacques phrases the familiar questions raised 
repeatedly throughout the book: "What then is human 
wisdom? Where is the path of true happiness?"2 Here as 
in all his work Rousseau links the pursuit of wisdom and 
felicity. The "wisdom" he professes to "love"—these two 
words being English equivalents of "philos sophos" — 
can alone bestow that bounty in his eyes. This means that 
the governor is already in search of "Sophia," or wisdom, 
who is to become the bride of Emile and to whom the 
temple of the soul is dedicated. 
The bliss promised in Emile and the Contract is a state, 
both present and permanent. In the author's opinion, as 
expressed in the novel, to sacrifice the here and now to 
some receding future is as much a travesty of wisdom as 
to jeopardize the future for the sake of somefleeting pleas­
ure of the moment. Hence Emile's governor protests 
against contemporary teachers of youth who fix their eyes 
always on the morrow, crushing boyish spirits with an in­
tolerable yoke of tasks and duties that cast a shadow over 
the lighthearted world of childhood and may turn out to 
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be either useless or harmful. He denounces the "false 
wisdom" of men who ignore the present for the sake of 
what may never be in the event of changing circumstances 
or premature death. On the other hand, he makes it clear 
that the happiness for which he pleads precludes a licen­
tious and spoiled child. Obviously in Emile, as in the ap­
pendix, he envisages the greatest possible felicity that the 
present moment holds in store for the future. 
In his view the nature of happiness depends upon the 
nature of the being destined to enjoy it, which is the 
"Emile" within us or human self more or less intensely 
felt in the hearts of all men. He explains: "Let us not 
forget what suits our human condition. Humanity has its 
place in the order of things; childhood has its place in the 
order of human life; the man must be treated as a man and 
the child as a child. Give to each one his place and keep 
him there. Control human passions according to man's con­
stitution. That is all we can do for his happiness."3 In 
other words, the natural organization of the human con­
stitution and faculties must be respected and taken as the 
boundary of a man's life at each phase in his growth. More 
precisely, the writer exhorts men to restrain desires that 
exceed their real faculties, and are therefore "imaginary" 
or unreasonable, and to maintain a balance between the 
two.4 The object of this rule of conduct is to activate the 
will that matches human powers and is therefore reason­
able, and to give it mastery over the soul so that the latter 
may be "rightly ordered" and "at peace" with itself. For 
such is the author's concept of the normal hierarchy ex­
isting within us. Rousseauist happiness is consequently 
achieved by establishing well-balanced moral relationships 
among the component parts of a man's nature as he evolves 
in the process of formation, thereby bringing him into ever 
closer conformity with the perfect human prototype of us 
all. As we were told in the beginning that felicity demands 
the fulfillment of the natural constitution, taking account of 
the gradual expansion of forces called into play in three 
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successive stages marked respectively by the need for what 
pleases, suits, and perfects us. It connotes a general 
completeness of life—what Socrates calls "the fullness of 
all that life needs"5—regarded as the aim of all true 
education and legislation. 
Yet the author defines happiness here and throughout 
the book with Stoic or Spartan austerity as health, strength, 
and a good conscience, all of which are to be found within 
the self. Fortunately he explains what these ingredients 
entail for one who, in his search for felicity, refuses to 
separate it from wisdom and professes to be concerned 
only with the duties of man. Strength is for him the ability 
to exercise our resources in order to provide for true needs 
without being tormented by useless cravings that ultimately 
lead us far beyond our reach. Health is not simply phy­
sical well-being as "false wisdom" teaches, but moral 
and spiritual well-being as well, including the ability to 
accept pain and death with equanimity by making good use 
of our faculties in dealing with the here and now. In So­
cratic terms it is the institution of a natural order and 
government in the various parts of both body and soul6 
to ensure a well-ordered life in the present that is also a 
promise for the future. As for conscience, he sets the mat­
ter aside for the moment. But the definition of health and 
strength already encompasses man's total being that is nec­
essarily the rampart and rule of his life. 
Using Stoical language, Rousseau calls his rule the 
"harsh law of necessity," as he did in Julie; but, since 
obedience and consent are correlatives, it inevitably leads 
him into a discussion of freedom implied in the defini­
tion of happiness. For harsh though it is, it liberates the 
human will and reason and all human powers necessary 
for the preservation of life both physical and moral. This 
perpetual liberation of the faculties that enables them to 
do what is considered to be their own natural work and 
act harmoniously in constant adjustment to each other un­
impeded by slavish desire is precisely what he means by 
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freedom. The man who does his will, says he, is the one 
who can do it without making claims upon others and 
thereby enjoys freedom, the first of all life's goods without 
which happiness as already defined is impossible. Conse­
quently the author formulates his fundamental principle 
of education, or, if we wish, legislation, in these terms: 
"The really free man wills only what he can do and does 
what he pleases." This maxim anticipates the law of free­
dom that is a correlative of the law of necessity. He adds 
that all other rules flow from it. Of course this must be so, 
since like the other it is the law of the human constitution, 
which for him is that of happiness. It reappears in similar 
words in a defense of the Contract contained in the Letters 
from the Mount, where it is adapted to the city-state, "the 
sovereign nation that wills of its own accord and of its own 
accord performs its will."7 The implication is that such a 
nation is happy. Here as in Emile felicity consists in the 
exercise of freedom of spirit, the free interplay of human 
endowments however confined, employed according to their 
natural hierarchy under the rule of the enlightened will, or 
rather, under the law of necessity. 
Rousseau's obsession with the disciplined human will 
as the secret of wisdom and happiness in the novel is, 
of course, matched in the Social Contract. The impor­
tance attributed to the development of that faculty in the 
child so that he can ultimately participate in moral life is 
reflected in the first three chapters of the analogous part 
of the handbook on citizenship, where the Socratic simili­
tude of city and soul becomes increasingly visible. The 
first chapter contends "that sovereignty is inalienable." 
Since the general will alone, as opposed to wayward de­
sire, can direct the strength of the state toward a common 
happiness, sovereignty, says the author, resides only in 
the exercise of the will thus defined and can never be 
alienated; and the sovereign, who is a composite moral 
being, can be represented only by himself. Power can be 
transferred but not will. He explains why. A "private" 
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will, or that of an individual, naturally has exclusive 
preferences; but the general will always tends to equality, 
since by definition it seeks the happiness of the entire 
moral person in which all parts share alike, according to 
their nature. That happiness is threatened by tendencies 
to partiality that indulge one part at the expense of an­
other. In Rousseau's view such tendencies are fostered 
by the modern political idea of representatives and con­
temporary theories of monarchy that he regards as immoral 
because they deprive the composite person of freedom of 
will and self-mastery. A nation, he concludes, that prom­
ises unconditional obedience loses its moral life and ceases 
to be a nation. In that case it is like the soul of a man who, 
by surrendering his moral freedom, divests himself of inner 
life. For as we have seen, within the composite creation of 
the soul the enlightened will must continually guard against 
individualist desires that would enslave it. The chapter on 
the inalienability of sovereignty is full of spiritual implica­
tions. So is the next one, which is closely related to it and is 
entitled "That the Sovereignty Is Indivisible." Again 
alluding to kings and representatives, he explains that 
sovereignty cannot be divided into individual rights and 
powers, whether they are vested in a single person or body, 
or in several. The reason given is that all powers are 
subordinate to the one they serve to consummate. And 
since that is a moral one, it may not be divided any more 
than it may be alienated, although it may, of course, be 
shared. 
It might be useful to show briefly how these ideas are 
applied in Emile. There sovereignty belongs to the moral 
being formed by the two characters. It is visible in the 
friendship of reason for human nature, which is nothing 
else but the enlightened will. Until Emile's formation is 
complete, the governor enforces that will which favors the 
human constitution and he opposes the private and per­
sonal interests of one or another part that wars against 
it. But the power assigned to him as governor is not for 
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that reason a portion of sovereignty, even though its bearer 
also shares in the supreme authority. It is a ruling power 
used to nurture the sovereign faculty in the disciple and 
bind him to an ideal communion of men who know what 
sovereignty is and how to wield it. 
Rousseau reaffirms his faith in human nature when he 
discusses the object of the will in the next chapter of the 
Contract, entitled "Whether the General Will Can Err." 
He begins by asserting that it is "always right" and always 
aspires to the common happiness, although his ultimate 
intention is to show that unfortunately the deliberations of 
men do not necessarily possess the same rectitude. "We 
always will our good," says he alluding to the supreme 
faculty, "but we do not always see it." In defending man's 
essential integrity, he is not thinking exclusively of distin­
guished spirits consciously pledged to his own city or to 
the pursuit of perfection, an ideal present in mankind in 
varying degrees of intensity. He believes that all men 
without exception naturally will their "good,"8 which is, as 
he has said, what suits the orderly human constitution, its 
powers, their proper functions, and balanced relationships. 
Curiously enough the idea has been translated into the 
doctrine of the natural or spontaneous goodness of man, 
which has, by some strange twist of fate, become associ­
ated with the name of Rousseau. I say "strange" even 
though he obviously rejects the dogma of original sin, 
which, he says, does not explain the sin of Adam. But even 
so, he does not believe in spontaneous goodness. In his 
eyes, as we know, primitive man is amoral, and his modern 
counterpart is immoral and the cause of all evil. It was 
other eighteenth-century authors who imagined that men 
were spontaneously good and needed only to follow their 
instincts to live rightly even in our society.9 Rousseau's 
idea of natural goodness is rather akin to that of Socrates 
and the Stoics, who also teach that moral goodness 
conforms with human nature in its pristine purity, although 
it would be impossible for modern men with their distorted 
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instincts to attain to the fulfillment of the human constitu­
tion without the strenuous and harmonious concurrence of 
all faculties both physical and spiritual and their careful and 
constant adjustment to each other and to the whole. That is 
why the author of Emile begins education by providing for 
the training of the will through the guidance of reason. 
In the chapter of the Contract under consideration 
the threat of capricious desires and illusions is treated 
in the same manner as it is in the novel. According to the 
writer men who naturally will the good are led astray both 
by faulty judgement and the seductions of private affec­
tions. The result is that the general will may conceivably 
not be the will of all. But he is convinced that in the case 
of "citizens," the enlightened will emerges from a conflict 
of personal preferences and passions balanced against 
each other. However, he admits that this would not be so 
in the case of members of disordered states where partial 
interests are collective and can hardly be counterbalanced 
by individuals. Indeed, he warns that such tyrannical ele­
ments, particularly those that are akin to one another, if 
allowed to grow numerous and powerful, soon overthrow 
the moral person. The only solution he feels is to weaken 
their influence by preventing them from uniting with one 
another. In the eighth and ninth books of the Republic 
Socrates utters the same warning against the complicity 
of tyrannical elements in a disordered city or soul and 
proposes the same solution. Moreover, in the case of 
"citizens," he too recommends the ordering and harmon­
izing of irrational principles to release human powers. 
That is the educator's great problem in Emile. 
The chapter just discussed has provoked the wrath of 
Rousseau's critics, and in a sense understandably so. 
They protest that his unanimous, harmonious being is a 
product of intolerance, and they suspect that his real 
purpose is to subdue opponents of majority rule and get 
rid of political parties. However, he does not say that 
he trusts the majority or even unanimity in any society 
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indiscriminately, any more than he would trust good to 
prevail in any man. He made that clear at the beginning 
of the chapter. Of course, he would do so in a well-
ordered city made up of "citizens" of well-ordered life as 
long as they remain true to themselves so that good and 
necessary feelings directed by reason prevail over all 
others. But in a disordered anti-society like ours made up 
mainly of disordered men, he says that the majority would 
inevitably overthrow the moral being, in which case he 
would be intolerant of the multitude and sympathize with 
the wise man who takes refuge from its madness. More­
over, he knows as well as anyone that if his own city were 
indeed a political entity, virtue would be, as Socrates says, 
a matter of habit or necessity, and this he neither expects 
nor desires. He is simply describing an ideal order to be 
taken as a rule of life, and the issues at stake are moral and 
spiritual rather than "political" in the sense in which his 
critics use the term. In the present instance he throws light 
upon the proper or normal organization of the human 
constitution as he sees it and illustrates the action of the 
supreme will for the good that is supposed to foster and 
cultivate simple moderate desires and prevent the others 
from growing. The will can perform this function in a well-
ordered life, but in any other it can hardly tame the wild­
ness of passion. In its action it may well be guilty of 
intolerance. But the intolerance favored is that of a man 
who insists upon allaying inferior elements within himself 
and mastering them in order that they may be ruled by the 
naturally superior ones. Any other interpretation would be 
contrary to the spirit of Rousseau's work. 
To revert to the corresponding context of Emile, he 
there proceeds to wrestle with the problem of the passions 
and illustrates the value of his "fundamental maxim" of 
necessity and freedom to cope with the great plagues of 
tyranny and slavery engendered by them. Returning to the 
themes that inspired him in the beginning, he again de­
nounces the so-called law of the strongest and the warfare 
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that enslaves, and describes each of these within the state 
and the family in accordance with the analogy already 
drawn between them. First, society in its present form 
robs us of our strength and resources by subjecting us 
not to true laws, acts of the sovereign will and our own, 
but to the arbitrary decrees of powerful factions in our 
midst. Likewise, in the little society of the family, parents 
subject to their own petty whims the limited capacities of 
a child who can hardly fend for himself. Second, the great 
society in its present form, instead of taming men's rest­
less impulses, fosters and multiplies them, thereby weak­
ening its victims still more, making them slaves of self 
as well as of others. Similarly, in family society, foolish 
and indulgent parents flatter the caprices of a child, mak­
ing it as dependent as a slave and imperious as a tyrant, 
these being two faces of the same medallion, as we have 
seen. The remedy prescribed is simple enough. Society and 
family alike must ideally obey the fundamental rules of 
necessity and freedom, or the rule of the human constitution 
that nature herself imposes upon all and that alone can 
liberate the faculties. Both institutions must confine their 
services to a minimum, ministering exclusively to the real 
needs of man determined by his place in the order of 
things; and both must demand of him only what is really 
profitable by the same standard. No one, says Rousseau, 
not even the father, has a right to command a child to do 
what is useless to him.10 These rules would make both the 
child and the man dependent only upon the nature of things 
and of human faculties and would thereby release the sov­
ereign will to pursue its lawful end. In the author's view 
if this will were once enshrined in law, it would be armed 
with all the resources liberated with itself and would pre­
vail in both family and state. Only under these conditions, 
says he, can the ordinances of men be made as inflexible 
as the laws of nature that are their proper pattern. Only 
thus can he visualize men enjoying the bounties of a hypo­
thetical state of nature combined with those of social life 
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in the city. These blessings are freedom and morality as 
contrasted with tyranny and slavery, the evils of both 
states to which we are said to be presently exposed.11 The 
passage in Emile shows how he would achieve the pur­
pose of the chapter of the Contract just discussed, namely, 
the gratification of man's natural will for the good, by 
placing legislation and education beyond the reach of 
human or inhuman passions. He himself admits that such 
an enterprise is tantamount to "squaring a circle" and 
quite as realistic.12 Nevertheless, since for him it is the 
only remedy for our woes, he prescribes it as the impos­
sible object toward which all moral effort must be directed. 
He makes the same double plea in favor of freedom and 
morality in the Letters from the Mount and in the Con­
siderations as well as in the Social Contract.13 In the 
Letters in question he pays tribute to a sublime concept 
of liberty and the creative exercise of will. Freedom, says 
he, consists of not being subject to the "will of others" 
that is not also our own and is therefore, by his standard, 
a form of lawlessness. Freedom consists further, says he, 
of forbearing to subject the will of others to our own that 
is not also theirs and is therefore, by the same token, 
equally lawless. From this two-edged definition, intended 
to outlaw tyranny and slavery, he reasons that there can 
be no liberty without justice to safeguard that of all men 
by subjecting them equally to the supreme rule of law. 
Accordingly freedom means obedience to the law and noth­
ing but the law that imposes equal conditions upon all and 
so is burdensome or harmful to none. This is the Aemilian 
law of the nature of things or rather of the human con­
stitution. The man who obeys it makes a virtue of neces­
sity, although in the end the law of necessity is elevated 
into a law of love. 
This dignified concept of freedom recurs in the Consider­
ations on Poland. The author-legislator warns the Poles, 
most of whom lived in slavery, that the laws of freedom 
he enacts are more austere than the yoke of tyrants and 
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are incompatible with slavish passions. Consequently, says 
he, the serfs cannot be freed until they have first been 
"educated," by which he means as usual that they must 
be taught to bear the yoke of true laws. The soul must be 
freed before the body, and then education or legislation 
will make every formal law superfluous. As in the case 
of Emile, the will must be trained before the fully formed 
man can be set free. In both books Doric or Stoic aus­
terity—the rule of necessity entailing as it does that of 
liberty—makes possible the freedom that releases human 
powers and is the essence of happiness. 
Rousseau's double plea on behalf of freedom and mor­
ality in the Contract occurs mainly in the fourth to the 
sixth chapters of the second part. These are key chapters 
in the book and the subject of most controversy. They are 
closely related to his protest against tyranny and slavery 
in Emile. Indeed, at this stage in the progress of his 
thought, the two texts are so conspicuously allied that the 
novelist himself directs the reader to the chapters in ques­
tion, and so the parallelism here is generally recognized. 
The value of a collation appears nowhere more strikingly 
than in the case of critical issues like the integrity of the 
will and the measures proposed to anticipate abuses. 
The object of the fourth chapter, "Concerning the Limits 
of the Sovereign Power," is to guard against the tyranny 
of arbitrary rule. Rousseau begins by reminding us that 
the city—and the same is true of the soul—is a moral 
person, or, if we wish, an active thinking being, whose 
life consists in the union of its members. Its first task is 
therefore, he explains, to preserve itself, its moral life, 
and hence its unity. In Christian terms, to draw a compar­
ison, it must not be a kingdom divided against itself if it 
is to stand firm. Or in Socratic terms it must not be at war 
with itself, but must save its constitution by instituting a 
natural order and harmony in the use of all its parts. To 
fulfill this purpose, according to Rousseau, it must have 
absolute power over them, to move and dispose them in a 
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manner suited to maintain the life and unity of the whole. 
This "will power," directed by the righteous law-giving 
element, bears the name of sovereignty, as he has said. 
His statements, which sound logical enough in the context 
of a collation that brings out the mythical character of 
his city, have surprised many of us in the past, leading us 
to wonder whether he is advocating some form of unruly 
popular absolutism or totalitarianism.14 That would be 
true only in the case of an earthly city or if the idea of 
absolute power were applied to inferior elements producing 
a disordered state that is thereby reduced to slavery and 
is neither moral nor rational nor even a being in the strict 
sense, since it would lack unity, organization, and life. 
The fact is that Rousseau's "absolute" power is far from 
arbitrary. It is circumscribed by the austere limits of the 
sovereign will and human resources, to secure men against 
the tyranny of passion. These limits are the very theme of 
the chapter. Each man, bound by the covenant, must of 
course obey the authority of the enlightened will. But in 
addition he possesses the natural rights of a private indi­
vidual whose claims for freedom, gain, or honor may be vin­
dicated on the condition that they do not violate the orderly 
disposition of the moral being but remain within the bounds 
of simple moderate desires that follow reason.15 Such 
claims are ensured by sovereignty- For the latter—subse­
quently manifested in conscience—is restricted by its own 
object described as "common utility," the "common inter­
est" or happiness of the whole moral entity, and already 
recommended in Emile as a safeguard against tyranny. 
Consequently it may impose upon its subjects no privations 
of strength, wealth, or freedom that are not absolutely nec­
essary or useful for the welfare of the entire moral person, 
and are not demanded of all in common. This rule, which 
determines in practice what the demands may be, reduces 
them to a minimum. Moreover, in the ideal order herein en­
visaged, the same rule ensures that a man who acts on be­
half of others acts also for himself, motivating him to seek 
[93] 
ROUSSEAU'S SOCRATIC AEMILIAN MYTHS 
his happiness in that of the community conceived as a sin­
gle moral entity, or, if we wish, in that of the ideal man in 
whose essence each one of us shares. This proves, at least 
to the author's satisfaction, that equality before the law, 
and the notion of justice produced thereby, derives from 
natural self-interest. In saying so, he has in mind the prom­
ises of the preface, to combine what law permits and what 
interest prescribes so that justice and utility are not divided. 
In his favorite Socratic phrase, he is training men "for 
themselves and for others." He achieves this purpose, ac­
cording to the present chapter, through the equality that the 
covenant establishes among the powers who share in it. An 
act of sovereignty, says he, is an engagement of the moral 
person with all its members but with none in particular, so 
that by submitting they obey only their own will. But the 
sovereign power may not exceed the general agreements re­
lating to the common object, which is by definition a moral 
one. There is no question of tyrannical rule, at least on the 
part of that power which represents superior faculties of 
soul and their natural or normal relationship, whether it is 
shared by a communion of men or embodied in a single man 
who is ruler of self. The message of the chapter is that the 
higher faculties, rather than individualist desires, must de­
cide what is necessary or useful to the whole, since it is de­
sires that give rise to tyranny by exceeding lawful claims. 
The rights that individuals retain in Rousseau's city are 
defined as the advantages of the covenant and are formu­
lated at the end of the chapter, as they were in the previous 
part. They are said to be freedom and the security of 
strength and life, or Rousseauist "property." In the world 
about him as he sees it, these two rights are violated, and 
each man enjoys "natural independence," which, under 
social conditions, entails the power to dispossess others of 
both of them.16 That world is as alien to the city of the 
Contract as it is to the society of friends in Emile where the 
author takes the same precautions to maintain freedom and 
strength by confining his view to what is useful to the en­
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tire moral person and suited to his place in the order of 
things and of human life. 
Not surprisingly, this chapter of the Contract has stirred 
up a "hornet's nest of words." The statement at the begin­
ning about the absolute power of the will over the moral 
person that has brought forth charges of authoritarianism 
and despotism is balanced, in the writer's eyes, by the de­
fense of individual rights that follows. But this only brings 
fresh charges of duplicity upon his head. It must be said 
that, if the text is interpreted positivistically, it is easy to 
create an artificial cleavage between a doctrinaire version 
of Rousseau and the true spirit of his work. But to do so, 
we should be obliged, among other things, to ignore the fact 
that the individual rights he means to protect in his myth­
ical realm are indeed defined in the last paragraph, how­
ever inconsiderable they may seem to our way of thinking. 
If on our part we undertake to defend the existing order 
against his ideal city and champion individualism against 
humanism, we must reply to his charges in that paragraph 
and show that men do not in fact enjoy natural indepen­
dence in our society, or possess the power to harm others 
in their persons or their property. But it is impossible to 
prove this since our world is imperfect actuality. On the 
other hand, he has removed to some Aemilian realm where 
the greatest human attribute is enthroned as sovereign ruler 
to sanction the lawful claims of individuals for freedom and 
security, freedom being the power to exercise each faculty 
according to its proper purpose and security promising only 
the necessities of life and nothing more. His one preoccu­
pation is, as he said at the beginning of the chapter, to save 
the constitution of the moral person, and he is convinced 
that this is possible only if the enlightened will assumes 
command and imposes upon all individual parts one and the 
same obligation to contribute in their own way to that end. 
Before passing from the question of tyranny to that of 
slavery, he discusses the risk of death facing participants 
in the oath of the covenant and tries to show that such risk 
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does not imply either of those evils. He does so in the fifth 
chapter, "Concerning the Right of Life and of Death." Its 
theme, like that of the previous one, forces him to begin by 
recalling the purpose of the engagement. Previously he said 
that the pact envisages the preservation of the moral per­
son. Now he declares that it envisages that of participants. 
If we fail to connect the two statements, we might be 
tempted to infer from the second one that for him as for 
Hobbes17 physical existence takes precedence over free­
dom, even though the latter is in his view the very condition 
of inner life. In point of fact, the sovereign will as guardian 
of the constitution or spiritual being of city and of soul is 
also guardian of all elements integrated into it, including 
subject desires that are, so to speak, its Socratic "main­
tainers." 
In this chapter of the Contract Rousseau considers the 
possibility that men entering such a union may have to die 
for the values to which they are committed, either in war­
fare or as a punishment for crime. By warfare he does not 
mean that which enslaves, as in the previous part, but that 
which frees. He means the warfare of a life dedicated to 
the discipline of the spirit and the pursuit of an ideal com­
munion of soul and of men, for there are supposedly no 
other wars in his city.18 When he comes to deal with the 
death penalty inflicted upon criminals, he says that a male­
factor who betrays the city and makes war upon it must be 
exiled or put to death, not as a "citizen" but as an enemy. 
That is the treatment accorded by Socrates to "barbar­
ians," who typify immoral passions in a passage discussed 
in my previous chapter. If we bear in mind the similitude 
of city and soul, Rousseau's words may be taken as meta­
phorically as those of the Greek master. They may also be 
taken as figuratively as those of Christ about the right eye 
plucked out and the right hand cut off, that one member 
should perish and the entire body be saved. But the mili­
tant spirit of the divine master in the New Testament is 
tempered by a peaceful soul that left a deep and lasting 
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impression upon his modern disciple. Consequently, even 
in the present context the latter does not betray uncom­
promising rigor, as we have sometimes believed.19 On the 
contrary, in his city there are no executioners at all since 
his government is presumed to make them superfluous. The 
writer of Emile goes even further: if in other cities mal­
administration forces men to do wrong in order to live, then 
it is the magistrate or governor who ought to be hanged.20 
But an evangelical spirit of mercy prevails in the end in the 
text of the Contract: "Let us leave these questions to 
the just man who has never faltered and who never stood 
in need of grace." The phrase echoes that of the master: 
"Let him who is without sin cast the first stone." In fine, 
whether he is speaking of the warfare of life within the soul 
or outside, his main concern is the threat of spiritual 
death posed by the slavery of passion. 
In the next chapter of the Contract, "Concerning Law," 
he finally faces the problem of the liberation of the rea­
sonable will from the midst of conflicting interests and 
dubious influences, and its ultimate emergence and conse­
cration as law. This chapter is usually considered to be a 
repetition of the fourth,21 but though interrelated the two 
are as different as the rules of necessity and freedom or the 
two cases contemplated in Emile: fathers may make no 
useless and tyrannical demands upon a child, nor yet 
foster slavish passion in its heart. Likewise in the Contract, 
after a chapter on the limitations of sovereignty comes one 
on the absolute rule of law as the only effective safeguard 
against slavery. 
Law, says the writer, is an expression of the voluntary 
engagements of the moral being and is necessary for the 
conduct of its life, to give it movement and will power to 
translate its integrity into action. The implication is that 
the only alternative is spiritual death. Here as in Emile true 
law is said to conform with the nature of things,22 which is 
that of the constitution or moral person functioning accord­
ing to the Creator's intentions. Consequently Rousseau 
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adds that justice comes from God and emanates from rea­
son alone. In other words, it is derived by reason from the 
nature of the spiritual being and therefore from the divine 
prototype. But, he reflects, if we knew how to receive it 
from that transcendental source, we should require no laws 
at all or government either. Now, to teach the art of dis­
pensing with external ones in the case of both, since in our 
world we shall never have either, is precisely his purpose 
in the handbook on citizenship, designed for the freemen of 
a city that will never be seen. It is also his purpose in 
Emile, as he says in the book itself as well as in his letter 
to the archbishop of Paris. In the end the hero needs nei­
ther external law nor government, which, we are told, are 
necessary only for children or childish men who have 
never been taught. But there as in the present chapter of 
the Contract, the author admits that anyone who obeys 
the laws of justice does so at his own expense, unless pos­
itive enactments, however unworthy they may be of grown 
men, provide a sanction to save him from the lawless pas­
sions of other people, and in the world of actuality that 
will never be. It is only in the spiritual Socratic and Rous­
seauist order that positive laws preserve the complex moral 
person within the natural mold, and they do so only for 
those who choose to enter therein and who are not thereby 
protected from the passions of others in an alien society. 
Unlike some of his contemporaries, Rousseau does not 
even imagine that he can control the anarchist. His "just 
man," Emile, lives in our world where justice is reputedly 
obedience to the law of the strongest, or lawlessness,23 
and where such a man faces the threat of martyrdom ex­
actly as he does in the Republic or in the New Testament. 
The main point of the chapter on law is that, although 
true laws are in the very nature of things and of man, yet 
there is a vast difference between natural law instinctively 
obeyed and moral law based upon a voluntary engagement 
and consciously embraced. The law of reason alone can 
provide against slavery by preserving the proper order and 
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balance of the faculties within the fabric of society where 
instinct cannot be trusted. It proclaims the sovereignty of 
the enlightened will of human beings over the slavish de­
sires of individuals. Consequently Rousseau says that law, 
like the will it expresses, proceeds from the entire moral 
person, upon whom it is equally imposed; for it is simply 
a general principle whose object is as universal as its 
motive. In biblical terms, with the law as with God there 
is no acceptance of persons. In Socratic thought law is the 
spokesman of the divine wisdom of the true philosopher 
that advises about the whole and all its parts and is con­
trasted with the false wisdom of imposters who abuse man­
kind and "make persons instead of things the theme of their 
conversation."24 Rousseau has assimilated the lessons of 
his masters and made them his own. He believes that real 
laws are as impartial as the will of ideal man in the hearts 
of all men, and as impersonal as the mathematical abstrac­
tions of the Contract. He also believes that in a true city 
they alone rule over all, including the governor-prince, 
whose first task is to enforce them upon himself. Being acts 
of the human will, they ensure both justice and freedom of 
spirit, which are the conditions of physical and moral life, 
as we have seen. Indeed, the author's main object in pro­
claiming the absolute rule of law is to defend the rights and 
freedom of the human person within every one of us and 
to teach men the art of self-mastery as security against 
moral slavery. 
In the chapter on law as in the earlier one on the pact, 
which is the first of all laws, the Aemilian city of the Con­
tract is wistfully called a "republic," a word suggestive of 
Plato and Socrates, who apply it to the spiritual city or soul 
governed by law. In Rousseau's view, as we have seen, 
true politico-moral laws exist only in that visionary Soc­
ratic city, in the Bible, or in works like his own. For the 
city to materialize, the body of the nation would have to 
register the acts of its own will for the good, and thereby 
ensure its unity and moral life. But unfortunately individ­
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ual judgments are obscured by "multitudinous desires"— 
the "blind multitude" of undisciplined elements in the soul 
that are like childish men in the city and foster tyranny 
and slavery. Consequently a system of legislation poses 
problems, which are, of course, those of education: "It is 
necessary to show people things such as they must appear, 
to discover for them the right path that they seek, to secure 
them against the seductions of private wills " To ac­
complish this miracle, the author has recourse to a legis­
lator or educator who finds in ancient traditions the remedy 
for the great plagues besetting mankind, and who is, of 
course, himself. 
It is necessary to pause here and dwell upon the rela­
tionship of the Contract and Emile with the Republic, 
where Socrates, as the main speaker, plays the role of 
legislator-educator exactly as Rousseau does in both his 
books. From the part now under discussion to the end, a 
consistent parallelism emerges between Rousseau's works 
and the ten books of the Greek classic. Much of the first 
four of the latter is reflected in the present part of the for­
mer, although the order in which ideas are presented is not 
necessarily the same in each case. In the first book of the 
Republic Socrates too begins by raising the question 
"Where is wisdom? Where is happiness?"; and, convinced 
that both are to be found injustice, he refuses to separate 
them. He starts with a simple definition of happiness sim­
ilar to Rousseau's, defining it as freedom from the passions 
and possession of the necessities of life. Then he too faces 
the problem of justice. Having said that the just man cannot 
harm anyone, he launches forth, like his latter-day disciple, 
on an attack upon contemporary laws of so-called justice 
that cater to the interests of the stronger and lead not to 
happiness but to misery. In the second book he embarks 
upon a search for the laws of true justice that, according 
to him, ensure virtue, strength, and happiness. When his 
listeners protest that in actual society such laws as those 
carry no sanction, with the result that the just man falls 
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a prey to the wicked, he admits it but undertakes to dis­
close the advantages of justice in inner life, these being the 
fulfillment of all the deepest aspirations of the human soul. 
To clarify his meaning, he creates an ideal republic where 
the just man would be happy among his fellows. In doing 
so the master says clearly that his true purpose is to illus­
trate the aforesaid felicitous effects of justice within the 
soul by looking at that virtue on a large scale in the state 
where, being magnified, it is more easily detected. He 
broaches his sketch of that mythical order by saying that 
its origin is need; the real creator of the state is necessity. 
It is only when an interlocutor insists upon exceeding that 
rule and going beyond "the true and healthy constitution of 
the state" that the sage considers the problem of educa­
tion or legislation in order to purge the luxurious one and 
restore it to health,25 whereupon there appears a blessed 
city that no man has ever before beheld, except perhaps in 
its spiritual prototype or Spartan counterpart, if we set aside 
biblical literature. The sketch he makes is closely matched 
in Rousseau's books, and the education he proposes is 
identical with Emile's. He begins by training the "guard­
ians" of his city who embody spirit, akin to Rousseauist 
will. The content and method of their formation—corres­
ponding to Emile's at the end of the present part—is de­
scribed in the second and third books of the Republic. The 
fourth book is that of the law, which is the term I used 
to designate the second part of Rousseau's works. There 
Socrates depicts the character of the moral being that he is 
shaping. In the first half of the book he formulates the laws 
that govern the city and its heroes, and are in fact the 
principles of their life and education. In the second half he 
outlines the virtues begotten in the city and the soul by such 
laws. Rousseau in both his books begins with the laws and 
the virtues they engender, and, although in handling the 
material he inverts Socrates' order, he is profoundly in­
debted to the master. 
For the purpose of explaining the relationship more 
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clearly and Rousseau's use of the aforesaid books in the 
present case, I must recall that the second part of Emile is 
divided into two unmarked sections, and that the first of 
these contains all the material of the pendant part of the 
Contract. We are now in the midst of that section which is 
based mainly upon the fourth book of the Republic, al­
though the author has begun by borrowing fundamental 
principles from the second and third books to which, as I 
have just said, he reverts a little later in Emile. Having 
begun in this way, he then defines the advantages of his 
principles, including the virtues of the moral person that 
are the ultimate goal, and in doing so adheres closely to the 
second half of Plato's fourth book. As we shall see, the 
virtues he preaches—all implied in the rule of the enlight­
ened will—are Socratic. The rest of this section of Emile 
and the corresponding chapters of the Contract formulate 
more specifically the laws of education or legislation that 
are intended to beget his Socratic virtues in the soul and 
the city. And his laws turn out to be no different from those 
of Socrates set forth in the first half of the same Platonic 
book. In the second and last section of the present part of 
Emile, he turns to Plato's second and third books to deal 
with the content and method of the hero's education at this 
stage, designed to enforce the laws and nourish the virtues 
extolled. The education prescribed is exactly the same as 
that of Socrates' guardians in those books to which I shall 
be referring frequently in handling that theme. Such com­
parisons throw into relief the images that evolve in Emile 
once the principles have been clearly set forth in the first 
section now under study. Indeed, this is the most theoret­
ical part of the book, as I have already warned. 
I said above that in defining his principles and the vir­
tues they foster as he has done up to this point in the second 
part of the masterwork and its appendix, Rousseau has at 
no time strayed from the Socratic teachings. I shall elabor­
ate briefly before proceeding. In the second half of Plato's 
fourth book Socrates begins by posing again the familiar 
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questions raised in the opening pages of the Republic: 
"Where is wisdom? Where is happiness?" He finds both 
in a rightly ordered constitution of city or soul. Such a one, 
says he, possesses all the virtues. It is endowed with wis­
dom that advises not about any particular thing but about 
the whole, and considers how it can best deal with itself 
and with others. This knowledge is that of the guardians of 
the city or Socratic spirit that guards the soul: "And so by 
reason of the smallest part or class, and of the knowledge 
which resides in this presiding and ruling part of itself, the 
whole State [and soul], being thus constituted according to 
nature, will be wise. . . ." Moreover, it possesses courage, 
which is fear of nothing but a violation of the law and its 
commands implanted by education. It also has temperance, 
which is the virtue of a man or state that is "master of self," 
and wherein all parts of the moral being are agreed that the 
naturally superior and smaller principle will rule the greater 
mass of the naturally inferior, that the few with moderate 
desires under the guidance of reason will control the meaner 
and manifold desires of the many. Such a man or state also 
exercises justice whereby each class or faculty does one 
thing only, the thing to which each is adapted and as­
signed by nature. By favor of these virtues, says Socrates, 
the soul or the city is "rightly ordered" and "at peace" 
with itself—words quoted textually in Emile.2Q It is, he 
adds, free to act, to provide for its needs and the care of 
its person, and to perform its work in public or in private 
life. It is in a state of health and well-being. Rousseau is 
utterly imbued with these maxims in the work discussed 
in the foregoing pages. He now broaches the question of 
formally defining his laws and their implications in accord­
ance with his fundamental principles, a problem which the 
sage handled first. 
To return to the Contract, as I have said Rousseau is 
himself the lawgiver there as in Emile. The next chapter 
"Concerning the Legislator" brings this out. Admittedly 
he begins by saying that the lawgiver is quite outside the 
[103] 
ROUSSEAU'S SOCRATIC AEMILIAN MYTHS 
constitution of the being he fashions, and shares neither 
in sovereignty nor in government, whereas in Emile he 
shares in both in the guise of Jean-Jacques. But as he fre­
quently does in his writings, he plays more than one role 
in the novel, where, in his function as author, he is in 
truth legislator in his own city as he is in the Contract, 
quite as much as Socrates, who is not visible within the 
pale of the imaginary city of the Republic, is in fact its leg­
islator as he himself says.27 In undertaking this function in 
the Contract, the writer fancies that he is generously 
endowed. For the lawgiver of that book, like the educator-
author of Emile, is theoretically a sage possessed of su­
perior intelligence who knows men and their passions 
without being blinded thereby and who serves the happi­
ness of others hoping to win for himself only the favor of 
generations to come. Indeed, he is "divine" since he pro­
vides a pattern for Emile's governor who, though a mere 
imitator, is himself "more than a man." This "divinity" 
proceeds from the wisdom that Socrates calls the divine in 
man and that Rousseau describes in this very chapter as 
belonging to "the gods" and "sublime." Later by impli­
cation he virtually admits having himself assumed the of­
fice of legislator, for he makes claims attributed to the 
wise lawgiver of the Contract, professing to have taught 
the duties of man for the happiness of others and asking in 
return only the honor he "has a right to expect from 
posterity."28 
His task in the Contract is depicted like that of the edu­
cator in Emile. It is to beget a moral person by transform­
ing the instinctive physical individual into a harmoniously 
organized and highly complex set of disciplined spiritual 
relationships implicate in the cultivated human soul or in 
the city. And the results are the same: a man whose facul­
ties are thus liberated, expanded, and integrated into a 
larger entity or Socratic "single human creature"29 gains 
in strength and perfection, even though the vaster being 
may not be visible to the eyes of flesh. 
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The lawgiver, in performing this task of education, has 
the same limitations as the governor who follows his direc­
tion. He may resort neither to authority nor to reason to 
induce people to accept his laws. Reason, we are told, is 
the end product of his work as it is of the educator's. Ac­
cording to Rousseau, that is why great lawgivers in the 
past, like Moses, Lycurgus, and Numa, have honored 
the"gods" with their own wisdom. If this is a lie, it is a 
Socratic "true lie," since the legislator has already been 
compared with "the gods" and his "divine being" is really 
man's. Through his "sublime reason" the laws of nations 
can allegedly be made as inflexible as those of nature, as the 
author of Emile enacted, so that people "may recognize the 
same power in the formation of man and the city." In the 
light of my collation this last phrase is highly suggestive. It 
implies again that the city is made in the image of the soul. 
As there is a hierarchy in the one, so there is in the other, a 
fact that has surprised some of us in the past. 
In Emile the legislator-educator's laws or rather the au­
thor's are enforced by Jean-Jacques and are used to shape 
a moral being that answers to the Rousseauist city. Since 
those enactments are supposedly in the nature of things, 
which is the rule of life, the child's caprices simply en­
counter physical obstacles or unhappy effects that perform 
the function of law. The author, who is about to frame his 
Socratic ordinances, everywhere betrays the fact that he 
has the master in mind. For example, in recommending 
such stringent asceticism, he suddenly raises a question 
asked and answered by the Greek sage at exactly the same 
point in the argument, just before issuing his laws: Is he not 
defeating his own ends and losing the happiness he covets? 
He denies it, reasoning as follows. A child exposed to a few 
perils that are in the nature of his constitution can at least 
delight in his freedom. In any case, he could hardly find 
contentment outside his nature. Besides, if his weaknesses 
prove painful, they have the advantage of nurturing compas­
sion in the heart. Moreover, they do not cause misery 
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unless they are accompanied by insatiate and insensate 
desires that also alienate others. These statements 
contain the substance of Socrates' reply to the same ques­
tion: the happiness contemplated is not the gratification of 
one or another of the faculties but the welfare of the entire 
human creature or composite being. The author of Emile 
agrees that this is attainable only under the laws of its 
constitution, whose rule serves to control the disorders of 
children and parents, too, to save young persons from 
slavery and tyranny in themselves or in others, and to 
postpone for them the yoke of existing civil bondage. His 
discussion about the disciple's happiness is equivalent to 
that of Socrates at the same stage.30 
So is another such discussion in a chapter of the Contract 
where he reverts to the question of happiness but which I 
must examine a little later. It is preceded by three others 
wherein he defines his laws. Now, since their content be­
longs to a train of thought that runs through the following 
pages of Emile, I shall proceed with the latter. The theme 
is the nature of the laws, which is, of course, the nature of 
the being who is led toward wisdom and happiness by their 
persuasive power. 
As we know, Rousseau's only motive in the novel is to 
teach the laws that are intended to mold the soul and myth­
ical city, or, as he said at the outset, to teach the duties of 
man and citizen. His laws, like those of Socrates, are really 
all one and the same, that being the law of the natural 
constitution. He begins by showing how the law of neces­
sity, already formulated, takes the place of the laws of rea­
son, which the child cannot know.31 But these laws that 
constitute the whole of education and that Emile con­
sciously embraces much later are really no different from 
the other since, in the author's opinion, true laws spring 
from necessity or need. However, at this stage he advises 
against reasoning about them since in his Socratic view the 
training of will takes precedence over that of a supposedly 
dormant reason. Consequently, his entire discussion of 
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law in the novel assumes the form of a protest against the 
use of reason to teach duties. Until the age of reason the 
child in the book, thanks to the governor's precautions, 
knows only necessity, impossibility, and constraint. In 
other words, he is made aware only of the physical world, 
and his virtue is a matter of necessity. In this context as 
well as in the Contract, Rousseau agrees with Socrates, 
that if children or nations either understood the language 
of reason, they would need neither education nor legisla­
tion to rule their lives. In Emile he also concludes with the 
master that to know good and evil, to feel the reason for a 
man's duties, is the study of a sage, not of a child of ten.32 
A governor who is imprudent enough to reason with the 
latter must, we are told, resort in the end to threats or 
bribes that only encourage deceit. "The laws," says the 
author significantly, "use the same constraint with grown 
men." But he explains that such men are "children spoiled 
by education," for "the sage needs no laws." The child 
who is to become that sage is simply kept in the place to 
which his weakness and ignorance assign him. He submits 
happily to necessity, to the force of things as they are, 
which is the rule of law in the Contract being "engraved 
on the heart" and mind.33 
Rousseau's second law—called "the greatest, most im­
portant and most useful rule"—is that of so-called negative 
education, which is really that of freedom and implies the 
doctrine of natural goodness.34 Expounding that doctrine, 
he sees men endowed with a single natural feeling, self-
love, that is good and useful in its original form. However, 
since in his view vicious habits and prejudices easily take 
root in what he calls the most dangerous interval of human 
life, from birth to the age of twelve, he has recourse to the 
principle of "negative education" that replaces instruction 
on the governor's part by strong negative action designed 
to secure the heart and mind against taint or flaw from 
without. But this principle has a positive value since it pro­
vides at the same time for the exercise of freedom, for the 
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natural growth of the future ministrants of reason, the 
body, organs, senses, and strength, while the action of the 
governor's reason keeps the feelings in check. The law of 
negative education is indeed that of freedom and has re­
sults as positive as the governor's ministry, which, how­
ever, is invisible to the child. 
This law leads to the enactment of a third. Education 
must be adapted to the child's particular character or cast 
of mind, which must therefore be studied before any at­
tempt is made to train it. Here Rousseau is mindful of 
Socrates' advice about the importance of finding out "the 
natural bent."35 The author of Emile professes to em­
ulate the wise physician, who probes his patient's temper­
ament before prescribing treatment. Again the image of 
the true physician, dear to both his masters, recurs.36 In 
that guise Jean-Jacques appears in the novel as the custo­
dian of the laws of wisdom. 
These deliberations of Emile are reflected in the afore­
said chapters of the Contract, all three bearing the same 
title: "Concerning the Nation." They are the eighth, ninth, 
and tenth chapters of the second part that contain a defini­
tion of the laws determined by the nature of the nation to be 
governed by them. Hence their title. These chapters have 
in the past been judged irrelevant.37 Yet their enormous 
value rises to the surface in a collation with Emile and 
comparison with the Republic. To dispense with them is 
to dispense with the author's laws, which are the same as 
they are in the novel although the order is reversed. 
In framing the laws of the Contract, he actually invites 
an analogy with Emile by drawing parallels between a man 
about to be educated and a nation about to receive a sys­
tem of legislation. For instance, in the first of the three 
chapters he says that nations like men are docile to law 
only when they are young, before evil customs and preju­
dices become so deep-rooted that people cannot bear the 
physician to treat their afflictions. Again the favored image 
recurs and in the same context as in Emile. The writer of 
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the Contract adds that a nation must possess the vigor and 
health of youth if its laws are to obtain any hold upon the 
heart. And yet he warns that the wise lawgiver or physician 
must not be in haste, as he said of the educator. Like the 
latter the legislator too must take time to prepare the 
ground first and examine the character or natural aptitudes 
of the nation that is to be disciplined, for "there is for na­
tions as for men a time of maturity that one must await be­
fore giving laws." By this he means positive ones as opposed 
to negative, since natural aptitude is itself a law and can be 
observed through the period of waiting and watching or 
negative formation that is also a law in both books and not 
merely in Emile. The author of the Contract himself sug­
gests the comparison with the law of negative education in 
the novel when he adds that a ruler who fails to exercise 
the restraint recommended is "like a French tutor who 
trains his pupil to shine a moment in childhood and then to 
be nothing at all forever afterward." 
In the next chapter Rousseau carries on the analogy of a 
nation and a man, for both of whom the best constitution 
or finest formation is not that of nature's vagaries, like 
giants or dwarfs, but rather the natural canon or standard. 
Weighing the comparative disadvantages of gigantic na­
tions and small cities, he still favors the city-state in the 
belief that it can develop resources to maintain itself 
against attacks from without by fostering a healthy and ro­
bust natural constitution that is well-governed, one with 
itself and united. In other words, it enjoys freedom. That 
is the very purpose of the negative formation prescribed. 
The third in the sequence of chapters is just as clearly 
patterned after his view of the laws in Emile. In it he is 
concerned with finding a suitable proportion between the 
wealth of a city, its property so to speak, and the number 
of its inhabitants. The land must suffice to support them, 
and they must be as numerous as it can sustain, for the 
city must be neither rich nor poor, but one and self-suf­
ficing. Here we recognize not only the author's views on 
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private property but especially the law of necessity, which 
protects the integrity of nature against inordinate desires. 
We must therefore face the fact that the laws of the city, 
formulated in the chapters just analyzed, are those of 
Rousseauist education. In the Contract the author con­
cludes the discussion by echoing the very words of the 
novel, when he adds that the period of a nation's "insti­
tution" is the most critical in its life since the constitution is 
likely to be overthrown by threats from without and ruinous 
repercussions within. These potential disorders parallel 
those in the domain of inner life at a comparable stage. 
The next chapter of the treatise on citizenship is enti­
tled "Concerning Various Systems of Legislation." Its 
main theme is the common happiness, which, as I re­
marked above, is defined as it is in Emile and in the fourth 
book of the Republic. As usual the author reduces it es­
sentially to freedom and equality. He does not dwell here 
upon the former since he has already said what he means 
by it. It proceeds from the law of negative formation that 
favors the orderly growth of natural resources and facul­
ties. Reverting to the question of equality, he reconsiders 
the two aspects of power and wealth. Power must be exer­
cised by virtue of rank and the laws, by which he presum­
ably means that rank and power depend upon the law of 
natural aptitude, which is that of the constitution with its 
hierarchy of faculties. As for wealth, no one must be rich 
enough to buy another man or poor enough to have to sell 
himself. This is an effect of the law of necessity. In fine, he 
urges moderation of property and prestige in the great and of 
greed and covetousness in the others. Again the hierarchy in 
the city reflects the one in the soul. As Socrates says in the 
same context in a passage paraphrased earlier, the few 
superior powers with moderate desires led by reason must 
control the covetousness of the rest. Any truly moral person 
imposes appropriate restraints upon himself and avoids 
anything that threatens to disorder his life. In Emile the 
governor inconspicuously imposes them upon the child for 
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the sake of a happiness that depends upon just such 
measures of austerity. In the Contract as in the novel the 
educator-legislator finally secures that object by modifying 
his system according to natural and local conditions, or 
rather, "the nature of things." It is logical that throughout 
this chapter where the author discusses happiness, he 
continually alludes to the laws designed to guarantee it. 
Unless we see this, we can hardly understand the chapter 
heading. 
As I have said, he frames his ordinances exactly as Soc­
rates does in the first half of Plato's fourth book. The 
Greek master, whose first law is, of course, that of the 
covenant, also legislates against wealth and poverty, which 
divide a city or soul into two or more separate entities 
always at variance with each other. In addition he makes 
a law regulating the size of the city, which must, like Rous­
seau's, neither expand nor contract, being neither large 
nor small but one and self-sufficing. Another of his laws 
governs rank or function, which is determined by natural 
aptitude. According to this law every member of the city, 
or faculty in the soul, is put to the use intended by nature, 
each to one work, so that the moral person is never at 
issue with self, reason ruling, with spirit as guardian and 
the covetous principles subject to the others.38 These or­
dinances minister, of course, to all Rousseau's aspirations 
expressed in the law of necessity, which controls desires; 
that of negative education or freedom, which governs the 
growth of faculties; and the rule about following the nat­
ural bent to ensure that one does one's own proper work. 
In the same context Socrates adds that all his regulations 
are really just trifles of one great thing, education and nur­
ture, whose main principle is that "friends have all things 
in common," this being the law of the contract, which is 
that of the constitution. To effect this principle is the sec­
ond gigantic "wave" to be overcome in the founding of his 
city, so that the moral being may be one with all its parts, 
whether its kingdom lies within or outside. He conceives 
[mi 
ROUSSEAU'S SOCRATIC AEMILIAN MYTHS 
the educational process as conducive to that end only if it 
safeguards and perfects the natural constitution, fulfills the 
latter by means of art, and keeps watch against lawless­
ness, which steals in first in the form of amusement, then 
penetrates into manners and customs, contracts, laws, and 
constitutions, to overthrow all rights in the end. In his view 
an effective educational process like this necessitates few 
laws, as Rousseau agrees. For example, in the present con­
text the sage declines to legislate about other things that 
men, disciplined by laws like his, need not be told at all 
but that are the sole object of all our enactments. Among 
these he mentions markets, insults, lawsuits, taxes, police, 
and harbors.39 Statutes about matters of that kind simply 
try to patch up a constitution as disordered as that of in­
temperate invalids, and this the Greek teacher—and Christ 
too—refused to do. 
It is worth observing again that Rousseau's laws favor 
the same virtues as Socrates': wisdom, fortitude, temper­
ance, and justice. Yet in the case of Emile the child is as 
unaware of the virtues as he is of the laws. The law of ne­
cessity breeds courage by teaching him to fear nothing but 
its infraction; that of negative education or freedom im­
parts temperance by protecting him from vice and error 
through the sway of superior powers; and that of the nat­
ural bent teaches justice by inducing him to do his own 
proper work in life and use his faculties according to their 
normal functions. At the same time he unconsciously 
learns to submit to the law of reason, which cultivates 
wisdom in the Socratic sense and promises a happiness 
suited to the constitution of the entire moral being. He is 
thereby being educated for the practice of virtue, the vir­
tue of one who is his own law and needs no other. But he 
knows nothing of all this. It is his governor who antici­
pates lawlessness, and he does so in the manner described 
by Socrates: by nurturing the constitution, guarding against 
lawless amusements, and fostering "the habit of good 
order" by way of manners and customs that replace laws. 
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We witness this in the second section of this part of the 
book. 
The last chapter of the same part of the Contract, called 
"Division of the Laws," illustrates the importance of the 
Socratic method of education just described and provides 
a good transition to a study of Emile's formation at this 
stage. In that chapter the author begins by saying that the 
true theme of the treatise is the fundamental political laws 
derived from the "natural" constitution, these being rules 
of citizenship applicable anywhere rather than particular 
civil or criminal laws, since he makes no practical appli­
cation of his general principles within a private society in 
the usual sense. That is also true of Emile in the first four 
parts. But in the same chapter of the appendix he con­
fesses that his precepts really depend for their effective­
ness upon other laws, those of custom and opinion that fix 
the constitution for all time. These laws are used to rein­
force the rest, particularly those of necessity and freedom 
or negative education that govern Emile's training here 
and throughout the book. 
THE FORMATION OF A SOCRATIC GUARDIAN 
The child's education as a conscious being begins at this 
point where Rousseau, having defined his principles and 
laws, sets out to depict the moral person and sketch his 
"city within," visualizing it externally as a society of 
friends to emphasize the importance of oneness. The edu­
cation proposed is that of a Socratic guardian, to be fol­
lowed later by that of a philosopher-king. Rousseau's debt 
to Socrates is so great in this section that he stops in the 
very midst to acknowledge it. Consequently I shall begin 
with an exposition of the plan of the model and then com­
pare it to Rousseau's at this stage before embarking upon 
my rather unconventional interpretation of the Aemilian 
text, in order to prepare the reader for what follows. The 
source in this case is, as I have said, the second and third 
books of the Republic. There Socrates, in order to purge 
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an unhealthy state and form his own city, trains men to be 
skilled in "warfare," choosing natures fitted to guard the 
constitution, and hence called "guardians." I referred to 
them earlier as corresponding to "spirit," comparable to 
Rousseauist will, in the soul. Their training consists of 
"music," designed specifically for the discipline of the 
soul, and "gymnastic," designed apparently for that of the 
body but really for both. The great sage commences with 
music. In the Greek sense music means all the arts over 
which the Muses preside and which produce harmony in 
the soul by bringing its various elements into reciprocal 
accord. In the education of the Socratic heroes it includes 
stories in addition to melody and rhythm. For the moment 
I shall confine myself to stories and defer my discussion 
of melody and rhythm as well as gymnastic until I come to 
speak of Rousseau's treatment of them. My present pur­
pose is simply to show that the general plan in both cases 
is the same. 
In the second book of the Republic Socrates observes 
that the young must be trained by means of both true and 
false stories or myths, and he begins with false or fic­
titious ones. But he objects to harmful ones, casual tales 
devised by casual persons, even those of great storytellers 
like Homer and Hesiod. Indeed, he censors such writers. 
He charges them with giving an erroneous representation 
of the nature of heroes whom the young are supposed to 
emulate, with the result that the latter are led astray, es­
pecially since they cannot judge for themselves what is 
allegorical and what is literal. He alone, as founder and 
legislator of the new state, will dictate the form in which 
tales should be cast and the limits that must be observed. 
For example, he will not have poets telling his guardians 
that heroes hurt anyone, violate oaths and treaties, or in­
dulge in lies and deception. This three-pronged attack upon 
harmful false myths and the three lessons implied therein 
continue to the end of the second book. In the third he 
passes on to what he calls true myths, melody, rhythm, 
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taste and gymnastic. 
Emile's education as a Socratic guardian is similarly struc­
tured. As I have said, it is governed by the Rousseauist and 
Socratic laws of necessity and freedom or negative educa­
tion—which Socrates calls "the strain of necessity and the 
strain of freedom," though the Greek word for "strain" 
also means "law"—and finally by the law of natural 
aptitude. The education of the Rousseauist guardian is also 
divided into music and gymnastic, and for him too music 
comes first. It includes what I shall call "parables in 
action," harmony and song. The parables are the Socratic 
stories and myths that fashion Emile's mind. But they are 
not recounted. They are played out in life. And, as in the 
case of the model, there are both false, though not harmful, 
ones and true ones. Rousseau, like the sage, begins with the 
former and uses them to illustrate his law of necessity. 
There are three of them and they are not devised by casual 
persons but by the governor himself or rather by the 
educator-legislator who, by the way, transmutes the sub­
stance of Socrates' thought into his own. For example, the 
three false myths teach the same three lessons for heroes 
formulated negatively by the master and summarized 
above, and in exactly the same order, although, as we shall 
see, the images are more familiar. Before passing on to true 
myths to exemplify the law of freedom or negative educa­
tion, the author makes a direct frontal attack upon "posi­
tive education" at this level, particularly our concept of the 
training of reason, and casts aside all studies and stories 
relating to an alien world such as the three R's, geometry, 
languages, geography, history and fables. Again like the 
sage he refuses to have his "guardian" indoctrinated with 
erroneous conceptions of heroes and heroism. In such 
manner he handles the substance of Socratic education up 
to the end of the second book of the Republic. Next he 
turns to the third book, which is the source of inspiration 
for the rest of his hero's formation at this stage. After 
covering gymnastic quite briefly, he dwells at length upon 
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true myths or parables, and then concludes with harmony, 
song, and taste, following the master step by step in every 
detail to the end of the present part. This general outline 
will serve to initiate the reader into the real spirit of 
Rousseau's text. 
He begins his task in a Socratic manner by recognizing 
that Emile and his governor live in an unhealthy society 
even though they inhabit a peasant's hut in Montmorency 
village. He admits that it is difficult to raise a child like 
an insensitive being, far from the sight of human pas­
sions. Nevertheless, he clings to his idealism since he is 
providing us with a pattern of perfection that may well lie 
beyond our grasp, as the great sage says, but still remains 
the goal. In an effort to reach it, the governor begins by 
transfiguring the surroundings, however superficially. He 
does so by having recourse to patriarchal and Christian 
charity, whose influence modifies that of the Greek model. 
He has a compassionate attitude not only toward Emile, 
or spirits akin to his own as do Socrates' heroes, but also 
toward "spiritual valetudinarians" and "fierce natures" 
from which the academic philosopher takes cover "like a 
man who has fallen among wild beasts."40 In fine, suffer­
ing humanity finds in him a father as it does in the mission­
ary of the Gospel or in the person of Job, whose words are 
almost quoted in the text. He thereby wins the love and 
esteem of the villagers in order to become master of 
Emile's surroundings as well as of the boy himself. He also 
implants in the little spectator of his actions lessons in 
morality that bear fruit years later when the temple of the 
soul is visibly transformed by clemency into a Judeo-
Christian shrine. But he forbears as long as possible to 
speak of such things, for, says he, he will not play the 
tempter by letting the innocent taste the fruit of the tree that 
brings a knowledge of good and of evil. If the child chances 
to witness some vice, he is told that it is a disease, though 
he is ignorant of diseases of the spirit. But the word 
contributes to the image of Jean-Jacques as the good 
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physician going about with the boy beside him like the 
divine master with his disciples or Socrates with his, to heal 
the sick in an unhealthy world. That world is in the end the 
greatest bond of necessity to which the hero must submit 
since it can never be changed, but the providential governor 
never leaves his side lest lawlessness gain a footing within 
the invisible pale of a well-ordered life. 
Under his direction the aforementioned myths are enac­
ted. The first three, the fictitious or false ones relating to 
a false order of things, belong to "the strain of necessity," 
as I have said. 
They begin with a Rousseauist parable of the sower pre­
sented in the form of a dramatic dialogue.41 It is designed 
to give the child some idea of morality before the age of 
twelve, but only in case of necessity to prevent him from 
harming others42 by instructing him in so-called justice 
and the origins of property in our anti-society. It is log­
ical to begin with this since our laws are concerned primar­
ily with property rather than propriety of life. The scene 
is set in a garden that is an earthly paradise until the child 
tastes of the fruit, which changes it into an image of the 
world as we know it. There he and his governor work 
together tilling the soil of which Emile finally takes posses­
sion by planting a bean, a possession more sacred and re­
spectable, we are told, than that of explorers like Balboa, 
named here and in the Contract too. It is more sacred be­
cause this son of man rightfully possesses the earth that is 
indispensable to his livelihood. To till it is his natural and 
necessary vocation. The new Aemilius, like his Roman fore­
bears, is born to be not only a patriot but a husbandman 
too, as he ideally is at the end of the book, and true to the 
name of "industrious." As the beans spring up, the gover­
nor explains: "That belongs to you." He is referring not 
to the earth but to its fruits, which are simple, necessary 
ones and upon which Emile has lavished his time, his labor, 
and his person. But soon the gardener Robert ploughs up 
the "wretched" beans, for he has already sown the earth 
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with Maltese melons, an exquisite delicacy. This, we are 
informed, is the child's first experience of injustice.43 In 
spite of some ambiguity about the victim and villain of the 
piece and in spite of Jean-Jacques' principles, which ought 
logically to favor lowly beans instead of Maltese melons, 
he nevertheless makes his apologies to Robert and admits 
that he ought properly to have inquired, before tilling the 
soil, whether it had already been ploughed by others. When 
Robert replies that there is no need to make such inquiries 
since the whole earth is already covered with "mine" and 
"thine,"44 Emile complains that he has no garden. The 
answer comes back: "What has that to do with me?" The 
implication is that the son of man has been defrauded of 
his birthright by greedy husbandmen who have cast out 
the heir and robbed him of the means of life. The drama is 
resolved when the kindly Robert, whose counterpart in 
the great world beyond may be less cordial, agrees to allow 
the friends to cultivate "a corner of his garden." They 
offer him half the harvest in return to give the child an 
idea of property rights and the principle of exchange as 
they prevail in our disorderly state of life. 
This myth shows clearly enough that the moral being 
shaped by the author exists only within the society of 
friends and not outside. For him Robert's claims based 
exclusively upon work and first occupancy cannot, as we 
know, take precedence over need, as they do in actual so­
ciety. His "moral being," like that of Socrates,45 is sub­
ject to the law of necessity, which, in the alien world of 
the myth, is ignored, and so is the common happiness 
that is Emile's. This is so in spite of the contrivance of 
exchange, effective enough to feed the poor, perhaps, but 
more so to fatten the rich, who, in Rousseau's view, should 
possess only the ground that they need and that they can 
and do till by their own unaided efforts. Otherwise, hu­
manity goes wanting. It is represented here in the person 
of the dispossessed Emile, who looks in vain for a "corner 
of the garden" of the world to be his own. At the end of 
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the book, where the little phrase thrice recurs, he has not 
yet found it and never will.46 The writer uses the same 
phrase in the second Discourse in his vigorous denun­
ciation of property in its present form wherein the usur­
pations of the rich have been consolidated by a historical 
contract disastrous to the majority of mankind. That pact 
is the antithesis of his. It turns most men into orphans 
like Emile, bereft of their Socratic nurse and mother. Soon, 
says the author of the Discourse, looking back through 
ages past, "it was no longer possible to find a single cor­
ner of the universe where one could be free of the yoke." 
We see this in the parable of the sower in Emile that sub­
tly foreshadows the denouement of the story, accentuates 
the artistic balance of the book, and gives relief to its 
meaning. 
The point of the myth was to teach the child the first 
Socratic lesson and prevent him from harming others. In 
the view of modern men he has done an injury to Robert 
and suffers the consequences. But if his pathetic protest 
seems to justify him, then he has learned that the just man 
is doomed to become the victim of our "laws," as Soc­
rates' disciples protest and the sage admits. He has also 
discovered, like the Greek heroes, that he can possess and 
cultivate nothing except himself. For if he is to be a hus­
bandman at all in our midst, it is a Socratic and Christian 
allegorical husbandman of the soul rather than of the soil, 
whose real vocation in life is not to earn bread.47 And so 
he will not covet his neighbor's ill-gotten goods but will 
render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, even if 
they are not rightfully his at all. In fine, he will bow to the 
law of necessity, including even an arbitrary yoke imposed 
upon him by others. And he will do so willingly, not resent­
fully. For he is also being taught that, regardless of adverse 
circumstances, the virtues born of his own law—the Soc­
ratic law of Jean-Jacques' city of the Contract—are by 
their very nature the greatest good of the soul, to whose 
essence they are intimately suited. The freedom he enjoys 
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in the exercise of his faculties supposedly compensates 
him for material privation. The author has devised the myth 
in such a way as to convey the main thesis of his work. 
In the following myth, also fictitious, he creates other 
imageries to teach the sage's second lesson, that good men 
do not violate oaths and treaties. Here the child—surely 
a vulgar Emile belonging to a "false" order of things— 
breaks the windows of his chamber more than once, is then 
left to suffer the ill effects of cold, and is finally confined 
to some "windowless place" until it occurs to him to make 
an agreement with his governor whereby he may recover 
his freedom on condition that he respect the window panes. 
Indeed, he is forced to do so by the law of necessity, here 
presented in a fairer form than in the first myth. The gov­
ernor accepts the proposal on the grounds that it offers 
advantages for everyone. His object is, of course, to en­
courage the child to keep faith with his engagements. This 
apparently trivial sequence of very ordinary events is em­
ployed to dramatize all the elements of a true covenant 
and to portray property in an equitable form in accordance 
with the principles of that covenant which lies at the basis 
of all moral engagements in the book. For example, the 
suggestion of a pact originates with the child, who is the 
weaker party, whereas in the historical order as depicted 
by Rousseau in the second Discourse the idea of a pact 
originates with the powerful rich. The child in Emile im­
plicitly consents to renounce his natural independence, lim­
ited strength, and the power to harm others, for the sake 
of freedom from the nameless place; for his own safety, 
now obvious even to him; and for the protection of prop­
erty in a just and reasonable form based upon need and the 
common welfare, including his own.48 The benefits of such 
an engagement are as conspicuously present here, even 
to the mind of a child, as they were absent in the parable 
of the sower. In fine, the agreement conforms with natural 
dispositions even if we are in the midst of a world that is 
the antithesis of Emile's. 
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This story too is full of symbolism. The author hints at 
the presence of symbolic elements in a concluding remark 
referring back to the previous tale: the little gardener, 
making a hole to plant his bean, did not dream that he was 
digging a dungeon where his knowledge would soon encom­
pass him. The "windowless place" or dungeon in the 
present instance is therefore mythical. It could hardly be 
taken literally since a little later in this same part of Emile 
Rousseau beseeches us never to confine a child to a dun­
geon. It is as symbolic as the underground den in the Re­
public and has the same meaning. According to Socrates 
himself his prison house represents the lowest and darkest 
sphere in the world of sight, a world that typifies intellect­
ual vision. In that sphere men are imprisoned in darkness 
and chains, which are an image of ignorance and slavery. 
This image is reflected in the story in Emile where the con­
scious being suddenly becomes aware of his plight and dis­
covers a remedy. The windows therein are also symbolic 
and suggest light or the opposite of intellectual darkness. 
In the Moral Letters (1757-58) the writer says that the 
windows of the house of human understanding are the 
senses, the basis of elementary reason.49 In Emile they 
would represent for the child the most rudimentary reason 
that bids us, blind as we are, respect the windows of our 
friends so invaluable to ourselves. But for the governor 
they are the eyes of the soul, its wisdom and that of the 
law which belong to him against whom the child's rebel­
lion is directed. The little window-breaker is an image of 
the lawbreaker whose revolt is that of our "false" society 
against the precepts of justice and the first of all laws, 
which is the covenant. 
Rousseau carries the myth further to teach the sage's 
third precept, that good men do not lie. If the little vandal 
fails to respond to the trust reposed in him and violates 
the promise volunteered by himself for his own immediate 
advantage, then he suffers the unhappy consequences of 
lying as a natural sequel, under the inflexible law of nec­
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essity. For example, he is unjustly accused, or distrusted 
when he speaks the truth. But according to the text, he is 
not the real Emile. The latter is supposedly not tempted 
to lie since he is made to feel that it is in the interests 
of his happiness to be sure that those who supply his needs 
and whose friendship he enjoys see things as they really 
are, for fear they may err at his expense. And unlike the 
little lawbreaker, he has no occasion to break promises 
since he has none to make: having no reason to alienate 
others, he is not obliged to make terms with them. To 
harm no one, concludes the writer as he began, is the most 
important of all moral precepts. It is by no coincidence 
that, as we have observed, this is the precept that stands at 
the very beginning of the Republic. 
After the three "false myths" with their Socratic mes­
sages meant as a safeguard against the evil ways of the 
false states of this world and before illustrating the law of 
freedom in an ideal world, Rousseau stops to acknowledge 
his debt to Plato as well as to the ancestors of Aemilius. 
Like the young Romans the disciple is astir and on foot 
from morning till night, and his childhood, like that of the 
Greek heroes in the Republic here actually named, is all 
festive games and music that replace schoolroom and 
books. This is confirmed hereafter. In the author's view, 
governors of small children ought to make a delight out of 
objects of instruction, for he is persuaded with Socrates 
that, at this early age, education should be an amusement 
suited to the blithe and sprightly nature of the child. He 
follows the master to the letter, as he himself implies, 
and does so with the most felicitious results.50 
Before proceeding with this happy formation by way of 
true myths and music, he launches his attack upon the 
disastrous moral effects of modern "positive" education 
that appeals to a child's reason. For he is always inspired 
by the same preoccupation with the duties of man in the 
Aemilian city. Like another Socrates protesting against 
the injustice of a disordered society and its abuse of the 
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means of education to shape men in its image, he outlaws 
the studies normally prescribed at the present stage such 
as the three R's, geometry, languages, geography, history 
and fables. He contends that, although they may prove val­
uable later, they are not only useless to a child under 
twelve but also, if taught at that age, may ultimately prove 
unfavorable to the acquisition of wisdom and happiness 
since they create in his mind a false impression that he 
knows something. Rousseau is convinced that he does not, 
that childhood is the sleep of reason, that children retain 
only sensations, images, and sounds rather than ideas, and 
consequently only seem to possess knowledge. Moreover, 
in his opinion most of the lessons assigned to them are 
better suited to adults. Young people conclude that study 
is reserved for childhood, as indeed it usually is, whereas 
the writer believes with Socrates that the pursuit of wisdom 
and knowledge should be the main business of grown men. 
For the time being, it is the occupation of the governor 
rather than Emile. Even later when the hero is initiated 
into traditional studies, he is simply given a taste for them, 
"for he has all his life long to learn." 
To prove his point, Rousseau comments upon the stud­
ies in question. For example, he denies that children can 
cope with the abstractions of geometry, or rather with 
what, in accord with Socrates, he calls "imaginative hypo­
theses."51 However, as we shall see in a moment, Emile 
is early encouraged to observe and compare geometrical 
figures, as part of the training of a childish reason of sense. 
As for languages, at his age they allegedly serve to teach 
only useless words void of the subtle modifications of 
ideas that belong to the spirit of a race. As for geography 
and history, it is too soon in the author's belief to trans­
port the child to faraway places, which to a very young 
mind are mere names, or to carry him back into ages past 
even if he belongs there. History is not a catalogue of 
names, deeds, and dates, but an inquiry into moral issues 
and the human heart in every century and country. Knowl­
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edge of that kind is considered perilous at present because 
the spectacle it offers is hardly more charming than the 
Rousseauist vision of the past in the second Discourse. 
It reflects our anti-society with its unseemliness magni­
fied a thousandfold and reveals, so to speak, the skeleton 
in the closet of mankind. As Socrates would say, it teaches 
us that heroes do harm, violate oaths, and tell lies.52 In 
Emile's case its ugliness is to be replaced by "fair sights 
and sounds" that are the acts and words of those about 
him, designed to turn his mind into "a goodly treasure-
house" for the benefit of his conduct at all times. 
The same happy experiences also replace La Fontaine's 
fables, which contain images of moral deformity as noxious 
as those recorded in history. Rousseau attacks them as 
violently as Socrates condemns Homer and Hesiod. Like 
the master he will not have some poet or storyteller of 
dubious intentions interfering with his work. Yet he ser­
iously doubts whether children really understand the fables 
since, like the Greek sage and in the same context, he 
says that young persons cannot judge what is allegorical 
and what is literal.53 But if they can, then the apologues 
are considered quite as baneful as history since they give 
the same false account of heroes and heroism. They reflect 
a disordered world where the Rousseauist covenant and 
laws are eluded and the common happiness is ignored. The 
examples he chooses include the following: "The Fox and 
the Crow," in whom he sees cunning knaves and simple 
fools; "The Cricket and the Ant," who symbolize for him 
the greedy rich and suffering poor; "The Wolf and the 
Dog," who in his eyes portray lawless independence mak­
ing a mockery of moderation and docility, which, though ex­
ploited and abused, he considers preferable to a life of 
open warfare. He also cites fables showing powerful tryants 
like the lion devouring the substance of the weak; and 
others representing satirists in the form of stinging gnats as 
powerful as the shafts of ridicule against which virtue itself 
is not secure. It is far too early for such lessons as these at 
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the present stage of Emile's formation. And so Jean-Jacques 
excludes them for the moment. But as I suggested above, 
he does not do so definitively in the way that Socrates 
banishes Hesiod, Homer, and the tragedians; for unlike the 
academic philosopher the Rousseauist hero is not to with­
draw from our midst altogether. Rather, he is to be a tower 
or temple of strength therein as we are told later. 
In that case he must get wisdom, and the author is con­
vinced that he will never do so at this age by way of books. 
At twelve Emile hardly knows what a book is, though, 
like the young Poles in the Considerations, he early learns 
to read and write for his real and present pleasure and 
advantage. But Rousseau declines to discuss such "non­
sense" as the three R's since his theme is education, and 
so far they have little to do with it. The governor's pur­
pose is not to impress people with the boy's brightness, 
like the foolish tutor in the Contract, but to find the 
way of happiness for them both and for mankind. That is 
the whole scope of wisdom's laws, which would now be 
imperiled by lessons in history, fables, geography, or 
languages. Those studies belong to another world that 
Emile must first be prepared to resist by a very different 
kind of discipline. 
This discipline is governed by the law of negative edu­
cation, the Socratic "strain of peace and freedom," as 
opposed to the "warlike strain of necessity" that relates 
to an anti-society. As the legislator enacted, it is primar­
ily directed to the expansion and refinement of the powers 
of reception, the skilled cultivation of human faculties and 
the early formation of sages through the negative element 
of purity from vice or error recommended to act as a posi­
tive influence. It was foreshadowed in the concluding 
pages of the first part. The body, organs, and senses grow 
and flower in an exquisite environment of natural charm 
and comely manners through the "music" and gymnastic 
prescribed by Socrates for his guardians in the third book 
of the Republic. There, as I have said, the sage deals 
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with true myths, melody, rhythm, and taste, accompanied 
by an austere form of gymnastic suited to train the spirit. 
Likewise in Emile, as I have also said, gymnastic is accom­
panied by more parables in action—true myths this time— 
as well as training in harmony and song. By exercising 
and perfecting his physical powers, the child learns to 
direct them independently and acquires skill in adjusting 
himself to all things about him in their relationships to 
him, while at the same time he develops enough reason to 
discover those relationships and discern what suits the 
nature of his being. Throughout this phase he therefore 
combines the operations of body and mind, the functions 
of athlete and sage, and in so doing he becomes as much 
of a Spartan as the Socratic guardians are. 
But it is the governor's duty to see that the boy uses 
his strength and reason without caprice or vanity. He 
performs this duty self-effacingly by ensuring that his 
ward remains subject to the law of the human constitu­
tion. Consequently he is the real master, though the boy 
thinks he is. As such, we are told, he captures the other's 
will and maintains it at one with his own. The latter is, 
of course, the enlightened will of the society of friends 
represented by himself and his masters, a society into 
which Emile is being integrated. Within a necessarily lim­
ited scope the young hero is unconsciously formed phy­
sically, intellectually, and morally, simply by pursuing 
the object of the will in the simple elementary form of 
his own real present and concrete advantage and happi­
ness. That is because the governor takes his proper place 
as "helmsman" or pilot, the helm being the law. He is 
also a seer possessed of intuitive vision that reveals to him 
the secrets of the heart. According to that vision, he con­
tinues to select all the circumstances of the boy's life as 
he has done from the first, "paying attention to the year 
and seasons and sky and stars and wind," like Socrates' 
pilot of city or of soul. In this way he uses reason to 
serve the will and safeguard its integrity. It is idle to pro­
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test that the child is being "indoctrinated" since he is 
merely an image of the morally committed man over whom 
the power of the reasonable will would have to exercise 
the same insight and vigilance if the ideal order were ever 
to become a reality. 
To depict the governor's vocation, Rousseau tells a fam­
ous story inspired by personal experience. It is a parable 
of the finest order and is told in two parts to show Jean-
Jacques' double action in negative education as both seer 
and steersman. In the first a spoiled child, who is, of 
course, not Emile, thrice startles his newly appointed 
governor from his couch at midnight for the sole purpose 
of forcing him to light a candle. The governor, unused to 
capricious behavior, confines his ward to a dark closet 
for the remainder of the night. The same child is as capri­
cious by day as he is by night and insists upon being 
escorted on walks whenever he feels inclined. When the 
governor, still unsubdued, refuses to comply, the rebel 
wanders off alone but is secretly followed by one of his 
mentor's accomplices, who sees that the event is attended 
with much unpleasantness but no great danger. 
The parable is transparent enough to be interpreted with 
a fair degree of certainty. In the first part a helpless child 
who lives and moves in a world of intellectual shadow, 
drenched though it is in material sunshine, would control 
the light that belongs to the seer and force him to be led by 
the blind. For the candle, like the windows earlier, rep­
resents the light of the mind, as Rousseau indicates later 
in another context and as he did in the case of the win­
dows.54 Socrates uses the same image when he bids his 
disciples "light a candle" and search about for justice. 
And we may observe parenthetically that it is he who does 
the bidding and not they. In the Rousseauist text the dark­
ness of the closet, like the windowless place in the former 
myth, symbolizes the opposite of intellectual light, the 
state to which the child's ignorance relegates him. In the 
last phase of the story he who meanders aimlessly abroad 
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in the world, a prey to his own vagaries, would neverthe­
less have the true "helmsman" follow him, instead of the 
reverse. He is like Socrates' mutinous sailors in the afore­
mentioned parable of the ship of the soul or city who in­
sist upon steering though they are not steerers at all. The 
symbolism in Rousseau's myth is simpler, and has the un­
obtrusiveness that we usually associate with the term clas­
sical, while at the same time it affords a powerful projection 
of his message. 
Broaching the problems of negative education in the 
ideal Aemilian world, he begins with physical training 
corresponding to the Greek sage's simple or military gym­
nastic in the third book of the Republic. This training en­
visages primarily the improvement of the soul, as the two 
philosophers phrase it, and is characterized by Stoicism 
and ascetism. All year long Emile goes clad in light gaily 
colored robes and walks unshod and bareheaded. Like the 
Socratic heroes he grows used to various changes of water, 
and like them is trained to abstain from excess in sleep and 
every sort of intemperance, and to avoid enslavement to 
all habit except that of order; for according to the ancients 
and Rousseau, too, habit soon becomes a second nature. 
Like the same Socratic heroes of the Greek classic, he is 
hardened to pain and death and, in the midst of his pleas­
ures, is no more aware than they of the fasting, fatigue, 
and hardships he endures. He learns to swim the Helles­
pont "in his father's canal" and to rejoice in all the ele­
ments, again like those young Greek athletes, called by 
Socrates wakeful, lean, and wiry dogs. By such means as 
these his soul is tempered and made invulnerable.55 For 
the object is to develop, not robust muscular strength, but 
a taste for fortitude and temperance, without ever calling 
them by their names. It is these two virtues combined that 
make him into a sage and athlete too by strengthening not 
only the will but the reason as well and nurturing them 
together to bring them into natural accord or friendship 
with each other. Gymnastic, by helping to foster them both 
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in the soul, plays no small part in the preparation of the 
Socratic and Rousseauist guardian. The author of Emile 
follows the master so closely here that to treat the latter's 
ideas on the subject separately would be far too obviously 
repetitious. 
In the last pages of this part of the novel Rousseau turns 
back again from gymnastic to music as already defined. 
True, he calls this phase the education of the senses, 
and in the past we have simply accepted it as such. On 
the surface he appears to present it in that form. But he 
does so in order to adhere at least externally to the fash­
ion of the day and pay his respects to the sensationalist 
doctrines of his contemporaries. Nevertheless, his purpose 
is both broader and deeper than theirs. We can close our 
eyes to this if we choose, and confine ourselves to a literal 
reading of the text since it always lends itself to a double 
interpretation. But if we overlook the possibility of a 
literary reading too, then we ignore the fact that Rous­
seau is an artist as well as a thinker. As is usual with him, 
it is his art that betrays his real thought here, although 
the former remains as "classically" unostentatious as ever. 
That is one reason why his motives have previously eluded 
us. For example, in the so-called education of the senses, 
he follows a significant symbolic order, but always with 
the utmost discretion. While training the senses in the se­
quence in which they naturally take their place in human 
life, he uses that sequence to typify the gradual raising of 
the mind to moral truth by the cultivation of reason and 
will, for which this training like simple bodily exercise is 
really devised. To revert to the Socratic image of the as­
cent of the soul from the underground den or lowest sphere 
in the world of sight, Emile is gradually turned away from 
intellectual and spiritual darkness toward a childish wis­
dom that prefigures Sophia.56 The process is accomplished 
by true myths, harmony and song that are conveyed in 
the form of lighthearted games in the fairest of settings. It 
is true that the hero thereby learns to use his senses ju­
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diciously but he is also oriented toward the virtues, how­
ever unwittingly, for Jean Jacques never averts his eyes 
from the goal. However, it is only a penetration and eluci­
dation of myths that can tell us so. 
The first of the true ones is that of nighttime games. The 
pretext for these games is the training of touch to teach 
the child to walk in darkness like the blind, to see at 
night, and to have no fear. This idea implies that the gov­
ernor is concerned not merely with the cultivation of touch 
but with that of reason and spirit too. The rest of the myth 
confirms our suspicions. Many people, says the author— 
and he was no exception57—fear the dark, "even philos­
ophers and soldiers" possessed of reason and courage, 
and Emile must be both. He explains that this fear is 
caused by ignorance of our surroundings, and he thereby 
suggests that the darkness of which he speaks is essentially 
that of the mind. To dispel both weaknesses, the governor 
imagines sprightly games at bedtime. It is in this context 
that we are warned never to confine a child to a dungeon, 
a word that inevitably suggests the symbolism of previous 
myths. To illustrate his meaning, Rousseau narrates a 
scene from his own childhood, one that has resonances 
in the profession of faith of the Savoyard vicar further 
on, but is not included in the Confessions. In the scene 
in question he appears as a boy of ten sent alone upon an 
errand at night to fetch a Bible from the pulpit of the un­
lighted temple of Bossey and stimulated to find his way 
and banish fear by the reassuring proximity of others. En­
gulfed in the darkness of that "vast place," he at last 
reaches the holy book that contains, says the vicar later, 
not one revelation but two. The priest makes this remark to 
his disciple, a young exile who appears groping through the 
obscurities of revelation and is comforted by his mentor's 
words: "The God whom I adore is not a God of darkness." 
These are signs enough that the exile is foreshadowed by 
the blind boy of Bossey striving to overcome his blindness. 
Emile is mystically present in that boy, as he allegedly is in 
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all of us; but the real one knows nothing of churches or 
revelation either, although he already possesses religion 
without professing it, like Socrates' heroes whose early 
theology is a rudimentary sketch of the virtues. For 
although he plays in intellectual darkness, since such is the 
lot of childhood, in doing so he acquires not merely 
balanced bodily movement but a trace of the Socratic 
virtues as well, especially courage and a groping reason of 
sense. 
Obviously darkness here is as symbolic as it is in the 
story of the little lawbreaker or that other child of mid­
night fantasies of whom I spoke before. Rousseau habit­
ually used it to typify mental and spiritual obscurity in 
both Emile and the Contract.58 His divine master does 
the same, for example, in the Sermon on the Mount, where 
the light of the body is the eye corresponding to spiritual 
vision, and darkness is the reverse. And, as we know, so 
does Socrates, who often advises that his guardians must 
have eyes and not be blind or feel their way about, like 
men in the dark. His allegorical den where men grope 
about through "shadows of images of objects" is the real 
setting of the Aemilian myth. Even when the Greek heroes 
go forth from the den into the world of light as philosopher-
kings and are sent back later to perform some duty among 
the blind, they must again get the habit of seeing in the 
dark, where most of us are content to pass our lives.59 
In Rousseau's view Emile must possess the same skill as 
the Socratic models if he is to fare well in the world as we 
know it since it is there that he must live. 
The next of the true myths shows children running races 
for cakes in miniature Olympics, which appears as a vio­
lation of the author's principles about the ill effects of com­
petition only if we are unaware of the imagery, as we have 
hitherto been. The theme of the great games is a favorite 
motif in Emile as it is in the Republic where, in the very 
book of that dialogue echoed here, the Greek sage says 
that his guardians are in training to win a more glorious 
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victory than the Olympic conquerors. Rousseau, like the 
master, treats the games as a symbol of life, and it assumes 
immense proportions in the book. It recurs in several con­
texts where the only element that varies is the prize: first 
cakes, then honor, then the Pauline "crown that never 
fades," and in the fifth "act," wisdom herself in the per­
son of Sophia.60 
The pretext for the childish races is the training of the 
eye to take a firm hold upon things and guard against il­
lusions. The boy learns to measure and compare the vary­
ing distances of several courses, one for each competitor, 
all leading like the radii of a misshapen circle to a single 
goal in the form of a cake. In time he learns to choose the 
shortest and most direct way to the goal, by making spon­
taneous estimates at a glance. Thus while he is thinking 
only of innocent pleasures and cakes, all his resources of 
mind and will are being called into play. But the will takes 
precedence over the reason. Jean-Jacques provides a hint 
of this in his reply to the child, who complains about the 
varying lengths of the courses: "In a gift I give of my own 
free will, am I not master of the conditions?" These words 
are reminiscent of the evangelical parable of the laborers 
in the vineyard where men, toiling for a material reward, 
are meant to portray souls in quest of the meed of virtue. 
The master who engages them claims the freedom to re­
ward them as he sees fit and to do what he will with his 
own.61 The situation in Emile is comparable, including 
the master's reply, since the cake, like the reward of the 
biblical laborers, is a result of the effort of will and mind 
and body necessary to obtain it. This story suggests a 
view of life that is realistic enough for a child. It projects 
a rudimentary form of justice and wisdom, and at this 
stage a cake is a suitable incentive. The implication of the 
book is however that our world is full of grown men run­
ning for cakes and that Emile is not to be one of them. 
The writer also comments upon the discipline of reason 
in the mythical races. The child soon acquires a "visual 
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compass" to evaluate the courses, which are like so many 
roads leading through life, and to choose the shortest 
and simplest one to the goal. The compass that the gover­
nor "puts in his eyes," as Rousseau phrases it later, rep­
resents childish reason based upon sense perception. For, 
says the writer, sight is the sense least separable from 
the judgments of the mind, and so later he uses it to repre­
sent the vast capacity of the systematic genius.62 Socrates 
does likewise, and so does Christ in various ways. In the 
Aemilian myth Jean-Jacques is therefore cultivating the 
judgment since he does not assume, as others do, that it 
already exists in the child. He forms the latter's reason 
instead of reasoning with him. And he does so with a view 
to the moral function of reason as a spiritual director to 
serve the will and lead the boy to the practice of a child­
ish image of virtue beyond which many men never ad­
vance. But for him the tiny drama of these boyish races is 
but "the mimic preliminary exercise for a larger contest," 
the race for Sophia, that is the governor's sole object, 
unseen by the child but visible enough to an attentive 
spectator. Jean-Jacques is gradually leading Emile from the 
mental and spiritual darkness of the Socratic den into the 
world of light. 
Like Socrates, Rousseau passes next from stories and 
myths to harmony, rhythm, and taste. In approaching 
these, one must realize that the whole of musical educa­
tion including what has preceded is intended to ensure a 
harmonious nature and the agreement of all faculties for 
the practice of virtue. 
Still under the pretext of cultivating the sense of sight, 
Jean-Jacques gives lessons in drawing and painting, taking 
nature as a model to train the child to observe objects 
and their appearances and to see the real truth and beauty 
of things. He also provides instruction in the proportions 
and relationships of geometrical figures.63 But he uses 
these studies to prepare the eye, the reason, and spirit 
for the discernment and pursuit of order in human life and 
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to impart rhythm and harmony to the soul through a knowl­
edge and appreciation of the rhythm and harmony of nature. 
And so the writer's enthusiasm for these occupations re­
flects his personal taste for the arts far less than it does his 
delight in the setting of his stories and its presumably felici­
tous moral effects upon the child.64 This motive that suffuses 
his text is accentuated in the light of the Platonic one he 
follows. There Socrates says that harmony and rhythm 
"depend on. . . the true simplicity of a rightly and nobly 
ordered mind and character." By this he means one in 
which there is a rhythmical interplay of faculties working 
in unison, with leaders leading and followers following. To 
foster such dispositions in his heroes, he too resorts to 
the painter's art and the study of beauty, convinced that 
grace and harmony are "the twin sisters of goodness and 
virtue." He ordains that artists "express the image of the 
good in their work" and avoid images of evil. In the Rous­
seauist text Jean-Jacques is supposed to be just such an 
artist, and his "work" is Emile, as he frequently says. 
To accomplish his purpose, he continues to follow the 
master, who insists that the young Greeks dwell not in 
some "noxious pasture" but "in a land of health, amid 
fair sights and sounds," including the words and deeds 
they witness. This rule applies to Emile, as we know- So 
do the rest of the sage's comments in the same context. 
Adapted to the Rousseauist hero, they show that beauty, 
"the effluence of fair works," diffuses about him power­
ful influences to conform him to themselves and prepare 
him for the beauty that is spiritual. Emile therefore exem­
plifies Socrates' conclusion that rhythm and harmony of 
environment impart grace to inner life and teach the dis­
ciple to "perceive omissions or faults in art and nature" 
and make him love the good and hate the bad "even be­
fore he is able to know the reason why." Rousseau is ut­
terly imbued with these maxims. 
To complete his treatment of rhythm and harmony, he 
has recourse to the teaching of musical instruments, under 
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the pretext of refining the senses and training the ear, but 
obviously for the purpose of disciplining the spirit, as 
Socrates does by the same means. The boy is taught to 
hear well, especially at night since, like the Socratic guard­
ians, he still dwells in partial darkness and must be as alert 
as they are. But as in their case the passive organ, the ear, 
is perfected by the active one, the voice, which is trained 
in speech and in song. The author's recommendations 
about these matters reflect the convictions of the master 
regarding melody and song, the various modes of music 
and their effects upon the soul, contained in the very con­
text of the Republic that is the model here. In melody 
and song the Socratic and Rousseauist "strain of necessity 
and strain of freedom" favor either the grave Dorian mode 
of the Greeks intended to bring the soul of the sage into 
harmony with the order of the universe, or the warlike 
Phrygian mode, becoming to the athlete. The same laws 
in both texts banish the relaxed Ionian manner and the sad 
pathos of the Lydian as being unsuited to a boy. Rousseau 
concludes by citing the very words of the Republic, that 
"all this must be simply an amusement" and nothing more, 
at least for the child.65 But for Jean-Jacques it is a serious 
business since the writer is obsessed by the Socratic affin­
ity of beauty and moral order. 
Next he turns his attention to taste, or appetite, treat­
ing it not merely literally but also in an allegorical manner 
to prefigure aesthetic judgment, which is already being pre­
pared by the education of music and is, as we have seen, 
mystically linked with spiritual life. Indeed, there is a sec­
tion on aesthetic taste and an essay summarizing its con­
clusions at the end of the fourth part that matches the 
passage on the present theme at the end of the second. The 
literary parallelism between physical and artistic taste is 
subtle and significant. For example, the writer says of the 
child's appetites that the rule in the selection of food is 
what pleases the palate, while his definition of good taste 
in aesthetics is what pleases most men. Moreover, in both 
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cases he is at pains to explain that he is not speaking of 
what pleases because it is useful—in the matter of food 
"healthful"—but simply of what is pleasing in itself. And 
so the guide in the choice of Emile's food is nature or 
natural taste, which is his own. It favors the most simple 
and universal tastes that are also regarded as best in the 
realm of aesthetics, where the guide is the same. In both 
areas Rousseau admits however that modifications occur 
through the influence of climate, manners, way of life, age, 
sex, character, and environment.66 There is another point 
not to be overlooked. Not only does he give us here a fore­
taste of his later reflections, but the essay that follows and 
synthesizes them itself combines the themes of aesthetic 
and physical taste, with moral overtones that are also 
present here. 
In fact, there are definite proofs that the passage on ap­
petite has figurative and spiritual implications in addition 
to the obvious literal meaning. For example, the author 
does not insert it in the part on gymnastic where he spoke 
of the drinking of water. He introduces it at the end of 
what Socrates calls musical education. The sage does like­
wise, using appetite as a transition from music to gymnas­
tic since his order is the reverse of Rousseau's. There 
Socrates treats the subject allegorically in the context of 
the views on aesthetic taste and spiritual beauty that I 
summarized above, and associates the sense of taste with 
both aesthetics and spirituality. In doing so, he warns 
that he will not have his guardians nourished with images 
of moral deformity, nor will he have them "browse in 
some noxious pasture, feeding upon many a baneful herb 
and flower day by day" and "gathering a festering mass 
of corruption in the soul." Here as in Emile physical taste 
is an image of aesthetic taste regarded as the bulwark of 
the austerely disciplined city or soul. The passage in the 
Republic leads to a discussion of food and drink that opens 
the Socratic treatment of gymnastic. In the great classic, 
as I have said, gymnastic follows music since, in the speak­
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er's view, "to the mind when adequately trained we shall 
be right in handing over the more particular care of the 
body,"67 an idea confirming that his main preoccupation 
is always the formation of the soul. The same idea per­
vades the corresponding pages ofEmile on appetite, where, 
moreover, Rousseau's Spartan prescriptions about phy­
sical taste echo the master's, since they are dictated by 
the same motives. For example, in the midst of them he 
refers us back to the mimic Olympics and to the cake that 
the boy earns by his own efforts of body and spirit and 
the practice of an elementary justice meant to foreshadow 
true wisdom. Strangely enough, in the same context of the 
Republic, in a passage to which I alluded in speaking of 
the races, Socrates too, recommending simplicity and tem­
perance of appetite in his heroes, emphasizes the fact that 
the men are in training for a contest greater than the Olym­
pic games, which is the pursuit of wisdom. This thought 
brings him to denounce "sweet sauces" and "unnecessary 
pleasures," which, as he reminds his listeners, corrupted 
the original healthy state of men and made education indis­
pensable to purge away luxury. And so appetite is not mor­
ally inconsequential for him, any more than aesthetic taste 
is. A sophisticated appetite represents symbolically a 
harmful way of life that must be purged. But he will do the 
purging, not physicians, who are thereupon denounced in 
the famous passage to which I referred earlier. He con­
cludes again that gymnastic, including the training of ap­
petite, envisages chiefly the improvement of the soul. 
Rousseau obviously agrees. 
The moral issues in the passage on physical taste in 
Emile emerge further into view when the author says 
that the child must be nourished, not by the flesh of ani­
mals, but by the fruits of the earth, which is "our nurse 
and mother." He is simply quoting Plutarch. But how cur­
ious that he contrives to bring to a close this interval in 
Emile's education exactly as Socrates concludes that of his 
guardians by telling them that "the earth is their mother 
[137] 
ROUSSEAU'S SOCRATIC AEMILIAN MYTHS 
and their nurse" to whom they are forever bound! The ob­
ject of the Greek philosopher's so-called royal lie is to 
make them care more for the city and for one another. This 
intention is implicit in Emile where the author expresses 
the belief that a flesh diet leads men to live like wild beasts, 
fosters cruelty, and stifles pity in the soul. He is still con­
cerned with the duties of man in the city of the Contract, 
even though in actuality its freemen are robbed of the 
fruits of the earth to which they are entitled. 
The Socratic idea of purging away luxury is also pres­
ent in Rousseau's text when he affects to deal with the 
sense of smell. For example, having admitted that it is 
weak in a child, he says that he would not arbitrarily re­
duce the number of agreeable sensations in life by using 
pleasant aromatics to hide a dose of physic whose bitter­
ness makes a child forever insensitive to their sweetness. 
The bitterness that purifies body and soul is as much a 
part of Emile's training as it is of the training of Socrates' 
guardians. Rousseau's views on the "education of the 
senses," which create the impression that he is adhering 
to the mode of the day, contain teachings at least 2,500 
years older than contemporary sensationalist doctrines. 
This part of the book ends with a portrait of the child as 
the embodiment of all principles set forth so far. His friend 
brings him forward into an assembly of scholars and in­
vites them to question him, though he has only a childish 
sort of reason, formed as a basis for common sense. The 
scene is reminiscent of Christ at the same age sitting in 
the temple amid doctors of the law and astonishing them 
with his understanding and answers as he goes about the 
Father's business.68 In Emile's case the "father" is the 
law, visible as a friendly presence by his side. They de­
pend not upon each other but upon the society of their 
friendship, for, we are told, they are always in agreement 
and find their greatest happiness together. In that society 
we have an image of the mythical city within whose 
bounds the hero's portrait unfolds. He remains as subject 
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to the law of necessity and of freedom as Jean-Jacques 
does to that of reason, these being one and the same law of 
justice. But the child observes moral rules, without having 
any knowledge of them, through the action of his governor 
and by virtue of the laws of custom and true opinion that 
prevail round about him and are. the lawgiver's main con­
cern. What few moral ideas he has relate to the covenant, 
property, and freedom. His reason has been taught not to 
gather useless data but to rule his person, direct his 
strength, and execute his will. Moreover, although he does 
not know it, he is bora to govern others too by his superior 
talents and experience and may do so through the force of 
his example, regarded as more persuasive than "all our dis­
courses." Only such men as this bear rule in the Rous­
seauist city, for, like his Greek master, the author does 
not favor equality of equals and unequals alike, whether 
they be men or faculties of soul. Equality of that kind 
would not lead to the felicity he seeks within the nature 
and limits of the human constitution. 
The portrait of the child with Jean-Jacques recalls Soc­
rates' conclusion to the education of his guardians or spirit. 
For example, the best Socratic heroes—who alone are 
chosen to become "rulers"—possess the power of com­
mand or self-mastery and a love of the city or brotherhood, 
such as Jean-Jacques has been nurturing in Emile. These 
qualities are bred in them by their education that humanizes 
them in their relations to each other, which are those of the 
Socratic and Rousseauist order of friendship. They too 
obey the laws of necessity and freedom. They possess 
nothing that may impair their virtue as guardians and men 
of temperance and courage. For example, they have no 
property of their own beyond what is absolutely necessary, 
but live together like soldiers in a camp, as do Emile and 
Jean-Jacques in their empty, austere rustic room. They are 
ruled not by desire but by the highest human faculties and 
forgo all riches for the sake of the diviner metal within, as 
do their modern counterparts. For the Aemilian governor 
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or philosopher-king is himself presented as a good guardian 
of self and of others, of the reasonable will or law, and of 
the constitution of soul or of city that is its principle 
materialized in Emile. It is to loyalties like these that the 
covenant of friendship has committed him. 
Emile is therefore drawn into the image and likeness of 
an ancient order of things exemplified in the friendly com­
panionship of ideal beings that results from the covenant 
and executes its laws. That order is also the one in the 
Contract that springs from the same principles. The happi­
ness it bestows is exemplified in Emile at the end of this 
part. Confined to the necessities of life, he enjoys freedom, 
the harmonious and voluntary direction of all his faculties 
in accordance with the aspirations of human nature and the 
proper exercise of human powers. Even though the hero is 
aware only of the rudimentary ideas of this philosophy, the 
author has already completely confided in his readers. The 
more we contemplate the two books together, the more 
they interlock and fuse into one. 
1. A collation makes it clear that Rousseau is "laying the foundations" in the 
first three parts of the Contrat as well as Emile and that the moral being does not 
emerge until the fourth part in both cases. In the past most of us have thought of 
the city or moral person as being already formed in the first part of the appendix, 
whereas the oath proposed there is effective only in the fourth part. 
2. See, for example, "Emile," pp. 304, 692, 814-20. 
3. " . .  . N'oublions pas ce qui convient a notre condition. L'humanite a sa place 
dans l'ordre des choses; l'enfance a la sienne dans l'ordre de la vie humaine; il faut 
considerer l'homme dans l'homme, et l'enfant dans l'enfant. Assigner a chacun sa 
place et 1'y fixer, ordoner les passions humaines selon la constitution de l'homme 
est tout ce que nous pouvons faire pour son bien-etre." 
4. For the importance of the balance of powers to keep one's place, see O.C., 
4:303 n. 1 and 304 n. 1; cf. also P. Burgelin, "L'Idee de place dans YEmile" 
Revue de litterature comparee (Paris) 35 (1961): 529-37. Regarding Rousseau's 
distrust of imagination in this process, that faculty was, of course, a source of 
happiness for him personally, but there is a difference between imaginary desire 
for material things and imaginative insight that transports one beyond their 
sphere: see M. Raymond, J.-J. Rousseau: la quite de soi et la reverie (Paris: 
Corti, 1962), pp. 81-83. 
5. The Republic 5. 465. 
6. Ibid., 4. 444. Rousseau's definition of happiness does not change through­
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out "Emile": pp. 455, 512-16, 536, 678, 691. It always includes health, the ne­
cessities of life, and freedom to use the faculties. Cf. the profession of faith in 
chapter 5 below. 
7. "Le Peuple Souverain veut par lui-meme, et par lui-meme il fait ce qu'il 
veut": "Lettres de la montagne." O.C., 3:815. Cf. Emile: "L'homme vraiment 
libre ne veut que ce qu'il peut et fait ce qu'il lui plait." Burgelin compares the 
free man and free city but declines to identify them on the grounds that the 
meaning in Emile is anthropological and not juridical: O.C., 4:309 n. 2. However, 
a collation forces one to identify them. Besides, Rousseauist law is based 
upon Rousseauist anthropology. Freedom as it is defined is enjoyed by Emile 
in slavery: "Emile et Sophie," O.C., 4:916-17. 
8. " . .  . On veut toujours son bien, mais on ne le voit pas toujours." Cf. 
"Emile," pp. 245, 248, 322, 586, 595, 600-604, 653-54, Cf. "Contrat social," 
pt. 4, chap. 1; "Julie," O.C., 2:571; "Lettre a C. de Beaumont," O.C., 4: 
935 ff.; and "Dialogues," O.C., 1:668, 670. Such references could easily be 
multiplied. 
9. Rousseau's harsh realism as opposed to the permissiveness of his contem­
poraries has aroused a great deal of criticism: e.g., Crocker, Rousseau's Social 
Contract: An Interpretive Essay (Cleveland: Case Western Reserve Univer­
sity Press, 1968), pp. 50, 72, 80-89, 91, etc. Seilliere is much closer to Rousseau 
than he imagines when he writes, "Je pense, moi aussi que la mystique natur­
iste—si elle est a temps ramen6e vers la tradition stoique et chr6tienne en 
morale—pourra laisser quelque jour la condition humaine amelior6e de fac,on 
durable" (E. Seilliere, "Alain contre Emile," Journal des debats, 40th year, 
no. 2029 (13 January 1933), pp. 73-76. 
10. Burgelin sees that even in the child's minority the father commands law­
fully only for the good of his offspring: O.C., 4:310 n. 3. 
11. Cf. second "Discours," O.C., 3:176-80; "Emile," p. 848, and cf. p. 311. 
12. "Emile," p. 263 n. 3; "Considerations" O.C., 3:955; C.G., 17:157, letter 
to the Marquis de Mirabeau, 26 July, 1767. 
13. "Lettres de la montagne," loc cit., pp. 841-42, 891. "Considerations," 
loc. cit., pp. 953-55, 972-74. For the Contrat social see below. 
14. For example, CE. Vaughan, S. Cotta, L.G. Crocker, J.I. Me Adam. 
Cf. chap. 2 above, n. 45. For Crocker see his aforesaid study of the Contrat 
social: pp. 44, 46, 57-58, 61, 62-63, 73, 74, etc. For McAdam see "Rousseau 
and the Friends of Despotism," Ethics 74 (1963): 34-43. J.-D. Candaux is in­
clined to support Vaughans views: O.C., 3:812 n. 5. On the other hand, Derathe 
is conscious of the discipline implied in the idea of sovereignty: ibid., p. 372 n. 
3. Cf. R. Derathe, J.-J. Rousseau et la science politique de son temps. (Paris: 
Presses universitaires de France, 1950), p. 117. A. Cobban also sees Rousseau's 
concern for human rights, e.g., "New Light on the Political Thought of Rous­
seau," Political Science Quarterly 66 (1951): 272-84. So does Broome in Rous­
seau: A Study of His Thought (London: Arnold, 1963), pp. 64-66. 
15. Cf. The Republic 9. 591-92. The sage takes heed that no disorder occur 
in the city within, such as might arise from superfluity or want, or from private 
or public honors. The same may be said of Rousseau's perfect man or human 
self as opposed to the disordered individual. 
16. He is clearly referring to the state of affairs in actual society. See "Lettre 
a C. de Beaumont," O.C., 4:937 ff., where, explaining the ideas of Emile, he 
depicts the third state in the evolution of humanity and refers to the second 
"Discours"; see loc. cit.,pp. 173-76. He is opposing those of his contemporaries 
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who favored luxury, materialism, and benevolent despotism. Cf. Einaudi, 
The Early Rousseau (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1967), pp. 26 ff. 
17. De Cive, chap. 8 ("Du Droict des Maistres sur leurs Esclaves"). 
18. Emile is prepared for the supreme sacrifice: pp. 743, 745, 823. 
19. See. for example, O.C., 3:376 n. 1. In any case, criminal law is not 
Rousseau's theme: ibid., pt. 2, chap. 12, p. 394. 
20. "Emile," pp. 468, 473. 
21. See, for example O.C., 3:378 n. 1. 
22. "Emile," pp. 522-23, 837; "Contrat social," p. 393. Cf. Chap. 2 above, 
n. 47. 
23. "Emile," pp. 524-25. Cf. The Republic 1. 343-44. In Rousseau's view the 
anarchist, nihilist, or immoralist can be controlled only by himself and no one 
else, except in the case of children. 
24. The Republic 6. 500. For Rousseau's use of the term prince mentioned 
below, see chapter 4 of this study. 
25. The Republic 3. 399. 
26. Cf. ibid., 4. 443, and "Emile," p. 304. 
27. The Republic 6. 497. In the case of Rousseau some critics have recog­
nized him as the lawgiver, but then they do not distinguish between the law­
giver or educator on the one hand and, on the other, the governor, whom 
they call "tutor" in Emile. 
28. "Lettres a m. de Malesherbes," O.C., 1:1145. 
29. The Republic 9. 588. 
30. Cf. "Emile," pp. 313-16, and The Republic 4. 419-21; 5. 465-66; cf. also 
"Emile," pp. 512-17, and The Republic 7. 519-20. 
31. Cf. "Emile," p. 458: "Au lieu des loix sociales qu'il ne peut connoitre 
nous l'avons lie des chaines de la necessite." Cf. p. 311. Burgelin hints at the 
link between the bond of necessity and reasonable law: O.C., 4:319 n. 2; 
cf. p. 317 n. 1. 
32. Of course, Emile's virtue later becomes an effect of love and discern­
ment: pp. 339-40; cf. p. 481; cf. The Republic books 1 and 2. Regarding the lack 
of reason in children see "Emile," p. 319; cf. The Republic 4. 441. Both Rous­
seau and Socrates warn against the abuse of dialectic on the part of children: 
"Emile," p. 319; cf. The Republic 7. 537-39. The sage concludes that "philo­
sophy" is not the study of a child, but he defines it as "the practice of virtue 
in the highest sense," that is, through the autonomous use of the faculties: 
The Republic 3. 407. Cf. 6. 499. 
33. "Emile," pp. 334 n; 454; 857; cf. "Contrat social," pt. 2, chap. 12; 
cf. "Considdrations," loc. cit., p. 1001; cf. 2 Cor. 3:3; Heb. 10:16. 
34. See, for example, "Emile," pp. 322-23; cf. "Contrat social," pt. 2, chap.8. 
35. The Republic 7. 537. Socrates insists upon this throughout: 2. 370, 374; 
3. 394-97; 4. 419-23. The doctrine of natural goodness is, of course, Socratic. 
See ibid., 4. 444 (justice is as natural to the soul as health to the body); 6. 505-6 
(every soul of man pursues the good); 9. 586-87 (what is best for each man is 
also most natural). Moreover, the sage avers that his wisdom, which takes 
this into account, is the only true one: ibid., 5. 449; 8. 544. Rousseau says 
the same: "Emile," Preface; and "Lettre a C. de Beaumont," loc. cit., p. 945. 
36. The Republic 3. 405-8; 4. 425-26. Cf. Matt. 9:12. 
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37. See, for example, R. Derathe, O.C., 3:384 n. 6; cf. J.-J. Rousseau, 
The Poilitical Writings, ed. C.E. Vaughan (Cambridge: At the University Press, 
1915), 1:31-33, 71-82. 
38. The Republic 2. 374; 3. 394, 397; 4. 419-23, 430-34, 441-43. Rousseau 
exacts that rulers be superior in personal merit: second "Discours" and 
"Considerations," loc. cit., pp. 189 and 963. 
39. The Republic 4. 425. Cf. Rousseau's "Considerations," loc. cit., pp. 
1000-1003, where as usual he insists that very few laws are necessary in a 
well-ordered city. Regarding the law of education see The Republic 4. 423. In 
the second "Discours," loc. cit., p. 187, Rousseau recalls that in Sparta the 
law provided mainly for education. Fenelon adopts the idea in Les Adventures 
de Telemaque (Liege: Grandmont-Donders, 1865), book 14, pp. 246-48. 
40. For the importance of mercy in the practice of justice, see "Emile," 
pp. 511-12. For the "valetudinarians" see The Republic 3. 405-6; 4. 425-26. 
For the idea that disordered souls are sick, see "Emile," pp. 327-28. Rous­
seau's text recommending charity and beneficence is very close to Job 29:12-17. 
41. It was one of Rousseau's favorites: "Emile," pp. 331 ff., 461, 818, 
834-35; C.C., 9:125, letter to Usteri, 13 September 1761. 
42. This is a Socratic and Judeo-Christian precept. See, for example, Rom. 
13:10. Cf. The Republic 1. 335. Cf. Rousseau's second "Discours," loc. cit., 
p. 156; "Emile," p. 594; C.C., 9:125 and 14:100, letters to Usteri and Moultou, 
13 September 1761 and 25 November 1762; "Confessions," O.C., 1:356-57, 
455. 
43. Cf. "Confessions," loc. cit., pp. 20-21. 
44. "Emile," p. 467; cf. second "Discours," loc. cit., pp. 164 ff. 
45. Contrat social, pt. 1, chap. 9. Cf. The Republic 4. 443; 9. 571 ff., 
581-82, 591. Again the sage limits gain and honor to necessity lest disorder 
occur in the soul. For the idea of property founded upon work, see chapter 
2 above and note 54. 
46. "Emile," pp. 834, 835, 856. Cf. the denunciation of property in the sec­
ond "Discours," loc. cit., pp. 164 and especially 178: " . .  . Bientot il ne fut 
plus possible de trouver un seul coin dans l'univers ou Ton put s'affranchir 
dujoug... " 
47. The Republic 9. 589 (the "good husbandman"). Cf. "Emile," pp. 342 
(after the garden scene Rousseau writes: " . .  . II n'y a point de propriety 
pour cet age en aucun genre . . . " )  ; 467 and 469-70 (on the need to earn a living); 
833 (the main business of life is not to earn bread); 856 (Emile can own nothing). 
48. Cf. "Contrat social," p. 375. 
49. "Lettres morales," O.C., 4:1092. Cf. Jean Starobinski, J.-J. Rousseau: 
la transparence et I'obstacle (Paris: Plon, 1957), p. 30. 
50. Regarding education as an amusement: "Emile," pp. 344, 403, 407; 
cf. p. 351. Cf. "Considerations," chaps. 1-4. Cf. The Republic 4.424; (6.498, 
where the idea is merely implied); 7.537; 8.558. 
51. The Republic 6. 510; 7. 526-27. Cf. 533, 536-37 (where Socrates recom­
mends geometry for children providing that "early education be a sort of 
amusement"). His complaint, mentioned above, about confining study to 
childhood is in 6. 498. 
52. The Republic 2. 379 ff. Cf. 5. 450-51. 
53. See above and cf. The Republic 2. 378. Burgelin sees Plato's influence 
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here: O.C., 4:352 n. 1. Rousseau's apostrophe to La Fontaine is comparable 
to that of Socrates to Homer. He writes: "Monsieur de Lafontaine... pour 
mon eleve, permettez que je ne lui en laisse pas etudier une seule (de vos 
fables), jusqu'a ce que vous m'ayez prouvd qu'il est bon pour lui d'apprendre 
des choses dont il ne comprendra pas le quart, que dans celles qu'il pourra 
comprendre il ne prendra jamais le change . . .  " Cf. The Republic 10. 599: 
"Friend Homer... if you are able to discern what pursuits make men better 
or worse, tell us what State was ever better governed by your help... or if 
you were privately a guide or teacher of any . . .  " 
54. "Emile," p. 381. Cf. The Republic 4. All. Cf. note 49 above. 
55. For the value of gymnastic to train the soul: "Emile," pp. 359, 370-71. 
Cf. The Republic 3. 403 ff. (especially 403, 410, 412). Socrates warns against 
habit that becomes second nature in 3. 395. Cf. 404. Cf. "Emile," pp. 
407-8. For the expression "habit of order" see The Republic 4. 425. For 
Socrates' comparison of athletes to dogs: ibid., 2. 375 ff.; 3. 404; 4. 422, 440. 
56. It is more profitable here to refer to Socrates than to Locke, Condillac, 
or Diderot. 
57. "Confessions," loc. cit., p. 566; "Reveries," O.C., 1:1007. 
58. For the symbolic use of darkness see "Emile," p. 323, and cf. p. 344; 
and "Contrat social," p. 456 n. 
59. The Republic 2. 375; 3. 404; 6. 484, 488, 506, 507-8; 7. 514 ff. 
60. "Emile," pp. 393 ff., 525, 589, 806-7. Cf. The Republic 3. 403. Cf. 5. 
465-66; 10. 613, 621. Cf. 1 Cor. 9:24-27. 
61. Matt. 20:15: "Is it not lawful for me to do what I will with mine own?" 
Cf. "Dans un don que je veux bien faire, ne suis-je pas maitre de mes 
conditions?" 
62. "Lettres morales," loc. cit., p. 1093. 
63. For Rousseau's personal taste for arithmetic and geometry, see "Con­
fessions," loc. cit., pp. 179-80, 238. Regarding the notebooks in which he copied 
an elementary course in geometry, see O.C., 4:399 n. 1. 
64. Cf. Rousseau's work on "La Morale sensitive" as described in "Con­
fessions," loc. cit. p. 409 and n. 1. Gilson in Les Idees et les letters (Paris: 
Vrin, 1932), pp. 275-98, like Faguet and Mornet before him, sees fragments 
of this work in Emile, Julie, and the Contrat social. 
65. See notes 50 and 51 above. 
66. "Emile," pp. 407-9; cf. reflections on taste on pp. 671-73. The essay is 
on pp. 678-91. See chapter 5 below. Regarding taste and morals see chapter 
15 of the Essai sur I'origine des langues. 
67. For this quotation and the one below regarding the great contest: The 
Republic 3. 403. 
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IV 
Threshold 
The symmetry of Em'ile and the Contract in the third part 
of each is as transparent and enlightening as it is in the 
two previous parts. As before, many an obstinate problem 
of the treatise on citizenship finds in a collation with the 
novel a simple, lucid solution. The confrontation and cor­
relation of parallel currents of thought in both works and 
their transfer in the Socratic manner from the sphere of 
the one into that of the other have the effect that might 
be produced by fitting some hitherto half-understood ab­
stract into its proper context.1 
PREPARATIONS FOR KINGSHIP 
In Emile the author begins by considering the boy's 
strength and the use to which it is to be directed. At the 
age of twelve to fifteen years—the period covered in this 
part—he has, we are told, for the one and only stage in 
life a surplus of physical and mental energy in excess of 
the amount required to provide for his limited needs. As 
a man he " i s , " or rather "would be," very weak but as a 
child he is relatively strong. Rousseau changes " i s " to 
"would be." The fact that he at first used the simple pres­
ent indicates that he is thinking of a man too. Emile's 
energy, bred of his friendship with Jean-Jacques largely 
through the restriction of needs to narrow natural bounds, 
is invested in work, instruction, and study. The author 
almost quotes from the Sermon on the Mount when he ex­
plains that the disciple will use his strength to lay up trea­
sure for himself, not in coffers where thieves break through 
and steal, nor in barns like men who forget that life is 
more than meat, but in his person and mind, which are 
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most truly himself. 
To what studies are his energies directed? This is tanta­
mount to asking again: "Where is wisdom? Where is hap­
piness?" For, in Rousseau's view, the only pursuits 
worthy of a child and the sage he is to become are those 
that convey a knowledge of what is really useful for human 
happiness and his own, that knowledge being wisdom. 
Childish reason must therefore be changed into common 
sense and adult reason, which order and adjust all facul­
ties of soul in accordance with the constitution of the 
whole being and all its parts, and its place in the order 
of things. The governor will reduce Emile's inquiries to 
what is useful for this purpose and accessible at his age, 
namely, natural knowledge about things, their existence, 
and essential relations to himself. With this in mind 
Jean-Jacques prepares to dispel "the darkness of human 
understanding" by drawing aside the veil from the face of 
nature. In other words, the disciple is now to be led fur­
ther away from the "darkness" of the Socratic den into 
the light by means of work and study, "the steep and rug­
ged ascent" to which I alluded in my second chapter when 
I spoke of the evolutionary process that is the theme of 
Rousseau's two books. 
First the governor measures Emile's intelligence accord­
ing to his progress in geometry, with which, after the 
fashion of Socrates at the same stage, this part of the novel 
begins and ends. The moment the boy can discern what 
is "useful" and what is not, he is artfully led to specula­
tive studies and induced, for example, to find a "mean 
proportional" between two lines, or so we are told. In­
deed, the author uses the term twice to convince us that 
the child can be impelled by some strange need to dis­
cover the solution. Then, after proposing the curious 
mathematical problem, he exclaims mysteriously: "See 
how we are gradually approaching moral ideas that discern 
good from evil!" He adds that until now we have known 
no law but necessity, whereas at present we are consid­
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ering what is "useful." Here the notion of the "useful" 
appears to be obscured by the terminology, which is at 
first sight dismaying. It is elucidated by the initial chap­
ter of the matching part of the Contract where he twice 
describes government as "a mean proportional" between 
subjects and sovereign. If, authorized by that text, we 
replace the geometrical terms in Emile by the idea of 
government or kingship whose proper role in moral life 
they symbolize, we may infer that the useful knowledge 
the boy is about to acquire relates to the governing func­
tion of reason, the art of kings and sages, or philosopher-
kings. He is to be initiated into the vocation of Jean-
Jacques, who professes to confine his teaching to what 
leads to wisdom and happiness. Such is the real theme of 
the third part as revealed by this collation and confirmed 
by the context of the passage on geometry in the novel. 
With a view to instruction in good government the gover­
nor stimulates natural human curiosity to train the boy's 
reason to embrace all that contributes to his own well­
being or felicity. Such curiosity is, we are told, the kind 
that might move a philosopher, if relegated alone to a 
desert island for life, to visit his earthly habitation. This 
image that dominates the whole third part of Emile is in­
terpreted by Rousseau himself. The island of the human 
race is the earth. In that case the solitary philosopher or 
"lover of Sophia" is an image of the race itself or abstract 
man, Emile, in search of what is useful for his happiness. 
Indeed, the lad is about to be transformed into a new ava­
tar of Robinson Crusoe, and at his time of life he judges 
all things by the usefulness they might have for that hero 
of childhood whose happiness is as simple as his own. 
Of course, the child's concept of the "useful" will fall far 
short of the governor's. Yet there is no discrepancy be­
tween them. Emile, limited to what is of "real utility," 
has a childish, Robinsonian idea of it since he is confined 
to the narrowest sphere in material life, but that is the 
very condition of the greatest possible spiritual expansion. 
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The harsh discipline that subjects him to necessity from 
the first still prevails under the law of expediency and 
liberates the spirit to prepare him for his destined place 
as sage and ruler in the world within. Hence the governor 
employs what is useful in the boy's eyes to train him for 
an understanding of what is useful to achieve wisdom and 
happiness through self-government, a process that depends 
for its success upon that narrow view of expediency in 
physical life. 
The writer is here inspired not only by the Sermon on 
the Mount but also by the teachings of Socrates. For ex­
ample, Jean-Jacques calls the useful "noble" and "sacred." 
So does the Greek master, who explains that all things be­
come useful only by their use of the idea of good. For 
him what is useful is wisdom turned toward moral truth or, 
as he says, whatever draws the soul toward true being or 
the good. This is the very sense in which Emile's gover­
nor uses the term when he proposes as his object the 
felicity of the sage and defines the useful as whatever is 
conducive to that end. In fact, the useful studies ultimately 
recommended in this part match the Socratic ones, which, 
as the master admits, are commonly called "useless" but 
which in his eyes are "useful" if sought after with a view 
to the beautiful and the good; but if pursued in any other 
spirit (for example, that of the shopkeeper), they are quite 
useless. The same beliefs determine Emile's studies at 
this stage and the use to which his reason is put. If, in the 
words of the Greek thinker, "the excellence or beauty or 
truth of every structure... and of every action of man is 
relative to the use for which nature or the artist has in­
tended them," then the excellence of reason is relative to 
its use for purposes of government and the enforcement of 
law for which nature has designed it, rather than for shop-
keeping.2 And so Emile is initiated into its real use. 
The idea that the sum of physical and spiritual strength 
fostered in soul or city by the society of friends must be 
governed and directed to whatever is useful for the happi­
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ness of the moral being enunciated in the laws is the theme 
of the third part of the Contract. Like the matching third 
part of Emile it contains a study of government. The first 
chapter deals with the subject in general. It begins sig­
nificantly with a comparison between the relationship of 
body and soul in a man and the operations of government 
and sovereignty in a city. "Every free act," says the 
writer, "has two causes . . . one moral: the will that de­
termines the act; the other physical: the strength that exe­
cutes it." In like manner the "moral person" of the city 
possesses both strength and will. These are the legislative 
power belonging to the sovereign people, whose acts are 
general principles providing for common utility, and the 
executive power, consisting of specific deeds delegated 
to an agent. The agent performs the function of the brain 
or reason in the soul by moving all forces to do the bidding 
of the will so that desires may not exceed strength and 
body and spirit may be brought into unison. That is pre­
cisely the role of Jean-Jacques' reason in the novel, and 
it is also the art he teaches. In the Contract the agent of 
the sovereign, its minister so to speak, is termed "govern­
ment," considered from the point of view of its function 
as the lawful exercise of executive power. The body in 
which it is vested is called the "prince," and its mem­
bers bear the name of "magistrates," "kings," or "gov­
ernors." The language and the mentality are both biblical 
and Socratic. The idea that reason must rule or, as the 
Greek sage phrases it, that philosophers must be kings, is 
the third great "wave" that he must overcome before he 
can found his city. His rulers, like Rousseau's, are called 
"kings," "ministers of justice," "governors," or "magis­
trates."3 As in Emile and the Contract, they guide the 
resources born of the city toward the happiness that is its 
object, implying at once the narrowest material limits and 
the largest spiritual growth. 
In the same chapter of the Contract, on government in 
general, this agent of the supreme power, who is as it were 
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a bond between body and soul, is accordingly defined as 
intermediary between subjects and sovereign, or, if we 
wish, between desires and will combined in the same per­
sons. Since the latter are subject only to the law of their 
own highest faculty, the government of reason is subject 
to the same law and rules in obedience to it to maintain 
freedom. For Rousseau as for Socrates, Christ,4 and the 
biblical writers too, true kingship or government is in the 
nature of a service, a ministry to others and sacrifice of 
self. He therefore rejects the idea accepted by his contem­
poraries that its institution is a covenant like that which 
establishes the sovereign power. This idea is all the more 
preposterous in his eyes since the ruling faculty is prone 
to be seduced by the blandishments of wayward desires. 
And so he considers it as subordinate to the constant 
will that remains an infallible guide to judge the use or 
abuse of reason in the executive power. To represent the 
latter as he sees it, he twice calls it by the mathematical 
term used as often in Emile, a "mean proportional" be­
tween sovereign and state, since it receives from the for­
mer both the directions it gives to the people and the force 
of which it disposes and which it may not exceed. This is 
in accordance with his Socratic vision of a well-ordered 
and harmonious constitution wherein all parts do their own 
work without interfering with others, the will being in high 
command, the governing power of reason ruling in obedi­
ence "in the form of a servant," and the subject desires 
or gainful faculties taking their natural place in submission. 
It is to accentuate the value of objectivity in acts of 
government that Rousseau, like Socrates, has recourse to 
the language of mathematics in both books. But the Greek 
philosopher uses it to measure the happiness of the true 
governor or king, who is king of self, and to compare that 
sum of felicity with the misery of the tyrant. To describe 
the interrelationships of spiritual forces, he favors musical 
terminology, likening the three powers in soul or city— 
reason, spirit, and desire—to the higher, lower, and mid­
1150] 
THRESHOLD 
die notes of the scale and the intermediate intervals, 
which must be harmonized into one. This idea is akin to 
that of the "mean proportional."5 But Rousseau prefers 
the mathematical term and shows how appropriate it is to 
express his meaning. For example, in a city the ratio or 
relationship of subjects or desires to the sovereign will, 
a ratio that determines the strength and integrity of the 
governing faculty, depends upon many factors, including 
the size of the city or "moral person." In a large one, 
where the temptations of prestige and wealth are numer­
ous and persuasive and the individual shares less in sov­
ereignty, there is need for a stronger governing power, 
which in turn must be controlled by greater "will power." 
Since the process is endless, the author disapproves of 
large cities. Analogously in Emile he counsels all men not 
to extend their being through space and time in pursuit of 
power and wealth until their lives are at the discretion of 
events essentially foreign to themselves and causing dis­
order within them. In that case "imaginary" desires in­
crease and multiply to deceive and enslave the proper 
agent of the sovereign will. 
To conclude his general chapter on government, Rous­
seau declares that this new "moral person," as he calls 
the governing power, who is active as participant in sov­
ereignty and passive as subject to the laws it enforces, has 
only a borrowed and subordinate life. It is an artificial 
body that is the work of another artificial body, the sov­
ereign. Of course, for reason is a product of art necessary 
to consummate the disciplined human will in the complex 
civilized soul. The author suggests that to prevent its 
abuse in morals or citizenship is practically impossible. 
But he also says that, apart from its "subordinate life," it 
it must have a vitality of its own in order to perform its law­
ful functions, combine its resources, take counsel, deliber­
ate, make resolutions, and enjoy the rights and privileges 
necessary to save the constitution. These are precisely the 
prerogatives of reason exemplified in Jean-Jacques' con­
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cept of government in Emile, where the neophyte is 
gradually initiated into its mysteries. 
Since the Rousseauist governor approaches his task in 
the manner of Socrates, I might profitably explain the au­
thor's use of the Republic at this juncture. Whereas 
Emile's early discipline as a Socratic guardian was the 
theme of the second part, his training as a philosopher-
king is the theme of the rest of the book. The third part 
contains the preparation for the education of a king; the 
fourth is an exposition of the formation required; and the 
fifth offers a spectacle of the inner realm of the ruler. 
Socrates, who has a fancy for musical terms since his pur­
pose is to create and maintain harmony in the soul, calls 
the present stage "the prelude to the chief strain," com­
ing after "the strain of necessity" and "the strain of free­
dom," and leading to the chief strain of kingship. For 
Rousseau too this is the prelude to his own chief strain, 
which is the next part and especially the Song of Orpheus, 
as he calls his profession of faith therein. His prelude is 
inspired by the sage's contained in the seventh book of 
Plato's dialogue, upon which he draws heavily. In doing 
so, he takes the opposite course to the one he followed in 
the previous part. There he began by describing the prin­
ciples and virtues of the moral being and the laws devised 
to shape it, and then depicted the discipline required, in­
verting the order of the first four books of the Republic. 
Here he begins with the process of education, or rather 
the content and method of the basic or preliminary train­
ing prescribed, and then in the fourth part proceeds to 
describe the nature and formation of the philosopher-king. 
But since in the case of kings Socrates follows a sequence 
that is the reverse of the previous one, Rousseau still 
inverts the order. I emphasize this because it is probably 
one reason why we have not previously recognized that 
Emile and the Contract are essentially a Rousseauist 
version of the Republic. 
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For greater clarity let me show briefly how Socrates 
handles the education of kings from the fifth to the sev­
enth books. In the fifth, having discussed the role of wom­
en, which is the apparent theme of the Aemilian finale, 
he deals with the problem of evil and the value of sym­
pathy to solve it, and finally discloses his ideal, which is 
to ensure that philosophers are kings, ideas that recur 
throughout the next part of Emile. The sixth book deals 
with the philosophic nature and its vocation and is also 
an important guide in the next part of Rousseau's novel. 
The same sixth book culminates with a similitude of the 
sun that is matched by an analogous one in the midst of 
the corresponding Aemilian text in the profession of faith. 
In the seventh book the sage finally broaches his "prelude" 
and leads his prisoners away from the den into the light, 
but first redefines the happiness of kings and sages that 
he visualizes, exactly as Rousseau does in the present 
part. Socrates' "prelude" consists of studies "useful" to 
that end, to prepare the reason for its proper role as ruler, 
not shopkeeper. It also specifies the qualities and age of 
student kings. The reader will see for himself how closely 
the author of Emile follows his pattern. 
The Aemilian prelude is heralded by a little similitude 
of the sun foreshadowing the real one, and both reflect 
the Socratic imagery. The writer here sees the sunrise as 
an immense fire in the firmament scattering "the veil of 
darkness" and of night. The same veil covers what he 
called earlier the dark recesses of the mind, where he 
feared to light the torch of reason too soon. Like the Greek 
sage he thinks of the sun as linking sight and visibility, 
and in this respect it is the Socratic "author of sight," 
which he has already called "the sense least separable from 
the judgments of the mind." Hence we have his sanction 
to see in the sunrise a dramatization of the dawn of manly 
reason. The child now beholds the earth in the light of rea­
son—a light that proceeds from truth, which is bound to 
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turn out to be moral truth as is usual with Rousseau. 
In the child's case, we are told, the light lacks warmth 
of feeling, since his heart is not yet stirred by the harmony 
of the universe. Besides, he contemplates the works of 
creation without seeing the "workman," whose absence is, 
however, rather obtrusive. In the next part when the great 
"artist" is at last revealed, Jean-Jacques exclaims how 
simple it is to rise from the study of nature to the search 
for its author, thereby confessing the reason for his pres­
ent explorations of the "island" of the world. When Rous­
seau finally broaches the sublime theme and returns to 
the symbol of the sun, he uses it with very different effect 
in a new and fuller similitude in the profession of faith, 
where reason is by then perfected by feeling. 
We come now to the "steep and rugged ascent" of the 
future Aemilian and Socratic king. It is designed to give 
him a taste for intellectual toil until his vision, still per­
plexed and weak, becomes accustomed to the brightness 
of reality, and he is able to rise to the upper levels of 
the higher intellect. 
Among the "useful" studies of the spiritual ascent, geom­
etry is employed both first and last to illustrate the proper 
and objective use of the speculative faculty in its role as 
ruler. But the boy's main study, which ultimately leads to 
the source and pattern of all kingship and sovereignty, is 
the exploration of the earth and the examination of the 
products of nature and of art in their relationships to him­
self. He thereby acquires a few elements of the Socratic 
natural sciences and of the industrial and mechanical arts. 
In recommending the arts and the sciences, he has not 
forgotten that he is the author of a Discourse contending 
that their restoration has helped "to corrupt morals," in 
the words of Fenelon.6 But in his view morals are cor­
rupted not by the proper use of the arts and the sciences 
but by their abuse in our society. For Emile the arts and 
the sciences are the preamble of the great revelations of 
the next part. 
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He begins with astronomy, combined with a rather un­
conventional kind of geography, for the purpose of learn­
ing how to orient himself in the world of things. His 
governor's laconic, or rather Socratic, questions stimu­
late him to solve problems relating to the heavens and the 
earth and the laws that govern them.7 These researches 
are complemented by a study of local topography and by 
the making of maps of the immediate surroundings. Since 
few of us at Emile's age have ever felt the "useful­
ness" of such knowledge to find our way about, it is log­
ical to suspect the presence of symbolism here. 
It resides in the concept of "orientation." Here the word 
means the ascertainment of the compass-bearings of the 
soul on its journey toward the good represented by the 
sun, whose light, as I have hinted, is that of moral truth. 
The idea is Socratic, as we know- Rousseau himself sug­
gests the allegorical meaning. He does so by reminding us 
in this very context that Emile already has "a compass in 
his eyes" and then by teaching him soon after that the 
mathematical instrument does not suffice and that he needs 
a helmsman's compass, too, not in his eyes or in his hands 
but in his soul. We shall come to that lesson in a moment. 
Meanwhile we may observe that the author connects the 
two compasses and intends a continuity of imagery, al­
though he uses a different word in each case. The magnet­
ized needle turning upon a pivot suggests to the mind a 
relationship with the geometrical instrument. Both are used 
in the novel as images of reason trained in the helmsman's 
art, and the helm, as we know, is the law. The boy learns 
to use his reason to "orient" his life toward the proper 
object of the will. Meanwhile he is unwittingly guided by 
his gouverneur. The allegory of the pilot that necessarily 
runs throughout the book becomes almost obtrusive in this 
part on government. That is as it should be. 
The Socratic heroes undergo the same discipline. After 
beginning with mathematics, considered "useful to draw 
the soul toward being" or moral truth, they approach as­
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tronomy as another theme "useful" for the same purpose. 
As they do so, one of the sage's youthful listeners, mo­
mentarily losing sight of the goal, remarks that this sub­
ject would be "useful" to a general, a farmer and a sailor 
(though he is not thinking of the "true pilot") since it 
would help them orient themselves in a literal sense. The 
master in his reply expresses amusement at his young 
friend's "fear of the world" and desire to "guard against 
the appearance of insisting upon useless studies" that 
"purify and re-illumine the eye of the soul" to reveal 
moral truth. The object of such studies is the spiritual 
orientation envisaged by Rousseau. The latter takes to 
heart the sage's advice to the youth to face the fact that 
some persons will see "no sort of profit which is to be 
obtained" from his words, since the kind of profit desired 
has nothing to do with shopkeeping and lies beyond child­
ish minds. Emile, though a child, is not one of them since 
Jean-Jacques uses his first lowly steps in the intellectual 
ascent to raise him at last to a loftier concept of what is 
useful for his happiness. That is because the governor fol­
lows Socrates' advice to the letter. For example, he uses 
"the spangled heavens" as a pattern with a view to higher 
knowledge, for which he prepares his pupil by problems 
to exercise his reason and teach him to reflect, deliberate 
and resolve, and ultimately to govern and orient the soul 
toward what is regarded as its proper end, namely, the 
good. So does Socrates.8 Both quite obviously have in 
mind the great similitude of the sun to follow later. 
Rousseau, like his model, is therefore mainly concerned 
here with the art of reasoning and of examining the truth 
of things. At this juncture, after the example of the master, 
he dwells upon the importance of that art. He warns that 
the child can acquire it only by using his reason indepen­
dently. Accordingly, Jean-Jacques secretly induces him to 
learn alone, to discover his own mistakes and gather clear 
ideas instead of facts. Moreover, he refuses to be a slave 
to the boy's questions, and answers them only enough to 
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stimulate curiosity but not enough to satiate it. In exactly 
the same context of the "prelude" Socrates too demands 
that his prospective rulers develop great skill in asking 
and answering questions, and advises against encouraging 
them to interrogate and argue for the sole purpose of refut­
ing other people. Jean-Jacques also resembles the master— 
again in the same context—when he further arouses curi­
osity by connecting knowledge in a manner suited to a 
child, one object naturally suggesting another to the mind.9 
To ensure, however, that the young scholar understands 
the difference between the use of reason and its abuse, 
the Rousseauist governor devises a new parable that is, 
appropriately enough, a tribute to Socrates but has hitherto 
been ignored as such. In tracing meridians to make maps 
to find their way about, the friends are led to the study of 
the magnet and ultimately to the helmsman's compass. 
One day they go to a fair where they watch a juggler using 
bread with a magnet hidden inside it to attract a wax duck 
floating upon water. On their arrival home they imitate 
him. The same evening again at the fair they confound 
the performer in the eyes of his audience and take pride in 
displaying their prowess at his expense. The following 
day they return to the scene of their triumph, only to be 
mortified in their turn by one failure after another, while 
the conjuror enthralls the spectators with his "miracles." 
The moral so far is that reason has been put to the wrong 
use, resulting in vanity, error, and disgrace.10 
But there is more to the parable than that. The juggler, 
secretly prompted by Jean-Jacques, as we are told in a note 
testifying to the symbolism here, pays a visit to the friends 
and complains that they had tried to rob an honest man of 
his livelihood, the only talent he has to earn his bread. 
Thereupon he discloses the secret of his exploits. When 
they offer him a gift, he refuses it: he takes no money in 
return for his teaching. Here he resembles not only the 
author, who earned his living copying music, not writing 
books, but also the two great masters, who took no fee 
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for their lessons. He also resembles Jean-Jacques. Before 
taking his leave, he reproaches the latter for failing to 
counsel the child in his ignorance. The older man's exper­
ience, says he, is the authority that must guide the other. 
At once the governor promises Emile to protect his inter­
ests in future by telling him of his mistakes beforehand. 
The reader is then informed that their relationship is about 
to change: Jean-Jacques is to be no longer an apparently 
complacent companion but a severe master. The change is 
anticipated by "our conjuror Socrates." For so he is 
called in this simple humble tribute to the teacher who 
uses the art of conjuring in the Republic to illustrate the 
illusions of the mind and the need for reason to combat 
them.11 The scene closes with the words: "All this to 
make a compass to take the place of meridians"12 for 
purposes of orientation. 
This part of the story requires commentary. The hero is 
being initiated into the notion of work as a means of earning 
bread, an idea vaguely present in the races for cakes or 
mimic Olympics. For Rousseau this notion implies a rudi­
mentary form of justice in the Socratic sense, demanding, 
as we said above, that each class or faculty do its own 
work and refrain from meddling with others.13 The sage 
himself, that great magician, is brought into the story to 
teach a basic lesson in the specific virtue that was the 
whole object of his quest in life. Emile has just meddled 
with others, committing a real injustice and not an imagin­
ary one as in the parable of the sower. Hence he is in need 
of positive government and the guidance of greater age 
and experience to teach him to practice true justice and 
prevent him from harming others and bringing misfortune 
upon himself, until he knows enough about the proper use 
of reason for these purposes. The conjuror performs a real 
miracle by preparing him to recognize the need for direc­
tion in due course, and in addition arms him against ser­
ious illusions and false miracles later on.14 
The compass that, according to the conclusion of the 
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parable, Emile has obtained must therefore be the one 
Jean-Jacques promises him therein, the ministry of his 
governor's reason. Of course he possesses it already, 
but he is unaware of that until later when the myth of 
the magician takes effect. At no time does he have any 
other compass but a symbolic one. That is why the gover­
nor, having said that they now have a compass to replace 
meridians, proceeds to give his pupil a lesson in orienting 
himself by means of the sun. It is also why Emile later 
possesses no compass literally speaking when, lost in a 
wood, he stands urgently in need of one. Then it is the 
helmsman's reason that becomes "that trembling vassal of 
the Pole, the feeling compass, nagivation's soul." The 
pole would be divine wisdom, Sophia, toward which the 
pilot-governor's course is oriented.15 
It is important to know what form of government Jean-
Jacques embodies and teaches in Emile. The answer is 
abundantly clear in the novel and is reflected in several 
chapters of the corresponding part of the Contract dealing 
with different kinds of government. "The principle that 
constitutes various forms of government," in the wording 
of the title of the second chapter, is the number of gover­
nors to whom the executive power is entrusted. Rousseau 
begins by establishing that the more governors there are, 
the less active the government is, even though it may be 
more righteous. He then considers two forms both of 
which he rejects. The first is the intensely active rule of 
one, who consolidates within himself the force of the en­
tire association but uses it to serve his own private inter­
ests or desires. The second is the government of the whole 
moral being in which the legislative authority reposes, 
whose will is righteous but whose governing power lacks 
energy, since its preocupation with general principles and 
abstract concepts makes it unable to cope with specific 
issues efficiently and expeditiously. The alternatives given 
only lead to an impasse and hardly correspond to the ideal 
situation in the novel. 
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In the third chapter, "Division of Governments," the 
author distinguishes three forms and emphasizes the role 
of the supreme command of will in their establishment: 
the democratic, suited to a small city, wherein the sover­
eign entrusts the administration to all or most of the people; 
the aristocratic, befitting a city of moderate size, wherein 
the sovereign confides it to less than half of them; and 
finally, the monarchy or rule of one man, expedient only 
for vast states. In all cases the difficulty of the subordi­
nation of powers accentuates the mythical nature of his 
city. And so he adds significantly that government is sus­
ceptible of as many forms as the state has citizens, sug­
gesting that the only true one is self-government. This is 
the message of Emile too. Of course, one of the three 
forms or a modification of it must then be adapted to the 
direction of inner life. 
The next (fourth) chapter of the Contract, "Concerning 
Democracy," deals with a form that Rousseau positively 
rejects as impossible. Yet many scholars today, like his 
contemporaries, see in the book a theory of democracy 
since he makes the king a mere governor to execute the 
sovereign will of the people. But a constitution of that kind 
would, in his Socratic terminology, be called not a democ­
racy but a republic or ideal city.16 He has already said that 
for him a democracy is a city wherein the administration 
is assigned to the whole nation and that the latter cannot 
cope with practical problems posed by the intrigues of 
private passions in particular acts, a truth that is also illus­
trated in the Republic. According to the present chapter, 
a city that would never face such problems would not need 
to be governed at all since it would be a minute epitome of 
the simplicity, equality, ascetism, and virtue of men so per­
fectly one that the execution of the laws would immediately 
follow from the sovereign will. He concludes that this 
form of government would be suited only to a nation of 
gods. He means, as we are told later in Emile, that the 
divine intelligence acts intuitively without reasoning and 
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the divine will takes effect without means.17 Men are other­
wise, alas! And so the Rousseauist city is not democratic 
in the sense defined by the author, who in any case has 
long since rejected dwarf cities as he did giant ones in 
favor of those of moderate size. 
Even if we confuse democracy with self-government, his 
ideal could hardly be called democratic in the Rousseauist 
view, since the term "self-government" suggests that there 
is a self to govern and another to be governed. But Rous­
seau does not confuse his terms. If, as democracy implies 
for him in any moral being whether city or soul, the reso­
lutions of the will always remain the measure of the im­
pulses of desire without the deliberations and guidance of 
reason, then as he has said the governing function, be­
stowed upon reason by nature herself, would not need to 
act at all to maintain a balance of powers and desires, 
and even self-government would be unnecessary. But that 
is impossible, even for Emile. He is being governed now 
as he is to be all his life long. Only he is not ruled 
democratically. 
In the novel, as we know, Jean-Jacques' rule repre­
sents that of a distinguished minority like that which gov­
erns the inner world of the soul where there is a hierarchy 
among the faculties. In him the power of reason follows 
its natural vocation and rules in the service of the sover­
eign will. The compass, the tiniest part of the soul obeying 
the human spirit's deepest aspiration, rules the large part 
consisting of the great obscure and formless mass of mul­
titudinous desires. Judgment and decision belong to the 
elite, for nature herself ordains it. The governor is at pres­
ent teaching Emile that very lesson, and when the boy fin­
ally governs himself, he does so in the manner of Jean-
Jacques. 
In the Contract too Rousseau favors aristocratic rule. 
He does so in the fifth chapter, "Concerning Aristoc­
r acy" But he begins by stipulating that governors, like 
Socratic kings, be servants of the nation, or rather, of 
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the righteous will. He distinguishes three forms of aris­
tocracy. The first is natural, based upon age and "the au­
thority of experience," says he, quoting the conjuror's 
words in Emile. This kind of government befits a child 
or, if we wish, humanity in its childhood. Then there is the 
elective aristocracy seen in the next part of the novel where 
the hero, having learned the art of self-government, ap­
points Jean-Jacques to be his "minister of education," or 
"governor," until he can safely serve and rule himself 
aristocratically, as he must do in the inevitable absence of 
the ideal social order. Finally there is the hereditary 
aristocracy, dismissed by the author as the worst of all. 
He prefers the elective by reason of its visible bene­
fits. They include the separation of the supreme will and 
governing faculty, and also the advantage of being able to 
choose as governors, not people who embody the desire 
for wealth and power as has supposedly been done in the 
historical past, but distinguished men of integrity, en­
lightenment, and experience. The rulers of his own city 
are, as we know, men who have proven their superiority. 
And so in this chapter he favors "sage rulers" or "philo­
sopher kings," providing they rule for the profit of all 
instead of their own private benefit, and begin by ruling 
themselves. It is useless to reproach him for controlling 
"individuals"—or individualist desires—by means of a 
small select leadership since that is admittedly what he 
intends to do. He concludes by saying that under such an 
administration rigorous equality is not necessary, since 
governors must of course have the means to exercise 
their function. He said the same in the penultimate chap­
ter of the previous part. This is not a violation of the prin­
ciple that property must be based upon need before it can 
become a legitimate right in any city, however governed. 
It simply means that the governing power in city or soul 
is supported by gainful faculties and is reduced to the 
necessities of its station in life, as are those faculties 
themselves. This is the case in Emile, where all the con­
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ditions of good government are translated into the domain 
of private life. 
The nature of good government is further elucidated in 
the novel by another parable, that of Montmorency forest. 
Before dealing with it, I must explain the context in which 
it occurs. Like the myth of the conjuror, this one too is 
connected with the study of the so-called natural sciences. 
The acquisition of the "compass" leads the friends into 
the vast domain of systematic physics. They create their 
own instruments to perform experiments in the world of 
nature in such a manner that the reason is slowly enlight­
ened by clear, well-related ideas. Rousseau comments that 
among the many fine shortcuts to knowledge, we sorely 
need someone to teach us the art of learning with difficulty. 
Here he is still inspired by Socrates, who in the same con­
text describes the attributes necessary to profit by his 
teaching and demands that his future kings be able to en­
dure the severity of study, that they be sound in body and 
mind and lovers of the labor of both. Emile's "laborious 
researches" are dictated by the same considerations. They 
allegedly combine the gymnastic of the athlete with the in­
tellectual discipline of the sage and raise him at last "from 
the amusements of philosophy... . to the true function of 
a man." Now a man's true function, still unknown to the 
boy, is philosophy, but not in the sense understood by the 
writer's contemporaries who discredited the term in his 
eyes, nor even in the sense of the study of science as some 
of us have recently supposed, but in the Socratic sense of 
the practice of wisdom for the sake of felicity. In order 
that the hero may practice it without compulsion as the 
Greek sage advises, he is taught that wisdom suits his na­
ture and is useful for his happiness. For example, we are 
told that he is learning to exercise enough reason and fore­
sight to see the value of work and submit to the law of nec­
essity with a view to providing for the modest needs and 
simple happiness of natural man, in accordance with the 
Socratic law of justice herewith presented in a form slightly 
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more refined than before. But Emile is not yet a moral 
being since his virtues are practiced unconsciously and are 
still only "images of virtue." Jean-Jacques is preparing 
him for that higher vocation and training his reason for its 
proper role therein, simply by confining him to activities 
conforming with his childish notion of present utility. "What 
is the use of that?" becomes a phrase as "sacred" for 
Rousseau as it is for his Greek master, since it signifies 
what is useful to the boy in the present to pave the way for 
the happiness of the sage, as we were informed earlier. 
With that phrase the governor quells his ward's inquiries 
and teaches him "to interrogate like Socrates," says the 
writer, referring openly to the very context of the Republic 
by which he is here inspired. If Emile in his turn responds 
to his governor's rare queries in like manner, Jean-Jacques 
in his reply never loses sight of the double meaning of what 
is useful for his pupil's happiness, implying both limited 
material bounds and unlimited spiritual scope. This brings 
us to the parable of Montmorency forest. 
In the midst of conversations about orienting oneself by 
the sun and observations about the position of the forest 
north of the village, Emile suddenly asks: "What is the use 
of that?" Jean-Jacques simply abandons the subject. But 
next morning he contrives to see that they go astray in 
those very woods, though, of course, he himself is far from 
lost. The boy sheds tears of despair though "the real 
Emile" never weeps. He is famished, and, to make matters 
worse, it is noon and dinnertime. After a while Jean-
Jacques like another Socrates suddenly recalls the previous 
day's discussion. At midday they can find the north judging 
by the direction of the shadows. To make their way toward 
the village, they need only take the opposite course from 
the darkness toward the light. For the first time in his life 
the happy Emile addresses his governor as his "good 
friend" while they follow the path leading out of the 
woods. The new Robinson Crusoe at last discovers "the 
footprints in the sand," an awareness of others that will 
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conduct him to the desired goal. 
This parable, presented as a dramatic dialogue like that 
of the sower, clothes the author's ideas in visible imagery 
essential to the literary art. Here Emile appears as an im­
age of natural man who is already unconsciously prepared 
for integration, since he sees that if he does not find his 
way out of the forest, he will starve. He is to become aware 
of the necessity for entering society in order to provide 
for the needs of life, the first and greatest of which is food, 
the very condition of existence.18 He must go forth to pro­
cure what is "useful" for his well-being as simply as he 
conceives it. In fact, he is about to be transplanted from 
his country garden to the city of Paris in the second part 
of this phase of his training. 
But other elements of symbolism in the myth show that 
the idea of usefulness extends much further than the boy 
can see. He not only moves from the woods to the social 
order to provide for his needs, but at the same time emerges 
from the shadows into the light, from the semidarkness of 
mental dawn toward the radiance of "truth." Now, as we 
have observed, that truth, born in society, is less intellec­
tual than moral. Here it implies the idea of work as a form 
of Socratic justice for which the boy is being prepared. The 
parable contributes to lead him thither by way of spiritual 
"orientation"—the pilot's art—again suggested by the 
problems of astronomy with their allegorical overtones. 
Accordingly, almost immediately after the miniature 
drama, the writer again refers to the ultimate goal of Rous­
seauist and Socratic reason, unknown, of course, to the 
child: "the happiness of the sage and the glory of para­
dise." The author has this in mind, therefore, in the para­
ble itself. He virtually says so in an allusion to it in the 
sequel to Emile—also inspired by The Republic—where 
it is interpreted symbolically. In an ethical situation in that 
fragmentary work, Emile says: "I took the direction con­
trary to the object that I was morally obliged to avoid, 
in the same way that I followed the opposite of the shadow 
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years ago in Montmorency forest."19 In a sense the whole 
allegory is a new appeal to men to find their way out of 
the woods and their amoral or immoral plight, and to orient 
their lives toward justice and spiritual values already 
roughly sketched in the apologue of the conjuror Socrates. 
Of course, the hero is not led from the woods by his own 
reason. He is guided by the light of the sun and the com­
pass that he discovered as a result of his encounter with 
the conjuror, namely, reason in the gouvemeur and the 
truth that lights its way. What is important here is that he 
feels this personally to the point of calling Jean-Jacques 
his "good friend." The phrase is suggestive of a Socratic 
utterance in Plato's third book where the sage, forming his 
guardians, anticipates the training of kings in words that 
resound throughout Emile, as we shall see: "When reason 
comes, he [the pupil] will recognize and salute the friend 
with whom his education has made him long familiar."20 
The reason that is friendly to nature must finally appear to 
him as such. But until it does and he has a "compass" of 
his own, he is brought to feel more and more deeply the 
need for Jean-Jacques' rule and is even led to implore it 
as a grace. 
There is an allegory in the fourth book of the Republic 
that combines most of the elements of the myth of Mont­
morency forest and casts light upon the moral function of 
reason therein. Socrates and his friends appear as hunts­
men in a forest in search of game, reminiscent of Emile's 
dinner. But the Greek master, like Jean-Jacques, has some­
thing else in mind, and the real object of his search is 
justice. His young friends, like Emile, "have just eyes 
enough to see what the master shows them." And although 
Socrates remarks, "Here is no path and the wood is dark 
and perplexing," yet we have the feeling that he is no more 
lost than the Rousseauist governor, for he suddenly finds 
the quarry as close by as the village in Emile. Rousseau is 
fascinated with the story. He returns to it in the fourth 
part where the lad goes hunting just before he discovers 
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true justice, and again in the fifth where the two friends 
lose their way thrice in the woods in their search for So­
phia, who turns out to be close by. And so the Socratic 
symbolism of the hunt for wisdom employed in the third 
part is rich in potential reverberations and becomes, as it 
were, a recurrent motif or musical phrase sustained through­
out the harmonious temple of the soul. 
IMAGES OF JUSTICE 
Emile is at last transplanted to the French capital to 
study the arts after exploring the sciences. To represent 
the spiritual isolation of natural man in a strange setting 
before he becomes active as social or moral man, to pre­
pare him for that vocation, and to initiate him into society, 
the author has recourse to the allegory of Robinson Crusoe 
to which he alluded at the beginning of this part. The nar­
rative becomes very personal here, for, in his autobiog­
raphy and Dialogues, he is himself the "new Robinson 
Crusoe."21 So is Emile. This is another confession that in 
the novel Rousseau is really telling the tale of his own spir­
itual aspirations. The allegory opens with a violent diatribe 
against "bookish learning," which has nothing to do with 
them. The fact is that Emile does not confine himself to 
reading the story of Robinson but acts it out in real life as 
in the case of previous myths. Indeed, this is the first one 
not invented by Jean-Jacques, although all are at least 
partially inspired by outside sources, especially the Repub­
lic and later La Fontaine's fables. The eponymous hero, 
like another Robinson Crusoe, learns to provide alone for 
the needs of natural man, which are those of his own life 
and happiness, beginning with the need for bread glimpsed 
in the conjuror's complaints and personally felt in the for­
est. He does so by means of the natural arts that a man 
may practice by himself and that afford no other felicity 
but freedom of spirit and the bare necessities of life. How­
ever, by favor of those very assets, he is soon to become 
an active moral being, "king of himself' as Robinson was 
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king of his island and Adam king of his. Indeed, Jean-
Jacques uses the myth of the great hero of childhood to 
make his ward into a Socratic king or governor like him­
self by teaching him to use his own reason to serve his 
needs and those of others too, while making as few claims 
as possible upon his fellows. 
Emile's kingship, anticipated here, raises problems 
posed in the Contract, particularly in the sixth chapter, 
"Concerning Monarchy." It is inspired by this part of the 
novel but deals largely with the world of actuality, which 
is contrasted with the ideal. Rousseau, moved by the spec­
tacle of eighteenth-century despotism, has already shown 
the disadvantages of royal government in its contemporary 
form, and he does so again in the present context. This 
does not alter the fact that his own governors are called 
"kings," that Jean-Jacques is one of them and Emile des­
tined to become one. The author never loses sight of the 
Socratic or evangelical kingdom within. His aristocratic 
governors and sages of the previous chapter are kings like 
those of Socrates, who makes no distinction at all between 
the royal and aristocratic forms of government and calls 
his rulers both "aristocratical men" and "philosopher­
kings." When Rousseau comes to speak of royal govern­
ment in the Contract, he simply reverses his own idea of 
kingship and shows the latter in practice as opposed to 
what it essentially is in his view. The whole chapter is a 
paradox. The kings evoked therein are imposters whose 
passions enslave them to the lowest elements and tyrannize 
the highest in themselves and in all those upon whom they 
depend. In its illuminating conclusion the writer actually 
refers back to the beginning of the Contract where he 
defends the kingship of man in Adam, "sovereign king of 
the world as Robinson was of his island." The heir of both 
is Emile, whose entire education is conceived to preserve 
his lofty birthright even when he is no longer alone. 
According to the chapter in question, the kings of this 
world do not pursue the common felicity that is a powerful 
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incentive for the "sages" of the previous chapter and the 
heroes of the novel. On the contrary, they flatter their 
own desire for gain and prestige as individuals, at the 
expense of human aspirations and the strength of the king­
dom that is their birthright. They thereby sacrifice the true 
king's interest to tyrannical and slavish passions. In the 
author's opinion no government is so ruinous to freedom 
and the needs of the constitution. 
It is not by accident that the rest of the chapter is de­
voted to the education of true kings. To "beget" them, 
we are told, we should have to do the antithesis of what 
we now do. Rarely, says the writer, do men "born to gov­
ern" or "steer" take the "helm" in a monarchy- Observe 
how the Aemilian myth recurs. He implies that those who 
presume to steer are not kings at all, but travesties of 
kings whose faculties are no more suited to the task than 
their training is.22 For, unlike his own "kings," they are 
taught to rule other people instead of themselves. That 
produces tyrants, not kings who know how to submit to 
the law of reason for the sake of wisdom, the discernment 
of good and evil. The idea is as old as King Solomon and 
a good deal older. As I have just said, Rousseau ends the 
chapter by referring back to the beginning of the book 
where, in addition to establishing the kingship of humanity 
in the person of Adam or Robinson Crusoe, he declares 
that a city suffering from serious disorders at the hands 
of charlatans has a right to have recourse to the services 
of a true physician, meaning a real statesman, governor, 
or king.23 The tyrants portrayed in the Contract as slaves 
are just such charlatans, and are the reverse of Socratic 
and Rousseauist kingship visualized in the sages of the 
previous chapter and in the heroes of Emile. The colla­
tion with the novel gives to the chapter on the monarchy 
a new breadth of meaning hitherto unsuspected, at least 
for some of us. 
In the next (seventh) chapter of the appendix, "Con­
cerning Mixed Governments," the author emphasizes the 
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value of mixed forms, subdivided into parts handled dif­
ferently, for the purpose of maintaining the equilibrium 
of the rational "artificial body" as an intermediary faculty 
or "mean proportional" between sovereign will and sub­
ject desires. He regards such inner adjustments as effec­
tive to preserve the ideal relations between the highest 
and lowest principles of soul or city.24 In his eyes, if the 
balance were upset, the covetous and concupiscent ele­
ments in the guise of powerful private interests would soon 
seduce the reason to tyrannize and overthrow the moral 
being. 
The author of the Contract next turns his attention to 
factors determining the wealth of a city and affecting its 
form of government. These are also the topics of the fol­
lowing pages of Emile, which begin with a discussion of 
the industrial arts and to which it is logical to revert be­
fore considering the appendix. As usual I shall confine my­
self to what is necessary to illustrate the interlocking of 
texts. 
While practising the natural arts, the "new Robinson 
Crusoe" takes a step beyond them. Suddenly he is initia­
ted into the mechanical and industrial arts that are born 
of society and make it necessary through the sharing and 
distribution of work and the resulting production of sur­
plus goods. He learns that those arts make men useful to 
one another and mutually dependent, but does not yet sus­
pect that they entail moral or immoral relationships. The 
governor traces the arts to their origins as he did in the 
case of property because the evolution of the moral being— 
the theme of Emile, the Contract, and the Republic—is 
that of human institutions.25 
As is well known, Rousseau is here inspired by the be­
ginning of the Republic where Socrates pictures the birth 
of our "luxurious" society and the conditions that neces­
sitated the formation of his own austere one. In this in­
stance the author of Emile violates the order of his model, 
since he uses the arts, as he did property, to bring the hero 
[170] 
THRESHOLD 
into active contact with that luxurious state of which the 
Greek sage takes leave at the outset. 
However, in dealing with the arts, he continues to shape 
the moral being or ideal order in the inner world or society 
of friends at the same time as he sketches it within an 
alien setting whose potential noxious effects, though hid­
den from the child, are visible to the reader. For exam­
ple, under his governor's guidance Emile esteems the arts 
according to standards other than our own. He judges them 
not with an eye to opulence but by their use to Robinson 
Crusoe. If this rule seems to belong to "an imaginary 
order," as the writer admits, that order is the Rousseauist 
and Socratic one, reduced in the material sphere to neces­
sity. The governor explains that his pupil, who is to be a 
sage, must know the truth of things before he knows men 
and their prejudices; for, he observes, "you do not lead 
a nation when you are like it." Here he hints at the kingly 
vocation for which Emile's judgment is being nurtured. 
Hence the boy knows nothing of our absurdities. Indeed, 
"he knows no other human being but himself," and he 
still has much to learn in that respect. He simply knows 
his own place in the order of things, being confined to it 
by the bonds of necessity or the law of his constitution 
instead of the laws of reason, which he does not yet recog­
nize as such. He is therefore hardly more than a physical 
being. And so he esteems the arts by their usefulness to 
the simple happiness of a creature like himself or Robin­
son, and also by their independence of other crafts, which 
makes them easier to practice. For example, he values 
agriculture, metallurgy, and carpentry in that sequence, 
which is also the historical order of their development as 
traced in the second Discourse. 
These studies serve as a preamble to lessons in poli­
tical economy and considerations of wealth and its effects 
upon government. Emile cannot help but see that the 
surplus productions of the industrial arts lead men to ex­
change with one another for the purpose of supplying their 
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own needs. Indeed, he glimpsed something of the device 
of exchange in the parable of the sower, where, however, 
it was obvious that men had gone beyond the principle of 
need. He now proceeds to investigate the interplay of 
trade and commerce, studying the products of each coun­
try, the arts and sciences of navigation, and finally trans­
portation problems arising through distance and the posi­
tion of waterways. He learns that trade of every kind, 
including all social intercourse, depends upon conventional 
equality, which is therefore the first law of society. He 
also learns that, in the world of men, this law necessitates 
positive enactments and government, and that the same 
law, in the world of things, necessitates the invention of 
money to compare the value of goods of different kinds. 
These lessons, inspired by the Socratic text mentioned in 
the penultimate paragraph above, are limited to a consider­
ation of economic relationships and exclude an explanation 
of their moral effects and abuses. 
At this perilous juncture in Emile's formation where he 
is brought into contact with an alien world, Rousseau faces 
the risks involved in the work of government. In doing so, 
he has recourse to a critical point in the same Socratic 
text, although this is not generally known. It is the point 
to which I referred earlier where the Greek master, in his 
sketch of society at its origins, is reproached by his lis­
teners for failing to give his citizens "a relish to their 
meal," whereupon he complies and then proceeds to purge 
away luxury with education and legislation. In Socratic 
phraseology, Emile is now to behold the unhealthy state of 
men who recline upon sofas and have sauces and sweets 
in the modern manner.26 Jean-Jacques escorts him to a 
sumptuous banquet but artfully contrives to turn it into 
a mimic symposium. Together they imagine the enormous 
resources called into play to supply the luxury surround­
ing them, reminiscent of the Parisian feasts of the baron 
d'Holbach. But soon afterward, to offset any false impres­
sions that may have been created in the child's mind, the 
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governor regales him with a simple rustic repast, seasoned 
with Socratic "necessary appetite," freedom of spirit, 
and delight in the society of good folk who are surely 
worthy of the Greek sage's "true and healthy state." 
Emile, like the writer whose rural repasts in life are trans­
formed into veritable idylls in the Confessions, finds more 
real pleasure in the country feast and is thus preserved 
from the seductions of luxury by good government. 
The symbolism is as clear here as it was in the discus­
sion of appetite hitherto. The banquet of life, suggestive 
of the Gospels as well as of the Republic and Symposium, 
is represented by two meals, each reflecting an entirely 
different mode of existence. The simple one is Jean-
Jacques' well-governed Socratic or evangelical "imaginary 
order." The luxurious one is our own ill-governed intem­
perate society where Emile passes unscathed. He is saved 
by some "sublime power" vested in his governor that 
enables him to stand firm against false opinion and the 
prejudices of wealth and power. 
Shielded by that "superhuman" presence, he is soon to 
be taught to earn his bread in an alien setting. But first 
he is trained in many different arts and crafts to inspire 
him with respect for other people's work as well as his 
own. The double purpose here defined evokes the two as­
pects of Socratic justice, which are to do one's own work, 
and not to meddle with others. Emile is to practise that 
virtue within the society of friends, but in a land foreign 
to himself and his own city. 
These pages of the book are the source of a much de­
bated chapter of the Contract (the eighth in this part) 
about the connections between wealth and government, to 
which I alluded above. It is entitled "That Every Form of 
Government Is Not Suited to Every Country." In the past 
we have supposed that it was added simply to fill out the 
book.27 But juxtaposition with the foregoing development 
of Emile disproves that. The author begins by saying 
that freedom is not the fruit of all climates. Hence it is 
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vital to know "in what corner of the world" a moral being 
might be free to exercise his faculties according to their 
proper functions and find happiness therein. In dealing 
with this question that is hardly beside the point, Rousseau 
continues to confine himself to general principles. In a 
city, he observes, the government is supplied with necessi­
ties from the surplus produced by subjects; in the soul, of 
course, the governing power is supported by desires or 
gainful faculties. That is why Socrates calls the latter 
"maintainers and foster-fathers": they keep body and soul 
together, while reason brings the two into unison. The 
amount of the surplus, as the author of the Contract re­
marks and as Emile now knows, depends upon three fac­
tors: fertility of climate, determining the kind of work 
and number of workers required to till the soil; the nature 
of the earth's productions; and the needs of men. This pas­
sage adheres closely to the order of Emile's lessons in 
political economy. So does the following. The factors in­
fluencing wealth, says the writer, in turn affect the form 
of government since some kinds of rule are costlier than 
others and even rob people of their contributions and make 
them miserable. He alludes to contemporary monarchs, 
meaning tyrants and despots. Free states, like a democ­
racy or aristocracy, require moderate resources that are 
wholly used for the common happiness. 
In the rest of the chapter he reflects further upon the 
three factors determining wealth. Fertile southern climes, 
says he, where the soil requires little work and fewer work­
ers to yield succulent fruits, produce the luxury that fos­
ters despotism, whereas temperate zones of moderate 
wealth are hospitable to good polity and suited to free 
men. This may be one reason why in the beginning of 
Emile he chose a temperate zone for the hero's life. Yet 
in doing so, he implied that the climate of the child's birth 
is as symbolic as his wealth (although both may also be 
taken literally) and that northerners dwelling on an un­
grateful soil are simply an "image" of the poor, whereas 
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southerners living in a fertile land symbolize the rich. The 
same symbolism may be present in the text of the Contract, 
for there he discreetly admits that even if historically 
the reverse of his theory about southern and temperate 
zones were true, he would nevertheless adhere to it. In 
other words, if the ideal Greco-Roman city was born in 
the south that supposedly fosters despotism, it could be 
reborn anywhere on earth as it is in Emile, who though 
strong and free in a moderate clime lives in the midst of 
despotism. That is because what really determines wealth 
and freedom too is the third of the three factors mentioned 
in the Contract, the needs of men, to which the author 
reverts. He observes that if the south fosters wealth, it is 
also because southerners live on hardly more than air, 
with the result that a Spaniard could live for a week on 
a German's dinner, and "in Italy they regale you with 
sweets and with flowers." Austerity—the law of neces­
sity—is the key to the author's ideal, which may easily 
come into being wherever the needs of men are few.28 The 
whole passage indirectly evokes Emile's two repasts, sym­
bolic of two different societies in any geographical area. 
It condemns all luxury that breeds tyranny and slavery. 
The latter occur, says the author concluding the chapter, 
in any country that has fewer inhabitants than it can sus­
tain and whose wealth therefore exceeds and increases its 
needs. He thereby exalts the Socratic Aemilian city, whose 
needs and resources are evenly balanced and whose life 
is secure from the disorders of passion. 
To revert to the novel, the new Robinson, having ex­
plored his surroundings, comes back at last to himself and 
his own "habitation." Thereupon the governor exclaims 
on an evangelical note: "Happy are we if, returning home, 
we do not find it in possession of the enemy who is lying 
in wait to enter and dwell therein." He refers to the ad­
visability of anticipating the "unclean spirit" of the Gos­
pel. Such illuminating phrases and imagery associated with 
Christ or Socrates are designed to carry us beyond the 
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child's point of view that is confined to material needs 
and reveal the vaster perspectives of the philosopher-king 
that depend upon the former for their realization. 
The hero, all absorbed in arts and crafts and Robinson 
Crusoe, sees at length that he himself like other men will 
have to resort to an exchange of work and goods in order 
to live, and that society is therefore necessary to human 
life and in that sense natural. Since he is able to grasp 
the material side of social relationships before he can 
really become actively engaged, his governor's first task 
is to teach him to preserve life and to provide for his needs 
by means of those relationships. But again there are signs 
that the physical world of the child prefigures the moral 
one and that Jean-Jacques' real preoccupation is spiritual 
kingship, the training of reason to rule the gainful faculties 
and serve the sovereign soul of man. For example, the boy 
is compared to various kings in history who have "risen 
to man's estate" by learning to earn their daily bread. 
The son of man who is born a king must do the same. For 
"social man and the citizen," whose vocation is Emile's, 
must regard work as a debt to society that has to be re­
paid according to the law of justice. In Socratic terms 
there must be no drones in the hive of the city or the soul.29 
The drones are "spendthrifts" full of "unnecessary or 
useless desires" bred in idleness, and are the governor's 
great foe in his work as guardian of the constitution. They 
are foreign to the hero, whose name is synonymous with 
industry and who will "do his own work," or, in other 
words, practice justice. The industrious man who works 
to supply the needs of life is an image of the just man. 
The author's thought transcends any literal interpretation 
as much as the governor's transcends Emile's. 
The theme of this phase of education is that of the ninth 
chapter in the third part of the Contract, where the key 
idea is also the preservation of life including moral life that 
depends upon the free exercise of the faculties. It is entitled 
"Concerning the Signs of Good Government," and is com­
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plementary to the previous one as freedom is a correlative 
of necessity. If the surplus wealth of gainful elements sup­
ports the governing power, the latter in its turn ensures 
the preservation and prosperity of those it governs. Rous­
seau begins the chapter by describing the blessings enjoyed 
by "citizens" as opposed to "subjects," meaning slaves. 
He mentions the freedom and security of the human per­
son from crimes at home and wars abroad, and the circu­
lation of bread instead of gold. These bounties are all that 
is necessary for the preservation and prosperity of men, 
which can be judged, says the author, by their number and 
population. It would be a mistake to conclude from this 
that he intends to ensure preservation at the cost of free­
dom, which is included in the bounties described. Obvi­
ously he is saying as clearly as he has done hitherto, that 
freedom is essential to life. He says so again in a note at 
the end of the chapter, declaring that the welfare of nations 
and the prosperity of the species depend upon liberty.30 
Moreover, in Emile the governor's concept of necessity 
and freedom is regarded as salutary for the life of both 
body and soul since it provides for the needs of the entire 
human creature. 
The next two chapters of the Contract (the tenth and 
eleventh) are a corollary of the previous one and confirm 
the importance of freedom to life. They show that if the 
governing authority fails to safeguard liberty, the result 
is death. The first of the two is entitled "Concerning the 
Abuse of Government and Its Inclination to Decline." 
Rousseau warns therein that if the governing power of rea­
son is seduced by passions intense enough to resist and op­
press the sovereign will and break the covenant, then the 
collective body dies like that of a man. He pursues the idea 
in the next chapter, "Concerning the Death of the Body 
Politic." There he prophesies that issue as inevitable since 
no state lasts forever. As Socrates phrases it: "Even a con­
stitution such as ours will not last till the end of time."31 
This means that even if it could materialize as a physical 
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entity in the objective world of actuality, it would not last 
as such. But Rousseau maintains that we possess the skill 
to make it last longer than most. Again drawing a compar­
ison between the collective body and the body of a man, 
he explains that the human constitution is the work of 
nature and that our power over our life span is limited, 
but that the constitution of the state is a work of art whose 
life lies largely in our hands. But for Rousseau the human 
constitution includes not merely the physical life of the 
body but especially the sovereign powers of the moral per­
son of soul or of city whose strength and growth depend 
as much upon art as does the state. But there is a differ­
ence. Although the passive being of a state dies like that 
of a man when its bonds with the sovereign or legislative 
power are severed, Rousseau could not say the same thing 
of sovereignty itself or the active being any more than he 
could say it of the human spirit, which is no different, 
for he professed to believe that it is indestructible and 
survives the body, as we shall see.32 That is why, to de­
scribe the life of the city, he uses the Socratic similitude 
of city and soul; but to describe the death of the state, 
he adopts the contemporary analogy of the collective and 
human body. The life of the passive being may be pro­
longed, says he—and incidentally this applies in a limited 
way to the human body—by strengthening the active 
being or sovereign will, wherein the principle of life resides 
and whose austere laws invigorate the body and the heart. 
In this context the sovereign power, identified with will in 
the soul, is linked with the heart, presumably as the seat 
of fortitude, while, as we know, the executive power an­
swers to the brain. It is only when the heart dies that "the 
animal" expires, says the author in carefully chosen words, 
to avoid suggesting that sovereignty might be destroyed. 
In a well-constituted state, he adds, the latter manifests 
itself in respect for the most ancient laws, by which he 
means his own that are over 2,500 years old. 
In the novel Jean-Jacques, like the sage governors of the 
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Contract, ensures the preservation and prosperity of the 
society of friends and therefore of Emile by fortifying the 
hero's powers and anticipating the decline of the friendship 
of reason for nature. He does so, as we have seen, by 
teaching the boy the art of self-government or ministry of 
justice, the art of mastering the gainful faculties with a view 
to the pursuit of wisdom and lasting happiness. 
These deeper intentions are further acentuated when the 
author speaks of a choice of work suitable for Emile. He 
prescribes manual labor on grounds that suggest his real 
purpose: the artisan is more independent of the caprices 
of fortune and of men, and hence more self-reliant than 
the husbandman. But at the same time he admits that hus­
bandry is man's first vocation and Emile's, and he calls 
it, in the manner of the Greek master, "most useful and 
noble."33 In recommending that it be supplemented by a 
trade, he hints that his words have spiritual implications, 
for he cites the evangelical saying that "the letter killeth, 
but the spirit giveth life," and explains that the object is 
less to teach a trade than to rise above the prejudices of 
men. He further suggests a moral motive by adding that 
the laborer, unlike the professional man, is exempt from 
dancing attendance upon scoundrels, courtesans, and the 
rich, and may therefore be a man of honor and justice. The 
governor's goal always remains a moral one. Emile is to do 
"useful," honorable work that is also compatible with 
humanitarian feeling. Nevertheless, he makes his own 
choice by following his personal idea of utility, selecting 
a trade of real value to the new Robinson Crusoe and 
adapted to his age, sex, and character. He chooses that of 
carpentry, and Jean-Jacques, who shares his entire life, 
serves an apprenticeship with him. 
There is both internal and external evidence that the 
carpenter here is a mythical image of a man doing a man's 
proper work by repaying his dept to society and thereby 
practicing justice, and that his object is not to pursue gain 
but to serve an apprenticeship in manhood. For example, 
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the friends spend only one or two days a week in the mas­
ter's workshop, and Emile never becomes a master car­
penter. Moreover, the hero does not really earn his bread 
until he is twenty-five years of age, and then he would not 
ideally do so by carpentering. In the Confessions the 
writer, recounting the story of apprenticeships served by 
himself at the same age of twelve or thirteen, says he could 
not tolerate the idea of heaping up money by a mean em­
ployment, for, he adds, money never tempted him greatly.34 
In the Considerations he utters biblical-like warnings 
against the worship of Mammon. In a word, he has a Soc­
ratic contempt for the money-making arts and earthly dross 
current among men, "the source of many unholy deeds." 
Like his Greek master he associates the gainful faculties 
with illiberality and baseness, for they are concerned with 
desires "that maim and disfigure the soul with their mean­
nesses." In his view such faculties must remain subject to 
the higher ones that make a man sovereign ruler of self. 
That supreme ruler and his work of ruling are foreshad­
owed by the Rousseauist carpenter, who is therefore the 
"maker of an image of justice" in Socratic terminology. 
He is as much a myth as the husbandman, who represents 
man's true vocation as a Socratic and Christian cultiva­
tor of the soul. Thus Jean-Jacques uses the arts and crafts 
to take another step upward in the ascent of the soul to­
ward wisdom. 
In fact, the myth of the carpenter is evocative of both 
Christ and Socrates. The latter's contempt for the money­
making arts or faculties does not prevent him from bestow­
ing upon the carpenter a distinguished place at the begin­
ning and end of the Republic. In the third book, in the 
midst of the denunciation of physicians who remove men 
from society and their duties, the carpenter appears in 
the likeness of a man who refuses to "nurse disease" to 
the neglect of his customary employment, since then there 
would be no profit in his life. But his employment is not 
simply carpentering. It is what Socrates and Rousseau, 
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too, conceive to be every man's real work, which is the 
practice of virtue or true statesmanship.35 At the end of 
the Republic the sage, having spoken of God as "the 
maker of the works of all other workmen," visualizes the 
carpenter, the maker of tables and beds, as a "creator" 
made in the divine image. The carpenter is closer to truth 
and reality than the poet who depicts the carpenter's work 
and is consequently only an imitator, says Socrates, ignor­
ing the meaning of "poet" as the Greek equivalent of 
"maker." After what we have already witnessed of Rous­
seau's affinities with the master, it is difficult not to sus­
pect that Emile is meant to be a reflexion of that Socratic 
carpenter. Having beheld all the works of creation, he is 
now being prepared for a vision of the Socratic "great 
artist" or Pauline "Master-Builder"36 who is shadowed 
forth in his workmanship. The reason why the hero is not 
a master craftsman is probably that for Rousseau, as for 
Socrates, there is only one, and that is he in whose image 
man is formed. But the whole context suggests that a man 
molded in that divine likeness does not merely make 
tables or beds. Observe the moment chosen by Rousseau 
for the emergence of Emile as the carpenter-builder. We 
are precisely at that point in the book where the founda­
tions of the temple are complete and the shrine itself about 
to be built. One is reminded of the carpenter of Galilee, 
the writer's divine master, who boasted that if the "tem­
ple" were destroyed he would build it up again in three 
days, meaning "the temple made without hands." Emile 
is a carpenter apprentice who, by making beds and tables, 
learns to practice justice and hence to build the temple of 
the soul or fortress of the city, guided by his governor and 
following the pattern provided by the master-craftsman, 
whom the Rousseauist legislator and educator professes to 
know. The Socratic and Christian imagery throws the 
meaning into relief. 
We may observe that in the myth of the carpenter the 
author simply amplifies all the principles set forth so far. 
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By practicing justice in this new form, the boy does not 
merely render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, 
as in the parable of the sower. He renders unto God the 
things that are God's, although he does not know it. He 
performs this office by applying his strength to do his 
will, or rather, the general will for the common good im­
plied in the idea of exchange, which the industrial arts 
entail. To the same end he is learning to acquiesce in 
the author's three Socratic laws by remaining within the 
bounds of necessity, by being ever one with himself and 
self-sufficing, and by doing the work to which he is nat­
urally disposed, all within the precincts of a society of 
friends. 
But although he is being prepared in this way for his du­
ties as sovereign ruler, he is unaware of it. In fact, he is 
still ignorant of the identity of his governor. This becomes 
obvious when, having cultivated a taste for reflection, he 
feels impelled to inquire about social inequalities and asks 
how Jean-Jacques, who is rich, earns his bread. Of course, 
we know that the prince or governor is supported by the 
people, that the ruling power is supported by gainful 
ones.37 But Emile's mentor forbears to explain this at 
present. He simply promises to reply later. What is note­
worthy here is that he conceals his identity as long as 
possible. But he can hardly do so much longer since, as we 
are told, Emile's relations with others are soon to expand 
beyond the purely physical sphere. This "active, thinking 
being," as he is called, is approaching the age when rea­
son is perfected by feeling to make him into a real phil­
osopher or lover of Sophia. Only then can he recognize 
his governor as such and finally take his own place as sov­
ereign ruler. 
The real duties of man's estate, shown in his appren­
ticeship under the mysterious master and consisting of the 
practice of justice and acquiescence in ancient laws rather 
than the amassing of gold, are set forth in the related 
chapters of the Contract. There are three (twelve, thirteen, 
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and fourteen) that bear a single title: "How the Sovereign 
Authority Is Maintained." 
In these chapters the author wrestles with the problem 
of securing the legislative power against the aberrations 
of the governing faculty, to preserve the life of the poli­
tico-moral body. He boldly asserts that the people must 
personally assemble to approve the constitution, sanction 
their own laws, and do their own work as they did 3,000 
years ago. In contending that this is not impossible, he 
betrays his concern for spiritual values: "The limits of 
the possible in moral matters are less narrow than we 
think: it is our weaknesses, vices, and prejudices that con­
tract them." He betrays the same concern when, after 
citing the example of the ancient Greeks and Romans to 
prove that his ideas are not the fanciful dreams of a vi­
sionary, he concludes: "What exists is therefore possible." 
The deft return to the present tense—"what exists"— 
shows that he is thinking mainly of the inner world. He 
adds that people must also assemble to govern themselves 
or else to provide for government by others in order that 
they may rule in obedience. For he still insists that the 
essence of the moral person consists of the harmonious 
correlation of obedience or necessity and freedom, sub­
jects and sovereign being perfectly united in the citizen 
who binds himself to the law of his will and submits to be 
governed thereby. This ideal of the sovereignty and king­
ship of man being exercised in popular assemblies is pos­
sible in small rural societies protected from alien peril 
by federation with others akin to themselves, says the au­
thor, allowing his imagination to roam beyond the dim pos­
sibility of even one such city coming to the birth. In the 
less improbable case of the free soul, such protective fed­
eration would consist of bonds of friendship established 
with great spirits of the past and present. But since even 
well-trained governors are wont to impede the action of 
the sovereign power, he insists upon the regular mani­
festation and perpetual activity of the "constant will" 
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(later identified with conscience) as the aegis of the poli­
tico-moral body. The latter may be preserved and prosper 
only if citizens avoid greed, cowardice, and idleness to 
activate and cultivate their noblest faculties. In that case 
they will do their own work like Aemilius, whose auster­
ity of life, courage, and industry or justice are molding 
him to inherit the high office and ministry of his forbears. 
The next chapter in the Contract (the fifteenth) deals 
with "Deputies or Representatives," of whom the author 
has already expressed disapproval in the beginning of the 
previous part. The chapter begins and ends with an evo­
cation of men who shamefully pay others to do their work 
for them, unlike the apprentice builder of the novel. In­
deed, its relevance to the masterwork is confirmed in the 
fifth part of the latter where Emile the carpenter refuses 
to pay anyone to do his carpentering in his place. There 
the novelist emphasizes the very point of the present chap­
ter of the Contract. In the latter we are shown how modern 
men pay others to wage "war" in their stead and wield 
sovereignty on their behalf, or rather to enthrall and be­
tray them. In the Socratic view they enslave themselves 
to the greed for gain and the money-making arts. "The 
word finance," says Rousseau in this chapter, "is a slave's 
word; it is unknown in the city."38 In other words, the 
free man or city practices in person the wisdom that con­
tributes most to the well-being of the whole and all its 
parts. An advantage of this course of action, according to 
the Contract, is that the various parts are not obliged to 
resort to particular remedies or "domestic cares" to patch 
up disorders or gratify humors. That is what the carpenter 
in the Republic declines to do, like the true statesman in 
the same context or Jean-Jacques in Emile. The author of 
the Contract adds that in the well-constituted entity 
therein envisaged, no part is indifferent to its life and hap­
piness or dares to say: "What has that to do with me?" 
These are the words of men like Robert in the novel who 
dwell in "false" states and are heedless of the common 
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happiness. That world is alien to Emile, who is learning 
that the well-ordered polity of the soul is his main con­
cern on earth. 
On the grounds of the foregoing considerations Rousseau 
rejects once again the modern political idea that the sov­
ereign will can be "alienated" and its activity assigned to 
deputies. True, he adapts the concept to modern cities in 
his Considerations.39 But he declines to make any such 
concession in the Contract, where he depicts a mythical 
city made in the likeness of the Rousseauist soul. In the 
chapter under discussion he honors the ideal order in a new 
tribute to ancient Greece and Rome. The Greeks, he says, 
did their own work because they preferred freedom, the free 
use of their highest faculties for the exercise of justice, 
rather than enslavement to the greed for gain. If we protest 
that slaves performed their menial tasks for them, a point 
raised by the author himself and used against him by his 
critics, he at once withdraws into the world of the spirit and 
admits that freedom is maintained only with the support of 
slavery or submission. Obviously this must be so if obedi­
ence and liberty are correlatives. He adds: "All that is not 
in nature has its disadvantages, and civil society more than 
anything else." Of course, since a true civil society implies 
morality and that freedom of spirit and ministry of reason 
which depend for their action upon the subjection of 
covetous desires. Modern men, concludes the writer, who 
cater to such desires do not have slaves, but they pay 
tyrannical masters to enslave them. As Socrates says: 
"The people who would escape the smoke which is the 
slavery of freemen has fallen into the fire which is the 
tyranny of slaves."40 In the Platonic text this is the fire of 
passion that threatens the souls of men who neglect their 
own proper work. Rousseau is saying the same thing in 
both the Contract and Emile. 
The end of the third part of Emile, inspired mainly by 
the Socratic "prelude," is devoted to the further education 
of the ruler. The hero's ability to use his reason to compare 
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sensations and form ideas is perfected. Only the savage or 
solitary sage may be indifferent to the objects of our judg­
ments and ask: "What has that to do with me?" So the au­
thor says in this context of the novel, in a passage remi­
niscent of another in the matching part of the Contract 
that refers to individuals who live exclusively for them­
selves alone. Emile the carpenter-builder, who is natural 
man living in the social and civil state,41 is to be otherwise 
and must perforce exercise judgment. He must therefore 
avoid error by verifying sensations. 
Among common errors of judgment caused by contra­
dictory impressions of the senses, Rousseau mentions two 
in particular to which he alludes more than once and which 
he takes the trouble to solve. The first is the case of a ball 
rolled between two crossed fingers that produces an im­
pression of two objects instead of one. The second is the ex­
ample of a stick submerged in water that appears broken.42 
Jean-Jacques and Emile perform experiments to rectify the 
errors and generate in the boy a force of reason not easily 
led astray by the authority of others. There are three other 
alleged advantages of this method. First, he advances in 
proportion to his physical and mental strength, which, as 
we know, is born of the friendship of reason and is the 
sphere of its action. Second, he discovers the limits of 
human knowledge, especially his own. Third, he is taught 
how to learn, and will do so all his life long for love of the 
truth, or so the author says. 
As usual, by "truth" Rousseau, like Socrates, means 
moral truth as he sees it, although Emile does not know 
it as such. The governor reveals his real motives when, 
after dealing with the correction of erroneous judgments, 
he describes the disciple's present formation in terms that 
have distinct moral overtones. Admittedly we are told that 
Emile possesses only natural physical knowledge and is 
ignorant of moral values or related matters. But this simply 
means that he does not know the name of the virtues he 
practices. Besides, the abstractions of geometry and al­
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gebra, which he continues to study at this stage, are pre­
paring him for the generalizations of the profession of faith 
in the next. Moreover, the Socratic "images of virtues" he 
displays, such as patience, industry, temperance, and cour­
age, are preparing him for the social virtues of a man. To 
possess the latter in their truth, the new Robinson Crusoe 
has only to become aware of his moral relationships and 
sensitive to them. 
As I remarked above, Rousseau is still inspired by Soc­
rates' prelude to the education of kings. The sage, too, has 
recourse to the mathematical sciences to perfect reason 
and lead it to moral truth. But to reach his goal, he ul­
timately renounces the senses, which his modern disciple 
refuses to do; and there lies an important rift between 
them. Nevertheless, in dealing with errors the sage cites 
the same two examples as are given in Emile, the first one 
in the context of the prelude and the second at the end of 
the book. He is therefore a more likely source of inspira­
tion than Descartes, who deals with one of the two cases, 
or the Logic of Port-Royal, which deals with the other.43 
When, says he in the prelude, the sense furnishes con­
tradictory impressions, he summons to his aid calcula­
tion and the arts of measuring and numbering—while 
Rousseau reverts to the senses themselves—to see whether 
the several objects "announced to the soul" are one or 
two. In Plato's last book he does likewise if the same ob­
jects appear straight when looked at out of water and 
crooked in it. Such errors, he says, are due to "that weak­
ness of the human mind upon which the art of conjuring 
and... other ingenious devices imposes, having an effect 
upon us like magic." This phrase probably suggested to 
Rousseau the figure of the "conjuror Socrates" as well. 
In addition to all these remarkable coincidences, the mas­
ter's precautions against false impressions at the end of 
the Republic immediately follow the idealization of the 
carpenter exactly as in the case of the modern pedagogical 
novel. In fine, the Greek thinker's presence can hardly be 
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doubted in the concluding tableau of Emile's qualities, 
which foreshadow those of a Socratic king. 
The last pages of this part of Emile relating to the estab­
lishment of reason as the governing power in man, and pro­
posing precautions against its vagaries, are reflected in the 
last three chapters of the same part of the Contract. These 
chapters are intended to show the way in which that power 
is set up within the moral constitution and also the need 
for the sovereign will to control its abuses. Two of them 
(sixteen and seventeen) are in a sense one, since both treat 
of the establishment of government, the one negatively and 
the other affirmatively. They are entitled "That the Insti­
tution of Government Is Not a Contract" and "Concern­
ing the Institution of Government." 
Rousseau begins by reaffirming his belief that only after 
the lawful power of the will has been firmly secured can 
the executive power of the ruler be instituted in its turn. 
This is, of course, the Socratic sequence followed in Emile. 
It serves, says he in the Contract, to keep the two prin­
ciples as separate as they naturally are, the one dealing 
with general concepts and the other with specific cases. 
The special right of the governing faculty or governor, 
he explains, is to ask that another do what he himself does 
not do. In the novel Jean-Jacques, instead of appropriating 
that privilege to himself, has personally shared in all 
Emile's activities and thereby trained the guardian will and 
ruling power in his ward to confer the right upon him. This 
motive explains his reticence about his identity. It also 
explains why the will has precedence over the reason in 
the formation of city or soul: in Rousseau's thought it is 
the "will power" that commits authority to the governor. 
But he denies again, as he did in the beginning of this 
part, that government is instituted through a contract of 
the people with their chosen leaders whereby the one 
pledges himself to command and the other to obey. There 
is only one covenent in the city, and it is that of the orig­
inal association. In Emile the demand for obedience is 
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made by a servant of the sovereign and is conditional upon 
the consent of the will dedicated to the happiness of the 
moral person. 
In that case how is the governing power set up? This is 
explained in the Contract and illustrated in Emile. Accord­
ing to the former, the law-giving element (visible in the 
society of friends in the novel) ordains that a ruling body 
be formed and then transform itself, by an act of the will, 
into a "democratic" governing power to consummate that 
ordinance and establish the government prescribed. For 
in the improbable world of the book, the entire city or 
moral person including sovereign and subjects must first 
learn the necessity and art of self-rule before it can exe­
cute an act of government by appointing others to do its 
will and then question their demands in the performance 
of that office. Accordingly, in the novel Emile is first in­
itiated into the art of kings and then later induced to en­
trust himself in time of crisis to Jean-Jacques, whom he 
finally recognizes as skilled in that art. Indeed, the process 
described in the Contract is dramatically presented in the 
next part of the pedagogical work where the eponymous 
hero shares in the complex act of providing for government 
by voluntarily confiding the authority of governor to his 
"good friend" at a moment already prepared in this part 
of the book. 
Rousseau's conclusions on the subject of rulers are to 
be found in the last chapter of the third part of the Con­
tract, entitled "Manner of Preventing the Usurpations of 
Government." The statements contained therein led to the 
burning of the book in Geneva, for they had a much more 
revolutionary ring in the ears of his contemporaries than 
they do in ours. Governing powers, he says, are merely 
officers of the sovereign, whom they must obey as a matter 
of duty. If they fail to do so and if their rule is incompat­
ible with the welfare of the whole, then they must be dis­
missed and replaced. Again, the idea is as old as Christ, 
who says that the "chiefest of all shall be the servant of 
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all," or Socrates, who says that his philosopher-kings, 
though unpaid, must rule for the public good, not as though 
they were performing some heroic act, but simply as a 
matter of duty.44 Otherwise, says he, they will bring about 
the ruin of the city. Rousseau means to avert this disaster 
by subjecting them to the constant vigilance of the lawful 
will, solemnly and formally summoned to act. In a similar 
manner the acts and intentions of a rational soul are scru­
tinized by the human conscience, which decides whether 
or not it is pleased with its present form of government. 
If not, it must be replaced by another. 
The two books, in company with one another, have led 
us to the same point. In the Contract Rousseau describes 
a gradually evolving process quite as much as he does in 
Emile, even though in the past the abstract, mathematical 
form of the work has made it seem static in our eyes. One 
of the advantages of a collation of the two is to show the 
value of the work as a complete philosophy of life slowly 
taking shape as it does in the novel, whether or not we 
agree personally with the author's ideas. Another advan­
tage is that the mythology of the pedagogical romance 
emerges more clearly by comparison with the appendix. 
Once the imagery is recognized as such it releases its 
meaning, as the body of a man expresses the soul. When it 
does, that mysterious essence proves to be no different 
from that of the companion volume, and in both cases the 
Republic is the model. These facts are even more strik­
ingly visible henceforward. For the temple of Emile, like 
the fortress of the Contrct, is only now about to rise from 
the foundations laid down in the first three parts of both 
works. From the "stylobate," or threefold basement, the 
stately pillars of each one rise toward the empyrean where 
they belong like the "pattern" of the Socratic republic.45 
1. I say this without forgetting that, according to the author, the Contrat is 
not only an appendix to Emile but also an epitome of a proposed work entitled 
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"Institutions politiques," fragments of which he destroyed. The latter statement 
does not alter the former or affect the indisputable proof of its veracity furnished 
by a collation of texts. 
2. For all Socratic references in this paragraph see The Republic 5. 457, 458; 
6. 505; 7. 523, 527, 531; 9. 589; 10. 601; cf. 621 
3. Ibid., 1. 345-46; 5. 473; 7. 540. Cf. Matt. 2:2 and 6. 
4. See, for example, Mark 10:43-44. 
5. For the analogy of the scale: The Republic 4. 443. In 9. 587 Socrates shows 
that the true king is 729 times happier than the tyrant. Even studies on 
Rousseau's mathematical language do not draw an analogy with Socrates. See, 
for example, M. Franqon, "Le Langage mathematique de J.-J. Rousseau," 
in "Notes rousseauistes," Annales de la Societe J.-J. Rousseau 33 (1953-55): 
243-46. 
6. Les Aventures de Telemaque (Liege: Grandmont-Donders, 1865), p. 340. 
Erechtheus, whom T61emaque sees in the Champs-Elysees, says: "Je prevois . .  . 
qudle (la monnaie).. entretiendra une infinite d'arts pernicieux qui ne vont qu'a 
amollir et a corrompre les moeurs . .  . " F. Bouchardy does not mention Fenelon in 
connection with the theme of the first "Discours": O.C., 3:5 n. 2. See "Con­
fessions," O.C., 1:351, where Rousseau defines the theme thus: "Si le progres 
des sciences et des arts a contribu6 a corrompre ou a 6purer les moeurs." 
7. Rousseau speaks as if the sun moved around the earth: "Emile," p. 433. 
Burgelin explains that he is probably interpreting the child's view: p. 431 n. 1. 
8. All references in this paragraph are to The Republic 7.526-27. 
9. Regarding questions and the abuse of dialectic, cf. "Emile," p. 339 n, 
436, and The Republic 7. 534, 537-39. For the connection of knowledge cf. the 
same text of Plato and O.C., 4:436 n. 3. See also "Confessions," loc. cit., p. 234. 
Of course, this was the whole idea of the Encyclopedie: See Diderot's article under 
that heading and d'Alembert's "Discourse preliminaire." 
10. Rousseau discusses this incident in C.C., 9:125, letter to L. Usteri, 13 
September 1761. 
11. The Republic 10. 602. 
12. Burgelin poses the question of the connection between the story of the fair 
and the tracing of meridians for maps, and finds the sequence of ideas "bizarre": 
O.C., 4:441 n. 2. 
13. The Republic 4. 433-34, 442-43. 
14. See "Lettres de la montagne," O.C., 3:739, and cf. p. 744 where, in a dis­
cussion of miracles, the author warns that the marvels of chemistry and physics 
are not miracles. Burgelin connects this text with the conjuror scene in "Emile": 
p. 437 n. 2. 
15. For the pilot see chapter 2 above and n. 10. The quotation is from the end of 
Byron's poem "The Island." 
16. This is so in spite of his rather loose use of the term "democracy" in the 
"Lettre a d'Alembert," O.C., Hachette, 1:256. 
17. "Emile," p. 593. 
18. The Republic 2. 369. 
19. "Pour moi, je suivois la direction contraire a l'objet que j'avois a fuir, 
comme autrefois j'avois suivi I'oppos6 de l'ombre dans la forest de Montmorenci": 
"Emile et Sophie," O.C., 4:912. For this work see chapter 6, note 18, below. 
20. The Republic 3. 402. 
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21. "Emile," pp. 429, 455, 457-60, 474. Cf. "Confessions," loc. cit., pp. 296, 
644; "Dialogues," O.C., 1:812, 826; cf. C.C., 19:71, 228, correspondence between 
Rey and Rousseau, 20 January 1764 and 17 March 1764. See the study by G. 
Pire, "J.-J. Rousseau et Robinson Crusoe," Revue de litterature comparee 30 
(October-December 1956): 479-96, and cf. P. Nourrisson, J.-J. Rousseau et 
Robinson Crusoe (Paris: Spes, 1931), particularly chapter 1. 
22. Cf. "Emile," p. 315, and second "Discours," O.C., 3:194. 
23. He says the same in part 1, chapter 3, at the end, apropos of the "law" of 
the stronger. The "true physician" would be the Rousseauist legislator who would 
"sweep the threshing-floor clean": second "Discours," loc. cit., p. 180 Cf. 
The Republic 3. 407 (the physician is called a statesman); 4. 425-26 (the statesman 
is likened to a physician). The image of the physician recurs throughout the 
dialogue. 
24. Political theorists explain Rousseau's brevity on the subject by the distinc­
tion he makes between government and sovereign, which in their opinion re­
duces the importance of mixed forms. But on the other hand, the problem of 
balance is all the more complex by reason of this distinction. Burgelin considers 
this to be one of the most important problems in "Emile," as indeed it is: O.C., 
p. 304 n. 1. He is speaking of equilibrium of soul, but that is the essential prob­
lem in the "Contrat" too. 
25. It is a great mistake to fancy that Rousseu's sketch of the city begins here: 
O.C., 4:466 n. 2; cf. p. 467 n. 2, which refers to The Republic 2. 369. In a sense, 
as I have said, the child's active initiation into society does, but even that has 
long since been foreshadowed. 
26. The Republic, 2. 372. 
27. For example, Derathe feels that the chapter is out of place: O.C., 3:414 n. 1. 
28. Cf. "Emile," p. 267. Beaulavon denies the possibility that a northern state 
could ever be as wealthy as a southern one since he takes the whole text ex­
clusively literally: J.-J. Rousseau, Du Contrat social, ed. Georges Beaulavon, 
(Paris: Rieder, 1914), p. 249 n. 1. In fact, in the case of texts like the present one 
a collation with "Emile" is imperative. The novel is full of passages like the 
following:" . . . La misere ne consiste pas dans la privation des choses, mais dans 
le besoin qui sven fait sentir": p. 304. 
29. The Republic 7. 520; 8. 552, 554, 564; 9. 573. 
30. Regarding preservation as an object, see chapter 3 above and cf. O.C., 
3:420 n. 1. For the importance of freedom see "Contrat social," pp. 419, 420 n. 
Cf. C.C., 10:94, letter to Rey, 18 (11?) February 1762, where the author shows 
concern that the note at the end of the chapter be correctly printed. 
31. The Republic 8. 546. 
32. When he speaks of slavery as a form of moral death in the midst of life, 
that must be taken as a figure of speech, since the will that frees is "indestruc­
tible," and so a man may be released from slavery and restored to life. 
33. The Republic 5. 457 (the useful is the noble). For the biblical reference 
that follows: John 6:63; cf. 2 Cor. 3:6. Burgelin, like Rousseau's contemporary 
Tronchin, and Montesquieu, too, see in technical training a departure from an­
cient education. But Rousseau, in the mythical figure of Emile the carpenter, is 
following Socrates and Plato to the letter. 
34. "Confessions," loc. cit., pp. 30-31. Cf. "Considerations" O.C., 3:1005. 
For Socrates' contempt for the money-making arts or faculties, which are forever 
abused, see The Republic 3.396, 405, 415-16; 5. 456, 466; 6.495-96, 7. 533; 9. 590. 
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35. For the carpenter see The Republic 3. 406; 10. 597. 
36. Heb. 3:4. 
37. "Emile," p. 480; "Contrat social," pt. 3, chap. 8. 
38. See note 34 above. Cf. "Projet... pour la Corse," O.C., 3:904 ff. 
39. Loc. cit., p. 979. He provides against corruption by frequent changes of 
deputies and by subjecting them to imperative mandates. 
40. The Republic 8. 569. Socrates' citizens are taught to fear slavery more than 
death: ibid., 3. 387. 
41. "Emile," pp. 483-84, 550-51, 662, 764. 
42. For the ball cf. "Emile," pp. 482, 486, and The Republic 7. 524. For the 
"broken" stick cf. "Emile," pp. 482, 484-85, and The Republic 10. 602. 
43. The example of the ball is proposed by Descartes, and that of the "broken" 
stick is in the Logique of Port-Royal (3:20); but neither gives both examples, as 
Plato does: O.C., p. lxvii (refers to Descartes) and 486 n. 1 (refers to the Logique). 
44. The Republic 7 540. Cf. Luke 17:10: "So likewise ye, when ye shall have 
done all those things which are commanded you, say. We are unprofitable ser­
vants: we have done that which was our duty to do." 
45. The Republic, passim. See especially 9. 592. 
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Temple-Stronghold

In the fourth part of the novel and its appendix, Emile and 
his counterpart in the Contract are finally impelled to as­
sume the social obligations that constitute the very fabric 
of the work in both cases. The moral person then comes 
to the birth, and the temple of the soul and citadel of the 
city become an identical reality.1 
This part of the novel has a tripartite form. The shape 
and proportions recall the main enclosure or cella of the 
Greek temple where the cult image stood. In the ancient 
prototype the great rectangular chamber was divided by 
colonnades into three naves, the central one being the 
broadest and containing the likeness of the Godhead. 
Rousseau adheres strictly to that pattern in his spiritual 
shrine—where the creed stands in the midst of the myth­
ical cella—but not, of course, in the fortress of the Con­
tract, where, however, the themes are the same. In both 
cases they parallel those of the second part. 
SAVING POWERS 
In Emile the hero's progress is traced between the ages of 
fifteen and twenty. At the outset the moral being's forth­
coming birth into life stands in counterpoise to the child's 
birth into consciousness in the earlier analogous part. Both 
events are the occasion for similar reflections upon the brev­
ity of existence.2 In the present case the passive sensitive­
ness of the child is replaced by the active moral or social 
sensitiveness of the youth that radiates beyond the indi­
vidual. The passions, against which the governor's precau­
tions were hitherto effective, inevitably wax strong at the 
advent of adolescence, says the writer, thereby underlining 
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himself the symmetry of the two parts. The approaching 
crisis is indicated by a storm-tossed agitated spirit com­
pared to a ship at the mercy of the waves. The Socratic 
allegory of the ship of the soul or ship of state, artistically 
used from the beginning, recurs again. The governor, we 
are told, dares not leave the helm or all is lost. He appears 
in the shape of the wise Ulysses, whose name befits Jean-
Jacques since he is the spiritual father of Emile, the "new 
Telemachus" of an imaginary city in the fifth part, as 
Ulysses was the father of the old. But before the youth can 
play his proper role, he too must, of course, become a 
helmsman and skilled in the art of steering his course 
through the passions.3 At this point where most educations 
end, Emile's positive education begins since Rousseau in­
tends, as he says, to consider the whole of life.4 
The feelings play a much more important part in the 
Aemilian shrine than they do in a Greek temple in the pure 
Dorian style. The author discriminates between good feel­
ings and bad in the same way that Socrates discriminates 
between good or necessary desires and evil or unnecessary 
ones. In Rousseau's reasoning the passions in their primal 
form are the work of God, whose name appears for the first 
time here at the very entrance to the sanctuary. They are 
considered to be the ministrants of our freedom and preser­
vation. Their origin and principle is identified as the natural 
feeling of self-love, or love of the true self in its original 
purity. This self, or "real Emile," is distinguished from 
another one that, according to the writer, is born in our so­
ciety and wars against the true one to enslave and destroy 
it by the perversion of self-love into selfishness. Self-love 
is said to be good on the grounds that it provides for our 
safety, leads us to love those who are well disposed in our 
favor and is content with the bare necessities of life. But 
selfishness is said to breed discontent, dissension, and en­
mity by leading us to compare ourselves with others in a 
conflict of interests with them and to expect to be preferred 
at their expense. Consequently, at the birth of moral and 
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social consciousness in the disciple, the Rousseauist gover­
nor's great task is to prevent the vitiation of self-love and 
anticipate the cleavage between the true man and the false. 
And so, at the portal of the Aemilian temple, we may fancy 
that we read a Rousseauist and emotional version of the 
inscription of the Delphic shrine, whose legend "know thy­
self" is combined with the precept "love thyself." Since 
the writer regards knowledge as essentially an awareness 
of relationships, he is convinced that to know and love one's 
true self is to know and feel one's real relationships. Emile 
is therefore now to study his moral being by studying his 
spiritual affinities with others for the purpose of percep­
tively practicing self-love in its original form in order to 
contribute actively and effectively to moral and social order. 
At this juncture the author reflects upon the earliest of 
these conscious and emotional affinities in human life that 
largely determine its direction. He contends that they do 
not naturally take the form of passionate love. He denies 
that a child, emerging from the solitude of Robinson Cru­
soe, begins by experiencing either moral love, which 
springs from intuitive knowledge foreign to him, or the less 
noble counterpart of that sentiment. In his view the senses 
are not naturally stirred until much later than is the case 
with precocious children today, whose curiosity about pro­
creation is prematurely aroused. But he feels that, even 
under the most adverse circumstances, education can re­
tard the first explosions of the most combustible tempera­
ment. Now since he is persuaded that delay increases vigor 
of body, of heart, and of soul, and in addition gives nature 
time to order and regulate the slowly evolving passions, 
he greatly favors it, as he did when he recommended the 
negative approach in the second part. It permits the child 
to feel what are considered to be his real affinities with 
others and enables the governor to direct the affections 
accordingly. 
Seeking to define the nature and origin of these affini­
ties, Rousseau rivets his attention on the moment when the 
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pupil, who has been placed in carefully chosen circum­
stances, begins to show signs of expanding sensitiveness 
and betrays feelings enlightened enough to tell good from 
evil. He observes that the youth's first feeling is an in­
cipient sense of friendship. This was anticipated, of course, 
in the parable of Montmorency forest, in the hero's child­
ish exclamation "My good friend!" It is friendship, we 
are told, that brings him into conscious contact with his 
fellow creatures and sows in his heart the seeds of human­
itarian feeling by cultivating natural compassion, mercy, 
and generosity. 
For in Rousseau's view sympathy is the source of friend­
ship and is the fountainhead and archetype of all love. This 
sentiment represents to his mind the deeper motives that 
bring men to unite with one another in society. He sees 
them moved by pity for common frailties and sufferings 
that identify them with each other through the action of the 
imagination. Indeed, he considers pity to be as natural as 
self-love and he does so both in the present context and in 
his evocation of the primitive state of the second Discourse 
where, moreover, it replaces laws, morals, and all virtue. 
Consequently, in his opinion a child must be induced at 
this stage in his progress to behold our poor humanity as 
it intrinsically is, and to feel that he is a part of others so 
that he might be disposed by self-pity to tenderness on 
their behalf. Accordingly Emile is made to see suffering 
mankind in his parents "or ailing governor," for whom he 
feels the pang of compassion. This, we are now told, is 
"the first relative sentiment to touch the human heart in 
the order of nature." It transports him beyond himself and 
brings him at last into real communion with men, channel­
ing the currents of sensibility into a broad sea of "good­
ness, humanitarian feeling, mercy and benevolence." Nev­
ertheless, it is first generated in him in the form of a friend­
ship that symbolizes an ideal social bond and as such is 
henceforth developed into a vast allegory in the book. 
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The author further reveals the value of his appeal to pity 
and its politico-moral implications by imagining a possible 
exception to the rule that we are touched by the grief of 
others rather than their bliss. For example, he admits that 
we are moved by the spectacle of a quiet scene of pastoral 
life, but explains the reason: it is because nothing prevents 
us from condescending to enjoy the same peace and inno­
cence that are a man's proper resources and true wealth. 
That is precisely the way of life promised by the order of 
friendship in the book and its appendix. On the other hand, 
he argues, if we disclose to a youth the sad fate of most 
men whose lives are disordered, then he will see at once 
that he must blaze a path to happiness where no one's 
footsteps lead. That is the path wherein Emile is now being 
guided. He is to be induced to follow it by being made to 
pity those who do not and to fear their fate and the loss of 
his own austere happiness. To this end he learns ultimately 
to identify himself not merely with his governor but with the 
common people as well, and to love and pity all mankind as 
he does himself. 
In accordance with these precepts Jean-Jacques as "ob­
server and philosopher" or rather, psychologist, probes 
and guides the boy's heart and stirs natural emotions to 
nerve and sustain the will, directing it toward a felicity 
compatible with that of other men and consistent with hu­
man sympathy. In discussing the value of insight into pain 
as a principle of moral excellence, Rousseau reflects upon 
the differences in men's capacity for sorrow, which de­
pends upon the degree of spiritual or intuitive perfec­
tion they have attained. He doubts whether insensitive 
souls who lack mercy, generosity, and pity can ever pos­
sess righteousness.5 Compassion is therefore indispensable 
to the whole purpose of education and legislation in both 
books. 
At this point in the argument he asks again, as he did 
in the second part, whether these precautions against pas­
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sion are not jeopardizing Emile's happiness. The negative 
reply is the same as it is there, and the artistic parallelism 
with "the book of the law" intensifies the politico-moral 
overtones of the present part. For example, to show real 
unhappiness he imagines a youth of fifteen who scales 
"Mount Olympus" all at once to enter the brilliant soci­
ety of the gods of this world and is doomed to disenchant­
ment like the child victim of indulgence in the former part. 
Moreover, the same three proofs, advanced there to show 
that Emile was happy in his ascetic life, reappear here. 
For instance, although he now shares the pangs of others, 
such participation is, we are assured, voluntary and sweet. 
This view was foreshadowed in the second part where we 
were told that under natural conditions happiness includes 
pain, disposing us to pity. Besides, the youth allegedly 
enjoys not things but himself, like the child who, even 
while enduring pain, found delight in the free play of his 
faculties that made him, at least in his own eyes, 
master of himself. Moreover, the signs of his contentment 
in the present case, says the author, are the serenity of 
his countenance and also his enjoyment of the esteem and 
confidence of others. That observation calls to mind the 
earlier part where indulgence was depicted as leading to 
the alienation of others and a life of misery. Throughout 
this discussion of happiness Rousseau is therefore mind­
ful of "the book of the law" The literary device of sym­
metry is intended to express artistically the idea that ful­
fillment belongs only to those who walk in its decrees.6 To 
ensure that Emile does so at this turning-point in his life 
and that his happiness incurs no risks, he is restored to 
his country garden. 
These arguments in defense of the hero's felicity are, 
like the ones in the pendant part, reminiscent of Socrates.7 
So great is the latter's influence here that I must stop and 
explain it. As I said in the previous chapter, this part of 
the novel is closely related to Plato's fifth and sixth books, 
in that order. There Socrates anticipates the formation of 
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kings, whose preamble is contained in the seventh. For 
the moment I am concerned with the fifth book, where he 
is forced by his listeners to speak of the family life of his 
citizens—"how they will bring children into the world"— 
and what their relations with women will be. The sage then 
agrees to "begin again at the very foundations," exactly 
like his modern disciple, for he too considers "the whole 
of life." He recognizes that this is a critical moment in 
the formation of his city and threatens its very existence. 
Thus he is induced to discuss the education of women and 
the problems of love and marriage, which Rousseau insists 
upon deferring until later,8 as the sage would fain have 
done. In this context he broaches the problem of evil, 
and he does so in the same manner as the writer of Emile 
and the Contract. For him too evil arises from a perver­
sion of desire that causes dualism and discord within a man 
or a city. On the other hand, his chief aim as legislator 
is to secure the bond of unity, which he conceives as the 
greatest good of the moral being. This is, of course, Rous­
seau's aim in the pages on sympathy. The sage solves the 
problem of unity of feeling and discord in three ways, and 
here lies a difference between the two thinkers. First, un­
like the author of Emile as we shall see, he educates wom­
en in the same way as men on the grounds that they have 
the same moral duties. Next he executes a law, much fa­
vored later by his disciple, whereby marriages are arranged 
between men and women of like nature. Finally he removes 
the family as he did property from the control of private 
interest or desire, whereas Rousseau, though likewise sub­
jecting it to higher powers, still clings to an emotional im­
age of it.9 But Socrates' intention is akin to Rousseau's: 
to foster sympathy among his citizens or, as he says, to 
produce "common pleasures and pains," common feelings 
rather than exclusive private ones, and to remove dis­
agreement about the use of the terms mine and not mine. 
The best-ordered state, says he, "most nearly approaches 
to the condition of the individual; as in the body, when but 
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a finger of one of us is hurt, the whole frame, drawn toward 
the soul as a center and forming one kingdom under the 
ruling power therein, feels the hurt and sympathizes all 
together with the part affected."10 This may also be said 
of moral afflictions in a well-ordered soul that has the same 
common feeling and is not at variance with itself so that, 
as the sage says, all powers speak "the language of har­
mony and concord." He thereby achieves peace in the 
moral being, which is further protected by two guardians 
"shame and fear" that reappear later in Emile. After 
speaking of the value of sympathy, Socrates next considers 
its effects upon felicity and again raises the question of 
happiness in the same way as he did earlier and as Rous­
seau does in identical contexts in each case. And his an­
swer is the same: the felicity sought is that of the entire 
moral being as it is naturally constituted rather than that 
of any particular class or part at the expense of the rest. 
He also recalls what he said earlier about the happiness 
of his guardians, which is, he says, greater than that of the 
Olympic victors. It is surely significant that at the corre­
sponding point in Emile the author shows the hero shar­
ing the pains of others and yet happier by far than the child 
who scales Olympus. The relationship of the two texts is 
undeniable. 
Rousseau takes up the Socratic image of sympathy, al­
though he ultimately uses it in a much broader way as we 
have seen. However, he begins by following the master, 
fostering pity as the basis of ideal friendship and thereby 
deepening the latter with a view to leading Emile from the 
law of necessity and utility to the law of love. The well-
ordered relations of the two protagonists become a pattern 
to enlighten the youth about all aspects of Rousseauist 
moral or social bonds and the "rights of humanity" that 
they are intended to secure.11 
A literary interpretation brings this out. Jean-Jacques, 
we are told, uses the fire of adolescence as an instrument 
of education by acquiring for himself first of all a hold over 
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his pupil's affections. This hold, says the writer, is all the 
more powerful to curb him since it is natural that the first 
bonds uniting him to mankind should embrace humanity 
in those nearby, particularly his governor, who shares with 
himself "common thoughts and feelings, common pleas­
ures and pains." The very words of the Greek sage re­
sound in the Aemilian text. As Emile becomes capable of 
affection, he allegedly grows sensitive to that of Jean-
Jacques, which is akin to his own. Since their friendship, 
far from becoming exclusive, always remains an image of 
the ideal order and human rights, Rousseau now calls it 
"the most sacred of covenants," adding that it will not go 
unrequited. We know, of course, that the covenant so de­
scribed is that of a man with his own sovereign will, and 
that friendship in the book expresses the same moral com­
mitment. But Emile has yet to learn that. When the youth 
becomes aware of reciprocity, the governor, we are told, 
acquires a fresh hold upon him, "having long since bound 
his heart with bands." These bands of the law that bind 
the heart instead of the body take effect quite naturally 
as he reflects how richly endowed his life has been. But, 
in the writer's opinion, such will be the case only on con­
dition that the governor does not claim obedience in return 
for his pains; for then the disciple, taken by surprise, would 
feel that he has been "bound by a contract without his con­
sent." Again the terminology of the appendix recurs, and 
the symbolism of the covenant of friendship rises to the 
surface. 
Jean-Jacques woos the youth's consent by speaking to 
him only of his duties to himself. Emile is thereby moved 
spontaneously to acknowledge a debt of gratitude to friend­
ship and respond to it. For, says the author: "There is 
nothing that carries so much weight with the human heart 
as the voice of friendship recognized as such, since we 
know that it speaks to us only on behalf of our own inter­
est." This phrase is obviously a Rousseauist version of 
a favorite Socratic one that anticipates the education of 
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kings and to which I alluded in discussing the myth of 
Montmorency forest where it was also echoed in Emile's 
expression of gratitude to his friend. In the Republic the 
master, having said that the most potent education of all 
is that which makes a man love the good and hate the bad 
even before he knows the reason why, concludes: "When 
reason comes, he will recognize and salute the friend with 
whom his education has made him long familiar."12 In the 
case of Emile this recognition, says the author, introduces 
the hero into the true moral and social order where justice 
and goodness are not abstract words or pure moral beings 
formed by the understanding but real affections of the soul 
enlightened by reason. Here he hints that he is translating 
the Socratic abstractions into more human terms. But to 
do so, he uses the sage's own images and ideas. Emile's 
grateful "recognition" of his friend conveys in an artistic 
form the first flutter of conscience, an acknowledgment 
of the duties or debts of social man, who is bidden by the 
precept of justice to render unto each what belongs to each 
so that, as Socrates says, everyone may have and do what 
is his own. The Aemilian hero now has an intuitive glimpse 
of that law which he already unconsciously obeys. 
In his broader use of sympathy Rousseau takes leave of 
Socrates, and, as we shall see, there is evidence that he 
does so deliberately. Having begun like the Greek thinker 
by arousing sympathy between kindred souls like Jean-
Jacques and his ward, he thenceforth transcends the mas­
ter in his appeal to that feeling by carrying out his inten­
tion of extending it to all mankind including men of evil 
life, much as he enlarged justice to include mercy in "the 
book of the law" Socrates opposes the idea of pitying the 
wicked in many contexts, including Plato's fifth book 
where, after the passage on procreation and sympathy, he 
makes children "spectators of war" in real life and shows 
them how heroes fight against their "enemies"—which 
typify evil passions in themselves and in others—lest they 
become "prisoners" of "barbarians."13 Emile emulates 
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those heroes later on when the same enemies threaten him 
personally. But meanwhile, he learns to pity all men with­
out exception. Here the author is inspired by his divine 
master, whose precept of love is expanded to include both 
"friends" and "enemies," according to the Sermon on 
the Mount. 
But thus far Emile, in pitying suffering humanity indis­
criminately, is blind to distinctions between men and does 
not even recognize the wicked as such. His next step is 
to do so. The author explains why. Since the youth's so­
cial contacts are about to expand and he will be compar­
ing himself with others in his search for a place among them 
and run the risk of being victimized by them, he must be 
prepared in advance for that experience by the sight of 
natural and civil inequalities and the social evils that we 
call "order." He must study society in men and men in 
society, combining politics and ethics as Rousseau himself 
does. The writer uses Socratic terms to describe our an­
archic world whose "false" notions of justice moved him 
to write both Emile and the Contract as they moved Plato 
to write the Republic. In all three the point of departure, 
now redefined in Emile, is to discredit such notions and 
the "law of the stronger" that favor private interests at the 
expense of the public good, and to honor true justice that 
consummates human aspirations and fulfills the promises 
of "the book of the law" The Rousseauist hero is about 
to look upon the fierce opposition of good and evil in the 
world about him without yet feeling it in himself, and to 
see it as the cause of suffering in most men without with­
drawing his sympathy from any. 
To achieve this double purpose, Jean-Jacques would 
have him read the human heart and see that it is naturally 
good, that men are perverted by the prejudices of our so­
ciety, unhappy in their iniquities and therefore worthy of 
his compassion. But lest the lad be led astray by them or 
fall a prey to them himself and hate instead of pity them, 
the governor briefly abandons his experimental method 
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and makes him a mere "spectator" of men's doings, like 
the Socratic children. The drama he beholds is compared 
to the pageantry of the Olympic games. In this chaotic con­
test, says the writer, men athirst for glory seek a perish­
able crown of bay; others engage in shopkeeping for the 
sake of gold; but the wisest of all are content to observe. 
The miniature Olympics of the second part come to mind 
to bring the artistic symmetry to the surface again and 
throw into new perspective the author's intentions. The 
implication is that in childhood Emile ran for cakes but in 
so doing acquired judgment enough to disdain to contend 
for foolish prizes. His object now is to acquire a sym­
pathetic understanding of human nature and its weaknesses. 
However, to avoid too close a proximity to the vices of 
men, he does not observe them in real life, like the Socratic 
children. Jean-Jacques finally has recourse to literary edu­
cation, to history and later to fables rejected before but 
now considered morally invaluable14 to show the youth 
the human heart, its folly and its misery, not in the pres­
ent moment but in other times and places so that he might 
see the stage without ever taking part in the play. In a ser­
ies of historical dramas that replace the parables in action, 
he is, as it were, led through the realms of the dead and 
thereby gazes upon the living and the unborn future too, 
"which are necessarily of like nature with the past." In 
fine, by observing the heart of men in this way he becomes, 
in Socratic speech, "a spectator of all time and all exis­
tence," like the Greek heroes described at the beginning 
of the sixth book of the Republic, in spite of certain differ­
ences of approach. 
Emile's governor uses discrimination in the selection of 
his histories and renounces those that portray evil exclu­
sively or that fail to tell the truth, since the matter at stake 
is the discernment of good and evil. He finds his ideal in 
biography on the grounds that by knowing the inclinations 
of individuals, one can see their combined effects in soci­
ety, and he thereby executes the author's intention of deal­
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ing with both together. He favors the faithful biographies 
of antiquity, particularly those of the Greek writer Plu­
tarch, who lays bare the human heart without regard for 
the empty rules of neoclassical decorum. In those lifelike 
portraits Aemilius, an ancient Roman reborn in the world 
today but a stranger to it, is enlightened by a Greek artist 
of 2,000 years ago who testifies to the state of the human 
heart in our society and whose testimony is true. Rousseau 
could hardly pay a more impressive tribute to one to whom 
he is as indebted as Emile is. The hero is especially sensi­
tive, not to models of virtue like himself that made the 
writer into an imaginary Aemilius at the age of six, but to 
the so-called slaves of passion that, thanks to the biogra­
pher's art, appear in the same truth as the martyrs of pain 
in life. 
The experience is narrated in dramatic terms. The youth, 
looking through the eyes of Plutarch as "the curtain rises" 
upon "the stage of the world," contemplates the spectacle 
of vice and suffering there presented to public view. He 
takes his place in "the wings of the theater," or rather, 
behind the "scenes," and "watches the actors don and 
doff their costumes," observing "the play of cords and 
pulleys" that deceives "spectators" unlike himself. He 
derives from this spectacle the initial impression that he 
has fallen among "wild beasts" with whom he has no kin­
ship. Yet the governor knows better for, we are told, Plu­
trch offers a whole "course of practical philosophy" — 
meaning psychology—and teaches a man "to know him­
self and grow wise at the expense of the dead." And so, 
although Emile hardly recognizes himself or his place in 
the "mad" multitude of an alien world since for him hap­
piness is as simple and nearby as health, freedom and the 
necessities of life, yet he has reflected enough upon human 
errors to pity all the tortured hearts of men, even his ene­
mies, who are enemies of the good and whose malice only 
betrays their misery. Or so the author would have us be­
lieve. 
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In these pages upon Plutarch he is fully aware of stray­
ing from the advice of his Greek master by bringing Emile 
to pity men of evil life whose pleasures and pains are not 
his own, but with whom he is somehow identified in sor­
row. Rousseau reveals this awareness by his use of terms 
borrowed from the stage. For the sage's protest against ap­
peals to pity for disordered souls is contained not merely 
in his discussion of "warfare" in Plato's fifth book but 
elsewhere, too, and especially at the end, in his renewed 
indictment of the theater and the tragic poets who portray 
lawless tyrannical feelings, "the creations of men them­
selves," not of God, and who are therefore "thrice re­
moved from truth." By so doing, they cater, says he, to 
false opinion and to passions that impair the reason and 
pose a threat to virtue and happiness. He warns his discip­
les against them and their works, convinced that "from 
the evil of other men something of evil is communicated 
to themselves."15 Rousseau, of course, knew these pas­
sages well. His essay upon theatrical imitation, written 
while he was working on Emile, is partly taken from them 
and, to some degree at least, so is the Letter to d'Alembert. 
His allusions to the theater in the section on Plutarch in 
the novel show that he has in mind the same Socratic text 
and that he is wilfully violating its precepts by favoring 
compassion for evil men. 
But the Aemilian text also suggests that Socrates' objec­
tions to sympathy for the wicked are not valid in the pres­
ent case. For example, we are told that Emile beholds not 
illusion, "thrice removed from truth," but truth itself. 
Moreover, the hero's impressions of the "madness of the 
multitude" and the image of "wild beasts"—the beast-
like nature in man that needs taming—are conveyed in 
phrases borrowed from the Republic,16 indicating the 
writer's sympathy for the Greek philosopher's viewpoint 
at the very moment when he disregards his admonitions. 
There can be no doubt at all that he has Socrates in mind 
since, in order to convince us that Emile, in pitying the 
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wicked, will not be tempted to imitate them, he takes the 
trouble to say that the youth will not imitate anyone, "not 
even Socrates or Cato... for a man who is alienated from 
himself soon forgets himself altogether." All this evidence 
combines to support the contention that Rousseau's 
thought on the educational value of pity on behalf of vi­
cious men takes account of the sage's protests. 
That he has the sage in mind is further indicated in the 
next development of the novel where he deals in his own 
way with Socratic warfare. There Jean-Jacques reverts to 
the experimental method to teach Emile the art of "war," 
not to combat passions still foreign to himself, but to guard 
against the errors of pride and false opinion that suppos­
edly generate them. For example, in order to persuade him 
that if he is happier than others it is by virtue of the gov­
ernor's reason and not his own, for he is a man and subject 
to weaknesses and errors like the rest of us, Jean-Jacques, 
who is "more than a man," provides him with experience 
of the world and purposely exposes him to humiliating ac­
cidents, as he did in the myth of the conjuror Socrates. 
However, he avoids perilous situations and at the same 
time imposes two other rules upon himself: he guards 
against assuming airs of false dignity and remains always 
at the youth's side, whatever happens. He is compared to 
a Roman captain, not of a ship but of a warrior who is 
Aemilius and whom he leads as a captain does his soldiers, 
even in retreat. In this role he strengthens the youth's 
earlier sentimental "recognition" of his friend, based upon 
self-love and sympathy, and wins new confidence based 
upon the authority of reason and superiority of knowledge, 
which belong to the "leader" (conducteur) whose wisdom 
serves the interests of human happiness. He achieves this 
by warning Emile beforehand against the perils with which 
he himself has secretly contrived to surround him in the 
war of life, but without yet giving him "orders." If his ward 
persists in running a risk, he "follows" him "gaily"17 to 
share in silence the inevitable mortifications as in the con­
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juror story, or else to lead him away to escape possible 
disaster if the risk becomes too great. As a veteran captain 
he will know in advance which expeditions are safe and 
which are hazardous, and the youth will in the end recog­
nize this knowledge. 
Once more Rousseau's symbols betray him. By resorting 
to images with military overtones, he again calls to mind 
Socrates, to whom he alludes in this context and whose 
advice about warfare is everywhere implicit in his words. 
As I have said, that advice is to be found mainly in Plato's 
fifth book, although throughout the dialogue life is de­
scribed in military terms. In the fifth book, as we know, 
Socrates makes young persons view the war of human pas­
sions, not on the stage or in books that naturally arouse 
pity for the victims, but in real life, which is less likely 
to flatter that sentiment. But he takes certain precautions 
that have left their mark upon Rousseau. For example, 
the children are "taken to see the battle" as "spectators," 
are placed "under the command of experienced veter­
ans . . . their leaders and teachers," are mounted on horse­
back and, if there is no danger, are "brought close up"; 
but if there is, "they have only to follow their elder lead­
ers," who know how to anticipate peril and conduct them 
away to escape in time of need. In this way they witness 
the merciless and pitiless treatment dealt out to "ene­
mies." The Socratic text proves how closely the author 
of Emile follows the master to show his hero confronted 
by a misguided world with which he must, however, 
sympathize. 
In combatting errors, the Aemilian governor has re­
course to the enactment of more parables, in this case in­
spired by La Fontaine's fables. Prompted by the latter, 
he secretly contrives appropriate situations, and later has 
the unsuspecting Emile read apologues to generalize his 
experiences. The author hints that much art and subter­
fuge are employed in these myths, but advises us that he 
does not intend to tell us everything, for, in that event, 
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we should stop listening. If we were to accuse him of de­
ception, he would probably reply with Socrates that "lies 
in words" are not "true lies" and are useful "in dealing 
with enemies," or as "a sort of medicine or preventive" 
to save our friends, and are also valuable "in the tales of 
mythology."18 In fact, all three functions are combined in 
the present instance. Thus the hero learns the danger of 
flattery and pride from myths like "The Fox and the Crow" 
or "The Frog and the Ox," and acquires a gradually dawn­
ing recognition of reason as a friend to man and a bulwark 
against error. 
Pages like those reminiscent of Socratic "warfare" might 
lead us to question Rousseau's originality, especially af­
ter the provocative statement that Emile does not imitate 
anyone, not even Socrates. Emile may not but the author 
surely does, although he does so in an original manner. 
Otherwise we should long since have discovered the close 
affinities of Emile and the Contract with the Republic. 
Like many great writers, including La Fontaine, he is 
deeply indebted to his classical and Christian inheritance, 
but skillfully changes the substance of his models into his 
own. For example, in the present instance it assumes an 
almost commonplace cast that is typical of him. If I point 
out resemblances, it is simply to throw new light on his 
work and thought, rather than to discredit or extol them. 
The foregoing phase of the novel, where the governor 
anticipates passions and errors by having recourse to his­
tory and real-life fables, is closely allied to the first two chap­
ters of the fourth part of the Contract. These chapters also 
deal with the problems of passions and errors and the value 
of bonds of friendship to solve them, although, of course, 
Emile's pity for the wicked, necessary for one who lives in 
a disordered world, is invisible in an exteriorized image of 
the perfect city. Indeed, the writer of the novel almost re­
fers us to the matching phase of the appendix. For example, 
his above-mentioned observations about the connection of 
politics and morals, and about the character of a society 
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being visible in the men composing it, link the whole con­
text clearly with the said chapters where the Socratic au­
thor shows how passions that oppress the will and errors 
that deceive it are as much a threat to the birth of the moral 
person or city outside as they are to that of the one within.19 
He also shows how those impediments of heart or mind 
from which Emile is saved through Plutarch and the fables 
may be overcome to make the moral person a reality. He is 
moving toward that goal at the same pace in both books. 
Again we become keenly sensitive to the evolutionary char­
acter of the Contract. 
It is further underlined by a comparison of the present 
context with the second part. For by virtue of the same lit­
erary symmetry observable in the pendant parts of Emile, 
the fourth part of the appendix refers back to "the book 
of the law." It begins with chapters on the indestructible 
will and its manifestations, corresponding to the earlier op­
ening chapters on the inalienable, indivisible, and unerring 
will. But whereas in the earlier ones the writer was 
concerned with proving that the sovereign faculty can and 
must be fostered to function autonomously in the moral be­
ing, and that it can and must be brought to emerge through 
all the conflict therein, here he shifts the emphasis to prove 
that no passion can destroy it or error delude it in a well-
ordered life. 
In the first chapter, entitled "That the General Will Is In­
destructible," Rousseau begins by exemplifying that power 
in men like the Swiss peasants of the rural cantons, united 
together in a single body and animated by a common spirit 
to preserve and prosper the ideal community. The prosper­
ity sought is not overshadowed by conflicting interests and 
is defined quite simply as "peace, union, and equality," 
to show that in such a society few laws are necessary, in 
fact, only those whose necessity \sfelt by all. At this point, 
like Socrates in Plato's sixth book, the author faces the in­
credulity of his hearers, who refuse to believe his words 
because they have never witnessed the truth of them. That 
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truth is illustrated in the novel, of course, by the friendship 
of Jean-Jacques and Emile, who are soon to settle their af­
fairs in the manner described in the Contract. As we have 
seen, they too are linked together by feelings shared in com­
mon and by singleness of purpose to preserve and prosper 
the reasonable constitution of man's entire nature suppos­
edly seen in their relationship. And their laws are the 
"peace, union, and equality" mentioned above. The law 
of equality forbids both wealth and poverty; the law of union 
enacts that the city be one and self-sufficing; and the law 
of peace bids each one do and have what is his own and re­
frain from meddling with others. These laws, which corre­
spond respectively to those of necessity, freedom and nat­
ural aptitude, suffice to achieve the main purpose of the 
covenant or law of friendship and therefore of man's sov­
ereign will. 
The author of the Contract next contrasts his ideal with 
a "false" society wherein exclusive private interests such 
as the greed for gain and power conspire against the moral 
being or human creature to destroy its unanimity and divide 
its kingdom into incompatible shreds by subjugating the 
will, as he warned in "the book of the law." If they prevail, 
"the social [and moral] bond is broken in all hearts." As we 
were told in Emile and are told again here, the public good 
is then sacrificed to shameful passions that muffle the will 
and dethrone it to sit in its place, fabricating their own un­
just decrees, which are, of course, those of the strongest. 
This is the chaos that was disclosed to Aemilius by Plutarch 
and that Socrates describes in a similar vein. As in the Re­
public, every word here is as relevant to the inner man as 
it is to the condition of social affairs outside. 
Regarding the anti-society Rousseau concludes Socratic­
ally that the sovereign will though mute therein is not de­
stroyed but remains "constant, unalterable and pure," like 
conscience, whose voice is its own voice, as we are later 
told. According to him and his master, senseless covetous 
and concupiscent desires, as distinguished from necessary 
[213] 
ROUSSEAU'S SOCRATIC AEMILIAN MYTHS 
ones that are the Socratic "maintainers" of life,20 cannot 
quench the longing for good that somehow survives in men's 
hearts, however they may try to elude it. To achieve an 
ideal order, it is therefore essential to elicit their will as citi­
zens, says he, by which he means men of integrity, and to 
take account of the right to "opine, propose, divide and dis­
cuss" that the governing agency of reason always takes care 
to reserve for itself. 
Some of us have in the past inferred from the text here 
summarized that Rousseau means to divest the sovereign 
will of the right to propose new laws and intends to reserve 
that privilege for the governing faculty or government. The 
eighth and ninth of the Letters from the Mount are usually 
cited to support this contention. But they fail to do so. In 
the eighth he is speaking of the status quo in Geneva and 
suggesting a change. In the ninth he merely says that the 
legislative power in a city may not be activated by any one 
of those composing it, which seems fair enough. But in the 
seventh21 he openly complains that the sovereign people 
have been deprived of the right to initiate legislation in his 
native city or to control the government that does. Even in 
the passage of the Contract under discussion, he obviously 
means to complain that the governing power "always takes 
care" to reserve such rights for itself. On the other hand, 
he demands that the will or "inner feeling" of conscience 
be elicited, as well as common sense, in the proposal and 
discussion of laws. Emile is trained to find necessary ones 
for himself, and with him, as with the Swiss peasants men­
tioned above, their necessity is always felt as well as seen. 
The main idea of the chapter, namely that man's will for 
the good is indestructible, is also Socratic, as we know- For 
instance, Socrates sees the soul of the tyrant as unhappy, 
for, being a victim of passion, "she is least capable of doing 
what she desires," and the good self is tryrannized by the 
bad. But the good self and its aspirations remain intact. Con­
sequently he speaks of the good "which every soul of man 
pursues and makes the end of all his actions," even though 
[214] 
TEMPLE STRONGHOLD 
we may not know its nature or true scope.22 
The question of knowledge of the good and errors in judg­
ment about the will's intent, posed in Emile through the 
enactment of fables is treated in the next chapter of the Con­
tract, "Concerning Suffrage." Rousseau begins by remind­
ing us once again that "will power" in a city is manifested 
by a healthful unanimous and harmonious agreement of all 
the various parts, resulting in a consensus of opinion in 
popular assemblies, unless, of course, men are unanimously 
dehumanized. But he admits that the actual falls short of 
the ideal, for the true self is led astray by the false. Hence 
he asks what degree of assent is required for the sovereign 
will to obtain in the moral person. That depends, he says, 
upon the seriousness of the matter at issue. The law of the 
covenant is the only one requiring total commitment in soul 
or city. We saw this in the case of Emile, who must himself 
consent to the covenant of friendship. In the city of the Con­
tract dissenters who refuse to adjust themselves to the sup­
posed reasonable constitution of nature and the ideal com­
monwealth and who reject the covenant are called 
"strangers." Socrates in the passage on "warfare" calls 
them "barbarians." They are excluded, or rather, they 
alienate themselves from the state that promises happiness. 
In less august matters in the Rousseauist city of the 
covenant, the opinion of the majority of its inhabitants 
suffices for the "constant will" of all "citizens"—includ­
ing the dissenting minority—to prevail.23 The writer 
maintains that in the case of committed men those who opine 
otherwise err; and that if they were to follow their own false 
opinions, they would violate their true will and be at issue 
with themselves quite as much as the victims of passion in 
an anti-society. Dissent, discord, and error inevitably exist 
within the self, however committed. But if the general will 
does not prevail in the majority, says Rousseau—and of 
course it would not do so in a disordered society like ours— 
then there is no more freedom. This applies not only to a 
state but to elements within the soul since moral and civil 
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liberty are equally impossible when superior powers are en­
slaved by inferior ones. His thought here echoes the later 
books of the Republic where the soul or city is betrayed 
into slavery by the sophisms of tyrannical desires. But he is 
persuaded that in his own city such abuses can be prevented: 
just as passions can be tamed by the human spirit, so errors 
can be rectified by common sense. Witness the case of 
Emile. The fables in action that served to correct him were 
designed to teach him the proper role of reason as faithful 
ministrant and friend to his own indestructible will for last­
ing happiness. 
A few critics24 feel that there is a certain ambiguity about 
Rousseau's "retreat" to majority vote after the demand 
for unanimity. The matter was raised in the third chapter 
above. Some people realize that the so-called retreat is an 
attempt to translate the will into practical terms. But even 
so, the author does not say here any more than in the second 
part that the general will prevails in the majority or even in 
unanimity. On the contrary, he says that it may not. It would 
do so only among moral beings who make the positive act 
of commitment to it, and only as long as they are mindful 
of their vows. Otherwise, sophisms carry the day. 
That is what Emile's governor has sought to prevent. 
Henceforward, from the part on "warfare" to the creed, 
he carries forward his task of stimulating the reasonable will 
and making the youth into a "lover of wisdom." That is also 
Socrates' object as seen at the end of Plato's fifth book and 
pursued throughout the sixth. The latter now becomes 
Rousseau's main inspiration to such an extent that I must 
deal with the two texts together. In the ancient one the 
speaker describes the philosophic nature, deplores its fate 
in our society, and examines the form of government 
adapted to it or education of philosopher-kings. 
Of course, the Socratic concept of the philosophic nature 
with which Plato's sixth book opens has already served for 
the presentation of Jean-Jacques, since only a philosopher-
king can "beget" one.25 For instance, he who was able to 
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distinguish between the true man and the false must presum­
ably possess his model's perfect vision of the reasonable and 
divine pattern of human life and like the model know how 
to order and preserve the laws of beauty, goodness, and jus­
tice in accordance with that vision. His friendship with 
Emile is supposed to exemplify this. And when in the pres­
ent crisis he rescues the youth from the enemies surround­
ing him, he again resembles the Socratic "friend of truth 
and all the virtues" whose enemies are the ones kept at bay 
in Emile and the Contract: the passions of mutinous men 
who try to prevent the "true steersman" from steering; and 
the sophisms of the great throng who fashion people to their 
taste in assemblies, courts of law, theaters, and camps, and 
whose prejudices and passions are called "justice" and "in­
justice," "good" and "evil." Rousseau almost quotes the 
master's words in Emile. In the face of such enemies the 
saving power of the Rousseauist ruler is that of the Socratic 
one in the same context, the "divine power" of reason that 
the hero has just recognized as a friend to man. And so, as 
both thinkers phrase it, he may safely descend into the den 
of human affairs to fight in courts of justice and public 
places, and partake of labors, lessons, and dangers there­
in.26 He now does precisely that. 
Rousseau defines the object and method of this descent. 
The object is to perfect his knowledge of mankind and him­
self and teach him to deal with men and calculate the ef­
fect of private interests in civic affairs. As for the method 
employed, he makes his way into society by practicing benef­
icence under the guidance of a sage. In dispensing his les­
sons, Jean-Jacques imitates the Socratic kings in the cor­
responding Greek text and makes his disciple into a "living 
authority" to perpetuate the idea of the constitution that 
guided the legislator in laying down his laws. For, after their 
example, he draws the youth to share in the same social vir­
tues of charity and humanitarianism that he himself prac­
ticed in the "book of the law," still visible here. Both he­
roes thereby deepen their love of mankind, as do the Socratic 
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rulers, who are also loving and kind and hold sway by win­
ning over the multitude gently and soothingly.27 Rousseau 
is walking in the very footsteps of the master at the same 
time as he passes beyond him. For in Socrates' case the mul­
titude is an orderly one, corresponding to necessary desires 
within the moral person or city, whereas the modern dis­
ciple, under the influence of Christian charity, appeals on 
behalf of the "indigent," "oppressed," and "unfortunate" 
amid a dusty and sordid humanity. Indeed, Rousseau vir­
tually says that Christian and classical traditions are herein 
intermingled by comparing his hero at this stage both to 
medieval knights-errant and illustrious young Romans 
' 'who spent their youth bringing criminals to justice and pro­
tecting the innocent." After their example and that of the 
Socratic kings, Emile takes care not to alienate people or 
cause contention among them, for he loves peace and har­
mony28 that are implicit in the common good. Gradually, 
his active compassion lavished upon all alike reveals to his 
mind what makes or mars the happiness of men, including 
his own felicity as a man of virtue. The love of humanity 
that results from his beneficence is identified as the love of 
justice, although he practices it only externally and is not 
yet obliged to "set in order his own inner life." The same 
qualities would be essential for the formation of the soci­
ety of friends described in the Contract. 
Rousseau warns that such good works permit no accept­
ance of persons. Like his masters he pleads strongly against 
partiality in soul or city. As we know, in both his books the 
sovereign will that favors justice has no particular object. 
Unlike those whom Socrates, in the very context here used 
by his disciple, styles "false philosophers" or "pre­
tenders," the hero of the novel is concerned not with per­
sonalities but with principles.29 He is taught that justice is 
the virtue most conducive to the common good of all men 
equally, for it secures the bond of peace and unity among 
them. Since the same bond is symbolized by his friendship 
with Jean-Jacques, their fellowship is obviously not an ex­
[218] 
TEMPLE STRONGHOLD 
elusive one. As we saw long ago, it is open to everyone, 
springing as it does from general concepts that lie at the 
basis of Rousseauist and Socratic order. Even in his per­
sonal life, the writer professed to be a friend of all men, how­
ever disordered, as well as a citizen of the new Geneva,30 
although he understood too well the discipline required to 
reconcile one's private affections with a generous fairness 
to mankind as a whole. The warnings against partiality in 
Emile, paralleled by those in the Contract, are prompted 
by personal experience as well as Socratic and biblical 
models. 
Rousseau stops at this point to admire the effects of 
Emile's formation and in doing so, continues to follow the 
sixth book of the Republic so closely that I must continue 
to handle the two together. The youth, with a heart free of 
exclusive inclinations and a mind absorbed by inner truth, 
beholds a Socratic ideal world "fixed and immutable," the 
true principles of justice, the real prototypes of beauty 
all moral relationships of beings, and the orderly disposition 
of things. Conversing with a reasonable and sublime order 
within the Aemilian city and practicing virtue in a chaotic 
world outside, he becomes orderly and sublime as far as 
the nature of man allows. These are the very terms in which 
Socrates too in the corresponding text describes his future 
philosopher-kings. Next Rousseau, again like the Greek 
sage and in the same context and similar words, faces the 
incredulity of his readers, as he also did in the Contract. 
He suspects that we have long since relegated him to the 
land of chimeras in company with his master.31 People are 
skeptical, says he, because Emile is the man of nature and 
not of man.32 Once more he is almost quoting the sage, who 
admits that by comparison with his ideal "all other things 
whether natures of men or institutions are but human," 
"conventional imitations," whereas he is molding "a hu­
man being" into the "proportion and likeness of virtue." 
Rousseau does the same. In doing so, he professes, with 
his master, to be adhering faithfully to his vision of human 
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nature sanctified by its divine origin. In the Greek text here 
reflected in Emile, Socrates explains further that he is fash­
ioning his "image of a man . . . according to . . . the form and 
likeness of God," or according to the truth that is akin to 
the highest good as he sees it.33 Rousseau hardly strays from 
the model that culminates with the great similitude of the 
sun or vision of the idea of good now matched in the creed 
of Emile contained in the "Profession of Faith of the 
Savoyard Vicar." 
The author finally has recourse to the saving power of 
religion when the hero is eighteen years of age. Before doing 
so, he remarks meaningfully that Emile is no longer one of 
the "vulgar herd," although he started as one. The point 
is that his religion will exceed theirs. 
According to the writer, most men are unable to com­
mune with the Supreme Being, even in our confined degree. 
Consequently he would not have them study the catechism 
or Christian mysteries, which allegedly mean nothing to 
them.34 If we protest that one must believe in God to be 
"saved," he agrees, on condition that the precept does not 
imply the notion "outside of the church no salvation." He 
believes that religion is necessary, at least for men living 
within the fabric of the social order. But he draws a distinc­
tion between the religion of the thinker or leader like Emile 
and the coarser instruction of the common people, who are 
so engrossed in physical needs that they hardly think at all. 
He does so even in his ideal order since many men are in­
sensitive to the harmony of the universe that now enchants 
and mystifies Emile. For this reason he would instruct them 
in religion all the sooner, as he does in his dream of a perfect 
city that comes to the birth at the end of both books. 
The distinction between the faith of leaders and that of 
followers brings to the surface the functions of Rousseau­
ist religion. The latter provides further against sophisms 
and passions that were the themes of the previous pages 
of Emile and the Contract. For example, we are told that, 
as the hero's mind becomes more cultivated, religion 
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would in the end be an intellectual necessity for him. That 
is one of its functions in the lives of leaders. But Rousseau 
is convinced that nature is slow to stir curiosity about the 
deity even in their case. Jean-Jacques, we are told, antici­
pates the moment slightly since he must impart instruction 
early enough to arm the will against the passions, acceler­
ated by society, and maintain a balance among the facul­
ties. The flames of passion constitute the sacrificial fire of 
the temple, offered to the Godhead to purify the soul. Re­
ligion serves this need for purification in the lives of both 
leaders and followers.35 It therefore has a double purpose 
for leaders, though not for most men. At last Emile is to 
know the great lawgiver, whose sacred laws are already 
the substance of his childish faith. He is to acquire the es­
sential elements of all religions without being associated 
with any particular one until he can choose for himself. 
These views that scandalized Rousseau's contempor­
aries are far from new. One might cite the example of the 
Republic. From their earliest childhood Socrates' guard­
ians are taught what is called a popular version of religion 
that is quite simply the practice of the virtues under the 
aegis of Apollo. But the reason of philosopher-kings is 
not even oriented toward the study of "true being" and 
the idea of good until after they are twenty years old, and 
only at fifty do they attain to the sight of God.36 In addi­
tion, the sage formulates a practical profession of faith as 
a guide to conduct for all men in Plato's last book. Thus 
he too sees religion as fulfilling a double role. Rousseau, 
in his view of the subject as everywhere else, remains close 
to the master without, however, forgetting the founder of 
Christianity, even though he remains skeptical about Chris­
tian dogmas and mysteries. 
One need not conclude that the religion of leaders and 
that of followers are incompatible, any more than the faith 
of guardians and kings in the Republic is incompatible with 
the practical religious dogmas formulated at the end of 
the great dialogue. The articles of popular faith in the Rous­
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seauist city are likewise defined at the end of Emile and 
the Contract, and identically so in both cases. Later I 
shall compare them with Emile's. The latter is now pre­
sented in a long profession of faith that has no correspond­
ing chapter at this point in the appendix. It prepares for 
an inner adjustment that is not included in an exteriorized 
version of the nascent city, upon which religious dogmas 
are superimposed after birth as the coping-stone of social 
order as in the case of the Republic. 
The Aemilian creed has an apparently objective form. 
The writer professes to transcribe a document composed 
by a fellow-citizen who recounts the adventures and re­
ligious instruction of his youth.37 To see the reason for 
the change in form, one must examine the introductory 
narrative. 
In the latter as in the creed itself there are two figures, 
just as there are in the rest of the book. But they are not 
the same ones. Rousseau suddenly abandons the ethereal 
Emile and the mysterious Jean-Jacques and replaces them 
by two very earthly human beings, a young exile who re­
mains nameless and an equally nameless Savoyard vicar 
who becomes the youth's mentor. In circumstances remi­
niscent of the vision of Er at the end of the Republic, two 
pilgrims ascend from the earth "dusty and worn with 
travel'' and confront two other souls who have come down 
to our midst by the heavenly way, "clean and bright." The 
vicar and his protege, who are obviously exiles from the 
blessed city or sphere of absolute beauty to which Emile 
and Jean-Jacques belong, are meant to exemplify the saf­
est course open to men who must live in a world not their 
own. 
The events of the introduction serve to show how en­
lightening an interpretation of art forms can be. Thirty 
years ago, we are told, a young Calvinist exile reduced to 
poverty became a fugitive in Italy, where he changed his 
religion for a morsel of bread. He was admitted to a hostel 
for converts, where controversy raised doubts in an unsus­
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pecting mind and evil was made known to an innocent 
heart. He longed to escape but was locked up. In the 
course of time he contrived to consult privately a poor but 
worthy visiting "ecclesiastic" who favored his escape at 
the risk of creating a dangerous enemy. Thereafter a little 
good fortune led him to forget his benefactor. But his hopes 
for the future soon vanished with romantic illusions. At 
last without food or shelter, he returned to the priest, who 
welcomed and comforted him. 
I must pause here for a moment before concluding the 
story. The outcast is, of course, the young, unregenerate 
Rousseau. The same child we saw groping about in the 
darkness of a Calvinist temple in search of the holy book 
is still groping about at a critical point in the writer's past, 
but this time in the Catholic church. The author here 
evokes the moment when, at the age of sixteen, he sold 
his Protestant birthright for a mouthful of food. The story 
is told in the second book of the Confessions; and if we 
compare the two accounts, we can easily see the symbol­
ism of the one in Emile, which is usually taken for "ro­
mance." In the autobiography the abandoned youth runs 
away from Calvinist Geneva and takes refuge in a Cath­
olic hospice for converts in the city of Turin. The hospice 
is transformed in Emile into an image of the Catholic 
church, in whose bosom he saw nothing but moral and in­
tellectual disorder. In that inn for the pilgrims of life he 
was morally a "prisoner" for about twenty-six years, from 
1728 to 1754. Within its precincts, though only after he had 
left the building in Turin (where he probably remained no 
more than a few weeks at the most), he met a visiting 
priest, Father Gaime, who was one of the vicar's two mod­
els in life. In the Confessions the vicar favors his escape 
from the mythical hostel by advising him to return to his 
own country and faith, advice which, as the autobiographer 
says, did not take effect until later. The youth's fleeting 
happiness with its promise of deliverance is also narrated 
in the Confessions. After its eclipse he remembers the vi­
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car's words and associates them with another voice heard a 
year later when, as a young seminarian at Annecy in Savoy, 
he receives guidance from Father Gatier, the second model 
for the Aemilian vicar.38 
In the rest of the story the vicar's life parallels the out­
cast's, and in the end the two are recognizable as one. A 
youthful adventure caused the priest to lose favor with 
his bishop, much as the exile's folly led him to break faith 
with the religion of Calvin. Consequently both are outcasts 
in Italy, where the vicar is almost as destitute as his pro­
tege. From this point on his story identifies him not 
merely with the exile of the context but also with the hero 
of the Confessions and the writer of Emile. The priest was 
once tutor to the Count de Mellarede's son, as Rousseau 
later became tutor to the count's daughter. Moreover, he 
desires to be restored to favor with his church and retire 
to a parish in the mountains, like the writer who in 1754 
resumed his Genevan religion and then made plans to 
withdraw to the Swiss mountains once Emile ws complete. 
Besides, when the book was published he was the same 
age as the vicar he impersonates, the age of fifty when the 
Socratic philosopher finally attains to a beatific vision of 
God. The priest's method of reviving a youthful conscience 
is also the author's. He begins by arousing self-esteem in 
the embittered outcast to lead him to the practice of virtue. 
For instance, he refuses to give him a deposit of money en­
trusted to him "for the poor," even though the youth pro­
tests that he is one of their number, for, says the vicar, 
"we are brothers; you belong to me, and I may not touch 
this deposit for my own use." The two are one, and the 
writer identifies himself with both exactly as he does with 
their heavenly prototypes, Jean-Jacques and Emile. More­
over, like him the two exiles favor dogmas contrary to 
the Roman church, although they remain faithful to its 
rites. In the end both appear as disguised Protestants. 
When the vicar or "man of peace" finally succeeds in awak­
ening the youth's reason and compassion for mankind, he 
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promises to confide to him the secret of happiness but 
warns him first that all is vanity under the sun and that 
peace of mind lies in detachment from the world. His se­
cret entails that of "man's fate and the true value of human 
life." This is the Socratic theme of Emile, the Contract, 
and the Republic, which is now to be evolved in a relig­
ious context that adds power to the author's philosophy. 
For the profession of faith is really a religious statement 
of the principles of his companion volumes. 
The figures of Ecclesiastes and the outcast evoke the 
most decisive events in the writer's religious experience. 
The voice that speaks in the creed is really that of his own 
conscience, which was once heard through the lips of two 
priests but was ignored. It is finally impelled to speak again 
by a consciousness of remorse embodied in the young 
scapegrace of thirty years before who still lives within him 
at this moment of truth. In other words, the voice is actu­
ally inspired by the mute presence of the hapless figure to 
whom it is ostensibly addressed. There can be no "revela­
tion" until that voice is heard. It formulates a profession 
of faith that, like the whole of Emile, is really a conversa­
tion of a man with himself on the subject of good and evil. 
Mingled in its accents is that of Rousseau the grave Calvin­
ist, the rebellious Catholic, the renegade "philosopher," 
and the disciple of Christ and Socrates. All combine to 
plead on behalf of a vision of moral truth that springs from 
the writer's deeper impressions of some of our oldest 
traditions. 
If we still wonder why, in such an intensely subjective 
phase of the work, he declines to speak in his own person, 
we might suspect that, as I have shown elsewhere,39 the 
objective form lends itself better to a public confession of 
the kind. But why put on the person of a skeptical Cath­
olic priest? There are several reasons why he dons the 
priestly mantle. One is that his theme is theology. Besides, 
he always longed for the life of a village curate although 
he was judged unsuited to that vocation after two months' 
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probation as a seminarian at the age of seventeen. There 
is still another reason. Since the voice that speaks is that 
of conscience, regarded as the spokesman of God, and 
since his conscience is unquestionably Christian, he quite 
naturally poses as a vicar of Christ, whose home is the 
promised land of Savoy, the scene of an idyllic phase in 
his life. We may infer that he himself presides as high priest 
in the temple of the soul where, in the life of Emile until 
the age of discretion, Jean-Jacques is ministrant or Levite 
in an office upon which his disciple's fate largely depends.40 
As for his skepticism, Rousseau maintains that, unlike 
that of the young fugitive and the writer's contemporaries, 
it does not affect the essential truths of religion.41 Skeptics 
like those, he says, have more to gain than lose by adopting 
the vicar's views. Thus he uses his unregenerate and regen­
erate selves respectively as an image of the society of his 
day and its supposed hope of redemption. 
But why choose a Catholic priest as spokesman instead of 
a Protestant, for whom doubts are permissible? He explains 
in the Letters from the Mount that the form of the work fa­
vors the Reformation, since a skeptical though pious Cath­
olic priest advises a former Calvinist to return to the religion 
of his birth. However, according to a letter addressed to him 
by a friend after a long conversation together, the word 
Catholic is used in its etymological sense of universal.42 
As has been suggested, he probably wished to underline the 
non-confessional character of his faith and its value for the 
safe conduct of human life wherever men may dwell. 
The setting of the discourse is adapted to its ideological 
function. The author describes a gracious summer dawn, be­
held from the heights of a hill that rises beyond the confines 
of the city of Turin and overlooks the long-drawn, gently 
sloping valleys of the Po. The scene is crowned in the dis­
tance by the immense chain of the Alps singularly clear in 
the transparency of the air and the flood of early morning 
sunshine. The aesthetic qualities of the description are 
heightened by symbolic implications that are intentional, for 
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the writer openly acknowledges the ideological value of suit­
able surroundings for any serious form of instruction. 
The choice of a mountain scene is especially appropriate. 
The mountain represents the summit of his thought. In So­
cratic terms it is the highest sphere of knowledge in the as­
cent of the soul toward moral truth. But it has many other 
resonances in the traditions combined in the book. It might 
be Mount Sinai, where God spoke to Moses as he does to 
the exile in the vicar's voice; or Mount Nebo, whence the 
prophet beheld the Promised Land here presented to our 
imagination; or even the hill of Sion, where Solomon paid 
homage to divine wisdom in the sanctuary of the Lord. On 
the other hand, it might also be some Greek acropolis or 
Mount Olympus itself, where the Delphic shrine now stands 
in ruins amid a landscape suggestive of the presence of the 
deity. But then again it may be that other mount in Galilee 
where Christ's "finest discourse" was pronounced, for the 
Christian overtones of this new sermon on the mount were 
accentuated in the final revision of the work.43 In fact it is 
probably all of these, evocative of the various traditions that 
solicit the author's thought. 
The sun is also symbolic.44 Indeed, it corresponds, as I 
have said, to a Socratic similitude prefigured in the third part 
of Emile. In the image that occurs at the end of the sixth 
book of the Republic, the sage uses the sun to convey his 
idea of the goal of the education of kings: the supreme prin­
ciple of the good whose light is moral truth and imparts visi­
bility to the sight of reason. This idea dominates the Rous­
seauist text where however biblical reminiscences are also 
implicit. For example, in the apocryphal book of Ecclesi­
asticus, a favorite with the writer, Wisdom, having spoken 
of God's covenant, the law of Moses, and its duties and 
promises, boasts: "Teaching is here like the dawn for bright­
ness, shedding its rays afar." The New Testament too is 
full of similar images of light to which Rousseau alludes 
elsewhere. In the brilliant mountain setting of Emile the 
blind boy of Bossey has come to be healed of his blindness. 
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The rays of light are a revelation illuminating reason and 
conscience that dawn like the sun upon the temple of the 
soul and lead man to an IDEA of good, which, for Rous­
seau, as for Socrates, is the "cause of knowledge and of 
truth." 
The landscape confronting the vicar is also an inner one, 
representing in artistic form his own complex state of soul, 
both "romantic" and "classical" at once. The orderly cul­
tivated valleys of the Po, remote from urban chaos, are an 
image of life as it has already been visualized, a well-organ­
ized, harmonious, largely "classical" vision. It is now su­
perelevated by powerful lyrical aspirations that are bodied 
forth in the Alps in the background of the picture to form a 
"romantic" image of eternity and infinity, concepts that are 
also in the background of the speaker's mind. As the ultim­
ate object of his thought, they poeticize it and sanctify it in 
his own eyes, thereby supposedly ensuring the safety of the 
simple order of life it propounds. 
CREDO 
"The Profession of Faith of the Savoyard Vicar" is, so 
to speak, the tabernacle of the living God in the very heart, 
or central nave of the cella, of the mythical shrine, where it 
is set apart by its own superscription and the cunning use of 
spacing. Rousseau himself called it "the best and most use­
ful piece of writing of the century," meaning "useful" in 
the Socratic sense. The work is indeed a landmark. For the 
first time in modern culture, the author of a literary master­
piece uses all the resources of his craft to handle his entire 
creed as a major theme of art.45 
Throughout the piece the blending of Greek classical and 
Judeo-Christian elements is visible. Rousseau's own state­
ment that his books were mere commentaries on the scrip­
tures is to a fair degree applicable to the profession of faith. 
Apart from numerous biblical echoes in its content, the 
ideological framework closely resembles that of the Solo­
monic book of Ecclesiastes, beginning with the theme 
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"Vanity of vanities; all is vanity," and ending in much the 
same way as King Solomon in the sacred text which is 
paraphrased by Christ and his apostles: "Fear God, and 
keep his commandments: for this is the whole duty of 
man." The Old Testament book shows how far a man, 
richly endowed with knowledge and experience, may go by 
the light of natural revelation alone, and in this respect is 
related to Rousseau's purpose. But its conclusion leads 
straight into the New Testament, which also reverberates 
in the Aemilian creed. Rousseau acknowledges a special 
debt to Christ not merely by choosing a mountain setting 
but in other more convincing ways. For example, he calls 
his work a "discourse," the word applied in French to the 
Sermon on the Mount. Besides, he quotes from that and 
other of Christ's sayings. And in the central tableau of the 
piece he portrays the divine master towering far above 
Socrates. But in the same tableau and elsewhere, too, he 
hints at his indebtedness to the Greek master and to pagan 
tradition in general. Indeed, as I have said, he calls his 
creed a canticle or hymn of Orpheus. Whether or not the 
reference to the Greek musician was inserted at the last 
minute to accommodate an engraver as seems to be the 
case, it is a felicitous image nevertheless. Just as Orpheus, 
the son of the Delphic Apollo, was empowered to tame 
wild beasts with the music of his lyre, so the son of man, 
who in the creed is "lord of the earth and the beasts 
thereon," appears in the vicar's person as the new Orpheus 
taming what Socrates and his disciple call "the wild beast" 
or "multitudinous monster" within the soul or city; and he 
does so far more effectively than the Sophist lion tamer of 
the sixth book of the Republic, who flatters the beast 
instead of taming him.46 In fine, the writer is obviously 
conscious of fusing the great streams of our culture in 
his "hymn." 
The creed is indeed a "hymn" as defined in the Diction­
ary of Music: a song in honor of gods or heroes. Moreover, 
just as a hymn is also a prayer, so is the whole profession 
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of faith: not a prayer in the sense of a petition but an act of 
worship, of admiration, contemplation, and submission, 
such as the writer favored in his personal life.47 It is a long 
meditative dialogue, or rather monologue, offered in hom­
age to the divine prototype of justice and wisdom and 
therefore to the soul or city made in that likeness. This 
prayer, like many another, is filled with imagery that in 
the present case serves to illustrate the author's philosophy 
of life, as is usual with him. 
The profession of faith begins and ends, as does Emile, 
with a defense of the "true" laws of basic social insti­
tutions, like love and marriage, that respect the rights and 
duties of humanity and are rooted in the universal princi­
ples of nature, unlike the "false" decrees of existing man-
made religious and political systems that allegedly shock 
her ordinances. Indeed, Rousseau says in his letter to the 
archbishop of Paris written to vindicate the book that that 
is the primary purpose of the vicar's creed and of Emile. 
According to the writer of the epistle, existing institutions 
that tyrannize and mutilate nature force her to claim her 
rights by stealth and thereby create an abyss between re­
ality and appearances. He exemplifies the strife between 
them by the contemporary laws of celibacy and marriage. 
The latter would be the laws whereby the French govern­
ment refused to recognize the validity of Protestant mar­
riages in France and also forbade the intermarriage of 
Catholics and Protestants. As we saw in the beginning of 
Emile, the author defends marriage as a civil contract upon 
which any society stands or falls. As such it wins the sup­
port of "enlightened" faith. 
Accordingly, the spokesman of the Aemilian creed com­
mences by confessing his own moral dilemma concerning 
marriage and celibacy. By virtue of a Freudian, or rather 
Platonic, method of using the sentiment of love to convey 
attitudes toward life, he expands his perplexity into a spir­
itual problem of good and evil. He begins with the reflec­
tion that he was destined by his estate to till the earth. This, 
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of course, is man's true vocation in the book and the one to 
which the author felt that he was born.48 The vicar's 
parents, however, decided to make him into a priest, much 
as Rousseau's resolved to "wed" him to an exclusive 
communion, without considering whether it respects the 
rights of humanity or does not. The "parents," in Socratic 
or Rousseauist language, are the country and its laws. This 
engagement is a false contract, corresponding to the 
falseness of a society that violates nature. The vicar is 
bound to it by a vow of celibacy whereby he promises "not 
to be a man." Again he is the writer pledging himself not to 
take any other "bride" outside the communion to which he 
is committed. This vow represents in the context a spurious 
rule, comparable with existing laws of marriage that cause a 
man to be at war with himself. The result of such rules is 
their inevitable infraction. In literary terms the vicar-writer 
is faithless to his "bride." He intuitively follows con­
science and well-ordered nature, which disregard "false" 
man-made decrees and lend their support only to the laws 
of reality. The spokesman breaks his vow of chastity, as the 
writer strays from the faith of his fathers toward "na­
tural religion." 
But the priest, in taking to himself another "bride," re­
veres marriage as "the first and most sacred institution of 
nature." In other words, though violating the mythical 
marriage forced upon him, he remains deferent to the com­
mitments of other people. He therefore forms a connec­
tion with an unmarried woman. She becomes for the author 
a biblical and Socratic symbol of the natural religion of man 
that is the vicar's faith, called "the pure Christianity of 
the Gospel." She is recognizable in the bride of the Levite 
of Ephraim, to whom Rousseau by his own free will is now 
espoused, at the same time as he professes to respect all 
established religions seen as private engagements like those 
honored by his spokesman in the Aemilian creed. 
The consequences in both cases are the same. The vic­
ar's infidelity to a "false law" leads to scandal, arrest, dis­
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missal, and exile. This was the fate reserved for the author 
as a result of an analogous apostasy. His words here are 
prophetic and proved to be true enough. But worse disaster 
lay in store for both men who are one. The vicar explains 
that the enforced infraction of arbitrary laws that trouble 
the order of nature causes strife and disorder in the soul, 
to which he is remorsefully a prey. The disorder in ques­
tion is typified by that of the senses and is said to impair 
the happiness of the human creature, which depends upon 
unity and harmony and can be assured only by a truly moral 
engagement and laws based upon man's natural constitu­
tion, with its hierarchy of faculties. Such are the allegorical 
implications of the exordium of the Aemilian creed. 
Before proceeding, it is necessary to consider it in the 
light of the Contract and other texts. The alleged viola­
tion of nature's ordinances by our institutions is traced to 
its origin in a historical survey at the beginning of the chap­
ter of the Contract "Concerning Civic Religion," which 
practically concludes the book.49 The survey helps to un­
derline the vicar's plight. In pagan antiquity, says the 
writer, the gods were identified with the laws of the city, 
which were regarded as divine. For him, of course, this 
would be desirable only in a perfect social order governed 
by "true" laws. Then, he continues, Christ came—to a "de­
graded" society, as we see later—to establish upon earth 
a spiritual realm or kingdom of the other world. This realm, 
which puzzled the pagans, is the one to which the vicar 
withdraws; and so conceivably would Emile, but for an al­
legorical coup de theatre at the end. The survey in the 
Contract ends with the advent of dogmatic Christianity 
that allegedly replaced the realm of the other world by a 
violent despotism in this, and caused a conflict of power 
between religious and political authorities. The conflict, as 
illustrated by the vicar, is due to the presence of the same 
tyrannical aspirations in both systems that Rousseau re­
gards as equally arbitrary and hostile to human nature, cre­
ating victims of "false" laws like himself and his spokes­
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man. The conclusion to be drawn from the passage of the 
Contract is that, although the social and politico-moral 
unity essential for a good constitution requires the support 
of religion, yet if the laws of society are not in fact "sa­
cred," then the only solution is the spiritual kingdom pro­
posed by Christ as a refuge from the world and at the same 
time a guide to life therein. 
In these pages of the Contract and Emile where the wri­
ter is haunted by Christianity, he has not forgotten his 
Greek teacher. In his preoccupation with moral law, he 
approaches religion in the same way as Socrates ap­
proaches both his similitude and practical creed at the end. 
In the former case the sage proposes to show his student 
kings the virtues "in their perfect beauty" to make those 
heroes into true guardians of the laws, and lovers of the idea 
of good. In the final creed, he seeks a remedy to the evils of 
actuality described in the eighth and ninth books where he 
traces the process of decline from the ideal order of things 
to the tyranny of lust and lawlessness. In those books he 
shows how moral and social chaos arise when desires, in­
stead of being tamed by true law, are constrained by neces­
sity and fear until they create "war" in the soul and then 
escape control, and a master passion, concupiscence, be­
comes tyrant absolute. In the tenth and last book he finds a 
solution in a religious profession of faith. The spiritual dis­
orders, in the context of which its doctrines evolve like the 
vicar's do, are in his view fostered by tragic poetry, which 
flatters and glorifies false opinion and tyrannical passion. 
He combats those exhibitions of evil by his own concept of 
the great artist and the divine plan of life. His avowed fol­
lower does likewise in the vicar's creed as well as in its 
popular version at the end. Presumably the Rousseauist 
"hymn" is meant to be an example of the only kind of 
poetry that the sage would admit to his city, the kind that 
honors gods and heroes and is "useful" to states and to 
human life.50 
I come now to the creed itself. Although the vicar's at­
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titude to speculative reason is far from Cartesian, he begins 
with what Descartes regards as a necessary first step in the 
way of truth: a denial of habitual impressions and a con­
scious opposition to the current mode of thinking. From 
that point he sets out to determine his bearings on the vast 
"sea of human opinions," without benefit of helm or com­
pass and with no other guide but "an inexperienced pilot 
who does not know his way, who knows neither whence he 
comes nor whither he goes." Here the Socratic image of the 
ship of the soul recurs by implication. The pilot without 
helm or compass is the untrained intelligence visualized as 
such in a passage on the philosophical nature in Plato's 
sixth book, as we know. In the Socratic text he "is a little 
deaf and has a similar infirmity in sight, and his knowledge 
of navigation is not much better." He is nevertheless the 
true helmsman and must attend to "what belongs to his art" 
if he means to be "qualified for the command of a ship."51 
In conformity with this idea the Aemilian vicar searches 
about anxiously for some positive light of doctrine to guide 
him to "the cause of his being and the rule of his duties." 
Bereft of the ancestral Roman religion as a guide, he 
contemplates the variations of philosophy and derives 
therefrom a renewed conviction that we know neither the 
first principle nor ultimate issue of things. He therefore 
disquiets himself only concerning those matters that it is 
important for him to know and reposes in profound ignor­
ance as to all else beside, says he in the very words of the 
book of Ecclesiasticus.52 These limitations and the avowed 
weakness of reason envelop his creed in intellectual uncer­
tainty and doubt. 
In order to learn what concerns him, he takes as his guide 
"the inner light," called "inner feeling or persuasion." It is 
really insight or intuition regarding his own true interests, 
confirmed by reason and experience and expressed in con­
science, which later appears as the voice of the enlightened 
human will. Consequently it is a moral and intellectual 
guide as well. Following this tutelary genius within, he is at 
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once led to reject materialism in favor of the "Being of 
beings and dispenser of things," honored by the theologian 
Clarke, who, like Socrates, rises to the idea of a Supreme 
Being. In other words, the vicar begins with an a priori 
choice in favor of God or Providence. By comparison with 
the rest of the book this choice is all that is ideologically 
new in the creed, but that is a great deal.53 The profession 
of faith proceeds like the convenant from a deliberate act of 
the will, as indeed it must do if, as we shall see, religion is to 
be a law in his city and invigorate all other laws. He defends 
his choice as being more consoling and presenting fewer 
difficulties and more proofs than any other system. But 
intellectually it still remains a hypothesis. It appears as a 
self-conscious assent to a presupposition without which life 
would be absurd as well as intolerable. He obviously finds 
sufficient ground of evidence in that very fact. Thus the will 
or inner feeling, used as an instrument of knowledge, pro­
vides him at the outset with a "reasonable" belief, tokens of 
which he now seeks in the world about him. 
Next, after using inner feeling as a guide to discover God 
as the source of moral truth, he sets out on his search for 
that truth and examines the guide he follows. The feeling in 
question must be essentially love of self since it entails a 
consciousness of his own existence and regulates the use of 
the senses as organs of cognition to acquaint him with the 
outer world of beings and things insofar as the latter act 
upon him. Thus he relies heavily upon sensitiveness and 
impressions, and his knowledge is largely subjective. 
Then he considers the structure of the intellect. He dis­
covers within himself the active power to compare the ob­
jects of his sensations by "shifting" them, "transporting" 
them, and "superimposing" them upon one another to form 
judgments about their mutual relationships. The motive im­
ages convey the idea of activity on the part of the subject 
and imply both volition and intelligence. Accordingly he 
concludes that he is an active, thinking being, capable of 
attributing meaning to existence and judging it. He denies 
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that he is merely sensitive and passive, as the materialists 
say. He distinguishes between the sensible and visible on 
the one hand and the intelligible on the other. In doing so, 
he shows that comparative and numerical ideas belong to 
the sphere of the intelligible. He gives the examples of a big 
and a little stick and the fingers of the hand, which the eye 
may see without counting them or making relative estimates 
about size. Socrates, too, in proposing the great revelation 
for student kings in his own similitude of the sun, makes 
meticulous distinction between the visible and intelligible. 
Later he cites examples of impressions that stimulate the 
mind and invite thought as opposed to those that do not, 
and his examples are the very ones chosen by Rosseau, 
who also resembles him by claiming the freedom to respond 
or not to the stimulus. But the mind is subject to error. To 
train it, both thinkers favor the mathematical sciences, as 
we know.54 But Rousseau's vicar, unlike Socrates, re­
fuses to renounce the senses in favor of speculative reason 
alone to attain to a vision of a reasonable order in human 
life. On the contrary, like Jean-Jacques hitherto, he corrects 
faulty apprehension of the outward world by having further 
recourse to them, for, says he, they never really deceive us 
about themselves, and we need no proof that we feel what 
we feel. We go astray, he explains, only when the judgment 
mingles its errors with the truth of sensations. The correc­
tive proposed is to refine and perfect the instruments of 
intuition by passing from confused to unconfused sensa­
tion, as Emile did, always remembering that the truth is in 
things and not in the mind that judges them. He concludes 
that the rule to follow inner feeling instead of speculative 
reason when the two disagree is confirmed by reason itself, 
which for him is basically a reason of sense, or rather, 
common sense. The rule of insight thus confirmed is con­
ceived as the bulwark of education and legislation. 
After making the choice of God and analyzing the organs 
of knowledge, he uses the latter to search for clues to justify 
his faith and rescue him from chaos. Lost in a universe 
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whose bounds escape him and amid beings whose nature 
and relationships to himself mystify him, he suddenly 
realizes, by the grace of inner feeling alone, that whereas he 
is able to move his limbs spontaneously and at will, the sun 
rising in the Alpine sky before him in its regular progress 
through the heavens lacks that very power. It obeys fixed 
laws, even as a watch does. This is a wonderfully sugges­
tive image, more Rousseauist than Cartesian or Voltairean, 
as it has been called, since the writer is the watch-maker's 
son—and I am not referring to Isaac Rousseau, who was a 
master craftsman in that capacity. Inner persuasion tells the 
vicar that movement is foreign to matter and that the 
heavenly bodies are responding to some external first 
cause, comparable to the power felt within himself. There 
is, he concludes, a sovereign will diffusing itself through the 
world, whose action sets the universe in motion and gives 
life to nature. The vicar is convinced that there can be no 
action, as distinct from movement, without will. The argu­
ment is a traditional one, of course. But the point to observe 
is the literary parallel with man, who experiences the action 
of the will not merely in spontaneous bodily motions but in 
the covenant and its oath that give life and movement to the 
city or the soul. Indeed, we are obliged to see this since, 
according to Rousseau and in view of the exordium of the 
creed, such is the main point of his dogmas, which are 
intended to sanctify his whole philosophy. 
The vicar confesses, however, that he knows neither the 
nature of the will nor how spirit acts upon matter. But to 
confuse the two substances as the materialists do, with their 
ideas of "blind force" or "necessary movement" in nature, 
is even more incomprehensible for him. 
Proceeding with his meditation, he deduces from the laws 
of order imposed upon the world of matter that there is also 
a supreme intelligence, an active, thinking being like him­
self "behind this vain show of things," an argument as old 
as the first. He sees this being in the harmony of nature to 
which he belongs and in the ordered relationships of things 
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that he perceives, even though their common purpose—of 
whose existence he feels inwardly assured—escapes him 
for the moment. He can do this just as a man who sees a 
watch for the first time can, without understanding its use, 
admire its mechanism and even see the workman therein. 
The familiar image recurs. In fine, the orderly spectacle 
before him discloses to the vicar's mind the intelligence of a 
master craftsman comparable to the Socratic artist of ar­
tists. Again we must see a literary analogy with man. The 
divine intelligence and its laws are visualized as a pattern of 
the operations of the human spirit and acts of the reasona­
ble will that impose laws upon the city or soul and order all 
parts of the whole in accordance with a common object. 
Here the vicar on the mountaintop receives the tablets of 
the law from the hands of God, and the law is the Rous­
seauist one, of course. 
Once more he attacks materialists like Diderot, with their 
theories of chance combinations of atoms. How could na­
ture and human life be the work of chance, he asks, any 
more than Virgil's Aeneid could result from fortuitous 
combinations of printed characters? His arguments are as 
old as time. "No," he cries, "the world is governed by a 
wise and powerful will: I see it, I feel it, and it concerns 
me." It is a very personal intellectual and moral need for 
him. 
He does not say here that the Being of Beings created 
matter, an idea unintelligible to him. However, he later uses 
the work creator to signify that the artist who formed and 
ordered all things is the creator of order and therefore of the 
idea of good in Socratic terms.55 What matters to him is that 
divine wisdom exists, one with nature and with man, dis­
posing the system of creation in such a way that every part 
contributes to a common end. The purpose now descried is 
the preservation of the whole in the established order. Since 
this is also man's object in the disposition of city or soul, 
the aim of Emile and the Contract is herein hallowed. The 
vicar gives the name of God to this being whose will and 
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power are equally boundless and balanced and who is, he 
infers from the perfect order of his work, possessed of 
goodness too. For Socrates and many other thinkers good­
ness is the first attribute of the divinity. But Rousseau cares 
less to show that God is good than to show how he is good; 
what concerns him is that goodness results from a balance 
of power and will and is manifest in order, an idea applied 
to man in Emile and the Contract. Accordingly the vicar 
concludes that what really matters are God's relations to 
him, and not a knowledge of the creator's essence or that 
of the human spirit either. Thus his recognition of God 
takes the form of conscious effort on his part to order his 
own soul or city after the divine pattern. God is he in whose 
image man or the city is made. 
This is confirmed when the speaker turns his attention 
directly to human beings. In lyrical passages of a biblical 
quality he proclaims the royalty of man, who is king of the 
earth like Adam and can tame the beasts at will. The new 
Orpheus uses words that hardly differ from those of the 
Psalmist or Socrates. His eulogy of human powers culmi­
nates in an angry apostrophe to the materialist Helvetius, 
who by establishing continuity between man and the ani­
mals is said to "liken himself to the beasts" instead of to 
God.56 By contrast, the vicar's convictions result in a sense 
of human self-esteem that arouses gratitude to the deity. 
This acknowledgment implies a flutter of conscience 
analogous to Emile's early gratitude to the "superhuman" 
Jean-Jacques, the recognition of a debt to be repaid accord­
ing to the law of justice, which is, after all, Rousseau's 
primary concern. 
Thereupon the vicar looks about him to find his place 
among men. It is then that he discovers evil and disorder, as 
Emile did in the portraits of Plutarch, but here it appears as 
a violation of the divine order of the cosmos: "The beasts 
are happy. Their king alone is wretched! O wisdom where 
are thy laws? O Providence is this thy rule? I behold the 
earth and there is evil upon it." The phraseology here re­
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sembles that of the Pauline passage: "O death, where is thy 
sting? O grave, where is thy victory?"57 The resemblance 
is appropriate, since we are about to learn that despair is to 
give way to hope since the disorder here revealed is to be 
adjusted in death. That adjustment depends, of course, 
upon his concept of the soul, which he discusses next. 
It is the discovery of evil that leads to the discovery of 
the soul, whose powers, according to Socratic doctrine, are 
called into play in the presence of evil. Thus the spokesman 
becomes aware of the soul when he observes and then 
personally experiences strife between two principles in our 
nature corresponding to the aforementioned active, think­
ing being and the sensitive, passive one. He discerns that 
the active principle conducts him to truth and justice, 
whereas the passive one, at issue with it, makes him a slave 
of the senses and passions, "the wild-beast nature" within, 
threatening to overthrow the balance of faculties. To de­
scribe the inner conflict, he follows Socrates but again bor­
rows the language of the apostle Paul: "No, man is not one: 
I will and I will not; I feel myself at once a slave and a free 
man; I perceive what is right. I love it, and I do what is 
wrong; I am active when I listen to the voice of reason; I 
am passive when I am carried away by my passions; and 
when I succumb, my greatest agony is the feeling that I 
might have resisted."58 The opposition of apparently in­
compatible elements, felt with the birth of moral bonds and 
passions in society, convinces the vicar of the dualism of 
his nature arising from the coexistence of a material and 
spiritual substance within him. 
Again he defies the materialists, who, in an effort to 
prove that there is only one substance, try to reconcile 
thought and feeling with qualities of matter like extent and 
divisibility. His arguments are less persuasive than the 
forms that clothe them. He accuses such men of being deaf 
to the hidden harmonies of the spirit that now reach a lyrical 
crescendo, not merely audible to the reader but also visible 
in that prospect toward the Alps: "Something within thee 
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strives to break the bonds that confine it; space is not thy 
measure; the whole universe does not suffice to contain 
thee "59 The passage evokes many another in Rous­
seau's works. But as a poetic tribute to the vast harmonies 
of the inner world, it is also evocative of Socrates' discus­
sion of harmony, wherein the sage disparages those who 
hear only with their ears and not with their understanding. 
The vicar, attentive to the reverberations within, for­
mally announces his belief in the soul. He declares his faith 
in the power of the human will to resist slavish passions and 
torment us if eluded. He further declares his faith in the 
ability of its ministrant, the active human intelligence, to 
formulate judgments and liberate the will, whose nature is 
to pursue the good of the entire moral person, and not to 
seek its harm. Man, he concludes, is free to act, animated 
by an "immaterial substance." This belief enables him to 
suggest a solution to the problem of death hereafter. But he 
does so in a new development in the creed, for the first 
series of dogmas ends at this point with the same emphasis 
on volition with which it began. 
We come now to another class. The transition occurs 
when the vicar suddenly declines to enumerate his doc­
trines, as he has done hitherto. The pretext is that we can 
do so for ourselves. But we could also have counted the 
others. The real reason is that he is on less solid ground. 
This is also indicated by the presence of prayers. There are 
five in the creed if we include a footnote, and but for one 
at the end they all occur in the passages we are now ap­
proaching. Even though the whole creed is a prayer, the 
prayer form here assumes great artistic value to express the 
writer's timorous "hope againse hope." So does his in­
creasing recourse to scripture to justify his persuasions. 
Since man is active and free, he alone is held responsible 
for evil. The greatest ills he endures, we are told, are moral 
ones and are his own doing in a supposedly enlightened 
social state since he abuses the freedom and intelligence 
that dignify him and enable him to scale the heights of virtue 
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and wisdom. The antithesis drawn in the text between the 
excellence of man's nature on the one hand and the respon­
sibility for evil on the other is suggestive of a certain vexa­
tion of spirit that deters many a man from belief. But the 
vicar rises above his difficulties in a first prayer and thereby 
testifies that he does so by virtue of a conscious act of the 
will: "God of my soul, I will never reproach thee that thou 
hast created me in thine own likeness to be free, good and 
happy as thou art."60 In these words the spokesman renews 
his vow of faith in the very presence of evil and in spite of 
his awareness of a certain inherent desolation in things, 
caused not only by the wicked deeds of men but also by the 
presence of death that he now faces. 
To show that life is prolonged after death, he quotes the 
words of Christ to the Sadducees, who say there is no resur­
rection, and declares that "God is not the God of the 
dead." In his own reasoning the Omnipotent, whose good­
ness imposes the laws of order, will in his justice restore 
order in death by bestowing happiness upon the virtuous 
man whose heart reassures him with the words: "Be just 
and you will be happy." Here the vicar deliberately rejects 
any suspense of judgment regarding further stages of being 
possible for the soul. But to proclaim his faith in a future 
life, he breaks free of dialectic to take refuge in artistic 
imagery by fancying a speech of God with the soul of 
Brutus, who cried out upon the plains of Philippi where he 
lay dying, "Virtue, thou art only a name." The image is 
momentous since here for the first time we behold a per­
sonal deity who intervenes in human life. In spite of the 
charming image of the watchmaker, God seemed until now 
more like the eternal reason of the Greeks than the Judeo-
Christian Father of men. Suddenly the latter stands com­
passionately over pagan humanity in the person of Brutus 
and promises new life to the dead. "O Brutus! O my son!", 
says he, "why dost thou say, 'Virtue is naught,' when thou 
art about to taste its reward? Thou shalt die? Nay, thou 
shalt live! And thus my promise is fulfilled!" In this context 
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the writer appropriately cites Plutarch, who uses the alle­
gory of the races to explain that we must finish the course 
before we can win the crown of victory. The apostle Paul 
says the same and so does Socrates.61 This is a race in 
which Emile must be an active participant and not a mere 
spectator. The prize this time is life after death, in which 
the vicar professes to believe. 
"If the immaterial soul survives the body," says he, 
"Providence is justified." On this condition, he adds, the 
appalling discord in the universal harmony, the triumph of 
evil over good, is resolved. At death, he reasons, when the 
two substances in man's nature are separated, the true life 
of the liberated soul begins. But, as someone has observed, 
he defends the idea negatively; for he explains that although 
he does not know the soul's essence, he cannot imagine 
how it could die, and so his reason assumes for moral pur­
poses that it lives, not merely until order is restored, but 
forever. The life he anticipates is a consciousness of his 
own identity prolonged by memory, a Fenelonian notion 
favored by Rousseau, who took pleasure in recollection. 
Our suffering or our joy, we are told, will be born of the 
remembrance of our deeds upon earth, contemplated in the 
light of God, truth, and the beauty of order.62 At this point 
the author adds a pious supplication hidden away in a foot­
note that again betrays the role of will in his creed. It is 
taken from a translation of Psalm 115 in the Genevan Psal­
ter of 1698 and reads: "Not for us, not for us, O Lord,/ But 
for thy name, for thine own honor,/ O God! may we live 
again." Reflecting upon that life, the vicar frames another 
prayer to express his doubts that the torments of the wicked 
never come to an end. But if the future life consists of a new 
vision of the present one upon earth, logic is again 
threatened by an effort of volition to behold perfect har­
mony beyond the grave, at least ultimately if not im­
mediately, although in the end he suspends judgment on the 
subject. 
In these reflections upon the origins and consequences of 
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evil, pagan images are intermingled with Judeo-Christian. 
Indeed, quite apart from Plutarch, pagan antiquity can 
hardly be ignored in the context. Socrates teaches his guard­
ians from the beginning that God is the author of the good 
only and not of the evils that occur to men, and in addition 
he commends to them "the world below" Later in his great 
similitude he proposes to lead his student kings to see the 
divine as the idea of good. Moreover in the creed at the end 
he presents the great artist or workman as the creator of 
real things existing in nature, especially justice and virtue or 
rather order. In the same context he also teaches the im­
mortality of the soul and the rewards of justice here and 
hereafter, comparing life again to the sacred games wherein 
the true runner wins the prize and is crowned—even by 
men and upon earth, at least in his ideal order. When he 
shows the meed of virtue in another life, in the culminating 
vision of Er, Socrates, who professes to believe in hell as 
well as heaven, declares that such rewards and punish­
ments are just, since men choose their own life and their 
own destiny: "Virtue is free," says he, "the responsibility 
is with the chooser. God is justified." These are Rous­
seau's very words. The sage concludes: if we discern well 
between good and evil and choose ever the better life that 
suits the nature of the soul and makes her just, then we 
shall be happy here and in another state of existence when, 
"like conquerors in the games who go round to gather gifts, 
we receive our reward." The passages in the vicar's creed, 
inspired by the spectacle of evil and the mystery of death 
into which it plunges him, turns out to be a fusion of biblical 
texts, Plutarch, and the Socratic myths. 
We are now approaching the high point in the canticle of 
Orpheus. After the "monument to the unknown God" 
whose presence is seen in the eternal processes of nature 
and especially in the life of man, the vicar still disclaims any 
knowledge of the divine essence or even of our own, and in 
a fourth prayer surrenders his reason before the mystery of 
the deity. Yet for him the mystery is partly unveiled when 
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he goes in search of rules of conduct and finds them written 
in his heart and uttered by his conscience. For him consci­
ence implies consciousness of a power outside the self that 
approves or disapproves of our conduct. It is in a sense the 
oracle of God testifying to the Socratic idea of good and the 
laws that it ordains. In the imagery of Emile it is the Pythian 
oracle in the midst of the mythical temple that again recalls 
the shrine of the Delphic Apollo. There stood the tripod at 
the navel of the earth where the divine voice spoke to men, 
as it allegedly does in the vicar's creed. According to the 
latter, it addresses each one of them and affords the only 
revelation that the speaker accepts unreservedly. 
The vicar defines conscience as a natural feeling of good 
and evil that bids men seek their own good but not at the 
expense of others. For him it is generated by the an­
tagonism of bodily passions in inner life that made him first 
conscious of the soul. Indeed, he calls it "the voice of the 
soul," which is the enlightened will as we know. It is there­
fore the voice of that "inner feeling" or insight that formu­
lates the creed as it does the rule of life in Emile and the 
Contract. The speaker regards it as a kind of moral instinct 
that is as natural to the heart as reason is to the mind, and as 
"normal" as the law of Rousseauist society, which of 
course does not mean that it is a spontaneous, subjective, 
and arbitrary moral sense. On the contrary, he calls its 
enlightened feelings "judgments," which are always on the 
side of justice. Hence he infers that justice suits the nature 
of man and reflects a state of health in the soul. Socrates 
said as much, and Rousseau did too when he spoke of the 
reasonable will that favors the virtue of justice.63 The 
vicar undertakes to prove it in literary terms. For example, 
he imagines men's reactions to the spectacle of good and 
evil in the situations of actual life, in the theater, or in the 
pages of Plutarch. What is the explanation, he asks, for 
their admiration of heroic deeds and their indignation at 
wickedness? "Why," he inquires, "should I choose to be 
Cato dying by his own hand, rather than Caesar in his 
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triumphs?" And again: "What are the crimes of Catilina to 
me? I shall not be his victim." Incidentally, the example of 
the Roman conspirator also inspires the writer of the civic 
creed in the Contract when he comes to defend the dogma 
of a future life. The Aemilian vicar cites more instances of 
men's love of moral beauty and of its frustration in our so­
ciety through the injustice of false laws. Even wicked souls, 
he adds, cannot entirely quench human feelings of mercy, 
loyalty, or friendship. He contrasts their remorse with the 
serenity of the sage who obeys nature's ordinances. Al­
though most of the images here are selected from pagan 
antiquity, the writer obviously possesses a Christian con­
science that throbs painfully before the spectacle of cruelty 
and suffering. Yet at the same time he contends that basi­
cally the precepts of good and evil are everywhere and 
always the same. He therefore concludes that men possess 
an innate sense of justice called conscience, even though it 
is felt only in a social and moral order that activates it in the 
presence of passion. 
As usual at each stage in his meditation, he challenges his 
adversaries among the philosophers. This time they include 
a dissident friend, Montaigne, of whom he asks in Cicero­
nian terms: Is it ever a crime to keep one's plighted word, 
to be merciful, beneficent, and generous? If not, then right­
eousness allegedly befits the nature of man. 
If we ask whether he means that men are naturally self­
less, or how he defines the principle of conscience or the 
will it expresses, he admits as usual that men must obey its 
laws for their own good.64 But he explains that there is a 
spiritual good to be found in virtue, the grace sought by men 
like Socrates and Regulus. The principle that bids us pursue 
moral order is, therefore, for him self-love, which, as we 
were told long since, impels us to seek what pleases, suits, 
or perfects our nature. In social life, however primitive, it is 
moderated by compassion for others; and with the rise of 
discernment it dawns upon us in the form of conscience, 
like the break of day that is the scene of this meditation. 
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Without that light, which is the light of moral truth, the 
rational power in social man is lost, in his Socratic view. 
The vicar bursts forth in oracular accents in a hymn to 
the unfailing monitor within, called "divine instinct," the 
"celestial voice," the guide of an intelligent and free be­
ing, "the infallible judge of good and evil, making man like 
unto God" and alone raising him above the beasts. This 
Socratic "divine wisdom within" supposedly dispenses us 
from metaphysical speculation and suffices to reveal the 
goodness that befits the human self, unless we wilfully 
suppress it. 
In defining the principle of conscience, the spokesman 
has also suggested its aim. According to him, the moral 
good it favors by favoring our own "true" nature requites 
our natural love of beauty, justice and truth and thus entails 
pleasures of soul like those enjoyed by the Socratic heroes 
in the sixth book of the Republic.65 In fact, his ideas on 
conscience as the voice of the soul are reminiscent of the 
philosophic nature described at the beginning of that book. 
Finding wisdom and happiness close by, he asks what 
sweeter felicity there is than to obey the duties of the 
natural law ordained by God's justice and to acquiesce 
freely not merely in a love of order but in a love of the 
perfect order divinely established? The Rousseauist 
philosopher resembles the Socratic by imitating that 
"heavenly pattern" in his life, and he does so, we are told, 
by ruling over the passions of a body maimed by disorders 
and thereby rising to a sphere above the angels, in the 
words of the vicar and the apostle Paul as well.66 The hap­
piness that results gratifies man's "first will," the constant 
and unalterable one that bids him be good and wise accord­
ing to his nature.67 In brief, felicity implies the orderly ac­
tion and interaction of human faculties working together in 
harmony according to their proper functions. 
The Rousseauist order and its laws now consecrated are 
violated by the "false" law of celibacy, to which the vicar 
alludes again at the end of the first or affirmative part of his 
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creed. He does so by referring to the irregularities of his 
life, including an illusion of happiness supposedly bred in 
him by that law which allegedly reverses nature's decrees. 
He goes on to condemn all "rash vows" that aspire to 
trouble the order of nature, including prayers for special 
spiritual graces or miracles of any kind. He himself refrains 
from praying for bounties, and the last invocation of his 
faith is the Lord's Prayer: "Thy will be done." For him 
that will is best expressed in the human conscience and the 
laws of the constitution that is the great artist's handiwork. 
The choice of the prayer form here to protest against what 
he considers selfish supplication has great literary merit, as 
the author says in the Letters from the Mount. Moreover, 
the prayer selected is ideologically appropriate, for, how­
ever we choose to classify his philosophy, his conscience is 
essentially Christian and even transfigures his Socratic 
laws. The affirmative part of the meditation that ends here 
has amply demonstrated this. I shall come to the so-called 
negative part in a moment. 
First it remains to be shown that the dogmas of civic faith 
stated in the penultimate chapter of the Contract, as they 
are at the end of Emile and the Republic, are wholly con­
tained in the vicar's creed. I have commented upon the 
historical survey with which the chapter opens. When the 
author comes to formulate the faith of his citizens, he be­
gins by considering the relationship of religion to both so­
cial and civil order and defining the virtues and flaws of the 
religion of man and that of the citizen, with a view to com­
bining their resources and avoiding the pitfalls of each. The 
creed he proposes is thus designed, like the vicar's, for 
society in general as well as for an exclusive association. 
Consequently the popular idea that the Aemilian faith is the 
religion of man and is irreconcilable with the other68 casts 
doubt upon his success in carrying out his intentions. 
The religion of man or of social order in general is, says 
he, true Christianity, not the dogmatic variety but the 
evangelical, which he identifies with the vicar's so-called 
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theism, or natural religion. He names it "natural divine 
law," meaning that it sanctifies the universal and eternal 
principles of natural and political law. It is confined to the 
inner cult of the heart and the moral duties of men, teaching 
them that they are all brothers. However, it adds no force 
to civil laws as we understand them, and even detaches 
men's hearts from the earth. The attitude of detachment is 
that of the vicar and the one Emile would logically adopt in 
an alien society where, in Rousseau's view, there is no 
other hope of happiness. 
Next the writer considers religion in its relationship to 
civil order, whose laws it serves to consecrate as it does his 
own. Such is the citizen's faith that he calls "positive divine 
law" since it adds divine authority to the positive laws of an 
established government. He favors the union of divine cult 
and love of the laws, providing, of course, that the laws are 
"true" ones based upon universal principles; but he fears 
superstitious ceremonial that disorders men and intolerance 
that destroys them. When he comes to define the civic 
creed of his own mythical city, he tries to avoid both perils 
by forbidding intolerance and recommending a simple cult 
reduced to public ceremonies that dignify the moral law. 
This religion would result from a sense of friendship, or 
fellow-citizenship, with others and would allegedly provide 
most men with a more powerful incentive for the perfor­
mance of civic duty than the vicar's "evangelical Christian­
ity," whose principles are, however, basically its own but 
are directed to leaders and thinkers. In a provocative pas­
sage he shows how those lofty principles, which foster de­
tachment in the anti-society of actuality, would among the 
common people of an imaginary, impossible ideal city, 
serve as a pretext for indifference to civic duty and sub­
mission to tyranny. Such men require only the practical 
dogmas derived therefrom. 
His idea of using religion to hallow the general principles 
of natural and political law as well as positive civil laws has 
far-reaching implications. Religion, far from fabricating 
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arbitrary enactments like the contemporary laws of mar­
riage and celibacy, which he regards as such, must be the 
strongest support of "true" ones presumably like his own, 
and for him as for Socrates it is itself one of them.69 Con­
sequently like all the laws of his city this one too is framed 
by the sovereign will of the people, which has no lawful 
superior, religious or political either. Moreover, since his 
laws envisage the common good and may require nothing 
useless or unessential to the entire moral being, the law of 
religion cannot evade or exceed these limits. It can sanctify 
only such commandments as those of Moses, Numa, or 
Lycurgus. And the vicar's "evangelical Christianity" pro­
vides for him a revelation of their source.70 
The articles of faith proposed in the Contract and later at 
the end of Emile are a popular exposition of the vicar's 
dogmas. The positive ones are briefly defined thus: "The 
existence of a powerful, intelligent, beneficent, foreseeing, 
and provident deity; the future life; the happiness of the just; 
the punishment of the wicked; the holiness of the social con­
tract and the laws." There is also a negative dogma forbid­
ding civil or theological intolerance of the kind exemplified 
in contemporary enforcement of the precept "Outside of 
the church, no salvation," which, so the writer declares in 
the Confessions, leads people to lie against the Holy Spirit." 
This precept is good, says the author of the Contract, only 
in a theocratic state that is in fact a church, whose pontiff 
is the prince. Yet like Socrates he himself applies it in his 
own city in the form "Outside of the city or temple of the 
soul, no salvation," meaning that the human constitution 
cannot otherwise be saved. In a word, he excludes dis­
senters who reject the faith, as they are free to do, just as 
he exiles those who repudiate the covenant. Men who pro­
fess to believe it and then behave as if they did not are pun­
ished with death. But he tolerates all religions that are tol­
erant of others and respect his own, even if the latter can 
never be an established faith any more than his city can see 
the light of day. 
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The death of the apostate has aroused a great deal of con­
troversy. To understand the writer's thought, one must cap­
ture the spirit of the text, which reads: "Let him be pun­
ished with death; he has committed the greatest of crimes, 
he has lied before the laws." Now to lie before the laws that 
proclaim the constant will as conscience does means, in the 
Aemilian faith and in the words of the Confessions, to "lie 
to the Holy Spirit" that speaks to men in that "celestial 
voice." Such is Rousseau's interpretation of blasphemy 
against the Holy Spirit, called by Christ "the unpardonable 
sin." This is "mortal" sin that brings death to the sinner, 
the spiritual death of one who is "cut off from the moral 
person like the sacrilegious soul in the Mosaic law who is 
"cut off from among his people" as a limb is severed from 
the body. If life, freedom and salvation are to be found, as 
Rousseau says, only in his system, then to cut oneself off 
from it after being integrated in it is in his eyes spiritual 
death. We are reminded of the controversial "right of life 
and death" as applied to apostates of the covenant in an ear­
lier chapter. The sentence of "death" is not only Judeo-
Christian but Socratic too, as we know. In speaking of spiri­
tual "warfare," the Greek sage says: "And he who allows 
himself to be taken prisoner may as well be made a present 
of to his enemies [meaning passions]; he is their lawful prey 
and let them do what they like with him." Rousseau too 
means that such a man is doomed to die, which does not al­
ter the fact that he teaches mercy and tolerance, as we have 
repeatedly seen. 
But he knew well enough that legislation will never pre­
vent intolerance, for human beings are always inclined to 
favor "friends" or kindred souls in preference to aliens or 
"strangers." He betrayed this awareness when he spoke 
of the difficulty of reconciling "positive divine law" with 
"natural divine law." He betrays the same awareness in the 
Letters from the Mount where, speaking of the problems of 
civic faith, he says that "patriotism," or love of a man's own 
city, and "humanitarianism," favoring human rights, are 
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two virtues incompatible in their energy and especially in a 
whole nation.71 Many of us may be tempted to infer from 
this text that the popular antithesis between man in Emile 
and the citizen of the Contract actually exists. But we have 
already seen that the principles of both are the same, though 
they are not applied with the same "energy" in the great so­
ciety as in a small one, except by a few lofty souls as opposed 
to "the body of a nation." Of course, in actuality the prob­
lem posed by patriotism is academic since for the author no 
authentic city exists anyway: there are only disordered 
states that foster nationalism or love of one's birthplace at 
the expense of human rights.72 However, he imagines the 
unlikely case of such a city existing, not only at the end of 
Emile as we shall see, but also in the Letters from the Mount 
where he evokes a society of the Savoyard vicar's Chris­
tians. They are surely freemen of the city of the Contract 
since, as he says, their creed—or, rather, the vicar's— 
"is affirmative and conclusive in all the main points of civic 
religion," which is that of his ideal citizens. He adds that 
it "contains all dogmas really useful to both universal and 
private [or exclusive] societies."73 Hence it teaches the 
duties of both man and citizen. The vicar's Christians are 
presumably both and so is Emile, as opposed to most men. 
But some critics still contend that Rousseau fails to rec­
oncile the two. They argue that he tries to do so by integrat­
ing the religion of both but that the civic creed has dogmas 
absent in the vicar's, these being the holiness of law and con­
demnation of intolerance.74 But these two articles are the 
very essence of the Aemilian faith. The affirmative part of 
it is nothing else but a vindication of the holiness of all 
"true" law. As to the negative part on revealed religion 
that we are now approaching, it is simply a denunciation 
of every kind of intolerance. The difference between the 
two creeds is more artistic than ideological, although the one 
explores principles and the other simply defines conclu­
sions, as I have shown. 
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In the second part of his meditation Rousseau in the per­
son of the vicar confides his doubts to a doubting world on 
the subject of dogmatic revelations. For him these are the 
"artificial" laws of established faiths that violate both 
"natural and positive divine law," including "evangelical 
Christianity" He speaks mainly of Judeo-Christian dogma­
tism and is inspired by personal experience. For example, 
his doubts are entrenched within the negative dogma of civic 
faith that condemns the maxim "Outside of the church, no 
salvation." This maxim vexes his conscience, audible in 
the vicar's voice and visible in the exile, who calls to mind 
a moment in the writer's conversion to Catholicism when 
he was allegedly asked whether, in his judgment, his 
deceased mother of the Protestant faith was damned.75 But 
although that memory never leaves his thoughts, his skep­
ticism really extends far beyond the Roman church and em­
braces the whole of dogmatic Christianity, including Calvin­
ism itself, as we saw in the story of the blind boy of Bossey 
groping through the darkness for the sacred text. 
The attack upon dogmatism is banal in its argumentation 
but is presented in an original form. If the writer regards 
his own faith as "evangelical Christianity," then authentic 
Judeo-Christian revelation as he sees it is to be found in the 
affirmative part. It is his inheritance and has left its mark 
upon his conscience and in the qualities of his imagery. He 
cannot then intend it as the object of his rebellion, which is 
directed rather against so-called obscure dogmatic interpre­
tations of its message. Consequently his art now consists 
in wresting it from the hands of sectarians and claiming it for 
himself by arraying on his side all the prophets of Judeo-
Christian tradition, including Moses, Isaiah, John the Bap­
tist, and the divine master himself. He does so by strength­
ening his arguments with words and phrases borrowed from 
their sayings. 
In his view private esoteric or "artificial" dogmas, as 
opposed to true revelation, lead to abuses that cause strife 
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among men. To illustrate this, he uses the very words of 
Christ's prophecy that his coming would bring not peace to 
the earth but fire and the sword. For Rousseau, who ignores 
the militant side of Christ, this is a warning that the spiritual 
kingdom of the divine missionary would turn into a violent 
despotism in the present world, as events proved according 
to the Contract. The vicar protests—again using the mas­
ter's words recorded in revelation—that the cult required of 
us is that of the heart and not simply the external formalities 
of a system of ritual. He adds that God wishes to be wor­
shipped in spirit and in truth, thereby repeating the lesson 
of Christ to the Samaritan woman at the well: "God is a 
Spirit: and they that worship him must worship him in spirit 
and in truth." For the vicar these phrases from revelation 
prove that to exceed its literal teaching is to violate it. For 
him a doctrine that does so is not merely unnecessary but 
harmful since it disorders and divides men. 
Looking about him at those who are eager for private su­
pernatural enlightenment, he assumes a tone recognizable 
as that of Solomon in the book of Ecclesiastes, the preacher: 
"I beheld the multitude of sects that hold sway upon the 
earth."76 He implies that sectarians use the supernatural to 
"hold sway over the earth." Apart from this impropriety, 
the multiplicity of sects varying from country to country 
makes religion of that kind an effect of chance dependent 
upon one's birthplace. If, says he, adopting a commonplace 
argument, there is only one of these churches outside of 
which there is no salvation, it possesses universal and eter­
nal signs obvious to all men. This argument leads him into 
a discussion of miraculous signs and wonders used by dog­
matizers to support their pretensions. 
The prodigies in question, unlike those of the first part of 
the creed, are the kind that every man cannot verify for him­
self. They are discussed in three lively dialogues. Whether 
or not we share the writer's views, we can still appreciate 
the mythical form with which he clothes them and acknowl­
edge its suitability to impart his message. 
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The first dialogue presents Ecclesiastes and a so-called 
apostle of truth who seeks to prove his mission by portents 
and prophecies recorded in books by human beings. In a for­
mula that most critics find the only original one here, the 
skeptical vicar protests: "How many men between God and 
me!" In a similar vein the author of Emile and the Contract 
virtually exclaims: "How many men between the law and 
me!" And again: "How many men between nature and 
m e . . . and between the world and me!" In the same spirit 
he asked the archbishop of Paris whether it was natural for 
God to go looking for Moses in order to speak to Jean-
Jacques Rousseau.77 The vicar demands to know how it is 
possible to verify ancient chronicles of prophecies and prod­
igies and to distinguish the latter from the unknown laws of 
nature that best reveals the Supreme Being. Nature itself 
is therefore the greatest of all miracles. Admittedly the 
writer contends in the Letters from the Mount that the mar­
vels of chemistry and physics are not miracles, but he means 
in the usual sense of the word, a point of view already im­
plied in the conjuror scene of Emile.™ The speaker of the 
creed suggests the paradox that the real miracles and true 
revelation are to be found in the affirmative part and that 
they support him against the dogmatizers. 
In the next dialogue he converses with a real apostle and 
does not exclude the possibility of authentic miracles in the 
popular sense. But he uses revelation to contrast them with 
the supposed miracles of zealots. The envoy of the Most 
High comes forward to announce undeniable ones that bear 
a conspicuous resemblance to those of Joshua stopping the 
sun and Moses making the waters of the Red Sea part to 
let his people cross. They are also reminiscent of others in 
a passage of Isaiah applied to Christ by John the Baptist and 
describing the Messiah's coming and the supernatural phe­
nomena to accompany it for "all flesh" to see. Such mir­
acles, says the vicar, are decisive and are not to be confused 
with the fraudulent ones of false prophets. Discussing the 
latter, he again borrows freely from Judeo-Christian reve­
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lation. For example, he cites the testimony of Moses in 
Genesis and Deuteronomy that puts us on our guard against 
the wonders of magicians and strange prophets. Moreover, 
he expresses doubt about miracles wrought in deserts or 
chambers, alluding almost textually to the words of Christ: 
"If they say unto you, Behold he is in the desert, go not 
forth: behold he is in the secret chambers, believe it not." 
Hence, Rousseau in the person of the vicar uses the words 
of the divine master himself to justify his incredulity. True 
miracles, he says in a note to the creed, must be evident 
even to the "poor in spirit'' for whom the kingdom of heaven 
is reserved, according to the Sermon on the Mount, whose 
message he defends against the dogmatists. The vicar rebels 
against the alleged obscurities of the latter on the grounds 
that the God he adores is not a God of darkness. Conse­
quently the speaker appears paradoxically as the defender of 
revelation against those who malign the "Great Being" by 
what Socrates calls unworthy representations of the God­
head. Such men are contrasted with the true apostle of the 
dialogue. 
The third dialogue is between Inspiration and Reason, 
both of which are personified—or, as some people say, 
caricatured—although the two figures are evocative of 
Fragonard's Inspiration and Study (circa 1769), which 
can hardly be so described. This dialogue differs from the 
others in that here the spokesman takes refuge in Socrates 
instead of revelation. Apparently hinting at the dogma of 
transsubstantiation and other mystical beliefs, Reason chal­
enges them with the mathematical axiom that the whole is 
greater than the part.79 By having recourse to mathematics 
to combat mysticism, Rousseau like the Greek master sum­
mons the arts of calculation to his aid to resolve the per­
plexities of the soul and virtually refers to a passage at the 
end of the Republic that I mentioned at the close of the pre­
vious chapter. In that passage the sage, speaking of optical 
illusions, observes that the confusion created within us is 
"that weakness of the human mind on which the art of con­
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juring and . . . other ingenious devices imposes, having an 
effect upon us like magic . . . and the arts of measuring and 
numbering... come to the rescue of the human understand­
ing. . . and the apparent greater or l e s s . . . no longer have 
the mastery over us, but give way before calculation... ."80 
The germ of the dialogue of Inspiration and Reason can be 
found here and so can the whole attack upon so-called false 
miracles, as well as the conjuror scene. The same Socratic 
passage also deepens our appreciation of the myths of 
Emile. Although the author has recourse to abstract math­
ematical sciences as he does in the Contract to evade what 
he regards as obscurity and deception or pious illusion, yet 
he personifies ideas and uses figures and dialogue to animate 
sheer logic, however misplaced the latter may be in spiri­
tual matters. The device is less subtle and more provoca­
tive than the paradox hitherto employed. 
He returns to the miracles and his defense of revelation 
as he sees it in the second and third of the Letters from the 
Mount. Again he uses the Bible to find support for his view, 
but this time he does so even more openly. Like his vicar he 
refers to the Old Testament, especially Genesis, where the 
feats of Pharaoh's magicians are said to be the work of the 
devil who performs false miracles. He adds that in the New 
Testament the divine master not only warns against false 
signs but rejects miracles altogether as a proof of doctrine. 
Here he almost quotes Christ's words to the Pharisees: 
"A wicked and adulterous generation seeketh after a 
sign.. . ."81 Again the scriptures are on the writer's side 
against the dogmatizers. Although in his youth as a Catholic 
he once testified to a miracle, he now claims the right to per­
sonal interpretation of the sacred writings on that subject as 
on every other. This right, he says, was originally the cor­
nerstone of the Reformation but was being demolished by 
his intolerant coreligionists. It was to them that he addressed 
the Letters. By what authority, he demands, do they deprive 
him of a liberty that they themselves have wrested from the 
mother church? But his main concern in the Letters, as in 
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Emile and the Contract, is not religion at all but a system of 
law to which it belongs. His attack upon dogmatizers is 
really an indictment of what he regards as arbitrary enact­
ments like contemporary laws of celibacy and marriage or 
those threats of damnation against dissenters like himself. 
The precept "Outside of the church no salvation" and its 
pendant the negative dogma of civic faith banning intolerance 
are still the prevailing ideas in the last part of the meditation. 
Rousseau's personal experience with the maxim, to which he 
twice alludes in these pages, lends warmth to his images and 
intensity to his thought. 
Assuming the dogma to be valid, his spokesman confronts 
us with the perplexities and fanaticism generated by it. Like 
many another man before him, he argues as follows: If there 
is only one true religion that all must follow under pain of 
damnation, how can the "lover of truth," who knows that 
she is one and not many, make a perfectly safe choice, since 
there are many guides among men proposing an infinite va­
riety of beliefs? He cannot study the doctrines of one sect 
without the others, for a judge may not listen to one party 
only but must hear them all. He must also read their writings. 
And if he decides to trust one of them, surely it must be one 
who has a thorough knowledge of all systems of thought, be­
ginning with the three great European religious philosophies. 
Even so, what is the fate of those whose lives lie beyond the 
span of any of these? The vicar imagines a pagan listening to 
a missionary preaching mysteries that men must know unless 
they would "be damned." The pagan replies: "And my fa­
ther is damned.. . he who was so good and k i n d . . .  " The 
thought is hardly original, but the tone is very personal. This 
is a direct allusion to the question allegedly asked of the au­
thor in life at the moment of his conversion,82 a moment eter­
nized in the homeless exile of Emile. The dismayed pagan 
decides that he must journey abroad to inquire about these 
mysteries. So, says the vicar, must all men. But since a life­
time would not suffice for such labor, he refuses to believe 
that it is necessary to be so learned "under pain of hell fire." 
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To resolve these perplexities, the vicar suddenly breaks 
free of theological erudition, scientific reason, and their in­
human demands to take refuge in the heart and plead in favor 
of evangelical Christianity. In a famous tableau of its founder 
he surpasses himself to portray the peaceful soul of Christ 
in life and in death that set him apart from the men of his 
time and our own. He compares him with the "statue" of the 
just man proposed as a type of the Socratic sage at the begin­
ning of the Republic. But then he proceeds to draw an im­
pressive contrast between the divine master and Socrates, 
who, we are told, found among the Greeks close by examples 
suggestive of his teaching, whereas Christ appears as an im­
age of the "loftiest wisdom amid the fiercest fanaticism." 
That wisdom is supposedly also the vicar's since his song of 
Orpheus is designed to tame the wild natures of men, and he 
is therefore called "the man of peace." Socrates, of course, 
sought to do the same by means of his laws and, although in 
the end he voluntarily submitted to "false" ones, died for 
the sake of the true; and so in the vicar's eyes his death 
redeems him. Yet Rousseau draws a distinction between the 
Socratic ideal of justice and virtue practiced among friends 
and the Christian ideal of compassion and charity for the 
wicked, exemplified by its founder, who blesses those that 
persecute him. Moved by admiration for the latter, he calls 
him a "God" among men. It matters little whether this 
divinity is of a substance, an adoption or a function. What 
matters is that, in conformity with his stance as the defender 
of Judeo-Christian revelation, he identifies his faith as an 
evangelical one. I have already said much about his cult of 
Christ in his personal life and in his work, which moreover 
includes two other portraits of the divine master.83 In the 
vicar's meditation he uses a mythical image born of great 
intimacy with the Gospels to convey his moral inclination 
toward Christian revelation in spite of his persistent doubts. 
In accordance with that inclination he is persuaded that 
true worship is indeed of the heart and is visible in pro­
priety of life and virtue. 
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The vision of sublime charity amid the madness of the 
multitude is followed by a new protest against the excesses 
of intolerance. The vicar refuses to preach damnation 
"outside the church" on the grounds that to do so is to 
blaspheme the justice of God and lie against the Holy 
Spirit. Again he alludes to Christ's words about the 
unpardonable sin and subtly uses revelation on his own 
behalf against its professed exponents. Moreover, the 
allusion, like the pagan's words above, shows again that the 
writer is indeed moved by that moment in his life when he 
abjured Protestantism and "lied to the Holy Spirit" by 
violating his conscience.84 It is wrong, says the vicar, to 
ask anyone to leave the religion of his birth, not because it 
may after all be the true one, but because by doing so we 
ask him to disobey the laws of his country that prescribe a 
uniform cult for all. This association of religion and law— 
as forceful in Emile as it is in the Contract—is one reason 
why the writer opposes Diderot's distinction between civil 
and ecclesiastical intolerance in both the Aemilian and civic 
faith where the language is the same in each case.85 It is 
also why the vicar, who has confided his faith to one who 
embodies a skeptical age, counsels him to return home and 
practice the ancestral cult prescribed by law in his own 
country, even though he may not share its beliefs. For, says 
he, quoting John the Baptist, "if God is able of the very 
stones to raise up children to Abraham, every man has a 
right to hope to be enlightened when he is worthy."86 Again 
he appears as a defender of revelation, confident that 
doubts will be dispelled not by a miracle but by a man's 
worthiness of enlightenment. And for him such worthiness 
can best be fostered by the faith of one's fathers, to which 
the heart most naturally responds. This is a practical 
solution of the dilemma posed by the multiplicity of sects, 
any one of which a "man of peace" must somehow 
inwardly adjust to the principles of natural divine law. He 
may do so by using those principles to exercise his spiritual 
freedom and rise above intolerance and the external con­
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formity prescribed by quite another law, as Emile does 
politically in the end. 
In conclusion the vicar suggests, as he did in the begin­
ning, that faith is at the outset an act of will or of hope or de­
sire. He adds, quoting Seneca, that it springs from a right­
eous heart, which is the true temple of the Godhead. The 
temple is also that of Emile. The righteousness it safeguards 
is synthesized by the new Ecclesiastes in the words of the 
old, which are also those of Christ and his apostles: "To 
love God above all and one's neighbor as oneself is the 
summary of the law"87 
The meditation closes with a little colophon in the form of 
a literary paradox. It is a skeptic's protest against skeptics. 
The vicar, having condemned fanatical, intolerant believers, 
denounces fanatical, intolerant unbelievers, although he pro­
fesses to reconcile the two and tame the fierce natures of 
both. Dogmatic atheists, says he, led on by their own wild 
imaginings, make a mockery of the old morality. In doing so, 
they exile themselves from the Aemilian city and that of the 
Contract.** By contrast with their "desolate" doctrines, his 
own moderate skepticism is intended to favor a decorous 
and venerable system of manners and morals that lends grace 
and harmony to human life. He sees it as the fruit of the hu­
man mind through the centuries, sanctioned by a great 
throng of distinguished spirits led by Christ and Socrates. 
But in his final words the Socratic "Know thyself" with 
which he commenced is transformed into the Christian 
"Forget thyself:" "When we forget ourselves," says he, 
"we are really working for ourselves." 
THE OATH OF KINGS 
The last "nave" of the vast temple chamber matches the 
first one and is the inspiration of the remainder of the Con­
tract with the exception of the final brief chapter. In Emile 
the author now comes to closer grips with the problem of 
evil, this time not besieging the soul from without, as in the 
first "nave," but checked from within by Jean-Jacques. In 
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subtle ways the latter uses religion as an ally in his work of 
government. 
Emile's faith is called natural religion or natural divine law; 
and although, like natural and political law, it will ideally 
guide him to favor its civic counterpart, namely the "positive 
divine law" of the citizen's creed, yet in practice he will pre­
sumably follow that of his birthplace and reconcile the two 
in the manner suggested above. Meanwhile, the governor 
takes advantage of the intellectual and moral value of reli­
gious studies and research on the author of nature to culti­
vate the youth's reason and moderate his sensitivity with a 
view to balancing the faculties, providing against inner strife 
and strengthening the ruler's hold upon the heart. As a re­
sult Emile is impelled to do good "without being forced by 
law," for love of God and himself or, if we wish, for love of 
the Rousseauist and Socratic divine order of things, so that 
he might one day enjoy lasting happiness in another state of 
existence reserved for the soul hereafter. For him the yoke 
of incipient reason is that of manhood, and its burden is no 
heavier than the cult of the heart upon which it rests. 
For Emile is on the verge of manhood. The latter comes 
with the full awakening of reason as the light of conscience, 
and therefore with the consciousness of a root of evil within 
himself to be felt intuitively and averted through his own vo­
lition. We are prepared for this awakening by a discourse 
directed by Jean-Jacques to imaginary critics among us. The 
governor explains that only at that moment do his own 
rights, which are those of reason, begin for the youth since 
only then will the latter recognize them. Hitherto, the law of 
duty was imposed so unobtrusively that it was as unknown 
to him as passion in his person. So was the minister through 
whom he was subject to its rule. It seemed to be in the very 
nature of things, as indeed it is in Rousseau's view. But 
since Emile is to ratify and obey it consciously, he must 
feel the need to do so and be made aware of the mediatorial 
action of his governor in the past as executor of the law as 
well as a friend to man. This step in his progress will be 
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made simpler by the fact that, as we are told once again, 
Jean-Jacques has bound chains about the heart of his dis­
ciple. As we have seen, the chains are meant to be the law­
ful fetters of ideal social relationships. Their appeal to 
• Emile is described thus: "Reason, friendship, recognition, 
a thousand bonds of affection speak to him in a tone that 
he cannot fail to acknowledge."89 Again the Socratic 
leitmotiv recurs in a fresh expansion of the basic theme. The 
idea is that, as reason sheds its light more brightly upon the 
bonds of friendship, his reaction will be the Socratic one an­
ticipated in the first "nave." He will recognize and salute 
his familiar friend as the law of reason and duty incarnate. 
This means as before that he will acknowledge a social debt 
of gratitude to be repaid, a reaction that symbolizes the law 
of justice at work in the inner realm of conscience. His grati­
tude, says Jean-Jacques still preparing us for the crisis, is 
based upon natural self-love, regarded as the only permanent 
feeling (as opposed to the flux of vagrant desire) and recog­
nizable as love of the human or higher self befriended by the 
governor. 
Since the moral order thus visualized respects nature, 
when the youth's desires begin to expand, Jean-Jacques con­
tinues, they will not be treated as "crimes," even though 
they are of course potential "enemies," passion having 
already been defined as a perversion of natural feeling. The 
governor of the ideal city is nature's minister, not her 
"enemy." In this capacity he does not, however, favor an 
early marriage but reconciles nature's decrees with the law 
that ought ideally to "befriend" them, and employs "a great 
deal of art to prevent social man from being quite artificial." 
The paradox is by now familiar to the reader. 
When nature's time comes, says Jean-Jacques in con­
cluding his discourse, the governor must make the youth re­
sponsible for himself by enlightening him about their mutual 
relationships and moral engagements, the crisis he has 
reached, and the perils he must face. Whereas, hitherto, 
vicious passions seemed alien to him personally, he must 
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now face the threat of evil in himself, the "enemy" within, 
and he can do so only if the notion of evil developing with 
instinct is clear to him. Like the Socratic heroes, who in 
this respect are said to resemble a well-bred dog, he must 
know his "enemy" as well as his "friend" and be able to 
distinguish between them.90 In fact, that is all the Socratic 
and Rousseauist philosopher needs to know in life. Con­
sequently, the Aemilian governor proposes to draw the 
youth into a larger consciousness of the spiritual obligations 
implicit in the order of friendship or moral order. In this 
wise we are led to the crisis. 
The shift of moral responsibility from Jean-Jacques to 
Emile is inevitable since the autonomous action of the inal­
ienable sovereign power is indispensable. In the author's 
eyes it is all the more so since the Rousseauist social order 
never has materialized and never will, and the hero is 
doomed to live in a disordered world. And, of course, even 
if the ideal order were to descend upon us from the empy­
rean, every human being must still consciously and volun­
tarily commit himself to the IDEA of man, whose essence 
is his own and upon which that order is supposedly founded. 
He must himself apply its laws as those of the human con­
stitution and be governed by "divine wisdom within." The 
just society must first exist in the heart of man if it is to exist 
anywhere at all and if, as Socrates says and Rousseau 
teaches, true justice pertains not to the outward man but to 
the inward, "the true self and concernment of man." Now 
that Emile's passions are quickened, he who knows how to 
create order in the external world must be induced to pre­
vent the elements within him from interfering with each 
other's work, to "set in order his own house," be his own 
master and his own law and at peace with himself. This is 
all the more true since he is presented as a leader who will 
hold sway over his fellows by the force of his example. In 
Rousseau's Socratic view men who are ruled by external 
authority and rely upon the enforcement of law by others as 
agents of an inactive will and dormant reason are childish 
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and could at best practice only "images of virtue" by force 
of habit or necessity like Emile heretofore. The youth later 
observes that they are like blocks of wood instead of men, 
and Socrates calls them "posts."91 
Jean-Jacques makes meticulous preparations before 
awakening his ward to the real struggle between good and 
evil: "Before we sow," says he, "we must till the ground; 
the seed of virtue is hard to grow; a long period of prepara­
tion is required before it will take root." Indeed, he has 
been cultivating the soil from the first where the book 
opened with the same image, which then recurred in the 
myth of the Socratic and Christian husbandman.92 
Before making the great disclosure, he wards off the immi­
nent onslaught of passion. The youth is compared to a som­
nambulist who is led away from the brink of a precipice be­
fore being awakened. He is then briefly distracted from the 
presence of peril by the violent exercise of the chase popular 
among Genevans. In a new Socratic myth elucidated by the 
author himself, he becomes a huntsman, a follower of Diana, 
the chaste goddess of the hunt and enemy of love, and rides 
through woods and fields and rugged countryside. He was 
prefigured by the child astray in the shadows of Montmor­
ency forest who exclaimed, "O my good friend!" when he 
was led forth into the light as the youth is about to be, only 
this time the light will be a brighter one. The myth of the 
hunter is, like that of the forest, evocative of the one in the 
fourth book of the Republic where Socrates and his friends 
go hunting for a quarry that is justice. Emile's quarry is 
the same. 
The scene of his awakening to the true nature of justice 
in the form of spiritual order is also that of the governor's 
transfiguration before him. It is hardly less dramatic than 
Mentor's metamorphosis into the goddess Minerva in Fen­
elon's Telemaque. The setting is chosen in accordance 
with Rousseau's usual respect for the language of signs and 
is an impressive one of woods and rocks and mountain 
slopes. Like that of the vicar's creed it is symbolic of a state 
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of soul in the midst of the temple as much as it is a landscape 
outside. It is, we are informed, a place fit for solemn oaths 
and the recognition of ruling powers, since it suggests the 
presence of the deity as the judge of mankind who sanc­
tifies "covenants," "alliances," and "promises." The 
writer recalls the awesome scenes of biblical oaths and sa­
cred contracts. He also calls to mind the august signs of 
royal power that won men's allegiance in the past, and gives 
the example of the ancient Romans and their use of symbolic 
expression adopted in the Aemilian text. He admires the 
care with which they chose a suitable time and place for the 
great assemblies of the people, and ordained that candidates 
for government office go clad in appropriate robes. From 
all these observances he draws a lesson: "Clothe your rea­
son with a body if you would make it felt" and let it speak 
the language of the heart. Indeed, the tableau in Emile is 
inspired by the solemn rites described, whose purpose was 
the same as that of Jean-Jacques. 
The dramatic action follows. The governor, animating the 
voice of reason "with images and figures" to appeal to the 
emotions, speaks first about friendship and then about mar­
riage, but his discourse is not verbally recorded as the vic­
ar's was. In the light of this collation of texts and in view 
of the author's own warning about "images and figures," 
we might be justified in seeing in his handling of the two 
themes a portrayal of Rousseauist social and civil order, 
which does not, however, exclude the possibility of a lit­
eral interpretation as well. 
The motif of friendship takes precedence, of course. The 
speaker finally reveals who he really is and shows Emile 
all that he has done for him but talks as though he had done 
it for himself, motivated by affection. Instead of appealing 
to the youth's interest as he did previously, he appeals to 
his own. Yet he is really identifying the two, if the common 
happiness is secured by the Socratic and Rousseauist law 
that "friends have all things in common," which is the law 
of the covenant. He explains: "I shall kindle in his young 
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heart all the sentiments of friendship, generosity, and rec­
ognition that I have already begotten." Again the famous 
words of Socrates are audible in the text that underlines 
the identity of thought between the two. Jean-Jacques con­
cludes the first part of his discourse with more Socratic 
speech: "You are my wealth, my child, my handiwork, my 
only hope of happiness." He implies that the law of reason 
or its spokesman begets the nobly ordered soul or city93 and 
is a man's true father and friend, who are one as we were 
told at the beginning of the book. 
Continuing the discourse, he allegorizes about marriage. 
He reveals both the natural laws and exclusive moral affec­
tion that consummate it, and depicts it as "the sweetest 
form of society" but also as a "sacred bond" and "the most 
holy and inviolable of covenants." He contrasts the horrors 
of debauchery with the blessings of chastity, which sym­
bolizes purity of will or love of the law—as in the vicar's 
case—and promises health, strength, virtue, love, and all 
the true goods of humankind. In this way he associates the 
good with happiness and evil with misery, "enemies," and 
death in the mind of Emile. 
This passage is full of allegorical elements. The bond of 
marriage, which for Rousseau as a Calvinist was, as we 
know, a civil contract,94 is "begotten" of the laws of nature 
and realized by love. Now he has already said that love in 
the civil order is an exclusive affection born with reason,95 
and in this respect it resembles a man's devotion to his own 
city. Indeed, the conjugal ties that consummate it poeticize 
for him the conventional bonds of a private civil order that 
harmonizes with the natural one. Hence while the vicar 
called love and marriage "the most sacred institutions of 
nature," Jean-Jacques calls the conjugal bond "the most 
sacred of covenants." He used the same words to describe 
friendship, which binds a man to the laws of justice and so­
cial order and is here applied to an exclusive object. There 
is no contradiction between the two texts. For Rousseau the 
civil covenant is founded upon the universal and eternal 
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principles of the great covenant or social contract, which in 
his view are the laws of human nature. When they are ob­
served in the intimacy of private life, intensity of affection 
gives powerful unity of motive to practical rectitude. Here 
as in the fifth part of the book, the primary institutions of 
love and marriage are used to portray the "wise order" of 
the Rousseauist city and its laws that are about to prevail 
in the innermost sphere of human action. The image is ap­
propriate since in marriage love becomes a law. If the author 
here regards matrimonial ordinances as "sacred" and their 
violation as a crime, it is largely because for him they sym­
bolize those of his own city and are the very reverse of the 
arbitrary decrees against which the creed was mainly di­
rected.96 Again Freudian or Platonic methods serve to im­
part his thought. 
Emile's response is typically Socratic. The Rousseauist 
huntsman, like the child emerging from Montmorency 
wood, exlaims "O my friend!"—recognizing in reason 
or the light of the human will the Socratic "companion 
of his life and education" and discovering the law of jus­
tice as nearby as the Greek huntsmen found it. Aware of 
his responsibility, he pleads with his "master" to resume 
the authority that, endorsed by his own will, is now all the 
more sacred to him. "Defend me," he implores, "from all 
the foes that besiege me and especially those I bear within 
myself." His constant will, he says, is to obey Jean-Jacques' 
laws, or rather the dictates of his own reason that alone can 
save him from the slavery of sense and make him master of 
himself. At this point the enlightened will is fully formed 
in him, and he sees his governor as an outward equivalent 
of that faculty whose voice, like the vicar's, is heard in con­
science. By promising obedience, he consents to share ac­
tively in the society of friends. He also performs an act of 
self-government by begging his friend to be what Socrates 
calls his "minister of education" or governor. He contends 
with evil autonomously in this way until he can finally cope 
with it alone. The pledge to which he proposes to subscribe 
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in this context is not merely a pedagogical contract that 
evokes the great covenant, as has been said, but actually 
translates that covenant into literary terms.97 
Jean-Jacques' reaction to the plea for his ministry is as 
typically Socratic as the plea itself. He hesitates. In a city 
of good men, says Socrates in Plato's first book, to avoid 
office would be an object of contention, for they would know 
—as Christ also teaches—that true kingship is of the nature 
of a service to others. Rousseau says the same in the Con­
tract, as we know and shall again be reminded. To restrain 
the passions of men is no easy task. Emile, says Jean-Jacques, 
will be like Ulysses, who could hardly resist the singing of 
the sirens even by entrusting himself to another. But in this 
case the "other" is the wise Ulysses or great helmsman, to 
whom the speaker himself was formerly compared and whom 
the youth must ultimately become. Rousseau, by identifying 
each of his characters with the same hero, confesses that 
both are himself, not merely Jean-Jacques. The confession 
is made in a moment of crisis, as is also the case twice in the 
next part. Furthermore, the use of the image of Ulysses for 
the two shows that the man of nature, by recognizing and 
choosing Jean-Jacques as the true pilot, already becomes 
for a moment his own helmsman. The imagery represents 
concretely and in a literary manner the way in which a gov­
erning power is lawfully instituted according to the Contract. 
The two friends together momentarily symbolize a demo­
cratic governing body into which the sovereign or collective 
moral being temporarily transforms itself in order to decide 
upon a ruler. Jean-Jacques, in spite of his reluctance to guide 
Emile, to "forget himself in devotion to his friend and wage 
unceasing war against the vagrant desires of both, accepts 
the double burden of the ruler who is also subject to the laws. 
After the disciple has "signed the covenant" and the 
friends have reached an agreement that, throughout the cri­
sis of expanding passions, the wiser of the two will execute 
the laws on behalf of both, Jean-Jacques at once takes pre­
cautions against acts of blind obedience. For instance, he 
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observes that Emile can understand his governor's motives 
if he waits to be free of passion before judging. "Always 
obey me first," says the ruler, "and then ask me to account 
for my commands." Here the friends poeticize the ideal 
Rousseauist and Socratic relationship existing both within 
the sovereign people and between them and their rulers: 
real governors are always answerable to those whose felicity 
they serve. Jean-Jacques' professed purpose is, as usual, 
to make Emile happy in the present as well as in the future, 
in accordance with nature's designs. He does so by repre­
senting true love as the supreme happiness of life, but he 
uses it to symbolize the love of wisdom and win Emile to 
his side: "I shall make him into a sage," says he, "by mak­
ing him into a lover." 
These pages of the novel, where the sovereign appears in 
a quasi-religious atmosphere to accentuate the majesty of 
sovereignty, and where the governing power receives his 
mission at the hands of the moral being over which he is to 
preside, are closely allied to the corresponding ones of the 
Contract. They are the third, fourth, fifth and sixth chap­
ters of the fourth part, and mainly the third and fourth. 
The third chapter is entitled "Concerning Elections." 
Here the idea that kingship is a form of self-sacrifice, al­
ready implied in the third book, recurs in a passage on elec­
tion by lot. In a true democracy, says Rousseau, the magis­
tracy is not an advantage but a burdensome office that cannot 
justly be imposed upon anyone, the difficulty being to pre­
vent the government from changing form. He adds that the 
law alone can impose that burden upon the man on whom the 
lot falls. The outcome is allegedly indifferent in such a so­
ciety since absolute equality is in its very nature and in fact 
the lot falls upon everyone. But he concludes that the matter 
is purely academic since he has already said that such a gov­
ernment is too precarious to exist unless people were gods, 
in which case they would not need to be governed at all. 
In an aristocracy such as we see in Emile the writer pre­
fers election by choice therein typified: "The Prince," he 
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says "chooses the Prince." In the novel we have just be­
held the prince in the union of Emile and his friend, decid­
ing together upon Jean-Jacques as ruler, a choice favored 
by reason. The author of the Contract adds what the Aemil­
ian governor also illustrates, namely the Socratic and Chris­
tian idea that in an aristocracy too magistracy or kingship is 
a ministry to others. 
In the same context he artfully contrives a pretext for re­
ferring to the assemblies of the people where rulers are 
elected, and thereby prepares us for his treatment of that 
theme in the next chapter. But the assemblies here are very 
different from the idealized ones to follow. They are exem­
plified by Venice, which he says, however, is not an aris­
tocracy at all but a republic, a term suggestive not only of 
the ideal city-state but also of his birthplace. Knowing full 
well that Venice was no such thing in his definition or any 
other, he proceeds to draw a parallel with Geneva. The 
irony lurking in the preposterous analogy was lost upon the 
world. We are right to question its validity,98 but the trag­
edy is that it was valid enough to convey his caustic criti­
cism of the Genevan assemblies and the election of magis­
trates therein. The impoverished Venetian nobles, says he, 
excluded from the magistracy and possessing only the right 
to attend meetings of the great council, which he compares 
to the Genevan one, have no more privileges than his own 
fellow countrymen. Since the real theme of the chapter is 
elections, he clearly means to impugn the election of magis­
trates in the council of his native city and discredit the coun­
cil's assemblies. Here we are very remote from the ideal re­
lationships portrayed by Emile and his chosen "ruler." 
The author of the Contract next turns his attention to 
Utopian assemblies of the sovereign people, where social 
order is born and elections take place, as in the case of Emile 
and Jean-Jacques. They are the theme of the first of four 
chapters partly inspired by primitive Roman institutions. 
Political theorists object to them, alleging that they have 
only a remote connection with the principles of political law 
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and are the work of a historian instead of a moralist, or 
rather, philosopher. They suspect the author of padding at 
the cost of a digression for the purpose of inserting the chap­
ter on civic faith, drawn up at the last minute. The same 
charge of padding has been laid against the second and third 
parts of the work, where it has proved unfounded." In the 
present instance, quite apart from the fact that throughout 
the treatise he has consistently illustrated his ideas with his­
torical examples and that the chapter on civic faith would 
probably have been inserted anyway in imitation of the Soc­
ratic model, a collation of texts shows that these chapters 
are as much an integral part of the book as the earlier ones 
that are also regarded as superfluous and yet define his laws. 
They are not a mere review of Roman institutions, and they 
bear a close affinity to the corresponding portions of Emile. 
The first one is entitled "Concerning Roman Assem­
blies." Rousseau was obliged to introduce a chapter here on 
popular assemblies to show how the moral being he has been 
carefully constructing ab ovo might finally come to the birth 
and enjoy the grace of life as in Emile. As he said in four 
chapters of the previous part, the realization of his system 
hinges upon the exercise of sovereignty that occurs only 
when the sovereign manifests itself. It is inconceivable that 
in the final book there would be no tableau of the society of 
his fancy and no picture of a popular convocation that alone 
could transform the dream into reality. 
But he knew well enough that modern readers would re­
gard popular assemblies as chimerical. To show that they 
are not, he affects to give a historical illustration instead of 
a purely imaginary one, although he virtually confesses that 
it is indeed mythical.100 If we failed to grasp the irony of the 
previous chapter directed against Geneva, we should expect 
him to cite the example of the general council there, espec­
ially since he professes to eternize that city in his book, at 
least as it existed in his heart. But a picture of the new 
Geneva would have been as disquieting here as it proved to 
be in the case of the dedication of the second Discourse. 
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Instead he chooses ancient Rome as an image of the ideal 
city and retires to the era of Aemilius to bring that city to 
life, for it does not belong to his century any more than 
the heroes of the novel do. 
Before he broaches the subject, the author of the Contract 
inserts a note about the transition from the rule of force to 
the rule of law effected by such assemblies. It reads: "The 
name of Rome, said to derive from Romulus, is Greek and 
means 'force'; the name of Numa is also Greek and means 
'law' Is it likely that the first two kings of the city bore in 
advance names so well suited to what they did?"101 Apart 
from providing new evidence of Rousseau's interest in the 
symbolism of names, the note relates to the whole purpose 
of Emile and the Contract, which was to show how the pre­
vailing rule of force can be replaced by that of law through 
the exercise of sovereignty. The idea does not merely apply 
to the existing order of things where anarchic individualism 
would have to give way to humanism. Even in the presum­
ably lawful order of his books, until the awakening of reason 
as a moral guide, the educator-legislator was obliged to re­
sort to force, necessity, or Socratic lies or myths to win 
obedience on behalf of that ideal, but henceforth the moral 
being is to be consciously and voluntarily governed by law. 
The writer of the Contract suspects that the evolution that 
presides at the birth of his own city also presided at the 
birth of Rome, whose traditions exemplify for him the 
proper handling of the sovereign power in solemn assem­
blies of the people. Many elements of the chapter inspired 
by those assemblies, the high point of the book, are also 
present in the scene where Emile's reason is roused from 
sleep to enlighten the will. 
The chapter is composed of two parts. In the first the au­
thor describes the character of the Roman people by recal­
ling the various classifications into which they were divided: 
first the military tribal divisions of Romulus; then the many 
rustic tribes created by the legendary King Servius in the 
mid-sixth century B.C. He reflects that the rustic tribes far 
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outnumbered the urban ones and won honor by reason of the 
predilection of the early Romans for country life, a taste 
that they combined with their traditional dedication to the 
duties of war. He then ponders upon a further partitioning 
of the people by King Servius into centurial divisions graded 
according to wealth. In Rousseau's system these gradations 
might correspond to the Socratic men of gold, of silver, of 
brass, and of iron, answering to a natural hierarchy of human 
faculties,102 especially since he shows how the simple man­
ners of the early Romans were effective security against the 
seductions of riches. Such was the character of the nation 
that he significantly studies first since, in his view, it deter­
mines the nature of the laws to be enacted for its moral and 
spiritual life. The same rusticity and austerity of life char­
acterize the freemen of the Rousseauist city including Ae­
milius, who is later reminded by his governor that he must 
always be ready to serve his country like the early Romans 
who passed from the ploughshare to the consulate. Of 
course, for he is their heir. 
In the second part of the chapter the author imagines as­
semblies, corresponding to the various divisions, that met 
to sanction laws, elect magistrates, and make the nation 
truly sovereign. He dwells upon the careful choice of time 
and place for solemn convocations, as he did in the awak­
ening scene in Emile. In spite of the imperfections of the 
centurial divisions, he expresses admiration for their assem­
blies and uses them to show how aristocratic and democratic 
elements, which after all exist in the human constitution, 
can be balanced in practice to achieve a close approximation 
of absolute justice. He concludes that they alone were en­
dowed with all the majesty of the Roman nation since no one 
was excluded. On the other hand, he disapproves of the 
tribal assemblies, called "the real council of the Roman 
populace'' (italics mine), since they were confined to the 
commons, or "motley multitude" in Socratic speech, and 
excluded the aristocracy. In spite of such abuses he is in­
spired by republican Rome to conceive of a sovereign nation 
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that not only exercises sovereignty in its own person but 
also assumes some of the powers of government that it has 
a right and duty to control. The same ideas are present in 
the monumental scene ofEmile where the hero participates 
personally in both sovereignty and government, the latter by 
his choice of an agent whose conduct he is bidden to super­
vise. Such is the controversial chapter of the Contract 
whose principles belong to the Socratic city in that book 
as well as to the mythical Aemilian one. 
It is followed by others equally controversial. One is en­
titled "Concerning the Tribunate" and the other "Concern­
ing the Dictatorship." Both deal with powers related to gov­
ernment, but lying outside the constitution. The reason for 
the presence of these chapters is that the powers in ques­
tion are extraordinary ones necessary for education, which 
is the real problem of the Contract and only true law. 
The Rousseauist tribunate is not to be confused with the 
early Roman one, whose function is, however, included in 
its own. It is designed to maintain the proper balance of 
faculties and prevent them from meddling with one an­
other's work. For instance, it serves to protect the sover­
eign against the encroachments of government and the gov­
ernment against the resistance of subjects, preserving the 
famous "mean proportional" between them. But it posses­
ses neither legislative nor executive rights. As defender of 
the laws, its action is largely negative, like that of the edu­
cator-legislator hitherto, but it is the strongest support of a 
good constitution. These are the author's professed convic­
tions. Yet in choosing examples from historical institutions 
to clarify his intentions, he illustrates intolerable abuses, 
instead of the uses just enumerated as one might have ex­
pected. The implication is that though the powers of any 
constitution must be balanced and harmonized, it is perilous 
to rely upon alien agents to do the work. This shows that he 
is thinking mainly of inner life and education, where the au­
thority of the Rousseauist tribunate is indispensable. In the 
novel we see its action in the explicit provision made for 
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Emile to supervise Jean-Jacques' government and for the 
governor to account for his commands, both of which tasks 
serve to maintain the balance of faculties threatened by the 
false opinions and evil passons of worldly society. The 
provision in question thereby ensures the safety of the con­
stitution by training Emile to be detached enough from him­
self to scrutinize the inner workings of his own powers to 
that end. 
The chapter on the dictatorship deals with the suspension 
of normal processes to save the city from disaster. The sus­
pension is brought about by concentrating the governing 
power in fewer hands and thus intensifying it under the sway 
of the laws, or else by naming a supreme commander to sus­
pend the laws and sovereign authority momentarily to meet 
the crisis. The writer shows how the institution was effec­
tive and without danger for the ancient Romans. But he also 
knows how hazardous it would be today. Again he betrays 
the fact that he is thinking of the law of education, which is 
suspended by this extraordinary device in the next part of 
Emile for the benefit of the human constitution.103 
The following chapter of the Contract, "Concerning the 
Censorship," is the last of the chapters that are alleged to 
treat of Roman institutions but are really devoted to Rous­
seau's own system, with the usual historical illustrations. 
Its theme is that of the remainder of the fourth part of Emile. 
His censorship proclaims the "law of public opinion" and 
applies it to individual cases, in the same way as the gov­
erning power makes particular applications of the law of the 
general will. The law of opinion, says he, defines moral and 
aesthetic tastes and affections by formulating what we find 
pleasing or beautiful as well as honorable. Such beliefs are 
an outgrowth of the spiritual or "political" constitution, 
and are fostered by education or legislation. Once they are 
fully formed, the censorship can preserve them by making 
wise applications of them, or it can fix them while they are 
still faltering. But according to Rousseau this institution, 
like public opinion itself, admits of no constraint, and cen­
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sors cannot do what legislation or education has failed to do. 
In both books the latter is presumed to have imparted the 
habit of order, true opinions, sane tastes, real pleasures, 
and lofty morals. Indeed, for Rousseau as for Socrates 
that is the main part of education or legislation, since both 
thinkers see men as products of the law of public opinion; 
and both regard lawful opinions, tastes, and pleasures as 
the source of all lawfulness. Consequently, the educator 
or legislator has sought from the first to provide for the 
cultivation of true opinion as opposed to false in the matter 
of what is pleasing. He was, we were told, "secretly" con­
cerned with manners, customs, and opinion that are en-
graven on the heart to secure the habit of order and are 
therefore the "keystone of the vault" of fortress or temple. 
This was illustrated at the end of the second part of both 
books, which concluded exactly like this one does in each 
case. His work was even then seconded and safeguarded 
by a censorship of some kind as is the case in the Repub­
lic10* and as I remarked in the third chapter above. With 
the formation of the city the institution emerges into the 
light to save that work. In the novel this task too as well 
as government is delegated to Jean-Jacques, but in the end 
both will be Sophia's—that of wisdom within Emile and 
perhaps also outside unless a combination of the two is 
impossible. 
To revert to the context of the novel where the ideas of 
the chapter on censorship are finely illustrated, after the 
youth has pledged himself to the covenant, we are told 
that he is not made to live alone but to fulfill his duties as 
an active member of society. In other words, he is now to 
be prepared for the civil contract symbolized in marriage. 
He must therefore learn "the art most necessary to man 
and the citizen," (italics mine) which is that of living with 
other people.105 Hence, he goes to reside for a year in the 
French capital. 
Before exposing him to the ways of the world, Jean-
Jacques in the censor's role takes precautions to fix his 
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opinions of what is beautiful and honorable, Socratically 
bound together here as in the Contract. As I have said, 
these opinions, the fruits of his education, are assumed to 
be true since that education has bred in him an orderly con­
stitution. The governor preserves them intact in the dis­
ciple's heart by molding them into the visible likeness of 
the future bride "who is suited to him," and proposes that 
they seek her out together. The verbal portrait he paints of 
her is designed to entrance Emile and secure him against 
danger. For the charms of the woman who is destined, 
through the efforts of his friend, to be his betrothed em­
body, we are told, all the qualities he must love and honor. 
Again, morals and aesthetics are linked. 
Jean-Jacques' portrait of her is curiously enigmatic. She 
is "imaginary," for true love is all "fancy, falsehood, and 
illusion"; and we love only the image we create, clothed 
"in a veil of prestige." Yet she is not "a model of perfec­
tion that cannot exist," although he would not lie by saying 
that she really does. He calls her Sophia, meaning "wis­
dom," a name dear to the author in his life and work.106 In 
fine, Emile "thinks that his destined bride is purposely con­
cealed from him and that he will see her in good time." 
Meanwhile, her image prepares him for his entrance into 
worldly society by protecting his taste and morals from de­
filement. Or so we are informed. 
Symbolism is suggested here by the mystery of the phrase­
ology, which, however, in any case never excludes a lit­
eral reading. Since Sophia is able to safeguard Emile's 
ideas of what is pleasing and honorable, she must be Rous­
seauist wisdom, allegedly suited to the perfect man and 
belonging to the same ideal imaginary order that may con­
ceivably exist, although in the case of both of them one 
may have to look here below for the nearest approach to 
the model. She crowns the whole purpose of the book, 
which was from the first to gratify nature's aspirations to 
what pleases, suits, delights, and perfects us, or rather, to 
find the wisdom that secures our happiness. At last Emile 
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understands how the "happiness of the sage is suited to 
the nature of his being."107 He becomes thereby a phil­
osopher, or "lover of Sophia," and is impelled to go in 
search of her though the governor has long since found her. 
He must personally engage in the search, since by binding 
himself to the covenant that provides a basis for his love 
and promises to fulfill it, he has dedicated the mythical 
temple to her. Besides, his virtue must be autonomous. 
Small wonder if her portrait is perplexing. 
Rousseau's personification of wisdom is reminiscent of 
many another in biblical and Socratic tradition. Take, for 
example, his favorite Old Testament books like Wisdom, 
and especially Proverbs, which closely parallels Ecclesi­
astes and contains the passage: "Get wisdom.... Forsake 
her not and she shall preserve thee: love her and she shall 
keep thee... she shall bring thee to honor when thou dost 
embrace her.... Say unto wisdom, thou art my sister, and 
call understanding thy kinswoman: that they may keep thee 
from the strange woman... which flattereth with her 
words." Finally wisdom herself speaks, promising "knowl­
edge rather than choice gold... durable riches and righ­
teousness."108 This imagery is increasingly reflected in 
Rousseau's text. So is the Socratic and medieval personifi­
cation of the Muse of Philosophy and companion of reason, 
the queen of the republic who appears in Plato's sixth 
book, for whom Socrates' rulers have renounced all other 
wealth and to whom the sage is finally wedded. Following 
such examples as those, Sophia is to preserve intact Emile's 
ideas of beauty, honor, and wisdom. 
Jean-Jacques finally introduces the youth into society 
using the precautions he has taken in order to guard against 
the attacks of passion and error. His object is therefore 
the same as it was in the first "nave" of the temple cham­
ber where he had recourse to Plutarch and the fables to 
achieve it. The themes are identical, but now temptations 
beset the inner man. In Socratic terms the governor hence­
forth relies upon "Sophia" to save Emile from sophists 
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and their allies, lawless desires. 
As in the earlier treatment of passion and error, Rous­
seau still has in mind Socrates' warnings about the corrup­
tion of the philosophic nature in the sixth book of the 
Republic, but also alludes to the eighth and ninth where 
the sage describes the decline of the state. I might point out 
that in the central pages of this part he has shown more in­
dependence than usual in handling his material. This is 
true even though, as we have seen, the similitude of the sun 
and profession of faith are largely Socratic, as are the myth 
of the hunter, the covenant of friendship, and the person­
ification of wisdom. He is perhaps slightly less original in 
dealing with the passions and sophisms that, according to 
Socrates, too, threaten the philosopher-king in our midst, 
but even here he draws heavily upon his own personal 
experience. 
The problem of sophisms is handled first. The governor 
shows how an ideal love typifying the spirit of wisdom can 
preserve a man from false opinion and the proverbial 
"strange woman" who, under the pretext of teaching youths 
fine manners, dishonors them. The text is autobiographical 
as well as scriptural in inspiration. One of the victims of such 
women was the model of the Savoyard vicar's protege in 
life who was also the protege of another Savoyarde, the 
Baroness de Warens. The young Rousseau's love for her 
was allegedly a shield of virtue in his life until she decided 
"to make a man of him."109 Her contribution to his "edu­
cation" was supplemented after 1742 by that of Parisian 
society, which also furnishes the writer of Emile with an­
other example of the dangers against which the hero is pro­
tected. He describes a young man well raised in the prov­
inces but transformed within six months in Paris by the 
distorted opinion of a disordered society that vitiates him 
and gives him "a second education the very reverse of the 
first." This is the education of the public who, in Rous­
seau's Socratic terminology, fashion him according to their 
taste, discrediting his parents and teachers as dispensers 
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of pedantic jargon and childish morality, until he finally 
succumbs to their insidious sophistry. 
In undertaking to save his disciple from that fate, Jean-
Jacques takes up Socrates' challenge in the sixth book of 
the Republic, to which I have alluded. The sage avers that 
under alien conditions the finest natures become preemi­
nently bad, "whereas weak natures are scarcely capable of 
any very great good or very great evil either." Of course, 
Emile has not been reared in a completely alien soil, and is 
to live in such a place only briefly. But for the Socratic 
thinker even transplantation for a year is not without danger 
in a city like Paris, where the public, "the greatest of all 
sophists," are always ready to educate him anew. The 
Greek sage is convinced that no private training can enable 
a young man "to stand firm against the overwhelming flood 
of popular opinion." Every type of character, says he, is 
formed by it. He adds that, in our present evil plight, what­
ever is saved is saved "by some divine power," which for 
Rousseau would be the reasonable will heard in the "celes­
tial voice." But according to Socrates, few are ever re­
deemed. For most men, says he, wisdom consists of popu­
lar notions of good and evil, justice and injustice. It is quite 
simply the discernment of the tastes and tempers of the 
multitude, who do everything possible to prevent a well-
endowed youth from "yielding to his better nature" and do 
even more "to render his teacher [reason] powerless by 
private intrigues and public prosecutions." Consequently 
"philosophy is left desolate with her marriage rite incom­
plete . . . ,"110 Such is Socrates' challenge to mankind, and 
Rousseau's is not very different. 
Nevertheless, in Emile Jean-Jacques accepts it. As the 
youth goes abroad with his governor in the French capital, 
he is allegorically armed from head to foot. The word 
armed is used in the text, reminding us of the medieval 
knights-errant that he emulates, "girt about with truth and 
wearing the breastplate of righteousness." He is also 
shielded by the aegis of Minerva in the persons of Jean­
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Jacques and Sophia. Moreover, he has two other "guar­
dians" as well called "shame and fear," the very ones that 
watch over Socrates' citizens in the fifth book of the Repub­
lic.111 And so he is allegedly invulnerable to public opinion 
that is false and foreign to his nature. The future Ulysses is 
insensitive to the siren voices of the children of foolishness. 
According to the text, their call is muffled by the voice of a 
"faithful and true friend" whose attachment of twenty 
years' standing has already been revealed to him as the 
"sublime" and saving power of reason in the service of the 
human will. 
That voice which is conscience makes an impassioned 
appeal to rescue him from provocative young sophists, 
foreshadowed by the flatterers and seducers of the earlier 
lessons of experience and fables in action who were re­
flected in the Contract. But here the tempters represent 
false opinion assailing the temple of the soul from within as 
well as without. They do the same in the sixth book of the 
Republic, in the passages on the corruption of the 
philosophic nature mentioned above, and again in the 
eighth. In the latter fierce natures beset the youth, oppose 
parental influence, and besiege "the citadel of the soul," 
driving away its best guardians, here identified as modesty, 
temperance, and moderation, and replacing them by a 
"rabble of evil appetites" such as insolence, anarchy, 
waste, and impudence that masquerade as "breeding," 
"liberty," "magnificence," and "courage."112 Emile finds 
himself in a similar plight. His governor pleads against such 
sophisms in the name of the hero's true interest that is his 
own and is alien to that of self-indulgent youths who seek 
only to control him, and have renounced the so-called pre­
judices of their fathers based upon love and experience to 
adopt those of other people. Thus Jean-Jacques carries on 
his task as the spokesman of reason and true opinion, of 
Emile's father the law, which begot him, appealing for dis­
cipline in the name of paternal affection seen as the truest 
image of friendship. 
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In Emile's response the haunting Socratic phrase from 
which the whole book sprang recurs like the fundamental 
theme of a great symphony: "He recognizes the voice of 
friendship, and knows how to obey reason."113 In doing so 
he obeys Jean-Jacques, who has the mastery of his will 
through the friendship of reason, and who governs him con­
tinually. So the text implies. Even when he leaves the youth 
among "strangers," he hints that he is mystically present 
within him. Emile, by heeding his governor, heeds his own 
conscience. In both plea and response, artistic and literary 
methods empower the author to make the inner workings of 
the human spirit both visible and audible to the reader. 
Next the governor faces the problem of passion also be­
leaguering the inner world, instead of appearing only exter­
nally as in the pages on Plutarch and the related ones in the 
Contract. The presence of the inner foe is indicated by 
fresh precautions against the instinct of sense, "which can­
not be trusted in the midst of social institutions." Guided 
by sad personal experience, Rousseau warns against the 
so-called dangerous supplement.114 If Emile is to be deliv­
ered up to a "tyrant," that tyrant will be women's wiles 
rather than himself. The image is well chosen to portray 
what Socrates calls the tyrannical soul in whom the best 
elements are enslaved to the beast within. The same image 
also conveys the idea that lawlessness does not necessarily 
have anything to do directly with other people. Here, for 
instance, it does not appear as a form of rebellion against 
external authority. That was the main concern in the first 
"nave" of the great chamber of the spirit, where the youth 
witnessed outward impropriety in ancient biographies 
without having any personal knowledge of inner disorder. 
Here lawlessness appears as a violation of the proper in­
ward disposition of all faculties, a disposition that requires 
unlawful appetites to be allayed and better desires and ra­
tional or spiritual powers to prevail in a harmonious order­
ing of the entire person. In fine, as in the vicar's creed 
lawlessness is represented by sexual aberration, whereas 
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love of law, purity of will and self-mastery are symbolized 
by chastity and continence. Rousseau implies as much by 
saying that until twenty continence is in the order of nature, 
and after that it is a moral duty indispensable for one who 
would "rule over himself' and be "master of his appetites." 
The precepts followed by the governor to combat error 
and evil within are the same as those employed hitherto in 
the external world. In both cases there are two. First, if the 
youth goes astray, his mentor remains at his side to guide 
him in his errors. The writer cites the historical case of a 
diplomat who became inebriated in the service of a prince. 
The example stands in counterpoise to that of the Roman 
captain in the first "nave" who, like the Socratic "leaders," 
led his army even in retreat. The second rule was also 
formulated there. The governor refrains from affected 
blindness or false dignity and feigned perfection that foster 
abuses and lead to "the overthrow of all order and con­
tempt for every law."115 The law here is not merely that 
which governs external behavior in society but the one 
whereby the disciple's inner life is kept in order by Jean-
Jacques. This interpretation, imposed by the context, is 
confirmed by an appeal to every governor to provide a 
model of one who must withstand his lower nature in order 
to remain "master of himself." The appeal accentuates the 
difference between the two "naves," for in the former he 
refrained from showing his weakness to the youth. The 
object here is professedly to save the latter from the fate of 
modern men whose shriveled souls and corrupt bodies al­
legedly make them incapable of any very great good or evil 
either, words echoing the Socratic ones quoted above. 
Emile is to be a good and temperate man who, if he chose, 
might like the child of the second part "become master of 
all with far less trouble than it cost him to become master of 
himself." 
At this point the author sketches the hero's portrait as he 
did at the end of the second part, except that now the set­
ting is worldly society. The one prefigures the other, as it 
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should. The emphasis is still on moral and spiritual qual­
ities. Although at the age of twenty Emile is as ignorant of 
the formalities of politeness as he was at ten, his attitude 
toward others has deepened. He feels a common bond of 
sympathy and affection for them, which is the mainspring of 
his conduct in their regard. Yet the rule of his conversation 
has not essentially altered. The youth of twenty confines 
his words to what is "useful," much as the child of ten 
uttered only the simple truth as far as he knew it. Emile 
does not cultivate eloquence until after he has entered soci­
ety, when grace of speech results from a new desire to 
please that is the secret of his cordial ways. His bearing is 
"that of a citizen"; and his politeness, being a spontaneous 
manifestation of human feeling, likewise proclaims "the 
citizen." Obviously this must be so since, as we were told, 
he is learning the art necessary to "man and the citizen." In 
a word, he appears as an inhabitant of the city of the Con­
tract. When the author adds, "All this demands... no 
great stock of precepts from me; it is all the result of his 
early education,' he reminds us again of Socrates, whose 
laws are as few as his own. In Plato's fourth book the 
Greek sage too declined to legislate about such matters as 
the respect owed to elders, the honor due to parents, modes 
of dress, deportment, and manners in general, since "the 
direction in which education starts a man will determine his 
future life." His very words are matched in the present 
context of Emile.116 Since the Aemilian city is hardly diffe­
rent from the ancient Greek one, it is not surprising to learn 
that the hero appears among men as an "agreeable 
foreigner." His spiritual growth is shown in the qualities of 
his mind, whose former embryonic moral ideas have ex­
panded to include all that is useful for his own happiness 
and that of others. It is also shown in the pleasure he finds 
in the company of those who possess his own taste in moral 
matters. Thus the association of taste with morals recurs as 
it did in the portrait of Sophia and the chapter on censor­
ship, as well as in the second part of both books. 
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The last pages of this part of Emile are devoted to the 
further cultivation of good taste or true opinion that is to 
save the constitution according to the texts just enumer­
ated, wherein beauty is conceived to operate as a moral 
influence. If I refer again to the said pages, already referred 
to in my first and third chapters,117 it is to accentuate 
further the linking of aesthetics and spirituality. For exam­
ple, although Rousseau now defines taste as the power of 
judging what is pleasing to most men in matters indifferent 
or amusing, we know that he means materially but not Soc­
ratically indifferent since pleasures determine the fate of his 
city. Moreover, according to him "what is pleasing" is as­
certained by "the majority of votes" if, as in an ideal order 
of things, each man expresses his real sentiment, which 
means that the canons of taste are formulated in the same 
way as the laws that govern the ordering of city or soul and 
that the same rule produces both virtue and the beauty of 
harmony. The affinity of taste and morals is everywhere 
implicit, even when he tries to distinguish between taste in 
moral and physical matters, for he observes that there is 
always a moral element present in everything involving im­
itation such as the plastic arts. Take for instance, traditional 
art, whose model is his own and which offers an idealization 
of nature such as we see in Emile or ancient Greek 
sculpture.118 For him the natural model constitutes a uni­
versal moral and aesthetic pattern. But he also says that taste 
is modified by local circumstances, as he said of laws as 
well. He adds that perfection of taste is the fruit of fre­
quenting numerous societies of amusement on condition that 
they possess a fair degree of equality to moderate the influ­
ence of false opinion, a condition also required by his sys­
tem of legislation and government. He goes further. Since 
good taste is in his eyes realizable in the company of the 
sexes wherever lofty moral standards intensify the desire to 
please, he concludes that good taste is related to good mor­
als. He links the two again by observing that we must know 
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how to please others if we would do them service. In fine, 
in the present context he illustrates the idea of the Contract 
that aesthetic taste is connected with moral taste and moti­
vates the conduct of human life, and that both are the main 
responsibility of education and legislation. Consequently 
Jean-Jacques, who professes to teach nothing but the duties 
of man, gives lessons in aesthetics. This makes the perfect­
ing of taste a very serious business. 
Rousseau's ideas on the subject are expressed in Emile's 
aesthetic training, which began with his education but 
which he now consciously pursues. The governor 
familiarizes him with models of taste in nature by training 
his judgment in Parisian society until he acquires a dis­
criminating insight into the complexities of the heart. His 
knowledge and love of nature are further deepened by a 
study of ancient writings like Plato's Symposium and Vir­
giVsAeneid. Unlike the Socratic philosophers and contrary 
to Rousseau's own teaching in the Letter to d'Alembert, 
Emile also frequents the theater and delights in all manner 
of beauty designed to please the heart and stir the feelings. 
For he is to be a sensitive man as well as a sage. Imagina­
tive sympathy, Christian in its origin, lends a lyrical tinge to 
Rousseau's basically "classical" tastes as it does to his 
moral convictions. 
The avowed purpose of the hero's aesthetic formation is 
to fix his affections and tastes and prevent the decline of 
natural inclinations so that he will seek his happiness not in 
wealth but in the good things of life that lie close by. This 
means that his felicity will depend largely upon his own 
personal resources. Rousseau suggests the extent of the 
hero's inner wealth by sketching a great tableau of happi­
ness and the good life that contrasts with the earlier specta­
cle of human suffering but matches the fair sights and 
sounds at the end of the second part. However, this tableau 
is supplied from the writer's own experience, including bi­
blical and Socratic readings, on the pretext that Emile's pure 
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heart "can no longer serve as an example for anyone." 
He calls the admittedly autobiographical conclusion an 
"essay." He imagines therein how he would enjoy all the 
truest pleasures of life if he were rich, although he has just 
said that happiness is not to be sought in wealth. Thus he 
appears to take up the challenge of his divine master, who, 
without excluding the rich from the heavenly paradise, 
teaches that "it is easier for a camel to go through the eye of 
a needle than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of 
God." The self-styled Gospel commentator is perhaps em­
boldened by the master's subsequent reassurance that 
"with God all things are possible," as well as by Socrates' 
conviction that in an alien state "whatever is saved, is saved 
by the power of God,"119 which for Rousseau is expressed 
in conscience. However that may be, the rich man in the 
essay wins happiness, but the delights he enjoys have no­
thing to do with vanity and false opinion. They allegedly 
spring from realities. 
In actual fact, although the writer is too much of an artist 
to say so bluntly, he indicates clearly enough that the 
wealth he possesses in the essay, far from being a threat to 
happiness, is paradoxically its source. It is the only kind he 
considers worthy of a disciple of Christ, or of Socrates and 
the Greek heroes, who were wedded to poverty as is he. In 
the language of his favorite "discourse," his coffers, like 
theirs and Emile's, are not laid up on earth but contain only 
the "gold" of spiritual and aesthetic experience that suf­
fices to make felicity possible for a nature like his. That 
wealth is his concept of wisdom as it has been presented in 
both books. 
Accordingly, the concluding tableau of wisdom and hap­
piness synthesizes Rousseauist social and civil order beheld 
in the ideal city or moral being, and anticipates the en­
chanted world of the fifth part of Emile and of certain pas­
sages of the Confessions and Dialogues. That order is con­
ceived as already existing within him, since he begets it in 
his work. The dream becomes reality. This interpretation is 
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suggested at once by the tone of the essay, which is that of 
the dedication of the second Discourse addressed to the 
new Geneva existing in his heart. There the motif "if I had 
had to choose my birthplace" serves as a pretext for sketch­
ing his "own city," much as the motif "if I were rich" serves 
as a pretext for depicting his own inner riches,120 which are 
those of that mythical realm. 
The essay is divided into two parts. The first contains a 
panorama of Rousseauist moral and social order. With So­
cratic sobriety and restraint the essayist depicts his idea of 
the outward fabric of a well-disposed life seen in the context 
of actuality and exemplifies the main principles governing 
the relationships of a spiritual being with the world as we 
know it. He follows the same sequence as Socrates does in 
the construction of his city, just as he did throughout the 
book. He begins by saying that if he were rich, he would 
first purchase freedom and then acquire health by the prac­
tice of temperance, since he still regards these two assets as 
the basic ingredients of happiness. In his appetites and 
tastes as well as in the adornment of his dwelling, he would 
take nature as his guide. Observe how he hardly distin­
guishes between physical and aesthetic taste. In all things 
he would favor simplicity of life. Like the Socratic kings 
who lived like servants in their own houses, he would have 
no footman stand between the world and himself. Nor 
would he dwell in a palace any more than they, for like any 
other traveler in life he needs, so he says, no more than a 
chamber at an inn. Besides, the world "is a palace fair 
enough for anyone." In that habitation and untrammeled by 
the furniture of other men's dwellings, he is as free as his 
thought. Ubi bene, ibi patria is his device, and for him both 
goods and city lie within the spirit that permits him to enjoy 
the true pleasures of mind and of heart. To prove that he is 
a lover of these rather than of wealth or power, he makes a 
sudden sally against gaming that, according to him, turns 
thought toward arid combinations. In other words, he 
would not resemble the lover of gain in the Republic who 
[289] 
ROUSSEAU'S SOCRATIC AEMILIAN MYTHS 
compels reason to think only of how lesser sums may be 
turned into larger ones, and who forces the human spirit to 
be ambitious of nothing else but the amassing of gold.121 
Indeed, Socrates can hardly be far from his mind since he 
depicts himself like a Socratic prince, professing to regulate 
bodily habit, property, and clothing in such a way as to 
remain, as he says, "master of his conduct" in all states and 
conditions of life and especially among the common people. 
In that case he does not covet power over others any more 
than wealth. This idea leads him to broach the theme of 
friendship and subsequently that of love, to which he ac­
cords the same symbolic values as he has done hitherto. 
His friends would be bound together not by dependence 
upon him but by mutual attachment and conformity of taste 
and character, in a relationship based upon freedom and 
equality. The main elements of the Aemilian city of the 
Contract and the Socratic one too are present in this first 
part of the essay-
The stark realism of the above tableau heightens the 
quasi-mystical "ravishing contemplations" that follow to 
provide a literary antithesis and foreshadow the denoue­
ment. Significantly enough, they are introduced by a long 
discourse on love. Thereupon we are admitted to the "inner 
sanctum" of the mind, corresponding to the ideal civil order 
or private society that would presumably materialize if the 
general principles of the Social Contract were applied in the 
sphere of an exclusive alliance. The writer appears in an 
idyllic setting evoked in the most enchanting language. "On 
the slopes of some pleasant shady hill-side," he writes, "I 
should have a little country cottage, a white house with 
green shutters." There he would gather round him a chosen 
company of friends who know what pleasure is and how to 
enjoy it. Each meal would be a banquet of the simplest 
things served in careless array on the grass: "We should be 
our own servants, in order to be our own masters; each 
would be served by all." These inhabitants of the city of the 
blessed who live together in freedom and equality share the 
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fruits of the earth with one another and their neighbors and 
do no harm to any man. Although the writer imagines him­
self living like a "prince" on his little farm (metairie) with 
its white dwelling-place, yet he would not indulge in the 
pleasures of other princes who hunt upon their estates and 
destroy the work of defenseless peasants. In the society of 
his dream he would enjoy only pleasures accessible to all 
men. 
Paradoxically he admits that, however mythical that soc­
iety may seem, it is a reality for him and that he has simply 
portrayed therein the life he lives in poverty. That being the 
case, the essay swarms with symbols beginning with his 
imaginary "riches" as we foresaw. His wealth consists in 
his capacity to inherit the earth like the meek and take 
spiritual possession of it. That is how he possesses the 
white house with green shutters, the spectacle of which is 
set within the city of Paris and contains many allusions to 
it.122 Since he has just refused to occupy more than a 
chamber at an inn, one can only surmise that the mysterious 
abode with its nebulous inhabitants is a state of soul or 
philosophic mood and the visions that this mood induces. It 
is the house of the writer's thoughts and emotions, which he 
"sets in order" in the Socratic manner by bringing it into 
harmony with itself and the world round about. There he 
retires into what the Stoic philosopher calls "the little farm 
of his own mind," and ministers to the genius within him, 
taking advantage of its "princely" power over cir­
cumstance to foster fancies that express his idea of beauty, 
wisdom and happiness. 
The high point of the ecstatic meditation is the banquet 
scene. The very theme is enough to bring to mind Plato's 
Symposium, whose repercussions in Rousseau's novel 
reach a crescendo in the next part prefigured here. Mean­
while we may observe that the host in that dialogue com­
plains in a phrase echoed in the present text that on feast 
days his servants become his masters. But the same theme 
is also Judeo-Christian, as we shall see hereafter. The 
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Christian elements transform the idyll into something re­
sembling an evangelical parable. Not only the meal on the 
grass but also the charity extended to others outside the 
fold have Christian overtones. As Rousseauist wisdom is 
both Christian and Socratic, so is the dream of happiness 
with which it culminates in the realm of the inner man. 
In this part of the essay Socratic elements are not con­
fined to reminiscences of the Symposium. If, as the Greek 
master says in the Republic, every genuine philosophy pro­
vides men with a better life than the one we know, the life of 
"beatific vision"; if, as he says, philosophy really "con­
cludes in an ecstasy" that affords full fruition to all human 
faculties, then the essay in Emile foreshadows the fulfill­
ment of Rousseauist wisdom in consummate happiness in 
the next part. That happiness is presumably born of a So­
cratic "knowledge of beauty and goodness" in the absolute 
sense, implying the sanctification of law and spiritual har­
mony transfigured by Christian influences. It crowns the 
author's philosophy in the same way that the blessed vision 
anticipated in Plato's sixth book and realized at the end of 
the seventh crowns Socratic education. And just as the 
latter inspired Emile's earlier formation set amid images of 
grace and harmony as counterparts of goodness and vir­
tue,123 so it inspires his future progress that leads him be­
yond the "things of beauty" where he played in childhood 
to the ecstatic contemplation promised here. But for him 
those "things of beauty" will always be caught up into the 
larger vision whose object they reflect. 
Rousseau concludes by affirming that the happiness just 
described is accessible to anyone in actual society pos­
sessed of freedom in the sense of self-mastery, health, and 
the necessities of life. Such a man, he adds, is rich in the gold 
of Horace's "aurea medocritas." He isrich because he finds 
within himself and round about him in the present moment 
some traces of the lost golden age of beauty that Emile 
recovers at the end of the book.124 Rousseau's thought has 
in fact led him to a vision of this perpetual "age of gold" 
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enshrined in the poetic essay. But the degree to which any 
man can attain to the same felicity depends upon poetic 
genius as well as the cultivation of powers of insight and 
volition necessary to transmute the dross of existence into 
gold and metamorphose ordinary human experience into an 
earthly paradise. Of course, the cultivation of such powers 
is the very object of the two books herein collated. 
The finest passages of the essay are reflected in many of 
Rousseau's works but nowhere better than in four letters 
written by him at Montmorency village to Malesherbes in 
January 1762 while the novel and its appendix were being 
printed. 
In the letters he tells his correspondent of his search for 
happiness that led to the discovery of wisdom too. That 
search impelled him to abandon the French capital for the 
countryside, where he could indulge his love of solitude, 
freedom, and ideal companionship. He traces these inclina­
tions to his earliest years when the disorders of actuality, 
including those of his own life, led him to escape to an 
imaginary world of his own creation. The same inclinations 
were further nurtured, he says, by a vision of spiritual 
"truth" vouchsafed to him in 1749 on the road to Vin­
cennes when he beheld in a single revelation both the present 
evil plight of governments and the essential goodness of 
human nature. That experience, he explains, moved him to 
compose his major works and change his life. Seeing the 
root of all evil as false opinion about the "just and unjust," 
the "honorable and dishonorable," he fled its yoke and 
found in the solitude of Montmorency new wisdom and 
happiness for himself, without doing harm to others. 
His solitary blessedness is that of the essayist in Emile. 
Asked by his correspondent what he enjoys, he replies 
"myself, the whole universe, everything beautiful in the 
visible world and everything imaginable in the intellectual 
world."125 He delights in wild places where he can, so he 
says, be master of himself and where none can come be­
tween nature and him. He rejoices in the company of chim­
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erical beings and creates for himself "a golden age" of his 
fancy not in the past or in the future but in the present. With 
a void still left in his soul, he strives to fill it by rising to 
enraptured contemplation of the universe and the "incom­
prehensible being who embraces all," until at last he 
reaches a state of ecstasy comparable to that of the "celes­
tial intelligences." But he denies that his love for the good 
life is incompatible with the love of humanity. He professes 
to practice the "duties of man" toward his neighbors and to 
preach them in his writings for the happiness of mankind 
and his compatriots. In such terms he depicts his own per­
sonal discovery of wisdom and happiness, which is the real 
inspiration of Emile and the Contract. 
And yet, according to the author, the felicity described in 
the essay of the novel is not Emile's nor is it comparable 
to his. The essayist, who poses as such in the whole book 
and not merely at the end of the fourth part, began by for­
bearing to define the ultimate ideal. Likewise at the same 
point in the Republic and in the similitude of the sun, Soc­
rates pleads that "to reach what is now in my thought 
would be an effort too great for me." In Rousseau's case 
we may, however, consider the essay as a kind of prophetic 
dream of Emile's mythical happiness in the fifth part. It 
anticipates the imaginary civil order in the novel even if, as 
the author would have us believe, it provides only a 
shadowy image of the ecstasy that Sophia promises to those 
who live as closely with her as Emile does in the end. 
Needless to say, the beatific vision has no place in the 
hypothetical exteriorized version of the city in the Contract, 
which is, however, patterned after its object as is the whole 
of Emile. We have seen that the entire fourth part of both 
books is essentially and substantially identical and that both 
echo faithfully the fifth and sixth books of the Republic. 
This is true throughout, beginning with the pages on soph­
isms and passions and the kind of "warfare" that must be 
waged against them until the "light of truth" dawns and the 
ideal moral being is born. It is also true of the measures 
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prescribed to balance, control, and preserve the powers of 
that being and save the human constitution, whose nature 
always remains the criterion of Rousseauist and Socratic 
moral and social order. 
1. I have chosen the chapter title to suggest the main body of the structure in 
both books. I am emboldened to use it by the thought of Romanesque churches, 
which were in fact medieval strongholds. It has the added advantage of combining 
the Socratic image of the "citadel of the Soul" and the Christian image of the 
spiritual temple. 
2. For reflections on birth, the brevity of life, and the passions, see "Emile," 
pp. 301, 306-8, and cf. 489 and 495. The question of happiness is also raised in 
each part: pp. 313-16, 512-17. So is the matter of delay: pp. 323, 518-19. In both 
parts there is an alien society round about: pp 329 ff., 517 ff. 
3. For the image see ibid., p. 388; cf. chap. 2, n. 10, above. 
4. Cf. The Republic 5. 450. Burgelin sees that for Rousseau positive education 
begins here: O.C., 4:490 n. 3. For the allusion below to the "know thyself" of the 
Delphic shrine, see the first paragraph of the fourth promenade of Les Reveries du 
promeneur solitaire, where Rousseau refers to "le connois-toi-meme du Temple 
de Delphes": O. C, 1:1024. 
5. "Emile," pp. 511-12. Cf. chap. 3 above, n. 40. Cf. Fenelon, Les Aventures 
de Telemaque (Liege: Grandmont-Donders, 1865), books 16, 17, 18, 21, 23 (espe­
cially pp. 410-11). In Fenelon's thought the example of Plato is tempered by that 
of Christ, and the tutor Mentor-Minerva links justice and pity, reflecting that 
"Sans cette compassion on n'a ni bonte, ni vertu, ni capacity pour gouverner les 
hommes." Such compassion is extended to all men without exception. 
6. The treatment of the theme in both parts concludes with similar phrases 
about method: "Emile," pp. 315, 316, and cf. p. 517. For the misery caused by 
indulgence cf. pp. 313-315, 512-15. Starobinski remarks upon this in "J.-J. Rous­
seau et les pouvoirs de l'imaginaire," Revue Internationale de philosophie, no 51 
(1960), p. 9. 
7. See note 2 above and chapter 3, note 30. 
8. He does so since he is persuaded that the age of innocence can be prolonged. 
9. See The Republic 5. 461, where Socrates speaks of a scheme whereby his 
guardians have their wives and families "in common," meaning that the latter are 
subject to universal human faculties rather than the lawless wild beast nature. 
10. Ibid. 5. 462. 
11. They are defended in the "Contrat social": see "Emile," p. 837. To see 
that the friendship of Jean-Jacques and Emile does not represent an exclusive 
affection between individuals, see ibid., pp. 547-48. The symbolism of friendship 
and love has escaped our notice in the past. 
12. The leitmotiv occurred in the previous chapter: see note 20. See also the 
covenant of friendship in chapter 2 above and note 35. 
13. For the attitude of Socrates'heroes toward "enemies," see The Republic 
2. 375-76; 5. 468-71. With the latter passage cf. 7. 537. 
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14. For the moral function of history in the eighteenth century, see G. May, Le 
Dilemme du roman au XVIlie siecle (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 
1963), p. 146. 
15. The Republic 10. 606. Cf. 3. 398 cited in Latin in the "Lettre a d'Alem­
bert," O. C  , Hachette, 1:259 n. 1 For Rousseau's images of the stage in this part, 
see "Emile," pp. 515, 525, 526, 527, 530, 532, 551. The work "De l'imitation 
theatrale," which is also reminiscent of Plato's Laws, was undertaken in connec­
tion with the "Lettre a d' Alembert" and was completed shortly afterward, though 
it was published only in 1764. 
16. For these two expressions see "Emile," pp. 352 (men are changed into 
"betes feroces") and 535 ("vous etes des fous"); cf. The Republic 6. 496 (regard­
ing "the madness of the multitude" and "wild beasts"). 
17. Here the governor behaves exactly like Mentor in Telemaque, where the 
language is very similar, especially in book 1, pp. 14-15: "Le sage Mentor m'aima 
jusqu'a me suivre dans un voyage temeraire que j'entreprenais contre ses conseils. 
. . . Une noire tempete deroba le ciel a nos yeux... . Mentor parut, dans ce 
danger, non seulement ferme et intrepide, mais plus gai qu'a l'ordinaire: c'etait lui 
qui m'encourageait." Burgelin implies that the governor symbolizes reason in the 
text of "Emile" to which I refer in this note: O. C, 4:539 n. 1. Cf. chap 2 above, 
n. 28. 
18. The Republic 2. 382. 
19. Cf. ibid., 10. 590-92. 
20. Ibid. 5. 463. For Rousseau's "constant will," applied both to the general 
will and to conscience, see "Contrat social," chapters 1 and 2; and "Emile," pp. 
583-84, 594 ff., 652. Their identity is commonly recognized. 
21. O. C, 3:830. If some readers still protest that he does not give "the 
people" sufficient chance to debate proposals but only to ratify those of "leaders" 
who have "discovered" what the general will is, the misunderstanding would be 
due to his use of Socratic symbolism. For him the "people" or "subjects" repre­
sent desires to be disciplined by the rule of the enlightened human spirit, which 
leads man to "moral truth." 
22. The Republic 6. 505-6; 9. 577. 
23. Cf. "Considerations," O. C  , 3:996-97. 
24. E.g., J.-J. Rousseau, Du Contrat social, ed. M. Halbwachs (Paris: Au-
bier, 1962), p. 355 n. Cf. Broome, op. cit., pp. 66, 68. C. Eisenmann sees in 
Rousseau's recourse to majority vote the collapse of the whole system: "La 
Cite de J.-J. Rousseau," in Etudes sur le Contrat social de J.-J. Rousseau 
(Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1964), pp. 197-98. 
25. "Emile," p. 849 ("rois et sages"). 
26. Cf. the present text of "Emile" and The Republic 6. 484-95 (definition of 
the philosphic nature and the dangers it faces); 503 (aspirant tested in labors and 
dangers); 7 517 (fights in courts of law); 519 (partakes of labors and honors); 537 
(trained in labors, lessons, dangers). 
27. Cf. "Emile," pp. 543-44, and The Republic 6. 497 (the "living authority"); 
499-500 (the philosopher is "gentle" and "soothing" and "loves" mankind). 
28. For Emile the paladin: pp. 544, 743, 770. For his duties and love of peace: 
pp. 544-46, and cf. The Republic 6. 500. Rousseau's note on pp. 544-45 alludes to 
The Republic 5. 464-65. Burgelin discusses it without reference to Plato: O. C, 
4:544 n. 2. But later he compares Emile to a Platonic philosopher: ibid., p. 548 
n. 2. 
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29. The Republic 6. 500. 
30. See, for example, C. C, 5:181 and 6:78: letters to mme de Crequi and T. 
Tronchin, 13 October 1758 and 28 April 1759. 
31. "Emile," pp. 548-49; "Lettres de la montagne," loc. cit., p. 810. For the 
reader's incredulity: "Emile," p. 548, and cf. The Republic 6. 498, 500. 
32. For natural man in the civil order see chapter 4 above, note 40. 
33. For the "conventional imitation" cf. "Emile," p. 549, and The Republic 6. 
501-2. Cf. p. 498. For the perfect model of the Socratic artist cf. "Emile," pp. 
549-50, and The Republic 6. 501-2. Cf. Rousseau's concept of the ascent of the 
soul to the idea of good and The Republic 6. 503-5. 
34. "Emile," pp. 554, 722-28. For the catechism cf. "Julie," O. C, 2:582-83. 
35. P. D. Jimack sees the usefulness of religion rather as a result than an object: 
La Genese et la redaction de I'Emile de J.-J. Rousseau (Geneva: Institut et 
musee Voltaire, 1960), pp. 161-62. In either case Rousseau cannot imagine virtue 
without faith. 
36. The Republic 6. 498. Cf. 7. 540. For popular faith: ibid., books 2, 3, 4. Cf. 
book 10. For the distinction between "leaders" and "followers": ibid. 5. 474; 
for religion as "a popular exposition of the virtues": ibid. 6. 504. 
37. Rousseau, of course, often admits that the creed is his own: see, for exam­
ple, C. C, 9:342, letter to Moultou, 23 December 1761; cf. "Lettre a C. de 
Beaumont," O.C., 4:960; "Lettres de la Montagne," 1-3: "Lettre a M. de Fran­
quieres (25 March 1769). O.C., 4:1134 ff.; cf. "Reveries," O.C., 1:1015-18. 
38. "Confessions," O.C., Pleiade, 1:46 ff., 90-92, 117-19. 
39. Rousseau's Venetian Story: An Essay upon Art and Truth in Les Confes­
sions (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966). 
40. Cf. Exod. 19:6: "Any ye shall be unto me a kingdom of priests and an holy 
nation." Cf. also Rev. 1:1 regarding Christ who "hath made us kings and priests 
unto God." 
41. "Emile," p. 630, and cf. p. 607. He professes to sacrifice a few branches of 
the tree of faith to preserve the trunk: C. C, 8:236, letter to Malesherbes, about 
10 March 1761; cf. ibid., p. 338, letter to Moultou, 29 May 1761; 10:113, letter to 
Neaulme, about 22 February 1762; "Lettres de la montagne," loc. cit., p. 802. 
42. C. C  , 16:75, letter from Usteri, 16 April 1763. For the "Lettres de la 
montagne," see loc. cit., pp. 719-20. 
43. For Rousseau's revision briefly stated: O. C, 4:lxviii, lxxix-lxxx, cxxxviii. 
44. Burgelin sees that the sun is symbolic but does not connect it with the 
Socratic similitude: ibid., p. 565 n. 1, and cf. p. 430 n. 1. 
45. Rousseau believed that he had a mission as the only eloquent defender of 
God at the time, and sought to make religion attractive and speak of death with 
more hope than all the moralists: C. C., 15:305-6, letter from mme de Chenon­
ceaux, 20 March 1763. For his judgment of the creed: "Lettre a C. de Beau­
mont," loc. cit., p. 960. Cf. C C  , 11:24-25, 36, 39, 44, letters to Neaulme, Moul­
tou, mme de Crequi, and m de la Poupliniere, 5, 7. 8 June 1762. 
46. The Republic 6. 493. For man's rank among the creatures see "Emile," pp. 
582-83; cf. pp. 587, 601. In assuming the person of Orpheus, Rousseau has re­
course to the Lydian or sorrowful mode banned by Socrates and akin to Christian 
pathos: see " Dictionnaire de musique," O. C, Hachette, 7:152. For the introduc­
tion of Orpheus see J.-J. Rousseau, La Profession de foi du vicaire Savoyard, ed. 
P.-M. Masson (Paris: Hachette, 1914), p. 299. Cf. "Confessions," loc. cit., p. 
207, and "Dialogues," ibid., p. 681. 
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47. "Lettres de la Montagne," loc. cit., pp. 751-52. Cf. "Confessions," loc. 
cit., pp. 236, 642, and "Lettres a m. de Malesherbes," O. C, 1:1141. For an 
example see "Emile," p. 594. 
48. See, for example, "Confessions," loc. cit., pp. 277, 492; and "Dialogues," 
ibid., p. 727. 
49. For Rousseau's civic faith see Lettre a Voltaire (18 August 1756); Julie; 
Lettre a C. de Beaumont; and Lettres de la montagne. Some scholars fear it 
breeds intolerance, which it is intended to avert: e.g., R. Derathe, "La religion 
civile selon Rousseau," Annales de la Societe J.-J. Rousseau 35 (1959-62): 161­
80. Cf. Ronald I. Boss, "Rousseau's Civil Religion and the Meaning of Belief: An 
Answer to Bayle's Paradox," Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century 84 
(1971): 150-53, 157, 173-74, 179-81, 187. To Rousseau's Socratic way of thinking 
his intolerance is directed against "disorder in the soul." 
50. The Republic 10. 607. 
51. Ibid., 6. 488-89. Burgelin also identifies the inexperienced pilot as reason, 
but traces the image to Locke and Condillac without recalling the Platonic myth, 
where the language is much closer to Rousseau's: O.C., 4:567 n. 1. 
52. Ecclus. 3:22-26; "Seek not to know what is far above thee. . . beyond thy 
range... dwell upon duty. . . . content to be ignorant of all God's dealings be­
sides . . .  . Leave off thy much questioning about things as little concern thee, and 
be content with thy ignorance.... By such fancies, many have been led astray 
and their thoughts chained to folly." 
53. Starobinski finds nothing new in the creed: J.-J. Rousseau: la transparence 
et I'obstacle (Paris: Plon, 1957), p. 180. 
54. See chapter 4 above. Cf. The Republic 7. 522-27, 531, 536; 10. 602. 
55. "Emile," p. 593. Cf. "Lettre a C. de Beaumont," loc. cit., p. 976, where he 
uses the word creator. He discusses the difficulties of the idea on pp. 956-57 in the 
same work. At the end of The Republic Socrates teaches that God or the idea of 
good is the great artist, maker, or creator "of all the works of all other workmen," 
meaning that he is the creator of the idea of their works. 
56. He does not name Helvetius or Voltaire: e.g., C. C, 13:37 and 191, letters 
to Comparet and De Luc, about 10 September and 10 October 1762. 
57. 1 Cor. 15:55-56. 
58. " . .  . Non, l'homme n'est point un;je veux etje ne veuxpas, je me sens a la 
fois esclave et libre; je vois le bien, je l'aime, etje fais le mal: je suis actif quand 
j'ecoute la raison, passif quand mes passions m entrainent, et mon pire tourment, 
quand je succombe, est de sentir que j'ai pu resister." Cf. Rom. 7:15 and Gal. 
5:17. 
59. "Quelque chose en toi cherche a briser les liens qui le compriment. L'es­
pace n'est pas ta mesure, l'univers entier n'est pas asses grand pour toi. .. " Cf. 
for example "Lettres a m. de Malesherbes," loc. cit., p. 1141. For Socrates on 
harmony: The Republic 7. 531, the words of which are echoed in Rousseau's text 
in the paragraph preceding the one quoted here. 
60. "Non, Dieu de mon ame, je ne te reprocherai jamais de l'avoir faite a ton 
image afin que je pusse etre libre, bon et heureux comme toi!" 
61. 1 Cor. 9:24-27 and The Republic 10. 613, 621. Cf. 3. 403 and 5. 465-66. 
62. Cf. "Confessions," loc. cit., pp. 619-20; the first of the "Dialogues" and 
second and fifth of the "Reveries." For the psalm below see O. C, 4:591 n. 2. 
When Rousseau says later that death is the end of life for the wicked, he means 
that that is their opinion and that they live as if such were the case: ibid., p. 820. 
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63. The Republic 4. 444 (justice is as natural as health); 6. 505-6 (mans whole 
quest is the good); 10. 612 (justice in her own nature is best for the soul in her own 
nature). For the idea that feelings may be judgments see "Emile," p. 484. Cf. p. 
584 n, where the same idea is suggested. It is obvious from the context that in the 
present case the subjectivity of conscience does not favor moral anarchy. 
64. For the complex idea of "interest" see C. C, 9:143-45, letter to d'Of­
freville, 4 October 1761. Cf. "Lettre a C. de Beaumont," loc. cit., p. 936. 
65. Cf. the text of "Emile" and The Republic 6. 485. Cf. also Rousseau's idea 
of divine wisdom within and The Republic 9. 589-92. For the imitation of the 
"heavenly pattern" mentioned below; ibid., 6. 500. 
66. 1 Cor. 6:3; but cf. Psalm 8:5 cited in Heb. 2:7, where the apostle recalls that 
man was made lower than the angels but was raised above them by Christ. 
67. "Emile," p. 599, and cf. p. 583, where the delights of the sage are compared 
with the torment of the man who succumbs. 
68. See, for example, O. C, 4:614 n. 2 and 636 n. 1. According to these notes, 
natural religion is excluded from the city of the Contract. 
69. Cf. The Republic, books 2, 3, 4. See especially 4. 427. 
70. The connection between the two creeds is discussed by S. Cotta, "Theorie 
religieuse et theorie politique chez Rousseau," Annales de philosophic politique 5 
(1965): 171-94. Crocker agrees with Talmon that they supplement each other: 
Rousseau's Social Contract: An Interpretive Essay (Cleveland: Case Western 
Reserve University Press, 1968), pp. 100-101. Cf. J. L. Talmon, The Rise of 
Totalitarian Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1952), p. 24. These writers see in 
the civic creed a support for totalitarianism. Broome, who also notes that the two 
creeds are reconcilable (op. cit., pp. 105, 114), is perhaps closer to the truth when 
he sees in Rousseau's notion of the General Will sanctified by religion "an at­
tempt . . .  . to propose a meeting-point between Man and God, in the concept of 
Law. . . . (ibid., pp. 122-23). Boss (loc. cit., pp. 130, 139, 144) also connects the 
two creeds: see note 74 below. 
71. Loc. cit., p. 706 n. 
72. "Emile," p. 250. He says the same of religion: "Contrat social," p. 469. 
73. Loc. cit., pp. 695, 705. 
74. See, for example, K. D., Erdmann, Das Verhdltnis von Staat und Religion 
nach des Sozialphilosophie Rousseaus (Berlin: Verlag Dr. Emil Ebering, 1935). 
Boss (op. cit.) concludes that the vicar's spirit of tolerance is violated in the civil 
creed. He allies himself with Bernard Groethuysen, J.-J. Rousseau (Paris: Gal­
limard, 1949), p. 259, and C. W. Hcnde\, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Moralist (Lon­
don: Oxford University Press, 1934), p. 243. Yet the idea of religion as law and of 
atheism as lawlessness and spiritually fatal is present in the vicar's creed. Since 
law, like conscience, is conceived as the spokesman of the sovereign human will, 
a morally committed man submits because he wants to, whether he is a leader like 
the vicar or a follower like the citizens of the Contract, even though the laws to 
which he submits are those of a city that can never exist on earth. 
75. His reply was that he would hope that she was not, and that God had been 
able to enlighten her at her last hour. 
76. "Je considerois cette diversite de sectes qui regent sur la terre." 
77. The quotations are from "Emile," pp. 311, 610-11, 680, 848; "Lettres a m. 
de Malesherbes," loc. cit., p. 1140; cf. "Lettre a C. de Beaumont," loc. cit., pp. 
986, 987. The protests against men who separate him from the law and from God 
are intentionally analogous: see "Confessions," loc. cit., p. 567: " . .  . La Relig­
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ion raisonnable et morale otant tout pouvoir humain sur les consciences, ne laisse 
plus de ressource aux arbitres de ce pouvoir." That is the object of law in Emile 
and the Contract, which are supposed to defend "the rights of humanity." 
78. Burgelin sees this: O.C., 4:611 n. 2. 
79. In the "Lettres de la montagne," loc. cit., pp. 749-59, Rousseau maintains 
that neither he nor the vicar approves of the "Raisonneur" but that the dialogue 
shows the dangers of mysticism and its vulnerability at the hands of scientific 
reason. 
80. The Republic 10. 602. This is a likely source in spite of Voltaire's feeling 
that the real one is his poem on natural religion and letter to Urania. See Bernard 
Bouvier, "Notes inedites de Voltaire sur la Profession de foi du vicaire 
Savoyard," Annales de la Societe Jean-Jacques Rousseau 1 (1905): 279. 
81. Matt. 16:4. 
82. Burgelin suspects this: O. C, 4:623 n. 1. See "Confessions," loc. cit., 
p. 70; E. Ritter, La Famille et lajeunesse de J.-J. Rousseau (Paris: Hachette, 
1896), p. 202. 
83. "Lettres de la montagne," loc. cit., pp. 753-54; "Lettre a m. de Fran­
quieres," loc. cit., pp. 1145-47. Cf. "Morceau allegorique sur la revelation" (O. 
C., 4:1053-54) where Rousseau (circa 1755) prefers Christ to Socrates, whose 
submission to false laws after his revelation of true ones still puzzled him. I deal 
with Rousseau s perplexity about Socrates in the next chapter where I handle the 
famous comparison of Socrates and Cato. 
84. "Confessions," loc. cit., p. 63; cf. Matt. 12:31. See Massons edition of the 
Profession de foi (see note 46 above), p. 425. 
85. Cf. "Emile," p. 628 n, and "Contrat social," p. 469; cf. also "Lettre a C. de 
Beaumont," loc. cit., p. 978. 
86. Matt. 3:9; Luke 3:8. Cf. Rousseau's plea for enlightenment and that in 
Mark 9:24. The problem of adjusting theism and one's ancestral faith, to which I 
propose a solution below, has been raised by various critics. 
87. "Aimer Dieu par dessus tout et son prochain corame soi-meme est le som­
maire de la l o i . . . .  " Cf. Eccles. 12:13; Prov. 21:3; Matt. 22:37-39; 1 Cor. 13; Gal. 
5:14. For faith as an act of the will, in addition to this context of "Emile," see 
C.C., 9:342, letter to Moultou, 23 December 1761. 
88. For attacks upon "Philosophers" and materialists in the creed: "Emile," 
pp. 568-69, 576-78, 579-80, 582, 595 n, 598-99, 601, 632-35, and Rousseau's note. 
For the latter, refuting Bayle's idea of virtuous atheism, see Boss, op. cit., pp. 
123 ff. The "philosophers" are also attacked elsewhere in "Emile": pp. 253, 256, 
350 n. 
89. "Mais voyez de combien de nouvelles chaines vous avez environn6 son 
coeur. La raison, l'amitie, la reconnoissance, mille affections lui parlent d'un ton 
qu'il ne peut meconoitre." For the Socratic leitmotiv see note 11 above. The 
phrase recurs often in "Emile": pp. 522, 539, 639, 648-49, 653, 660-61. For "law­
ful fetters" mentioned above, see "Contrat social," p. 351. 
90. The Republic 2. 375-76. 
91. Ibid., 7. 534. For virtue practiced by habit, force, or necessity: ibid., 2. 
358-59; 7. 519-20; 9. 590; 10. 619. 
92. Ibid., 6. 491-92. Cf. 497 (Socratic parable of the sower). For the hus­
bandman: ibid., 9. 589. Cf. the Christian parable in Matt. 13:1-8. Rousseau writes: 
" Avant de semer il faut labourer la terre: la semence de la vertu leve difficilement, 
il faut de longs apprets pour lui faire prendre racine." 
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93. Cf. The Republic 7. 520 ("we have brought you into the world"); 8. 548 
("running away like children from the law, their father"). Rousseau writes: 
" . .  . J'enflamerai son jeune coeur de tous les sentimens d'amitie, de gen6rosite, 
de reconoissance que j 'ai deja fait naitre et qui sont si doux a nourrir . . . . Je lui 
dirai: tu es mon bien, mon enfant, mon ouvrage; c'est de ton bonheur que j'attends 
le mien " The Socratic leitmotiv is quoted above just before my discussion of 
Plutarch's biographies and again a few pages later apropos of the so-called lessons 
of experience; see also the last section of this chapter, "The Oath of Kings." 
94. "Contrat social," p. 469 n, and "Lettre a C. de Beaumont," loc. cit., p. 
979 n. 
95. "Emile," pp. 494, 764. For the distinction between what is natural in the 
savage state and civil order, see chapter 4 above, note 41. For the vicar's words 
quoted below: "Emile," p. 566. 
96. "Lettre a C. de Beaumont," loc. cit., p. 979 n, and see the fourth paragraph 
of the section of this chapter entitled "Credo." For the law of love that replaces 
the rule of necessity mentioned above, see Plato, The Symposium (Agathon's 
speech). 
97. Emile is asking to be "forced to be free." Failure to see the Socratic 
symbolism here leads to the impression that the hero, in order to be free of the 
slavery of sense, renounces his own free agency: David Cameron, The Social 
Thought of Rousseau and Burke (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973), 
pp. 101-2. An awareness of symbols and literary correspondences shows that the 
"ordering agent" is in fact Emile himself, who is engaging a minister or servant to 
externalize the governing power existing within him until he can serve himself. He 
does so in the fifth part, whose ideological content we can no longer afford to 
ignore. See chapter 6 below. 
98. O. C, 3:442 n. 4 (here we can see that even Voltaire missed the point) and 
443 n. 1. With regard to elections it has been said that in Rousseau's system 
magistrates are chosen by lot. But this would be so only in an impossible democ­
racy where the lot falls upon all, not in the elective aristocracy that he prefers. 
99. The chapters considered out of place are "Contrat social," part 2, chapters 
8,9, 10; part 3, chapter 8; part 4, chapters 4, 5, 6, 7; loc cit., pp. 384 n. 6;414n. 1; 
444 n. 1; cf. 458 n. 1. See chapters 3 and 4 above and chapter 1, note 55. Many 
thinkers believe that the book contains confused historical discussions of institu­
tions of little importance today. 
100. In the opening words of the chapter he admits that all he knows about the 
origins of Rome are "fables," "conjectures," "traditions." 
101. "Le nom de Rome qu on pr6tend venir de Romulus est Grec, et signifie 
force; le nom de Numa est grec aussi, et signifie Loi. Quelle apparence que les 
deux premiers Rois de cette ville aient port6 d'avance des noms si bien rdlatifs a 
ce qu'ils ont fait?" 
102. The Republic 3. 415. 
103. There Jean-Jacques exercises some mysterious power to force Emile to 
leave the beatific contemplation of wisdom for a time and engage in active life in 
the "false" kingdoms of this world. 
104. Cf. The Republic 2. 377. 
105. The italics are mine. We were previously told that he was not "an active 
member of society": "Emile," pp. 421, 467. Even when his pity becomes "ac­
tive," he is still a spectator: pp. 542 ff. The references to the "citizen" in this 
context are on pp. 655, 667 and note, 669. Cf. pp. 262, 469. It must be understood 
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that when Emile enters our society, he is literally going down into the Socratic 
den, on a level far below the lofty idealism of the Contrat, which always remains 
within. 
106. In addition to being mme d' Houdetot's name, it is also that of a character 
in his play "Les Prisonniers de guerre" and of one of the mendicanti orphans in 
"Confessions," 7. Cf. the Princesse Raison in "La Reine fantasque," O. C, 
2:1189-90. 
107. He learns to seek what was beyond him in "Emile," p. 453: "On voit a 
quinze ans le bonheur d'un homme sage, comme a trente la gloire du paradis." 
108. Prov. 4:5-8; 7:4-5; 8:10; 8:18. For the banquet of wisdom in 9:1-5 see 
chapter 6 below. 
109. "Confessions," loc. cit., pp. 193 ff. For love as a shield of virtue: ibid., 
pp. 7, 109. 
110. The Republic 6. 492-95. Cf. 8. 560 ff. 
111. "Emile," p. 659: " . . .Tous deux [Emile and a young girl] auront au moins 
pour gardes la crainte et la honte . . .  . " Cf. The Republic 5. 465: "For there are 
two guardians, shame and fear, mighty to prevent him . . .  . " " Fear means fear of 
breaking the law bred in him by education. 
112. The Republic 8. 560-61. 
113. " . .  . II reconoit la voix de l'amitie et il sait obeir a la raison." "Emile," p. 
661. See note 89 above. 
114. Cf. "Confessions," loc. cit., pp. 108-9. 
115. The parallel passages are in "Emile," pp. 537-40, 663-64. 
116. "Emile," p. 669, regarding manners, deportment, and taste in dress and 
concluding: "On voit que tout cela n'exige point de ma part un etalage de pr6­
ceptes, et n'est qu'un effet de sa premiere education." Cf. The Republic 4. 423­
25. All Socrates' regulations are trifles of the one great thing, education. And he 
too declines to "legislate" about "when the young are to be silent before their 
elders; how they are to show respect to them by standing and making them sit; 
what honour is due to parents; what garments or shoes are to be worn; the mode of 
dressing the hair; deportment and manners in general." His heroes will discover 
these rules for themselves, through the force of their education. The same is true 
of laws about markets, police, harbors, law-suits, and so on. See chapter 3 above, 
note 39. 
117. See above, pp. 16 ff. and 135 ff. 
118. His taste is also shown in his admiration for Raphael that is characteristi­
cally combined with a love of the neo-classics of Bologna, who added emotion to 
Rapheal's classical ideal: "Emile," p. 790. For the importance of amusements 
cf. The Republic 4. 424. Rousseau associates virtue and beauty as the object of 
laws in the "Fragments politiques" as well as in the chapter of the "Contrat" on 
the censorship. 
119. For the evangelical challenge: Matt. 19:23-26. For the Socratic phrase 
corresponding to "with God all things are possible": The Republic 6. 492-93. 
120. Cf. O. C, 3:111 n. 4. 
121. The Republic 8. 553. Cf. 550-51. Cf. also "Contrat social," p. 429 (the 
word finance is unkown in the city). 
122. See pp. 680, 683, 686, 691. 
123. The Republic 3. 400-402. Burgelin notes the connection of taste and mor­
als in Rousseau: O. C, 4:671 n. 2. 
[302] 
TEMPLE STRONGHOLD 
124. See pp. 782, 820, 859, 861. Observe that for Rousseau the golden age 
belongs neither to the past, as with the ancients, nor to the future, as with the 
moderns, but to the eternal present. 
125. "Mais de quoy jouissois-je enfin quand j'etois seul? De moi, de l'univers 
entier, de tout ce qui est, de tout ce qui peut etre, de tout ce qu'a de beau le monde 
sensible et d'imaginable le monde intel lectuel . . . ." 
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VI 
Inner Sanctum 
The fifth part of Emile leads the reader into the innermost 
chamber1 of the mythical temple dedicated to divine wis­
dom. Although there is no corresponding part in the Con­
tract,2 the principles of the treatise on citizenship prevail 
throughout this section where they are also summarized. I 
shall therefore discuss the novel in the light of discoveries 
to which the collation of the two books has led. Indeed, 
here it affords a new vision of Rousseauist wisdom in its 
most intimate relations to the human spirit. In addition, the 
writer shows clearly enough to what degree he dared hope 
that the city of his creation might have real existence in 
some form of civil order or exclusive communion of men. 
The inner sanctuary of the temple of the book matches 
the second chamber of the Greek pattern, adjacent to the 
other and somewhat smaller, but also divided by rows of 
columns into three symmetrical naves. In accordance with 
Rousseau's consistent symbolic adherence to this architec­
tural form, the last part of Emile is therefore a little smaller 
than the previous one and also has a tripartite shape, the 
three "naves" varying only slightly in magnitude. 
It covers the hero's life between the ages of twenty and 
twenty-five and contains the story of Emile and Sophia in 
three parts, the first and last being marked by titles, and the 
middle by the spacing of the text. They deal respectively 
with the nature and formation of woman and presentation of 
Sophia; the courtship of Emile and Sophia and the promise 
between them; and finally a comparison of the Rousseauist 
covenant with the historical one, culminating in Emile's 
pledge to the former and marriage to Sophia. Henceforth 
the symbolism becomes increasingly obvious. Indeed, fail­
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ure to cope with it and to take account of the literary—as 
well as literal—aspect of the work especially here is the 
reason for most of our misunderstandings in the past. Often 
we are so shocked by the "reactionary" or traditional 
character of Sophia's formation that we can hardly see 
much else, or are tempted to pass lightly over the 
"storybook ending" as if the romance were simply that of a 
man's love for a woman. It may indeed be that, but it also 
turns out to be much more. Rousseau himself has said so, 
as we know. In painting her portrait, the Aemelian gover­
nor explained that the aesthetic and spiritual or social ideal 
existing in Emile's mind and heart is embodied in her, and 
that his love for the moral truth and beauty of that order of 
wisdom assumes the form of love of Sophia, whose name 
befits her. That was the very reason for the portrait. This 
love supposedly makes autonomous action possible for a 
man and releases him from "his tutor the law," to use the 
author's Socratic and biblical phraseology. And so we need 
not protest, as we have done hitherto, that this part whose 
theme in the original plan of the work was to be wisdom is 
replaced by a love story.3 As in the case of friendship, 
Rousseau handles the theme of love as freely as he did 
before and no less freely than it is handled in the Platonic 
dialogues, particularly the Republic and Symposiurr. He 
uses it to dramatize the idea that wisdom is suited to the 
human spirit, and to exteriorize his thought in figures and 
events that may be taken literally but must be taken symbol­
ically. 
SOPHIA 
In the first nave of the mythical inner shrine, where he 
begins with the nature and formation of woman, he makes 
statements that have a double meaning and hint at both a 
philosophical and love drama. For example, he quotes 
Genesis, "It is not good for man to be alone," and then 
formulates a query that may have a much broader scope 
than we think, like the biblical text itself. It reads: "Where 
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is Sophia? What is she?" These words conspicuously echo 
the oft-repeated phrase: "Where is wisdom? Where is hap­
piness?" 
He considers first the nature of woman, since her forma­
tion must be suited to the constitution of her species and 
sex if she is to fulfill her role in life, which for him is that of 
wife and mother. He dwells especially upon the moral ef­
fects of the affinities and differences between men and 
women and the role of both in their union, wherein each 
concurs in the common object in a different way. His medi­
tations run as follows. Man is active and strong, endowed 
with power and will, whereas woman is a passive being, 
made to please him and activate his strength. In their recip­
rocal reactions he is governed by the law of reason, which 
makes him free and master of himself. She is as subject to 
that law as she is to him, but is further restrained by the 
modesty imposed upon her by nature and also by a gradu­
ally acquired aesthetic taste for right conduct. Moreover, 
although the stronger of the two seems to be master, he 
really depends upon the weaker and must please her as 
much as she does him if he would woo her. In this way, 
according to the author, the moral aspects of their interrela­
tionship give rise to "the sweet laws of love" and have 
consequences that influence the whole of life. By the power 
of love, says he, she binds men's hearts to herself, educates 
her children, and is the link between them and their father. 
Her fidelity to the covenant from which the miniature soci­
ety of the family springs is therefore more indispensable 
than man's for the purpose of maintaining "the bonds of 
nature." Again as in the first part of the book, he sees her 
faithlessness as the source of all evil. Indeed, in his view 
she must not merely be faithful and chaste, but deemed so 
by public opinion as well as by her husband. For Rousseau 
these are the moral effects of the peculiar place that nature 
herself assigns to women in regard to men. 
These opinions about the nature of women are as rele­
vant to the "perfect city" or "wise order" of the covenant 
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as equivalent ones about a mother's duties in the first part.4 
And rightly so, since in the book it is through a man's 
alliance with her that the city materializes. The special des­
tiny attributed to her in the pursuit of that object proves to 
be that of the ideal state, passive as such, created to please 
him and impel him to moral action or obedience to the law 
of reason that is rooted in his noblest self and empowered to 
release it. A woman subject to such a man is, as it were, a 
"state" ruled by "true laws," and a state ruled by true laws 
is the ideal city. The charm of its institutions is also hers, 
which he must honor.5 By her persuasive influence Jean-
Jacques' law of reason, of necessity and freedom, of utility 
or Socratic "usefulness," and of the constitution—which is 
as subject to human nature as she is—becomes "the sweet 
law of love" that makes the city a reality. That law, like the 
one that takes the form of friendship, may also bring others 
into the fold and win their hearts to the Socratic "father." 
Fidelity to the latter, who is the law, ensures peace and 
union—the blessings of the common good and of the 
covenant—by securing "the bonds of nature" that are the 
spirit of all law. Since the moral order that takes shape in 
this way and without which man is presumably lost is Rous­
seauist wisdom, public judgment that safeguards it is seen 
as true opinion, which prevails in the Aemilian city and 
whose approval the heroine must win while her lover, beset 
by the sophisms of false opinion, despises them in favor of 
her. These distinctions convey in an imaginative way the 
idea that she must move him to be what he essentially is and 
fulfill himself through her in the mythical city whose image 
she exteriorizes, however small or large it may be. 
Before dealing with her formation, Rousseau himself 
draws attention to the symbolism of love and marriage in a 
passage in which he appears to part company with Soc­
rates. He challenges the sage's disregard of the family as an 
educational institution and repudiates his ideas on the edu­
cation of women contained in Plato's fifth book, from 
whose content the author of Emile nevertheless borrows 
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later on. As we know, the Greek sage allots the same exer­
cises and duties to both sexes in the republic. His modern 
disciple protests that women are not made to go to "war," 
meaning that they cannot engage in active life in the world 
like men can. We may judge from the name of Sophia that 
for him their domain is "politics," or citizenship and educa­
tion. He complains that the speaker in the Republic turns 
them into men because, having removed private families 
from his system of government, he has no place for women 
as such, and consequently no other alternative.6 This "civil 
promiscuity" leads, says he, to the subversion of the 
sweetest sentiments of nature, meaning family affections, 
which are sacrificed for the sake of an artificial sense of 
loyalty to an outward city that could exist only through 
their effectiveness. For him, as we saw in the first part, 
these bonds furnish a natural foundation for the conven­
tional bonds of patriotism that they also serve to portray. It 
is "through the miniature city of the family that the heart 
grows attached to the large one." It is "the good son, the 
good husband, the good father who makes the good citi­
zen." Accordingly, as before, the writer uses conjugal or 
family affection to allegorize the orderly disposition and 
felicitous expansion of the soul wedded to "wisdom" or the 
ideal city. 
In that case his thought remains as Socratic as ever, 
whatever form it assumes, especially since he really has no 
more hope for the family than he or the Greek thinker has 
for the city. Consequently, even in this context the ideal 
probably remains as confined to the inner realm of the sage 
as it does in the Republic. The truth is that Rousseau does 
not take leave of his model at all. However much he makes 
an issue of disagreeing with the sage's views in Plato's fifth 
book on the nature and formation of woman—a real dis­
agreement that we anticipated in the previous chapter—he 
nevertheless continues to be deeply indebted to the master 
in another context of the Greek classic for the image of 
Sophia or woman as the embodiment of wisdom and the 
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ideal state whose lover is a "philosopher" in the etymologi­
cal sense. We saw this too in the previous chapter above, as 
well as in the second, where we studied the symbolism of 
the father, mother, and family. But in this respect, as we 
know, he is inspired by Plato's sixth book where woman 
plays a symbolic role and personifies the Muse of 
Philosophy or queen of the republic who has watched over 
the early education of its heroes and is finally revealed as 
the philosopher-king's destined bride. Indeed, that book, 
together with other Socratic recommendations at the end of 
the Republic dealing with the choice of wisdom in life, is 
one of Rousseau's two chief sources in his treatment of the 
formation of woman, which is not, however, Socrates' real 
theme therein. The other source is Plato's Symposium or 
Banquet1 to which he directed us earlier by including it in 
Emile's readings and which has no more to do with 
feminine education than the texts in the Republic. He ap­
propriates the Socratic ideas and allegories of his models 
freely enough to show clearly that the main subject of the 
present part of his work is not what it appears to be. The 
reader is by now familiar with the symbolism of the first 
Platonic dialogue. I must briefly review the other before 
proceeding further. 
The theme of the work is love. Socrates is again the chief 
speaker but takes his turn with others in discoursing upon 
that subject. In fact, it is the only one of which he professes 
to have any knowledge at all since, in his opinion, there is 
only one love and that is the love of wisdom, as Rousseau 
too implies by naming Emile's beloved "Sophia." I shall 
combine all the discourses into one except that of the sage, 
which I shall handle separately. 
Love, we are told in the Symposium, is a source of virtue 
and honor, since lovers would be pained to be dishonored in 
each other's eyes. Consequently, "if there were only some 
way of contriving that a state or an army should be made up 
of lovers and their loves, they would be the very best gov­
ernors of their own city... . Love will make men dare to 
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die for their beloved." Such love is, however, far from 
common. It is love of the good, that of intelligent beings 
who "are a law unto themselves," and is incompatible with 
tyranny [a cipher of the power of evil passion]: "The in­
terests of rulers [meaning tyrants or tyrannical passions] 
require... that there should be no strong bond of friendship 
or society among their subjects [corresponding to desires 
that ought to be harmonized by reason and true opinion] 
and love, above all other motives, is likely to inspire this." 
But such a bond can be formed only by "love of the noble 
mind," subject to law, as opposed to love of wealth and 
power. Now since both noble and ignoble love are to be 
found in all things, only a skillful physician or musician can 
discern the love that harmonizes temperate and intemperate 
elements, "is concerned with the good," "is perfected in 
company with ...justice," and leads to happiness. This 
love that is "lord of the good" is every man's desire and so 
"if all of us obtained our love... then the human race 
would be happy at last." But under present circumstances, 
the nearest approach to consummate felicity would be the 
attainment of a congenial love. And that achievement de­
pends upon ourselves, for acts of love must be distin­
guished from those of necessity: "all serve love of their 
own free will and where there is love as well as obedience 
[the Rousseauist correlatives too], there, as the laws which 
are the lords of the city say, is justice," and temperance, 
courage, wisdom, and poetic inspiration. The latter is in­
cluded since love is love of the beautiful as well as the good. 
Before dealing with Socrates' part in the dialogue, I 
might observe the relevance of these ideas to Rousseau's 
thought, even though the connection becomes clearer 
henceforward. Woman, as he has described her, inspires 
that love of the good which wins obedience to the laws, 
which is manifest in wisdom and all virtue, and tempers 
ignoble passions to create harmony and peace among the 
powers. Indeed, such a love which is that of the beauty of a 
divine order of things allegedly becomes the only law in the 
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end, making all other ordinances superfluous and creating a 
state where honor reigns and the lover knows "for whom 
he must die." So we are told later, as we shall see. The gov­
ernment of love or honor ultimately replaces that of reason, 
both being subject to the same law of the human constitu­
tion. The speakers of the Symposium help clarify the sym­
bolic value of Rousseau's text. 
But Socrates, who incidentally attributes his ideas to a 
"wise woman," Diotima, is the most enlightening of all. He 
explains that if love is defined as love of wisdom, truth, 
beauty, and goodness, to which he adds immortality, it is 
not because that all-powerful creature posseses them, but 
because he feels the need for them and hence pursues them 
for the sake of happiness, bearing fruit thereby in thought, 
word, and deed. Thus the sage sees love not as possession 
but as poverty or an awareness of need, and this leads him 
to emphasize the pursuits and labors of love to the same 
extent that he emphasizes those of study, which are iden­
tical. Creative souls, says he, who engage in an active 
spirtual life, are moved by love to beget wisdom and poetic 
fervor. "But," he adds, "the greatest and fairest sort of 
wisdom by far is that which is concerned with the ordering 
of states and families and which is called temperance and 
justice." That wisdom of the ideal city is not only Emile's 
whole quest in life but is the very essence of Rousseau's 
conception of the education of woman, since for him the 
ideal can materialize, if at all, only through a woman thus 
formed. And that miracle would be possible only if she won 
the love of a lover of wisdom like the hero, or the ones 
exemplified in the master's words in the Greek dialogue. 
Socrates adds that such a lover has in him the seed of tem­
perance and justice, and in his maturity desires to generate 
both: "He wanders about seeking beauty that he may beget 
offspring [the aforementioned virtues]... and when he finds 
a fair and noble and well-nurtured soul, he gladly em­
braces that soul, and to such an one he is full of fair speech 
about virtue, and the nature and pursuits of a good man, 
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and he tries to educate his beloved: and, at the touch and 
presence of the beautiful, he brings forth the beautiful 
which he conceived long before.. . and they have a closer 
relationship than those who beget mortal children." As we 
shall see, this is precisely the homage for which education is 
intended to prepare a woman in the Rousseauist order of 
things. The sage concludes by tracing the course of love 
from beautiful forms and fair thoughts to beauty of institu­
tions and laws, culminating in the love of absolute beauty, 
which enables a man to bring forth not mere images of 
beauty but realities or true virtue and to become the "friend 
of God" and enjoy immortality. It is impossible to ignore 
the affinity of his words and of the whole work to the text of 
Emile where the author portrays his own view of the beauty 
of a wise order of life that wins love and moves a man to 
beget virtue.8 
The personification of wisdom and the ideal state in 
woman is, as I have previously remarked, Judeo-Christian 
as well as Socratic. Quite apart from the Solomonic per­
sonification of wisdom, or the idealization of chaste 
womanhood discussed earlier,9 other biblical imagery to 
which I alluded in speaking of the covenant is visible in 
Rousseau's handling of the theme of Sophia and accen­
tuates its symbolism. For example, in the Old Testament 
the covenant people Israel is represented as a spouse whose 
spiritual husband is God. In the New Testament the society 
of the church, Ecclesia, appears as the bride of Christ, 
united with him in a single "mystical body," and again as 
the "holy city prepared as a bride adorned for her hus­
band." In both cases the city is ideally shaped by the laws 
of the mystical bridegroom. These ancient myths combine 
to cast light upon Rousseau's miniature city of the fifth part 
that suddenly becomes accessible in woman. 
Broaching the question of her education, he defines first 
the principles of the process, that spring from the distinc­
tive traits of her nature as analyzed at the beginning of this 
part, with their symbolic flavor. If she is to be suited to 
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man, to please him and direct his strength as she must in 
accordance with her alleged destiny, inclination, and duties 
as wife and mother, which are surely Sophia's, her educa­
tion must be devised to that end. The writer sees no other 
possible vocation for her. He accentuates her dependence 
upon man but paradoxically admits that the latter depends 
upon her for everything: his education, morals, passions, 
tastes, and happiness throughout life. As we foresaw in the 
previous chapter in reference to Sophia, she is entrusted 
like Socrate's Muse with what Rousseau called, in the sec­
ond and fourth parts of the Contract, the laws whose do­
main is the heart, which replace authority by manners, cus­
toms, and opinions and which determine the success of all 
other laws, shaping men's morals, tastes, and lives for all 
time. In that case Sophia has been mystically present in 
Emile, in company with Jean-Jacques, from the dedication 
onward. 
The education of Rousseauist woman, which I shall trace 
briefly to show how the symbolism evolves, is both aesthe­
tic and spiritual according to the character of Rousseauist 
wisdom, and, together with the story of Sophia that follows, 
is sketched within the bounds of Paris like the philosophic 
ecstasy induced by the same wisdom. In every phase of her 
evolution the model proposed is the example set by her 
sisters in the ancient cities of Sparta and Aemilian Rome, 
cities whose character is reflected in their noble women as 
it is in her. Moreover, the order of her formation is that of 
the "true" state ruled by the reasonable will or law of the 
constitution, which she must learn to activate and for which 
she must win obedience by the power of love alone. Thus as 
in the case of Emile provision is made for the training of 
physical attributes first of all, and then the will and the 
reason in that sequence. 
In the first stage of her education the author directs his 
attention to the cultivation of personal charms and a strong 
constitution required for the fulfillment of her vocation as 
he sees it. He gives the example of Spartan maidens who 
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sang and danced at public fetes and pious rites, which he 
elsewhere recommends for his own city. With that ideal in 
mind he begins by recommending outdoor games and 
amusements. He combines these with simple "useful" les­
sons in sewing and design, the physical side of the art of 
pleasing, and also in traditional studies like the three Rs. In 
prescribing the latter, which he ignored in the case of a 
leader like Emile, he applies to her the rule of the common 
people or ideal state. In this context he likens her to the 
goddess of wisdom, whose role she plays in the end as 
protectress of a supposedly wise order of human life sym­
bolically identified with her. 
There are further signs of the presence of symbolism in 
the treatment of her early moral formation. She is industri­
ous like Emile, but always under constraint since all her life 
long she must submit to the will and judgments of men as to 
law. Such, of course, is the nature of Rousseauist and Soc­
ratic wisdom, as we have seen from the beginning. The 
author adds that she must be devoted to her duties and— 
like the Socratic muse, we may observe—must guard 
against lawlessness in amusements, although she is permit­
ted to use her natural ingenuity to evade the rules in matters 
of indifference.10 She learns thereby to reign in obedience 
and make man's dwelling-place an abode of happiness. 
Jean-Jacques has done the same. The functions assigned to 
her in the most intimate sphere of life are those of wisdom 
or the imaginary city where the laws of reason prevail as 
they did in the order of friendship, and the laws are the 
same in both cases. 
The second phase of her education is suggestive of the 
same symbolism. The new Minerva emulates Venus by 
favoring Spartan simplicity of adornment to accentuate her 
natural graces. Her charm is therefore that of the new 
Sparta. From the age often she also follows the example of 
Spartan maidens by acquiring talents already extolled in 
them, such as singing and dancing, that enhances private 
life. In Rousseau's view the lawful amusements of harmony 
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and rhythm are the palladium of marriage and the family as 
they are of the Aemilian city and Socratic republic. He 
never loses sight of the principle that the city stands or falls 
upon the nature of its pleasures, and greatly emphasizes it 
in the present context. 
Obviously for him the art of pleasing extends far beyond 
the sphere of appearances. Taste, he says again, opens the 
mind to all beauty, including that of moral ideas. Accord­
ingly he is led to speak of ethical instruction at this stage. It 
is largely imparted by way of conversations on moral 
themes that, besides teaching the art of polite speech, show 
the child "what qualities men esteem and what makes the 
true glory and felicity of a good woman." She learns, in 
fine, where wisdom and happiness lie. 
To lead her thither and foster in her a growing "taste for 
good morals" that combines ethics and aesthetics, Rous­
seau borrows the support of religion when she is presuma­
bly ten or twelve years old. He explains that since the con­
cepts of religion are beyond her reach, she must learn them 
all the sooner. Here, as in the case of the three Rs, he again 
applies to her the rule of the common people, which is that 
of the state subject to law. Before doing so, he defines her 
cast of mind. In his opinion it is practical, oriented toward 
human relationships, and it conducts her to the goal 
proposed by man, who in turn reaches that goal through 
her. The goal, as we know, is that wise order of things 
called the city. He admits it. The society of the sexes, says 
he, produces "a moral person of which woman is the eye 
and man the hand... . " This idea brings into higher relief 
the symbolism of the text and of the names Aemilius and 
Sophia, "industry" and "wisdom," the latter conceived as 
pertaining to the sense of sight. The composite creature 
thus formed, upon which both are completely dependent, is 
an image of the rational being born of a man or association 
of men wedded to "divine wisdom" by the covenant of 
peace through an act of the enlightened human will intensi­
fied by love. Reflecting upon the society of the sexes, 
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Rousseau explains that man discovers principles or laws 
but his companion possesses the spirit of detail and 
observation that leads to their execution. Hence, "each 
contributes to the common purpose . . . each obeys and 
both are rulers." Here again their reciprocal correspond­
ence resembles that of the citizen to the subject or the 
sovereign to the state, which is really the solemn engage­
ment of a man with his own noblest faculties.11 This pledge 
could hardly be better portrayed in its innermost and only 
really effective form than by the conjugal union. In the past 
we have been aware of the analogy without seeing that the 
one is a literary image of the other. The author himself 
suggests the politico-moral similitude by quoting from the 
Pauline chapter on the mystical body born of the union of 
Christ with his bride Ecclesia: in matters of religion, 
"women must receive the decision of fathers and husbands 
as that of the church,"12 or the holy city they symbolize in 
the context. They must do so because religion is a law in a 
presumably wise order of life governed by the covenant. 
That he does indeed allude to the ideal city is even more 
evident when he defines the faith prescribed, which is the 
law of the civic creed in the Contract.13 He replaces the 
catechism and mysteries by dogmas "important to human 
society" that bid us do our duties toward our neighbor and 
ourselves. The dogmas he recommends here as in the Con­
tract proclaim the existence of God, our judge and common 
father; they ordain in his name the practice of justice, char­
ity, beneficence, mercy, and fidelity to our engagements 
with others; and they promise a future life where the Sup­
reme Being will reward the good and judge the wicked. 
These dogmas, we are told, are compulsory for all "citi­
zens," and expressly preclude any others that breed 
intolerance. Their very nature lends more weight to the 
figurative or literary interpretation of woman in Emile, 
which, however, does not exclude a literal reading as well. 
Rousseau's conception of the third and last degree in her 
formation has even more allegorical overtones than the pre­
[317] 
ROUSSEAU'S SOCRATIC AEMILIAN MYTHS 
ceding ones. It is ushered in by the awakening of reason in 
conscience. The rational faculty is given a twofold ministry 
to discharge. In a very simple form it enjoins duties of 
obedience and fidelity to the covenant upon which the di­
minutive city of the family stands. In a more complex form 
it reconciles the voices of conscience and public opinion 
whenever possible, in which case a woman must learn to 
make wise applications of the law of true opinion like the 
censor in the Contract. And as the latter defines opinions 
when they waver, so she too must learn to anticipate them 
and win their favor for herself by wooing them to wisdom. 
For her domain, like his, is a sort of government, as I have 
said, and is analogous to that of the prince, whose work she 
makes superfluous in the end. The symbolism is unfolding 
more insistently. 
It is carried further when Rousseau considers the training 
of her reason. Before doing so, he reflects again upon the 
intuitive discernment of a woman who knows the art of 
pleasing men by virtue of subtle observation of the heart. 
He gives the example of Galatea in a Virgilian eclogue, who 
resorts to cunning wiles to induce a shepherd to follow her. 
We may infer that in Emile's case Jean-Jacques' earlier 
artfulness will soon be replaced by Sophia's, or even by his 
own since, according to the projected work on Sensitive 
Morality described in the Confessions, a man may invent 
such devices for himself to regulate his conduct. The writer 
of Emile adds that the practical tendency of a woman's 
mind with its firm grasp of human reactions not only ena­
bles a man to implement the moral laws found by himself, 
as we were told before, but even leads him to find them. 
She discovers "experimental morality" or psychology, 
while he reduces it to a system. Both together attain to "the 
most complete knowledge accessible to the human mind, 
that of oneself and of others."But this indispensable knowl­
edge that is the fruit of their union is already bred in Emile, 
betrothed to Rousseauist wisdom from the beginning. His 
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education, presided over by that wisdom through the 
agency of Jean-Jacques, culminated in the previous part in 
the conscious cultivation of taste and discernment, making 
him sensitive to the beauty of an ideal order presented in a 
form to win his love and ultimately moving him to act and 
exteriorize it. 
In the author's opinion that mythical order can assume 
visible form in a woman only if her mind is trained accord­
ing to his concept of its nature and if the fine psychological 
observations of which she is capable are exercised, like 
Emile's hitherto, in worldly society, which also provides 
for the acquisition of agreeable knowledge and the forma­
tion of taste, as we know. Rousseau follows the example of 
the ancients by favoring the frequentation of polite society 
for young girls of marriageable age rather than for married 
women. But first, by way of precaution against evil, he 
would provide them with common sense, a love of honor, 
and a taste for the simple charms of family life and the little 
city of the home, the sanctuary of woman. If he succeeded, 
the woman he has in mind would give outward expression 
to virtues and a society regarded as impossible at the begin­
ning of the book. 
For experience furnished by social life teaches her the 
answer to the questions that were the theme of her childish 
conversations: "What qualities do men esteem? And what 
makes the true glory and happiness of a good woman?" Or 
if we prefer: Where is wisdom? Where is happiness? She 
learns what the Symposium teaches, namely, that propriety 
of life wins love and honor in the sight of men and moves 
them to seek honor for themselves in her eyes, since she is 
the natural judge of their merit as they are of hers. But for 
Rousseau the burden rests primarily with woman if the 
miniature city is to exist at all. He again holds up to her the 
example of her Spartan and Roman sisters of a heroic past. 
The love she must win is a love of the good and of the 
wisdom exemplified in them and is akin to that of the 
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Platonic dialogue, whatever other implications it may have. 
But like Socrates weaving his myths in that work, he goes 
further. That love is not passive, any more than the Spar­
tan's love for Sparta or the Roman's love for Rome. In 
Socratic speech it is the love of creative souls and impels 
them to pursue wisdom and all virtue. In the phraseology of 
Emile it arouses in the lover's heart natural fervor for per­
fection and beauty, visualized in the beloved, and begets 
sublime acts in himself, leading him at last to the supreme 
sacrifice. For the author asks, in the language of the Sym­
posium or even of Christ: "What true lover exists who 
would not lay down his life for his beloved?"14 Once more 
evoking the shades of medieval paladins, he observes that a 
chaste and virtuous woman wins devotion like theirs from 
all mankind as well as the love of a good and noble-minded 
man. Again using the language of the Symposium, he exp­
lains that "a lover serves his beloved as he serves virtue." 
He adds that a virtuous woman, like her Spartan sisters — 
and he might have said like Sparta herself—rules over 
great and strong souls and "sends her lovers to the end of 
the world, to war, glory and death at her behest." 
Moreover, we are later told, in a passage occurring after 
Emile's meeting with Sophia, that he must study a citizen's 
duties in order to learn "for whom he must die," a phrase to 
which I alluded above. The Aemilian texts as well as their 
analogy with the Platonic one suggest again that the hero's 
love for the heroine is really a love of wisdom involving 
"political" responsibilities and the risk of death. If pas­
sages like these are mystical jargon, as some of us in the 
past have been tempted to suppose, then so is the whole 
Symposium, for the great concepts of the latter are recog­
nizable therein. Without ignoring Judeo-Christian tradition, 
Rousseau hints broadly that here woman is for him a sym­
bol of the Socratic "greatest and fairest sort of wisdom by 
far" and an image of "the beauty of institutions and laws" 
that generated the fervor of the Spartan patriot in the open­
ing pages of the book. 
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The foregoing survey of her education in Emile shows 
that the writer uses the theme to convey his thought in a 
new and imaginative form. His statements may be taken 
literally if we wish. But he has already said that women will 
never again be mothers, as he also said that the city will 
never exist in the world. And so while he takes pains to 
record his thoughts upon such grave issues, he frames them 
in figures equally suited to convey the main message of his 
work, the Socratic ordering of a man's inner life through 
effective modes of self-direction to make the mythical city a 
moral reality at least. 
The allegorical character of the fifth part becomes even 
clearer in the brief portrait of Sophia that follows. The wri­
ter illustrates therein his previous treatment of the theme of 
womanhood. And yet there are subtle distinctions between 
Sophia, who is "woman," and woman in general as wife 
and mother. In the case of the latter the exteriorization of 
the ideal city in the sphere of conjugal and family relations, 
however hypothetical, seems less so than in the portrait of 
Sophia, which appears to belong more obviously to the 
world of the spirit. Moreover, the mingling of Judeo-
Christian elements with pagan is more highly accentuated 
in her. For example, she bears a striking resemblance to 
Antiope, heroine of Telemaque, whose Christian and 
Platonic qualities reflect the scholarship of her creator, the 
priestly Fenelon. In that treatise of education, written a half 
century before Emile, Antiope is betrothed to the hero 
Telemaque and like the latter's governor Mentor is said to 
be "Minerva herself in human form."15 Sophia too is 
Minerva, and her affinity to Antiope is hardly surprising 
since Telemaque is later reborn in Emile as Mentor is in 
Jean-Jacques, the Rousseauist figures being further christ­
ianized in the process. Such affinities as well as the portrait 
itself, like the earlier one, indicate that a purely literal and 
positivistic approach to the heroine and a neglect of literary 
values would be inadequate for an understanding of the 
author's meaning. 
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In the portrait the fusion of Greek and Christian elements 
is evident in both physical and spiritual attributes. Describ­
ing the former, the writer, having said that Sophia does not 
at first appear beautiful, betrays the fact that he has in mind 
his own "classical" definition of beauty as the sum of the 
most common features, or eternal and universal traits. Yet 
he also ascribes to her a gentle, touching expression that 
belongs to Christian tradition in art and literature. Besides, 
he visualizes her inflowing garments that reveal the charm 
of her person and are as evocative of both traditions as the 
imagery of the book that enhances his concept of natural 
wisdom. Moreover, he endows her with talents that are 
both Platonic and Fenelonian. For example, she is deeply 
sensitive to cadence and music and grace of movement, 
qualities that are as characteristic of Fenelon's Antiope-
Minerva as they are of the "true Muse" of the Republic, 
who is "music," the companion of reason and philosophy, 
and who guards against corruption of soul by the potent 
influence of beauty and of order. Sophia too exemplifies the 
beauty of harmony that saves the constitution of soul and of 
city.16 Rousseau imagines her "setting her house in order" 
like Antiope and thereby displaying the same love of grace, 
purity, and discipline as the Fenelonian heroine and a cast 
of mind like hers, bereft of "vain" ornaments, but pleasing, 
penetrating, and substantial. He bestows upon her an 
abundant capacity for practical observations that can trans­
late all principles and powers into acts. He enriches her 
with other qualities too that in his view facilitate the same 
operations, such as Christian sensitivity, imaginative sym­
pathy, patience, and charity. These moral virtues are, he 
says, the essence of her faith and life. Indeed, he sees her 
enamored of virtue by reason of its aesthetic appeal and the 
glory and happiness it promises a woman by winning her 
the love of a man of merit "whose character is written in 
her heart," as it is in the ideal city and as, conversely, the 
hero like the author bears her likeness and the city in his 
soul. 
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Having completed her portrait, Rousseau tells the story 
of her tragic fate. Suddenly the allegory becomes so trans­
lucent that an exclusively literal interpretation would be 
immensely perplexing. 
Sophia, having grown to maidenhood, receives from her 
father instruction about the purposes of marriage and the 
principles to be followed in the choice of a bridegroom. In 
accordance with Rousseauist imagery the theme of mar­
riage serves to convey ideas about the nature of the soul 
that may be "wedded" to wisdom and in whom the latter, 
in the language of the Symposium, may "walk and dwell 
and have her home." The purpose of the sacred covenant, 
says her father, is the common happiness, that of her par­
ents, herself, and the bridegroom of her election. The prin­
ciples prescribed to guide her are simple. She is to choose a 
man who would be honored by her and would also do her 
honor, being suited to her. The author's words are those of 
the Symposium, and the meaning is Rousseauist and Socra­
tic at once. If she is indeed supposed to portray a wise order 
of human life, by her very nature she honors that of man 
and is honored thereby. But a man will be suited to her only 
if he typifies humanity at its best and in its pristine purity, 
not "disfigured by ten thousand ills." Such is the object of 
her search. 
To guide her further, her father proposes an ideal of love, 
setting aside all other considerations. In other words, her 
bridegroom is to be a Socratic "lover of wisdom." The 
speaker urges her to seek a union of hearts, conformity of 
tastes and inclination, and thereby alludes to what were 
called the keystone of the vault of a "unanimous and har­
monious" city or soul. He also alludes to the city by declar­
ing that the law of love is that of nature, which civil laws 
may not oppose except at the expense of happiness and 
good morals. It is, however, a law or act of the will for 
Rousseau, as it is for the speakers of the Symposium. 
Sophia is therefore bound to obey it and remain "mistress 
of herself in choosing her lover. Her task is all the more 
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difficult, she is told, since although she possesses spiritual 
riches, in the eyes of the world she is poor—as poor in 
popular esteem, we may add, as wisdom or the ideal city, 
where the word finance is unknown. Hence she is now 
bidden to follow the law of reason rather than the inclina­
tion of the heart. The apparent discrepancy in the text is a 
matter of semantics. The inner feeling favored above is 
based upon real conformities, and consequently it is en­
lightened by intelligence and distinguishable from sentimen­
tal dispositions that lead us, in the vicar's words, "to do 
other than we will." Sophia is to avoid this pitfall by con­
sulting her parents before making her choice. In a word, 
that choice is obviously to be governed by the laws of 
poverty or necessity and freedom, which are those of the 
Rousseauist city and of the wisdom it serves to symbolize. 
If readers are skeptical, Rousseau is aware of it. To con­
vince us of the truth of his words, he declares that she is not 
imaginary and that her name alone is of his invention; for 
she really existed, and her memory is still mourned by a 
whole honorable family. Then he decides to finish the story 
of a girl so similar to her that it might well be her own, and 
so he continues to use the same name. It is necessary to 
finish it with him in order to grasp his meaning. This new 
Sophia is sent to the town in search of "a master for life," a 
"lover" to be her bridegroom. But her errand is vain: "she 
sought a soul and there was none to be seen." Con­
sequently she chooses none. On her return home she con­
fides to her mother that she could enjoy love and happiness 
only with him whose "charming image is written in her 
soul." The image turns out to be that of Fenelon's Tele­
maque, son of Ulysses and prince of Ithaca in Greece who, 
according to legend, died many centuries ago. Sophia jus­
tifies her choice by saying that she was not formed for a 
man of her century and asks whether it is her "fault" if she 
loves "what is not." Yet she adds: "I am not mad lam 
not a visionary: I do not want a prince, I am not looking for 
Telemaque. I know that he is only an imaginary person. I 
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am looking for one who resembles him. And why may he 
not exist, since I exist, I who have a heart like his? No, let 
us not dishonor humanity; let us not think that an amiable 
and virtuous man is merely chimerical. He exists, he lives, 
he is looking for me perhaps . . .  . But what is he? Where is 
he?"17 These questions echo Jean-Jacques' "Where is 
Sophia? What is she?" 
According to the author, her search is futile to the end. 
She slowly draws near death, like her prototype, while 
"others are thinking of forcing her to the altar." He admits 
at last that such love as hers is based upon notions of merit 
and beauty that are not to be found in nature. But, of 
course, neither is wisdom nor the spiritual state or city 
evoked by the love theme in the book, or the patriotic fer­
vor it would generate if it ever took shape "under the sun." 
Obviously an exclusively literal reading of the story 
would be puzzling to say the least. As in the first presenta­
tion of Sophia, here too the element of mystery is too con­
spicuous not to be intentional. If we use our collation to 
solve the enigmas, the original Sophia who really lived 
would be the wisdom of Socrates as Rousseau sees it. In 
our confused world, says the sage in the sixth book of the 
Republic, the Muse of Philosophy, beloved of the lover of 
wisdom and queen of the republic "is left desolate, with her 
marriage rite incomplete: for her own have fallen away and 
forsaken her, and . . . other unworthy persons . . . enter in 
and dishonor her Persons who are unworthy of educa­
tion approach her and make an alliance with her who is in a 
rank above them." This passage, which inspired the frag­
mentary sequel to Emile, vividly describes the fate of So­
cratic wisdom in actuality, where she is mourned by a 
"small remnant" of "worthy disciples of philosophy."18 
The latter would be the grief-stricken "honorable family" 
of Rousseau's text. 
The new Sophia who loves Telemaque is, of course, his 
own understanding of wisdom. She is the heir of the Socra­
tic one, but is also descended from Judeo-Christian tradi­
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tion. Like her forebears she honors poverty. And her fate in 
actuality is conceived to be as tragic as that of her Socratic 
predecessor since she cannot exist in the abstract but must 
dwell in a soul worthy of her, and none is to be found. Or 
rather, the new Sophia finds one in Fenelon's Telemaque 
and will wed only a man who, like him, is "prince" of 
himself and a disciple of Minerva or divine wisdom. But 
such a one is not of the author's century. Nor is Aemilius or 
the Aemilian city of the Contract, which do not exist, prob­
ably never did and never will. In all cases he portrays 
"what is not." But although he admits that he is writing 
about an ideal, he borrows Sophia's voice to protest with 
Socrates that it is not an impossible one and that he is not a 
visionary after all.19 Nevertheless, since the existence of 
the hero and that of his city, taken in the usual sense or as a 
family, is far more problematical than Sophia's, her lot in 
life is the lot of the Socratic Muse, as we saw in the case of 
her counterpart in the Levite ofEphraim.20 
And so Sophia dies. But the author resurrects her at 
once. He also resurrects Telemaque in the person of 
Aemilius, upon whom he bestows her. Consequently he 
abandons actuality altogether in evolving his myths where 
the lovers come to life within the world of art and thought. 
This is the very theme of his "lyrical scene" or prose-
poem Pygmalion, which is universally regarded as an im­
portant work for a study of his psychology and aesthetics.21 
Since it is textually derived from the foregoing story of 
Sophia and, like it and the Levite too, casts light upon 
Rousseau's view of Emile—facts hitherto unrecognized in 
published works—I must examine it briefly. Although he 
was not the first of the moderns to seize upon the ancient 
theme, which was treated in an opera-ballet by Rameau in 
1748, yet later versions were inspired by the fame of his 
work. 
Its protagonist, the sculptor Pygmalion, is obviously the 
author himself. In the opening lines of the poem he appears 
in his atelier surrounded by his works symbolized by pieces 
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of sculpture, only one of which is finished and that one is 
veiled. Similarly the Symposium has been compared to a 
statue, and in the Republic Socrates, the son of a statuary, 
uses the same comparison to describe the portraits of his 
heroes,22 as we have seen. He does so because, as we 
know, the Greeks of his era expressed inner harmony in 
their sculpture and painting, not in their literature—with 
some exceptions like the Platonic dialogues. There is only 
one of Rousseau's works that in his eyes has the beauty of a 
finished statue, and that is Emile. It would therefore be 
designated by the single completed piece in Pygmalion's 
studio. In his masterwork, as we have observed, he be­
haves like a Socratic artist and avoids images of moral de­
formity that abound in his other writings. The latter, which 
he calls "pamphlets" by comparison with this, would be 
the rough casts of other carvings in the prose-poem. These 
sculptures have reduced their creator to a state of discour­
agement and apathy comparable to Rousseau's reactions 
after the completion of his magnum opus.23 
The only object capable of stirring the sculptor's emo­
tions is his "immortal work" that stands veiled like the holy 
of holies. In it he professes to have "surpassed the master­
pieces of nature" that were the models of his art. Likewise 
for the writer, nothing in nature is comparable to the moral 
beauty expressed in his Emile. Pygmalion exclaims: 
"When my extinguished spirit no longer produces anything 
great, beautiful, worthy of me, I shall show my Galatea and 
say: 'This is my work.' " It is, he adds, "the most lovely of 
my works . . . the sanctuary of a divinity."24 
The name Galatea reminds us of the incident in Virgil's 
eclogue used in the novel to illustrate the feminine mind. In 
the lyrical monologue or dialogue, she becomes, like Sophia 
herself or the bride of the Levite, a new personification of 
Rousseauist wisdom, which, like its Socratic and Christian 
origins, has an element that is called "divine" and which, 
later abiding in the soul of Emile, is presented in very deed 
as a "divinity" whose sanctuary is the temple of the book. 
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In the prose-poem she is a "goddess," "lovelier than 
Venus." As the artist raises the veil to admire her graces, 
he declares again: "Nothing so beautiful has ever appeared 
in nature; I have surpassed the work of the gods." His 
adoration of his own masterpiece recalls Jean-Jacques' 
enigmatic words in the first portrait of Sophia: "We are in 
love with the image we create," meaning an image of virtue 
and moral beauty such as the writer professes to offer in 
Emile. In this spirit Pygmalion cries out before the statue: 
"What! so many beauties have come from my hands... 
My mouth was able to . . . " The suspension points, which 
are in the text, and the allusion to the mouth confirm my 
suspicion that marble is used to symbolize the medium in 
which the artist really worked. He is dealing with lan­
guage that, in the words of Socrates, "is more pliable than 
wax or any similar substance." Suddenly the hero of the 
piece wonders whether the vesture covers the nude too 
much, just as the author of Emile says that Sophia's robes 
are not made to conceal her charms. The sculptor decides 
to cut the garments lower to reveal more hidden seductions, 
but his hand trembles and the palpitating flesh rejects the 
chisel. This work, says he, is consecrated to the gods. 
Rousseau's Greek master says the same of the art he favors 
in the Republic. 
Like Emile's Sophia, who sought a soul "written" in her 
heart and could not live without it, Galatea, says the 
sculptor, "lacks a soul" and needs one suited to her beauty. 
Impulsively he looks into his own and "the veil of illusion" 
falls, a phrase lifted right out of the first portrait of Sophia. 
He finds within himself a spirit where she might come to 
life, much as Rousseau liked to imagine that his own was 
worthy of the Aemilian heroine. At last Pygmalion borrows 
the speech of the unhappy admirer of Telemaque, though 
Sophia is moral beauty in love with humanity instead of the 
reverse as here: "Such is the noble passion that leads me 
astray." Moreover, as she protested that she had not lost 
her sanity, so he too denies that he is a madman or a vision­
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ary: "I am not in love with this dead marble, but with a 
living being who resembles it." This is almost a quotation 
from Sophia's words applied to the Fenelonian hero. Again 
in terms suggestive of hers, he inquires whether it is folly or 
a crime to be sensitive to beauty's spell. She poses the same 
question by asking whether it is a fault in her to love "what 
is not," meaning a soul made in the image of absolute 
beauty to which Rousseau refers later in the phrase "there 
is nothing beautiful but what is not." (Italics mine.) 
Pygmalion like Sophia rejects the idea that the object of 
his love cannot live. Impelled by sudden hope, he calls 
upon the gods to give life to Galatea, invoking Venus espe­
cially, "the sublime essence" of true love, felt not by the 
senses but by the heart. "See this object; see my heart," 
says he, much as Sophia asked: "Why may he not exist 
since I exist, I who have a heart like his?" Pleading for a 
hearing, the sculptor cries: "Where is the law of nature in 
the sentiment that I feel?"—words echoing the author's 
about Sophia's love for Telemaque. The artist then offers 
his own life to the creature of his hands: "It will be enough 
for me to live in he r . . . Goddess of beauty, spare nature 
this affront, that such a perfect model should be the image 
of what is not."25 These are the very words of Sophia, who 
also rebels against the dishonor done to human nature by 
those who regard her noble ideal as imaginary. The same 
terms lend themselves to both texts since to say that the 
sage is unreal is to say that moral beauty cannot live. 
Just as the writer resurrects Sophia to inhabit the soul of 
Emile, so he brings her to life in the poem, where she reap­
pears as Galatea. The statue, moving from the pedestal, 
recognizes herself only in Pygmalion, while his other works 
with their images of a disordered world are alien to her. The 
scene closes much as it began, and the artist exclaims: 
"Yes, worthy masterpiece of my hands, of my heart and of 
the gods , . . . I have given you all my being: I shall no longer 
live except through you." This means that paradoxically 
she resurrects the dying artist and becomes the everlasting 
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reflexion of the soul that fashioned her. 
This interpretation of Rousseau's poem, derived from the 
texts of his writings, can hardly be reconciled with that of 
Goethe.26 According to the German poet, Pygmalion, hav­
ing put part of himself into his creation, refuses to allow the 
work to enjoy an autonomous existence, but insists that it 
be reabsorbed into his earthly life, with the result that art is 
dissolved in nature. Literary criticism shows that the oppo­
site is more nearly the case and that though the artist's work 
owes its life to him, he, on the other hand, lives and has his 
being only in his art that eternizes his own apprehension of 
moral beauty. At least, such is the author's hope and inten­
tion, lyrically expressed in the poetic "scene" and power­
fully manifested in Emile. 
To recur to the novel, the death and resurrection of the 
heroine bring us to the end of the first "nave" of the inner 
sanctum of the Aemilian temple. Rousseau conveys the 
idea by spacing his text at this juncture and introducing a 
horizontal stroke of the pen to conclude the section devoted 
to Sophia or woman, where Emile's name appears signific­
antly at the beginning and end. 
EX-VOTOS 
In the next or central nave, which unlike the other two 
bears no label, the author reverts to the hero. This section 
is appropriately dedicated to the latter's homage and offer­
ings to Sophia. I say "appropriately" because, although we 
do not know for certain the function of the Greek chamber 
upon which Rousseau's is herein modeled, archeologists 
have surmised that it was chiefly a treasury where things of 
value were kept such as votive gifts made to the divinity or 
plunder from famous battles among men. In the central part 
of its equivalent in Emile, the young man is to make choice 
of Sophia and place all his inner wealth at the feet of her in 
whom wisdom is reborn. 
Just before the friends set out in search of her, Jean-
Jacques addresses the reader in a discourse matching her 
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father's. It too is presented by way of precepts about the 
principles of marriage. After wisdom's quest for a noble 
soul comes the soul's quest for wisdom. This one is more 
practical since it must take account of the conditions of life 
in a man's bodily abode and earthly dwelling-place. That is 
the real difference between the two discourses that com­
plement each other, without being redundant. 
Since in choosing a bride Emile chooses a life for all time, 
the matter is a solemn one. The rules he follows relate to 
natural affinity, institutional distinctions based upon natural 
ones, intellectual formation, and finally physical beauty. 
In recommending "natural" affinity, Sophia's only rule, 
Jean-Jacques like her father emphasizes the importance of 
reason in its application. For just as he previously distin­
guished between what is "natural" in the savage and social 
state, so he now distinguishes between what is "natural" in 
the savage and civil state. Whereas in uncivilized life all 
women suit all men, in society love is born of a perception 
of diversities in character and intellect and is therefore en­
lightened by reason, as we have seen,27 although it still 
remains a natural bond in the civil order. Consequently 
enlightened love must be the basis of the civil contract of 
marriage if the latter is to dramatize the formation of an 
ideal "political" association. Jean-Jacques points out that 
an alliance of that kind rather than one based upon distinc­
tions of wealth and power, ensures human happiness by 
ministering to harmony of feelings and tastes, and the 
speakers of the Symposium say the same. The freedom of 
choice herein defended, unhampered by the sway of riches 
or prestige, corresponds to that which unites the freemen of 
the Rousseauist city. But in Emile's case the ruler claims 
the right to discover "nature's choice" since he who has 
made a man of the youth is in reality his father. His claims, 
which are also those of the Socratic ruler in thefifth book of 
the Republic, are valid since he is the law of reason that 
begets natural man in society. As we know, he has not 
waited until now to find the bride. He finally admits his 
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Socratic "duplicity": "this feigned search is purely a pre­
text for acquainting him [Emile] with women so that he may 
feel the value of her who suits him. Sophia was discovered 
long ago."28 So was the city or wise order of the Contract 
for which the hero has been fashioned from birth as he has 
for her. The city, like Sophia, is supposedly suited to his 
nature as an active, thinking being, and the choice that 
favors both is primarily determined by this principle. 
However, the speaker does not set aside institutional dis­
tinctions altogether, especially if they reflect natural ones 
like the moral and spiritual distinctions already mentioned. 
With respect to institutional considerations, Jean-Jacques 
prefers that Emile's bride be his equal in birth though not in 
fortune, as we know, since the author means to honor pov­
erty in her as he does in the ideal city. But since the hero's 
property is probably his birthplace as his inheritance is the 
earth, his real wealth is herself and is the same as the es­
sayist's in the previous part. As for equality of rank, if in 
actual practice it were impossible, then the ruler would 
select a bride in a station below her husband rather than 
above, so that civil order would accord with the natural one 
that "bids woman obey man." Symbolically this would 
mean that wisdom must serve human nature. If she governs 
man, as we have been told, she does so "as a minister 
[meaning "servant"] reigns in the state." In objecting to a 
bride of higher rank, Jean-Jacques may also mean that 
Emile is worthy of his consort, unlike the "unworthy per­
sons" of the Republic who make an alliance with Socratic 
wisdom in a rank far above them. On the other hand, the 
governor does not favor a bride of very lowly station either, 
on the grounds that it would be difficult to find in the dregs 
of society a woman with an appropriate idea of what is 
beautiful and honorable, which is supposed to be her spe­
cial domain. 
He thereby reverts to the moral and spiritual class dis­
tinctions that he admits. But he denounces lady pedants as 
he does all pedants, at the same time as he exalts Sophia's 
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vocation in the spheres of aesthetics and spirituality. He 
insists that she has only moderate instruction, as she has 
moderate personal beauty, for moderation is the key to both 
beauty and wisdom. He intends her bridegroom to adorn 
her mind with the talents and knowledge she needs to en­
hance her natural gifts.29 
Such is the governor's discourse on marriage, which, as I 
hinted in the antepenultimate paragraph above, has the 
same allegorical elements as Socrates' treatment of the 
same theme in the fifth book of the Republic *° The Greek 
sage too has his rulers secretly arrange marriages between 
guardians of the city and women of like nature and of simi­
lar capacity and character, both guardians and rulers repre­
senting faculties of soul related to Rousseau's reasonable 
will that is entrusted with the choice rather than desire. But 
as I have said, the master's recommendations about the 
choice of a bride have influenced the Rousseauist governor 
far less than the idea of the mythical marriage of the sage to 
wisdom. To this influence we must add that of other sub­
sequent admonitions of the sage about the choice of a life. 
The latter occur at the end of the great classic in the vision 
of Er, to which I have alluded in discussing the creed. In 
that vision souls, in the act of choosing their lives, are ad­
vised by the sage to observe the very rules that determine 
the selection of Sophia. A man must, says he, seek and 
follow wisdom only, which teaches him to discern between 
good and evil, so as to choose always the better life. In 
making his choice, he must consider the bearing of all things 
upon virtue, such as the effect of beauty combined with 
poverty or wealth. He must study "the good and evil con­
sequences of noble and humble birth, of private and public 
station, of strength and weakness, of cleverness and dull­
ness, and of all the natural and acquired gifts of the soul, 
and the operation of them when conjoined; he will then look 
at the nature of the soul, and from the consideration of all 
these qualities, he will be able to determine which is better 
and which is worse; and so he will choose . . . . " That is 
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exactly what Jean-Jacques has done in deciding in favor of 
Sophia, to whom his own philosopher-king will be wedded. 
It is therefore time for the hero to find and "recognize" 
her. The friends begin their "journey" in search of her by 
bidding farewell to Paris, for, says the author, she is very 
far from there. Since he has already said that happiness is 
always close by and since it is to be found in her, the dis­
tance here must be spiritual rather than spatial and the 
"farewell" a symbolic one to the spirit of worldliness. In­
deed, the travels of "our paladins"—for the two compan­
ions are thrice pictured as such in this context—have the 
same mystery about them as have all art forms. The theme 
can hardly be travel in the literal sense, which is treated 
later under that very title. The journey in this case would be 
a high point in the pilgrimage of life,31 projecting the explo­
rations of the spirit as it follows the call of an ideal of 
happiness and wisdom that Emile must know for what it is. 
The story of his progress contains a description of the 
conditions of the journey that may be taken as an imagina­
tive definition of the three requirements for the attainment 
of wisdom. The first is to live in the present, making the 
most of every experience and adorning the days with a vivid 
appreciation of things and the performance of good deeds. 
The second is to make the pilgrimage on foot, since nothing 
but our own effort can transport us to the goal. Rousseau, 
describing Emile's delight in walking, is mindful of his own 
pedestrian expeditions, recorded in the Confessions, that 
enriched his knowledge of men and of things.32 Indeed, he 
momentarily identifies the young hero with Jean-Jacques 
when he writes: "If I am tired . . . but Emile is never tired." 
The suspension points, which are in the text, suggest that 
the two are one, who is the author himself recounting his 
own journeys in search of wisdom and happiness. He re­
calls ancient philosophers who were engaged in the same 
search and traveled the same way, as he also does in a note 
to the second Discourse. Those named are Thales, Plato, 
and Pythagorus, and he might have added Christ and Soc­
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rates too. "How," he asks, "can a philosopher travel 
otherwise?"33 The "philosopher" is etymologically the 
"lover of Sophia" in the text, and the word implies the third 
requirement for the successful pursuit of wisdom: the love 
of learning. It is illustrated by the youth, who reads the 
book of nature and studies husbandry and natural history. 
All these clues suggest that the writer is describing a way of 
life that leads to wisdom and clothing it in myths to cover 
the nakedness of unembodied ideas, although he leaves us 
free to look no further than the myths if we so choose. 
Lest we imagine that men do not go astray in the quest for 
wisdom, Jean-Jacques and his spiritual companion, that 
other and purer self, lose their way in valleys and moun­
tains where there is no path to guide them or food to ap­
pease their hunger. The scene is reminiscent of the one in 
Montmorency wood at dinnertime. Here, as in the earlier 
one and in the allegory of the hunt in the previous part, the 
object is the same as in the myth of the Republic where 
Socrates and his hunting party are lost in a wood that is 
"dark and perplexing," in search of their quarry justice, 
called "the cause, condition, and preservative" of wisdom 
and all virtue. Once again we have the feeling that Jean-
Jacques is no more lost than the sage. Suddenly a peasant 
appears to direct the pilgrims to a "house of peace," which 
happens to be Sophia's. He describes it as the dwelling of 
a good and generous family that is blessed by all the coun­
tryside. After more vicissitudes34 they reach their destina­
tion, which turns out to be on a nearby hillside like the 
white house with green shutters in the previous part. 
The reception of the wayfarers is full of mystery, sugges­
tive of symbolism. "The house of peace,"35 a phrase re­
miniscent of the "man of peace" who is the vicar, is later 
called a "castle," perhaps because it is a castle in Spain 
that suddenly appears like a mirage in the desert. But in 
reality it is hardly more than a farmhouse, like the Stoic's 
"little farm of the mind," which I recalled in connection 
with the essay on wealth. The pilgrims, craving hospitality, 
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are welcomed by the goodman of the house and conducted 
to a modest guest chamber, comparable to Emile's rustic 
room elsewhere in the book, or the essayist's simple lodg­
ing at an inn. There they find fresh linen garments laid out 
in readiness as though this were indeed some curious 
shrine. Soon thereafter supper is prepared. The scene 
brings to mind the Gospel story where the disciples make 
ready for the Lord's supper, as well as the Symposium, or 
even the feast of Dido and Aeneas in Virgil's epic. But 
memories of these famous banquets are all eclipsed by the 
recollection of another in the Book of Proverbs where we 
are told that "wisdom hath builded her house... : she hath 
mingled her wine: she hath also furnished her table." It is at 
the table that Sophia suddenly makes her entrance like an 
apparition. When Aemilius weeps over the fate of her pa­
rents, who may be identified with the two main Rousseauist 
laws that govern her life, she sees him as a reincarnation of 
Telemaque arriving in this new isle of Calypso with his 
governor Mentor-Minerva. For his part he recognizes her, 
not only by her name, but also by the sound of her voice. 
This is another allusion to her role as the Muse or Socratic 
guardian of virtue, companion of philosophy, and counter­
part of Antiope-Minerva, whose charms she combines, 
however, with some of the emotional seductions of the 
nymph Eucharis in the Fenelonian story.36 The hero be­
haves like a man in a trance: "It is the soul of Sophia that 
seems to animate him." The words may be taken literally if 
we understand that, in the phraseology of the Symposium, 
divine wisdom takes up her dwelling in the soul and re­
ceives therefrom the life that she in her turn quickens and 
safeguards. The whole tableau has an emblematic flavor 
that can hardly be ignored. 
Rousseau himself invites us to look beneath the surface 
by warning that all these details are no frivolous amusement 
on his part and that this is the most valuable phase of the 
book, which is "the romance of human nature" and ought 
to be the story of the race. He adds characteristically that 
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Emile's mind, feelings, and tastes are fixed for all time by 
this lasting passion. In saying so, he is simply quoting from 
his earlier reflections on a woman's vocation that secures 
the most essential part of the Contract. The cipher of 
Sophia's name,37 already emphasized in the previous part, 
and the mystery of their meeting serve, we are told, to 
intensify the hero's love of her charms, which is rep­
resented as a noble one, fostering in him a sense of propri­
ety and honor and disposing all his inclinations towards what 
is good. This love of the beautiful and the good is that of 
the Symposium. The symbolism of the text is unmistakable. 
It is increasingly accentuated in the story of Emile's 
courtship, which assumes the form of homage to a divinity. 
Subject to Sophia and docile to Jean-Jacques, he is, we are 
told, "subject to the law of wisdom" and "docile to the 
voice of friendship." In that state at the age of twenty he is 
about to experience what is described as "an intoxica­
tion . . . a delirium... the supreme happiness" of life and a 
foretaste of "paradise upon earth." In the light of the essay 
upon wealth this would be a foretaste of the ecstasy of phil­
osophic vision that crowns the education of kings at the end 
of Plato's seventh book and of which they too are given a 
foretaste at the age of twenty, as we shall see. 
This view of the "courtship" is confirmed by a second 
visit of the friends, who take lodgings for the summer not 
too far away. Emile and Sophia converse together in a gar­
den which, we are informed, is that of the visionary white 
house of the essay. This earthly paradise is a suitable set­
ting for their quasi-mystical discourse. The theme is Jean-
Jacques' or the reasonable will, of which Emile speaks to 
Sophia as passionately as the lover of wisdom in the Sym­
posium who, having found and embraced a noble soul, is 
"full of fair speech about... the nature and pursuits of a 
good man." The power extolled by the Rousseauist hero is 
to preside over his union with the heroine, as it does over 
the enchanting city of the essay and that of the Contract 
and Socratic republic. 
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There is further evidence that the essay upon wealth an­
ticipates this part and therefore casts light upon it. The 
courtship encounters an obstacle, in Sophia's eyes, caused 
by Emile's reputed fortune. Of course, since, as Socrates 
says in the Symposium, love is poor and must engage in 
many labors in the pursuit of good and fair things. The 
young man, apprised by his governor of her feelings in this 
respect and hitherto unaware that he is "rich," is ready to 
renounce all else for her sake, to have the honor of being as 
poor as she is and worthy of her hand. Jean-Jacques pro­
tests that she cannot be "purchased" in that way, and that 
what she fears is not wealth itself but its effect upon the 
possessor.38 Hence Emile is bidden to offer her the trea­
sures of his spirit by loving and serving her and her parents, 
for the sake not of passing fancy but of indestructible prin­
ciples written in the heart. The latter are the laws of the city 
of the Contract, where the wordfinance is as unknown as it 
is to Emile or the essayist. 
It is helpful to be conscious of the Socratic and Christian 
tonalities of the thought in this advice of Jean-Jacques, as 
well as in the essay. For example, in both cases the mood is 
close to that of the Sermon on the Mount. Like the essayist, 
Emile has presumably "laid up for himself treasures in 
heaven" rather than upon earth, and his heart is where his 
treasure is. There lie the coffers whose contents Sophia 
must see. The governor's advice also contains other recog­
nizable evangelical echoes. For example, the warning that 
the hero may not "purchase" her seems to imply disap­
proval of the merchant man in the parable of the kingdom of 
heaven who, having found one pearl of great price, "went 
and sold all that he had and bought it." The same admoni­
tion conflicts with Christ's exhortation to a rich young fol­
lower who sought to attain eternal life: "Go and sell that 
thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure 
in heaven." We can hardly ignore these famous parables in 
the context.39 Jean-Jacques, fearful lest Emile try to buy 
the right to enter into paradise, adheres more closely than 
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they do to the divine master's conclusions that it is hard for 
a rich man to enter the kingdom of God. It is scarcely 
necessary to repeat that Socrates was obviously of the same 
opinion. In Emile the treasures offered to Sophia are of a 
Socratic and evangelical order. 
After she is reassured, there follows the promised 
foretaste of paradise or of the philosophic ecstasy that pro­
vides more clues to the myths. It comes about through the 
intervention of Jean-Jacques, who, wearing the mantle of 
Mentor-Minerva, is mediator between the lovers.40 He is 
the link between the heart and the object of its longing, 
defined as "the good that every soul of man pursues," and 
it is he who fulfills the aspirations of the sovereign will. 
Through him Sophia finally takes possession of Emile in­
stead of the reverse, as the Socratic soul is said to be "pos­
sessed of wisdom." The effects are the same in both cases. 
The author portrays the "raptures," "intoxication," and 
"delirium" in which the ruler shares as he leads the lovers 
toward "the happy bond that is to unite them until death." 
The myth of the sage and the wisdom that suits him is 
becoming increasingly obtrusive. 
It is highly accented from here to the end of this section. 
In the treasure house of the mythical shrine, Emile culti­
vates "music" in company with the Muse by dedicating to 
her all the agreeable talents he has developed, these being 
the arts over which the Muses preside and that preserve 
harmony in the soul. Rousseau writes: "As an idolator en­
riches the object of his worship with the treasures he loves 
best and decks out the altar of his God," so the lover pays 
homage to his beloved. He adds: "It seems to him that all 
beautiful things find their place only when they adorn the 
supreme beauty."41 The distinction between beautiful 
things and absolute beauty is expressed in the words of the 
Symposium and is by now familiar to the reader of this 
study of Emile and the Platonic dialogues where the su­
preme beauty is the idea of good and the ultimate object of 
love, manifest in divine wisdom. In his tribute thereto 
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Emile, like the lover of wisdom in the Symposium who 
"tries to educate his beloved," offers to Sophia a summa of 
his studies, which are "useless" in his eyes unless they 
pertain to her. So we are told in words recalling those of 
Socrates in the Republic, who also calls the same studies 
"useless" unless they are sought after with a view to the 
beautiful and the good. Accordingly, the Rousseauist hero 
dedicates to the heroine his knowledge of philosophy, 
physics, mathematics, history, and religion, which at this 
stage are to be brought together and interrelated. In doing 
so, he is on his knees before her and "imagines he sees the 
heavens open" above him. In the rarified atmosphere of 
the book, with its close affinities to the purity of the Con­
tract and its correspondences in antiquity, the writer's 
phrases have an entirely different emphasis and broader 
scope than similar ones in love scenes elsewhere in his 
other works, where images of disorder abound. Love here 
appears as a myth for the conveyance of philosophic ex­
perience at its best, which does not exclude a literal reading 
as well. 
The youth's formation at this stage is patterned after that 
of philosopher-kings at the end of the seventh book of the 
Republic where their education is completed. There the 
sage insists that his heroes, trained in physical and intellec­
tual discipline, be "industrious" in the pursuit of 
philosophy or moral truth. To them, as I have said, he 
grants a foretaste of wisdom at the age of twenty when their 
studies have reached "the point of intercommunion." This 
foretaste takes the form of a comprehensive view of their 
entire education and its "relationship to true being," and 
hence, to wisdom. The Rousseauist hero enjoys an analog­
ous privilege, represented as the delirium of love but adher­
ing strictly to the author's original plan for the fifth part of 
his book, which we have in the past accused him of ignor­
ing. His adherence to that plan is still more obvious hence­
forward. 
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If the foretaste of ecstasy described in Emile with such 
abandon results from the fulfillment of the soverign will or 
law under the rule of Jean-Jacques, then, paradoxically, the 
condition of such blessedness is austerity. Rousseau in­
vents more myths to emphasize this. Sophia is, he says, 
morally severe for the sake of preserving her integrity. For 
instance, she objects when Emile dares to kiss the hem of 
her robe in private, although her father permits him to kiss 
her lips in his presence. That is precisely because the 
natural feeling uniting them is governed not by the law of 
instinct or desire but by the law of reason that gratifies a 
man's heart by gratifying his entire nature. Indeed, in this 
context we are told again that civilized love, in spite of its 
natural origin, is very different from "the gentle habit" of 
nature's ways: it is based upon a perception of beauty and 
merit, betokened by exclusive preferences. According to 
the author, that is why it quickly grows into an unbridled 
ardor full of illusions of perfection in the beloved. Again we 
are free to observe that in this respect it is like a man's love 
for the city. The remark is all the more valid since Rous­
seau adds that love, giving in return as much as it exacts, 
begets justice. We may also draw a parallel between the 
austere demands made upon both patriot and lover by the 
object of their love. Their fervor is, in the writer's view, a 
betrayal of nature and of virtue only if it is accompanied by 
jealousy born of vanity. In that case pride replaces love, as 
nationalism replaces patriotism. Hence the Rousseauist 
myths emphasize the idea that there is a discipline or law of 
love and that Emile can win Sophia's esteem and find hap­
piness only by increasing his merit in her sight. 
Subsequently the author develops further the double-
edged Socratic idea that in all probability suggested the 
foretaste of wisdom and happiness now granted to the hero: 
the idea that throughout the book the latter's studies all 
pertain to wisdom and that they are now brought together 
and interrelated. 
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To show first that Emile's education has led him toward 
wisdom from his birth, Rousseau proves that the youth's 
present passion, far from marking a break with the past, is a 
sign of continuity in his formation. 
The writer broaches the matter by asking whether the 
hero, who was subject only to the laws of wisdom, is 
now—at the age of twenty—living an idle life at the discre­
tion of a child. Since the word child is written in the mas­
culine gender, it may refer to himself. Yet the context 
suggests that it refers to Sophia. The reply to the question 
reads: "Happy is he that is conducted to wisdom in spite of 
himself!" To conduct him thither by winning his love is 
Sophia's role in the book, and in a mythical sense she has 
fulfilled it from the first through Jean-Jacques. 
To illustrate this, Rousseau continues to employ literary 
methods. He explains that the governor is like a clever 
artist under whose direction early inclinations, good habits, 
and tastes are carried forward from childhood and adoles­
cence into "the yoke of manhood" that is docility to reason 
and the love of Sophia. This love, we are told, has been 
contrived by the "artist" because it embodies the very 
qualities he has been molding in the disciple at every step 
of the way so that the latter has only "to be himself" in 
order to woo her. Again Rousseau admits that the youth's 
passion is the governor's work. According to the text, it is 
not by chance that the lovers find and suit each other, that 
they live far apart, and that Emile's visits are few and tiring. 
The latter remark shows that he is not idle at all, but must 
work as hard as the Socratic heroes and be "industrious," 
or rather, "Aemilius," to court his bride. For this reason he 
is separated from her, we are informed, as Leander was 
from Hero, which incidentally explains why he learned to 
swim the Hellespont in the second part: otherwise, asks the 
writer curiously, how would he be willing to die for her? 
The question implies that she does indeed embody the val­
ues for which he has been taught to live and die. The sym­
bolism of the heroine is as transparent as that of Jean­
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Jacques. Emile, recognizing the latter's part in his felicity, 
calls himself in gratitude "the child" of his mentor. Sophia 
is even more aware of the governor's role as she follows his 
secret advice regulating the austere circumstances of their 
visits. In him the law of the reasonable will presides visibly 
over a relationship that promises to crown his work. 
Rousseau next provides a summa of Emile's education so 
far—such as the one offered to Sophia—and thereby 
exemplifies concretely Socrates' idea of granting his heroes 
a comprehensive view of their entire education in its rela­
tionship to wisdom. He thus brings together and integrates 
some of the most striking images in the book, which are, 
however, not merely Socratic but Judeo-Christian too. 
First he evokes Emile the husbandman. The youth works 
with peasants round about and then is suddenly trans­
formed into an image of the Socratic42 and Judeo-Christian 
"good husbandman" through the practice of beneficience 
and charity among them. For the object of his zeal is not 
simply the cultivation of the soil but especially that of the 
soul. 
The image of the mythical husbandman is followed by a 
new image of the equally mythical Olympic victor of the 
second part who reappears in the youth of twenty. The 
latter can still run for cakes like other men. But like the 
Socratic heroes, and the apostle Paul too, he also runs a 
very different race with Sophia herself, who volunteers for 
this exercise. She is compared to Atalanta, who consented 
to marry only a suitor able to outstrip her in a race, and who 
incidentally appears at the end of the Republic too. Emile 
pursues her as he has done all his life long, though now he 
does so consciously. Then he lifts her in his arms and car­
ries her to the goalpost, crying "Victory to Sophia!" as he 
kneels before her and confesses himself vanquished. This is 
surely the race for wisdom that a man may win only by his 
own autonomous efforts and that leads to the imperishable 
crown promised by the vicar in words worthy of both Paul 
and Socrates. In fact, we may reasonably see in Emile the 
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sage's "true runner [who] comes to the finish, receives the 
prize and is crowned" at the end of the Republic, winning 
wisdom and with it a paradise here and hereafter. Of course 
there is a link between the childish races and the manly one, 
as we foresaw in the earlier context. Indeed, Rousseau's 
very purpose here is to show the interrelationship of past 
and present. In the scene with Sophia he is saying, as 
clearly as subtle literary methods would allow, that the 
early training of the mind and will through those childish 
contests, and the practice of a shadowy form of justice 
therein, was the beginning of a race along a course cul­
minating at the high point of spiritual formation now 
reached. To ignore this would be to ignore the substance of 
his art as a litterateur. 
After the tableau of the "true runner" comes another of 
the mythical carpenter. Again we behold Emile "doing his 
own work" under a master craftsman, paying his debt to 
society with the sweat of his brow, and providing a new 
image of human justice. The text itself suggests that his real 
work is not the carpentering that builds material things, but 
rather the work of the Socratic or evangelical carpenter, 
namely, the practice of virtue that builds the city or temple 
of the soul. The deeper meaning emerges further into view 
when Rousseau points to the hero and exclaims "Ecce 
homo!" in remembrance of the carpenter of Galilee. It is 
even more conspicuous when Emile, visited at the work­
shop by Sophia, forbears to pay the master workman to 
release him from his contract in order that he might escort 
her home. By refusing to substitute money for duty, he 
recognizes the sacredness of contracts and proves that he is 
not a slave of wealth but a "lover of Sophia." So she herself 
says in the text. The artist is doing his utmost to draw 
attention to his myths and show that his real theme here is 
that of his original plan. 
The Socratic "intercommunion" of studies ends with a 
tableau to show that the lover of Sophia is and ever will be 
the same lover of all humanity that we knew before. In­
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deed, we are told that, if he would win her, he must prefer 
humanitarian duties to the private object of his love, al­
though she is otherwise jealous of her rights without, how­
ever, failing to be reasonable and just. 
The ideas are conveyed in another well-devised myth or 
parable. One day the friends are summoned to the heroine's 
presence but do not appear until the following morning. 
When they finally arrive, she betrays resentment of their 
apparent neglect. Jean-Jacques then relates the unhappy 
events that delayed their coming. They were detained by 
the performance of acts of Christian charity toward men of 
disordered life, notably an intemperate peasant—the very 
one who had originally guided them hither—and his unfor­
tunate family, whose needs and sufferings they relieved on 
their way. When the tale is told, Emile declares coura­
geously that Sophia cannot make him forget the rights of hu­
manity, which are more sacred to him than hers. The just 
Sophia recognizes in her lover one who vindicates the univ­
ersal claims of all mankind as well as her own. This brings 
her to consent spontaneously to become his bride. Then she 
too sets out, with "the zeal of charity," to minister to the 
afflicted family that belongs to another order of things in the 
world. She is called "an angel from heaven sent by God," 
since she too serves the "rights of humanity" by combining 
Christian mercy with Socratic justice. "Ecce femina!" says 
the author in a phrase that again calls to mind the divine 
master, whose wisdom is visible in her. 
This allegory throws new light upon the great problem of 
humanitarianism and patriotism that I discussed apropos of 
the two creeds. Although Emile's love for Sophia is an 
exclusive one like a man's love for his own city, yet it does 
not exclude or overlook the "sacred rights" of humanity 
that are its source—which does not, however, make it 
compatible with cosmopolitanism, the love of "false" 
states that violate them and might even include his birth­
place.43 The rights in question spring from natural law in 
the sense of the law of human nature, and have hitherto 
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been portrayed in two different spheres. In the foregoing 
scene they are implicit in the claims to pity made upon the 
friends by men of disordered life, victims of a "false," anti­
social and uncivil state that frustrates human rights. Obvi­
ously a state of that kind also frustrates the laws of the just 
Sophia, who, however, has the same compassion for erring 
mankind as her votaries have. Human rights have further 
been portrayed in the guise of ideal Socratic friendship used 
as a cipher of universal natural and political bonds that are 
allegedly the basis of all Rousseauist society including an 
exclusive one like Sophia's. In that shape they generate a 
love of humanity in its pristine state that is as reconcilable 
with patriotic fervor as Emile's affection for Jean-Jacques is 
consistent with his passion for the heroine. For Rousseau 
both are essentially a love of human nature at its best, how­
ever difficult it may be for the average person to practice 
that love with equal intensity in its various forms. 
The author touches upon the same question in many 
another work. In particular, his article on Political 
Economy contains a well-known passage where he con­
trasts Socrates and Cato, the sage and the citizen.44 When 
the former lived, says he, Athens was already lost and the 
sage had no "patria" but the world; whereas Cato bore his 
in his heart, challenged Pompey and Caesar on its behalf, 
and died when he saw no country left to serve. The writer 
therefore prefers Cato. But he knows full well that Socrates 
too bore his city within him and that neither one had a true 
city anywhere else. Only the Greek master bore his in his 
mind instead of his heart. Moreover, he confined his patrio­
tic fervor to that inner realm and therefore declined to chal­
lenge the gods of this world in vain. According to his words, 
if a man of understanding tried to resist the beast-like na­
tures about him, "he would have to throw away his life [as 
Cato did] without doing any good to himself or to others." 
This being so, he lives apart. But if he found a state suitable 
to him, he would favor the life of a patriot and would have a 
larger growth therein,45 although such a state would not be 
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best for most men. In fact, it would be a city of sages. Thus 
what really distinguishes him from Cato is first the quality 
of his "patriotism," which is intellectual rather than emo­
tional, and then his aloof attitude toward the world as it is, 
as opposed to the Roman's sublime act of laying down his 
life in an elan of enlightened love for a city and its laws that 
still existed in his heart five hundred years after they had 
ceased to exist anywhere else. But the great sage passed 
beyond his theories and died a willing victim of a mere 
semblance of law in a state as disordered as the Rome of 
Cato's time. His voluntary submission after a lifetime dedi­
cated to the discovery of true law long perplexed Rousseau; 
but since he died for the sake of his teaching, his death 
redeems him in the Savoyard vicar's sight, even though in 
the creed it is not considered comparable to Christ's. The 
writer obviously does not consider it comparable to Cato's 
either, since Socrates is moved by the dialectical intelli­
gence as opposed to enlightened feelings. That is Rous­
seau's real quarrel with the master, which does not 
minimize his debt. We noted the cleavage between them in 
their attitude toward justice and sympathy. But in this re­
spect the modern writer's teaching transcends not only the 
thought of Socrates but also the example of Cato, by the 
breadth of its Christian charity extended to men of ignoble 
life, visible in the foregoing myth of Sophia and the peas­
ants. In Rousseau's view love of one's own city must 
somehow be reconciled with love of mankind, however dis­
ordered men may be, and the two are in fact as reconcilable 
as love of self and pity. 
In other works, as we have seen, he deals with various 
aspects of the question of humanitarianism and patriotism. 
One might cite, for instance, his letter to the archbishop, 
where he complains that national political and religious sys­
tems do not respect the rights of humanity as they ought to 
do. One might also cite the Letters from the Mount where 
he is solicitous about doctrines useful to both universal and 
private societies and warns that in practice even the purest 
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patriotism, as opposed to national prejudice on behalf of the 
land of one's birth,46 can still lead to the neglect of man­
kind. Nevertheless, he regards love of a man's own city as a 
more powerful motive in human conduct than love of hu­
manity. He does so long after renouncing his Genevan citi­
zenship, for instance, in the Considerations upon the Gov­
ernment of Poland where he favors an exclusive society 
based upon human rights, even if it exists only in the hearts 
of men as Sophia exists in the heart of Emile. 
The scene where Emile sacrifices the ecstatic contempla­
tion of Sophia to heed the call of humanity brings to an end 
the Socratic foretaste of wisdom and happiness and the 
"intercommunion" of studies entailed therein. In literary 
terms the lovers are to be separated for a time. One day the 
governor abruptly asks the youth what he would do if 
Sophia were dead. Since she has already been resurrected 
from the dead as the spirit of wisdom in the book and since, 
according to Rousseau, that spirit will never again be seen 
in the shape of a city or family, she probably has only a 
mythical material existence anyway, like the ideal creatures 
that filled the author's life in solitude. Nevertheless, Jean-
Jacques reassures his disciple and then addresses him in a 
long discourse designed to win his consent to leave his pre­
sent state of blessedness and go abroad among the "false" 
states of the world. 
In the discourse, which has puzzled many of us in the 
past, the writer again handles in a literary manner the great 
problems of education at this stage, problems magnified by 
the necessity for a transfer of government from Jean-
Jacques to Emile. The youth is now to be taught that the 
object of his love does not exist among men in the sphere of 
his travels, but that the energy and intensity of that love 
must never impair his love for our poor humanity, although 
it must preserve him from the unworthy passions of others. 
The governor begins his discourse by asking again where 
happiness lies, although he has obviously found it in wis­
dom, even if both have reality only in a Rousseauist world 
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of chimerical beings. He recalls the covenant of friendship 
to which he engaged himself at Emile's birth for the sake of 
his disciple's happiness that is his own. That felicity is now 
threatened, he says, by the enemy within, in the guise of 
exclusive affections with which the young man has not yet 
learned to cope alone since he still has a "minister of educa­
tion" upon whom he relies. Jean-Jacques explains that the 
youth was previously subject only to the human bonds of 
friendship, but that now he is subject to personal attach­
ments that give him a much more relative existence—like 
the Spartan's, for example—by concentrating his growing 
sensitivity into a smaller private whole. These attachments, 
says the speaker, will threaten the former ones if they are 
governed by the law of desire exemplified in the theater. In 
that respect, one might infer, they are like a man's love for 
the ideal city that threatens his love for mankind as it is, 
except in a few rare souls. Rousseau is presumably one of 
the exceptions according to his aforementioned statement to 
Malesherbes that his own love for the society of imaginary 
perfect beings is not incompatible with the love of humanity. 
Emile, who has successfully reconciled the two under the 
sway of Jean-Jacques, must now learn to do so himself. 
In that case, according to the discourse, he must learn to 
rule his own heart by subjecting to the bond of necessity all 
desires that exceed human strength and cause misery and 
vice, such, one may fancy, as the desire for a corporeal 
Sophia. To rule himself in this way he is bidden not only to 
accept involuntary privations, as in the past, but also to 
sacrifice his feelings deliberately whenever the law of 
reason demands it, in order to practice an autonomous vir­
tue.47 He is told that he will thereby learn to follow reason 
and conscience, be his own master, and not only govern his 
passion for Sophia48—as Jean-Jacques has done hitherto— 
but subjugate all other loves, these being in all probability 
worldly passions for sensual gratification, gain, or glory. 
He is therefore advised that he must be skilled in "warfare" 
to face the aforementioned "enemy within," or vagrant de­
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sire, especially since he runs the risk of losing Sophia, as the 
speaker may lose Emile or, we might add, as any man may 
fall from grace or fail to attain the object of his love. The 
thought of losing Emile prompts the governor to ask: "What 
would be left of me then?" By posing this question, the au­
thor hints that the hero is natural man within himself re­
deemed by the pledge that induced these meditations. 
Jean-Jacques concludes the discourse by asking once 
more; "Where is happiness? Where is wisdom?" The an­
swer implies that they do not exist in the world of actuality, 
to which the heroes are about to repair. For Emile is told 
that he must love only imperishable beauty, which in Socra­
tic terms would be that of wisdom or the heavenly city. By 
virtue of an inward adjustment to the law of necessity, he 
must detach himself like the vicar from everything else but 
the object of that love which liberates the spirit and permits 
a man to rise above vexations and enjoy the transitory 
graces of this life while he awaits a better one beyond the 
grave.49 In that case it is problematic whether those fragile 
beauties, even though they are a reflection of the absolute 
and constitute the Rousseauist "age of gold," include a cor­
poreal Sophia. It is all the more problematic by reason of 
the governor's conclusion that, with the exception of the 
being "that is," "there is nothing beautiful but what is 
not." Surely we must infer, as we were told before, that in 
our disordered world she "is not," she who loves "what is 
not." She is meant to be not a reflection but "supreme 
beauty itself," as we were told, the love of which may 
conceivably be crowned only in death. And so, after a 
"foretaste of paradise" mysteriously vouchsafed to Emile 
in a blaze of summer sunshine, as the ghostly season ap­
proaches he is bidden to go down into another and different 
world to make his own practical and laborious effort toward 
the ideal. 
The speaker of the discourse adheres closely to the ad­
vice of Socrates in the final pages of the seventh book of the 
Republic following the "foretaste" of wisdom and integra­
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tion of studies discussed above. The sage, introducing his 
heroes to the study of philosophy—or, if we wish, initiating 
them into the love of wisdom—also fears lawlessness. 
Since that study is intended (as in the Rousseauist text) to 
lead them to discover the true law of justice in the inner 
man and to practice virtue in the highest sense, he takes 
precautions lest they come to regard as an amusement what 
ought to be an orderly and steadfast pursuit. Even later 
when they finally reach the "beatific vision" itself (as dis­
tinguished from the "foretaste") and are unwilling to de­
scend to human affairs, for their souls are ever hastening 
into the upper world where they desire to dwell, he still 
ordains that they take their turn at "politics" as a matter of 
duty, although they do so only in "the good and true city," 
as he shows at the end of the seventh book. Thus Rousseau 
concludes the section on Sophia much as the sage concludes 
his study of that city. Moreover, in the next two books 
Socrates too embarks upon a review of evil and false states 
and shows how easily his kings could become slaves of 
passion therein. And as he sets out, he poses the question 
of the relative wisdom and happiness of his own state and of 
others, the very question framed by Jean-Jacques when he 
proposed to Emile that they engage in a similar survey. In 
both cases the answer is the same. Wisdom and happiness 
are not to be found among the disordered states of this 
world. The sage decides that his kings must be content to 
cultivate "divine wisdom" within or "the city within," and 
live accordingly. Its "pattern" is absolute beauty — 
Rousseau's "supreme" and "imperishable beauty"—that 
is not to be found on the earth and is the ultimate object 
of Socratic and Christian love. Hardly anything could be so 
valuable as the ancient text to heighten the symbolic quality 
of Rousseau's, since their affinities are undeniable and are 
abundantly disclosed in intimate correspondences of 
thought, word, and image. 
To revert to Jean-Jacques and Emile, the latter is as re­
luctant as the Socratic heroes to leave the better life, and 
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suggests marriage as an alternative. It is rejected for three 
reasons. First, he wishes to wed Sophia because she 
"pleases" him. He has yet to understand as well as Jean-
Jacques does that she "suits" him. Again the love of wis­
dom is governed not by pleasure or desire but by the law of 
the enlightened will that secures happiness. Second, he is 
too young for marriage. We may take this literally to mean 
that he may not enter the conjugal state before the age of his 
majority, then twenty-five,50 or figuratively to mean that he 
may not be wedded to wisdom until he is ready to be re­
leased from his governor's custody, which would be at the 
same age. However we take it, he will be united to Sophia 
two years later when they are twenty-five and twenty years 
old respectively, the age favored by Socrates for his heroes' 
nuptials in the fifth book of the Republic. The third reason 
for delay is that before he enters a private civil order by way 
of marriage and seals his pledge to the covenant that sec­
ures it, he must know his place as a citizen therein. He must 
study the pattern of the city, its laws and government, as 
compared with existing evils, and learn "for whom he must 
die." These words, suggestive of the Symposium, refer to 
Sophia as though she were in reality the image of a realm for 
which he must live and die, as I have observed. They echo 
earlier ones about his tiring visits that teach him to be wil­
ling to die for her, and are related to others on the formation 
of the woman for whom a man will lay down his life and 
who sends him "to war, glory, and death at her behest."51 
Throughout the whole context here, the heroine emerges as 
more mythical than corporeal. 
At this juncture the influence of the Christian Fenelon is 
again combined with that of Socrates. Emile's reluctance to 
face the earthly warfare necessary for virtue is so great that 
the governor is obliged to exercise the dictatorial authority 
vested in him and force him to be free, to do not his plea­
sure but his will. And so at the moment of parting, when 
Sophia has given Emile her Telemaque as a guide on his 
travels, he is "drawn away" by the superior power of 
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Jean-Jacques. Likewise, in Fenelon's book Mentor-
Minerva is obliged to use extraordinary means to force his 
disciple to leave the nymph Eucharis and the enchanted 
island where she lives. The young prince never again sees 
either one. But as I have said, Sophia resembles not only 
the nymph but especially Antiope, the hero's betrothed, 
from whom he must also part for other reasons, namely, to 
become worthy of her by following the call of duty. The 
latter idea is present in the scene of Emile's departure. He 
leaves Sophia in order to find her again by Socrates' 
"longer and more circuitous way." 
VIATICUM 
The last nave of the mythical inner chamber of the spirit 
bears the title "Voyages." There are only three subtitles in 
the whole book, including "The Profession of Faith of the 
Savoyard Vicar'' in the middle of the previous part, whose 
tripartite shape is thereby emphasized. As I have said, the 
other two occur at the beginning and end of the present part 
and have the same effect. The entrance to the first nave 
bears the rubric "Sophia or Woman" and is matched by 
this one that contains a summary of the Contract or a politi­
cal profession of faith, essentially identical with the reli­
gious creed. 
There are several reasons for the title. For example, 
Emile now relives the wanderings of Telemaque on a mod­
est scale. Just as that Greek hero goes upon his travels in 
search of his father, Ulysses, whom he finds at last in his 
own city of Ithaca, so his modern counterpart goes abroad 
looking for the city of his heart, whose prince he recognizes 
at last as his own father, the new Ulysses. The title is like­
wise suggestive of the epic journeys of Ulysses himself, 
whose adventures in quest of his island home Emile has 
long since read in the Odyssey. It is also evocative of the 
wanderings of Aeneas, who goes through the world seeking 
a site for his city and finally settles in Latium where the 
Rome of Aemilius was born. But, as I have already pointed 
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out, the main source of inspiration here is Socrates, who 
surveys the "false states" of this world in the eighth and 
ninth books of the Republic before taking refuge in "the 
city within" whose "pattern is in heaven" and whose laws 
govern the sage's life upon earth. 
The title has other implications. It is derived from the 
Latin "viaticum," meaning "provision for a journey." This 
journey in quest of the ideal city on earth is an image of the 
pilgrimage of life like the earlier one in quest of Sophia, 
where the author defined the conditions indispensable to 
attain that object. Here the "provision" in question is his 
whole philosophy, which, according to the preface, is 
necessary for those who wish to prosper on their way 
through the world and find happiness here and hereafter. 
To establish a psychological link between the search for the 
city and the search for Sophia, he has recourse to the ar­
tistic device of parallelism that always helps to clarify his 
meaning. For instance, in each one he warns that travel 
must be undertaken for love of knowledge. And in both he 
cites the example of Plato and Pythagorus, whose pedest­
rian expeditions were a form of study. Moreover, in the 
same way that Jean-Jacques on the former occasion en­
gaged in a "feigned search" for Sophia, who had already 
been found long before, he now goes looking on earth for a 
city that has already been found in the place where she too 
exists, the domain of the heart and the mind. And just as the 
previous search was simply a pretext for acquainting Emile 
with women so that he might feel the value of her who suits 
him, so the present one is a pretext for acquainting him with 
"false" states that he might cherish the one that suits him 
and is "his own." These facts, combined with the presence 
of mystery in both texts, suggest the need for a literary 
rather than an exclusively literal reading. 
The purpose of this second peregrination is further elabo­
rated as the parallelism continues. As on the former journey 
Emile studied the great book of nature and natural history, 
he now studies the nature of mankind and the natural his­
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tory of the race to avoid national prejudice. At the same 
time he examines his civic relations with his fellow citizens 
and consciously analyzes the nature of government and its 
various forms including that of his birthplace to see whether 
or not it is "suited to him." For, as in the case of the 
covenant of friendship that prompted this Odyssey, at 
twenty-five years of age he is free to confirm or abjure, by 
his choice of residence, the historical contract to which he 
was pledged by his ancestors. The combination of the study 
of human psychology and political philosophy at this stage 
shows that he is looking for a city patterned after the nature 
of man. 
The difficulties confronting him are set forth by Jean-
Jacques. The latter explains to Emile that the youth is soon 
to be released from the external authority of his governor 
and must rule himself independently, for the "laws" are 
about to make him "master of his property and of his per­
son." Yet in the next breath the speaker warns the future 
"master" that he now runs the risk of depending upon ev­
erything, including his patrimony, which is presumably his 
birthplace. After these admonitions he is advised that he 
must choose his own life. Of course, he has already done so 
by choosing Sophia, but that was through the complicity of 
powers unrecognized by him until after the choice was 
made. And so he is told that he must decide for himself 
what kind of man he intends to be, how he means to spend 
his days and earn his livelihood, which is not, however, the 
main business of human life. Will he be a lover of gain or 
glory and seek his fortune in commerce, offices of power, 
the army, or finance, where he must cater to the vices and 
prejudices of others and fall a prey to them himself? In this 
vein the speaker describes the dilemma of a man trained in 
Socratic law to become guardian and ruler of his life, and 
now faced with the risk of living in a lawless society full of 
slaves and tyrants. 
Jean-Jacques' speech to Emile virtually alludes to Plato's 
eighth and ninth books where Socrates describes the evil 
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plight of men who live in "false" states. These are the 
military state, the oligarchy of wealth, the democracy that 
in his view indulges multitudinous desires, and the tyranny 
where passion prevails. Such states threaten ruin to his 
kings. Until their majority, says the sage, their safety has 
been assured by the authority that the law has exercised 
over them "and the refusal to let them be free until we have 
established in them a principle analogous to the constitution 
of a state, and by cultivation of this higher element have set 
up in their hearts a guardian and ruler like our own [to give 
life and movement to the city within], and when this is done 
they may go their ways." This is the crucial point now 
reached by the Rousseauist hero. Jean-Jacques follows the 
master to the letter. 
The question is, Which way will Emile go? He replies 
that his employment will be the practice of beneficence and 
justice, which, incidentally, is the employment of the Soc­
ratic and Judeo-Christian carpenter king. It is also that of 
Jean-Jacques, whose "work" is often said to be Emile, the 
cultivation of the ideal man within us. As for the "play" 
that men call "work," the hero chooses husbandry in order 
to be happy and live independently with Sophia by acquir­
ing each day the ingredients of felicity that are health, 
strength, and the necessities of life. He longs only for a little 
"farm" in some "corner of the world" to be his own. The 
word "farm" (metaihe) was also applied to the visionary 
white house of the essay on wealth. In the context of the 
book his ambition is puzzling. One of the first lessons he 
learned was that there was "no corner" of the world that he 
might call his own. If there is and it enslaves him, as he has 
just been warned, can he be more than a symbolic hus­
bandman, like Jean-Jacques, cultivating his spiritual pow­
ers under the guardian and ruler that is said to deliver men 
from the disorders of gain and prestige?52 On the other 
hand, one might also ask whether Sophia's solitude is not 
the farm of his fancy; and if so, why is he looking for 
another? The logical reply to that question is only one more 
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reason for suspecting that her retreat is as mythical as Fene­
lon's enchanted isle, especially in the light of Emile's forth­
coming vain search for the object of his desire. 
In his response Jean-Jacques commends the choice of 
wisdom in preference to power and wealth. But he 
wonders — logically enough after the parable of the 
sower—in what "corner of the world" a man of property 
can live free and independent, in peace and justice, without 
compromising his honor, and yet manage to escape the fate 
of the biblical Naboth dispossessed of his vineyard and his 
life by the wicked King Ahab and his wife Jezebel? Con­
trary to Voltaire in the conclusion to Candide, Jean-
Jacques doubts whether to "cultivate one's garden" really 
ensures happiness, if the famous phrase be taken literally.53 
One may infer that if Emile is to rule his own life, he cannot 
possess anything or live after the manner of the earthly cities 
where he dwells. That is why the governor now sketches for 
him the ideal city of the Contract, where the orderly rela­
tions of powers allegedly reflect those of human faculties. 
This is the "pattern" to which Socrates too reverts at the 
end of Plato's ninth book, and with which the sage, both 
Socratic and Rousseauist, strives to conform his life. 
It is not surprising that the idyll of Aemilius and Sophia 
with its summa of the hero's education, implying all the 
principles of Rousseauist wisdom of Emile and the Con­
tract, is interrupted by a frank synthesis of the latter or of 
Political Institutions, interposed between images of the 
heroine in the innermost chamber of the mythical temple. 
Rousseau could hardly say more clearly that the city to 
which Emile aspires is formed by a man's pledge to wisdom 
and is made to suit him as she is. The demands she makes 
upon him are, like those of Jean-Jacques, set forth in its 
principles and precepts that are his own. He now acquires 
an awareness of their particular application to his present 
circumstances. 
These precepts, says his governor, are those of "politi­
cal" law, called "natural and political" law to emphasize 
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the anthropological and ethical implications of Rousseauist 
citizenship. He admits that the study of true law is a "use­
less" science except for someone like Emile, for whom, we 
recall, the only useless knowledge is whatever does not 
pertain to Sophia. This obviously does. It is therefore com­
parable to Socrates' "useless" studies that are popularly 
so-called since they relate to the beautiful and the good 
instead of to shopkeeping. It is also useless since it dis­
closes "what must be" but, alas, "what is not," and never 
will be except in the inner realm where the hero and heroine 
of the book have their being.54 As I have said, in all cases 
the writer proposes a canon of moral truth that is "the 
nature of things" as he visualizes it. The mythical Emile is, 
we are told, far from indifferent to his new studies, for it is 
not immaterial to him to know whether the outer and inner 
worlds meet in one or do not. On the contrary, he who 
cherishes human rights is eager to find a government that 
safeguards them, as that of the Contract supposedly does, 
so that he might live under its rule. He is stimulated in his 
search by a love of justice and (moral) truth to which the 
author of the treatise professes to devote his work. Its prin­
ciples are now to be defined by Jean-Jacques as a standard 
to judge the positive laws of established civil societies and 
guide the hero in his present plight. I shall give a simple 
exposition of them to underline their relationship to the 
context here. 
The young man, about to be "set free," is told that all 
men are by birth naturally free and independent. And he 
who intends to dispose of his freedom by entering into a 
union with Sophia is made to realize that human beings can 
be united only by an act of the will (or law), since force 
cannot produce any permanent bond between them. This 
instruction about the nature of a genuine union among men 
is equally true of an integration and correlation of faculties 
within the soul. Emile is himself intended to be an example 
of such a harmonious whole, of one whose virtue is not 
what Socrates calls an enforced virtue. He may therefore 
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conceivably achieve happy self-expansion in the exercise of 
paternal rule, which Jean-Jacques discusses in his synthe­
sis. Of course, that rule is an image of the rule of law that 
is as rooted in the nature of man as fatherhood is, and that 
the disciple is now to exercise autonomously. According to 
the governor, a father—the Socratic symbol of law—has 
the same restrictions as that organ of the human will and his 
authority over his children is limited to what is "useful" to 
themselves. He adds, moreover, that at the age of reason 
they become the judges of such "usefulness" and masters 
of self, as his own disciple is destined to be. If they continue 
to obey the father or submit to another in his place, as 
Emile defers in the end to the laws of which he is begotten 
and which, in the person of Sophia, preside over his whole 
life, it is of their own free will. According to the speaker, 
slavery pertains not merely to the thralldom of bodies but to 
the repression of the human person and of inner life or 
morality that springs from the free operations of conscience 
and reason required of us by nature herself. It is she who 
ordains that men govern themselves as Emile is now bidden 
to do. 
Men bear rule, the governor continues, or delegate it to 
others freely according to their will, by favor of a prior 
conventional bond or covenant that creates civil society, as 
it also does moral man. He formulates the familiar words of 
the covenant of promise. By its terms, as we know, 
individuals—like individual powers and desires within 
man — subject themselves and all they have to the 
sovereign power or active thinking being and become an 
indivisible part of a moral collective whole that represents 
civilized or humanistic man born of the act of union. Since 
Emile exemplifies the engagement in himself, he will see it 
as that of Rousseauist moral man who is social and civil 
man. Such a man, the governor explains, is committed to 
the sovereignty of his own higher being and applies this 
principle in the disposition of his life. Although the hero's 
personal commitment has been freely assumed in en­
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lightened forms of love and moves him spontaneously to 
seek his happiness in that of the objects of his love, or 
rather, in the gratification of conscience and in the service 
of wisdom, he must now learn that the bonds formed by that 
commitment are a law, the one and only fundamental law of 
the moral being. The pledge can be renounced, says the 
governor, only if it proves harmful, which, to his mind, is 
preposterous. The human will it hallows and exalts seeks 
only the good of the integrated person as a whole and can 
have no other object, for, as the vicar said, men are free to 
will their good but not to harm themselves according to 
their "pleasure."55 Injury, says Jean-Jacques, could hardly 
come to the various parts from inner adjustment to the 
spiritual sovereignty proposed, which need therefore give 
no guarantee of fidelity to the pledge. Harm could come 
only from a betrayal of the engagement by the parts them­
selves, such, for example, as might arise through the desire 
for gold or glory that enslaves the soul. Emile, who has 
been taught to respect his promises as sacred and to rule by 
obeying his own sovereign will, has already learned the 
advantages of doing so. One of these, says the governor, is 
freedom, meaning freedom to obey the self that is made to 
rule, and to pursue the human spirit's loftiest aspirations. 
Another advantage, which would allegedly ensue, how­
ever, only if the human will were enshrined as law in objec­
tive reality, is the protection of Rousseauist property. But 
since this is not the case, Emile's coveted vineyard is not 
safe; and, as we shall see, he will have to find the neces­
sities of life in some other way. Such is the bearing of the 
first part of the Contract on the hero's present problems. 
Jean-Jacques synthesizes more briefly the following two 
parts of that work. He ponders over the nature, of law as an 
act of the sovereign will applicable to the entire moral per­
son, as opposed to the acts of partial factions that divide 
a kingdom against itself. 
This raises the question of the application of law in par­
ticular cases. The moral person, says the speaker, may 
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transform itself into a democratic governing body for the 
purpose of appointing leaders to do its will, if it so chooses. 
But, he warns, such leaders are neither sovereigns nor rep­
resentatives of sovereignty in which they share but which 
can never be alienated to them as individuals. They are 
merely officers of the people, and as subjects of the law are 
entrusted with its execution and the maintenance of civil 
and political freedom. By emphasizing the importance of 
self-government in rulers, he suggests that it is perilous for 
a man to entrust the "helm" to anyone but himself, or 
rather, his own best faculties, if he is to be properly gov­
erned and his freedom safely ensured. Emile exemplifies 
this. To show the hero the need for objectivity in acts of the 
governing power, Jean-Jacques, like the author of the Con­
tract, represents the ruling faculty in geometrical terms as 
intermediary between subject desires and sovereign will, all 
of which must do their own proper work indicated by the 
nature of each. He exposes the perils of government in 
far-flung realms where a man hardly shares in sovereignty 
at all and where manners and customs are at variance with 
law- Analogously the same evils would arise in the soul of 
one who, instead of expanding spiritually, extends his being 
through time and space in search of wordly benefits. He 
explains that in such cases the governing power is necessar­
ily intensified for purposes of active life, but then it allies 
itself with lawless elements and private interests to silence 
the moral will of man. Proceeding from these considera­
tions, he summarizes the ideas of the Contract on the vari­
ous forms of government, their rectitude and effectiveness, 
and suggests that aristocratic rule, which is that of the 
reasonable will, suits a state—or a man—whose range is 
that of neither giant nor dwarf but is of natural and normal 
proportions like his disciple's. At the same time he warns 
that government is capable of as many forms as the state 
has citizens, implying that the only true one is self-
government, for which the young man has been trained 
from the first, and which is of course entirely consistent 
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with aristocratic but not democratic rule. 
He crowns his discourse by developing the brief "Con­
clusion" of the Contract that was to be treated in the work 
Political Institutions. This is the only chapter of the fourth 
part of the treatise to which he alludes and the only one that 
remains to be included in this collation. The writer of the 
Contract states simply that his book, to be complete, would 
have to take account of the external relations of the ideal 
city in war and peace. These relations, he says, would be 
governed by international laws enforced through federa­
tion. As we have observed, the idea is extravagant if he 
envisages an affiliation of many mythical cities, since the 
existence of one is hard enough to imagine. And how could 
he suppose an association of his "true" state with the 
"false" ones of this world, to use his own Socratic expres­
sions? Or in his favorite Pauline terms, can there be any 
accommodation of his covenant of promise to the covenant 
of bondage allegedly prevailing in our midst? He has consis­
tently rejected the idea. Hence in the Contract, where the 
city appears miraculously materializing as such, the prob­
lems of external relations seem purely academic and are not 
developed. Of course if we pierce the imagery, they are as 
real as they are in Emile, since the city seen as a magnified 
image of a well-ordered life might indeed come to the birth 
in a human soul as it does in the novel, where the matter of 
external relations is critical. Emile, though bound to great 
spirits of the past and present, must also live among "false" 
states and learn not only what his relations with them might 
be but also what their own are with each other. Jean-
Jacques illustrates these problems in the conclusion of his 
discourse. 
He paints a melancholy picture of what he and his disci­
ple have beheld in the world and what we can see for our­
selves not merely in life and history but also in the eighth 
and ninth books of the Republic: the wretched state of men 
perpetually buffeted in their internal and external contacts 
with each other, and subject not to law but to tyrannical 
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passions that create a state of warfare within and among 
them and expose them to foreign conflicts as well. Their 
misery, he says, is the result of an imperfect historical 
evolution that combines the evils of an allegedly "natural" 
state of independence with those of a so-called "civil" con­
dition of slavery. In his eyes this combination of evils ex­
plains the futility of past attempts at federation, since he can 
visualize affiliation only among "true" states possessed of 
sovereignty. By contrast with this course of events, the 
Aemilian order is presumed to combine the supposed ad­
vantages of the Rousseauist natural and civil order, free­
dom and morality.56 But Emile has learned that to expect to 
find his city and its laws in the sphere of actuality is both 
absurd and undesirable, for then virtue would be a matter 
of habit and necessity and men would be like blocks of 
wood, or "posts," as we remarked. He says so, observing 
that he and his governor seem to be "building" their "edi­
fice" with wood instead of men. On the other hand, any 
sort of alliance of the Aemilian city with our disordered 
world is just as absurd and undesirable, although Emile 
will not withdraw altogether and a society of friends or city 
of the heart is never impossible. 
After the pattern of the Contract has been revealed, the 
ruler identifies the city of his fancy with the Fenelonian one 
in Telemaque, transfigured not only by the wisdom of 
Mentor-Minerva but also by Christian charity. According 
to him, if the friends search for it in vain that is because, 
unlike Fenelon's heroes, they are neither God nor even 
king in the usual sense of the word and so they cannot 
imitate those models by re-creating cities and their rulers 
but must content themselves with doing the good that is the 
work of men. Indeed, they would decline to rule over 
others even if they could: "If we were kings and sages, the 
first good deed we should do for ourselves and for others 
would be to abdicate our kingship and become ourselves 
again." Of course they are kings and sages; but their king­
ship is not of this world, and the Rousseauist philosopher­
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kings do not rule in objective reality. Nor do the Socratic 
ones, as we see at the end of Plato's ninth book where the 
sage reverts to the soul. The Rousseauist philosopher-king, 
like the Socratic, rules over himself and his own city or 
inner realm without trying to convert other people living 
outside the covenant except by the force of his example. To 
try to change them in any other way would, in his eyes, be 
not merely unrealistic but unlawful and immoral, a violation 
of all the principles of Emile and the Contract, as well as of 
the Republic. For him the impulse for reform must come 
from within the human spirit. Men cannot be "forced to be 
free" unless they are already committed to the covenant 
and its laws by an act of their own enlightened will and are 
themselves the ordering agent. 
Apart from this basic difference, Jean-Jacques' city is 
indeed the Fenelonian one. The travelers examine the to­
kens of good government, defined by Fenelon exactly as 
they are here and in the Contract and related works.57 A 
good administration in the sight of both writers favors popu­
lation by encouraging marriages. This criterion accentuates 
the value of the governor's work in Emile, which fosters 
marriage as an image of the autonomous inner bond of a 
man with his highest self. The same criterion also provides 
Rousseau with a new pretext to underline the primacy of 
volition in the contract by specifying that the conjugal un­
ion, like any other, must not be an effect of force, or laws 
against celibacy, which are as bad as those enjoining it. He 
protests against such enactments, even though, in his Pro­
ject on Corsica—in the region of imperfect actuality—he 
discriminates against celibates by limiting them to the class 
of aspirants to citizenship.58 A further sign of good gov­
ernment for himself and Fenelon is the even distribution of 
population over the whole territory in agricultural districts 
outside the urban center of the city-state. This is illustrated 
by Jean-Jacques' rule in Emile that is represented as par­
ticularly effective in rural surroundings, as we know. The 
friends on their travels verify the author's fond illusions 
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that men closer to nature are also closer to goodness. In the 
society of country folk the young man's virtues are sup­
posed to run less risk, although his aegis at all times is his 
love for Sophia. 
The denouement of the novel begins at this point, as 
Rousseau indicates by the use of spacing and a horizontal 
line. The last conversations of the travelers refer back to 
questions posed when they set out in search of wisdom and 
happiness. With that object in mind, what conclusion has 
Emile reached about his future? This is tantamount to ask­
ing which is more conducive to his goal: the Rousseauist 
covenant that aims to secure the life and liberty of persons, 
or the historical one that consolidates property? Or how 
can fidelity to the one be reconciled with the demands of 
existence under the other? Such is the theme of the hero's 
dialogue with his governor, treated not abstractly but 
through cunningly contrived myths. 
Since this is the case, and since the myths are largely 
inspired by the second half of Plato's ninth book, it would 
be helpful to recall the latter before broaching the Aemilian 
text. I was obliged to allude to it earlier since, in the pream­
ble to the separation of Emile and Sophia and again at the 
outset of the peregrination abroad, Rousseau reviewed the 
Republic cursorily from the end of the seventh book to the 
end of the ninth. In the present context he exploits the latter 
more fully and leaves me no alternative but to revert to it. 
There the sage solves the problem of wisdom and happiness 
posed by himself as well as by his modern disciple, as I 
have said, when they began their survey of false states. He 
concludes that the happiest of men is the lover of wisdom 
who is master of himself and knows a felicity that the vo­
taries of gain and glory do not know, which is the fulfillment 
of the human spirit according to its nature. Speaking of the 
others who engage in injustice to indulge their lusts, he 
warns them that it is ignoble and unprofitable to happiness 
to enslave the god in man to the beast. He contrasts them 
with the sage who is ruled by divine wisdom within that 
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suits his nature and who preserves his freedom of action by 
regulating his property and prestige so as to guard against 
the sway of wealth or power, which cause disorder in the 
soul. Such a man is statesman and ruler in the aforemen­
tioned "city... within him." It is not the land of his birth 
but a city that "exists in idea only" and whose "pattern" is 
laid up in heaven. He "will live after the manner of that 
city, having nothing to do with any other." This Socratic 
text is the inspiration of Emile's dialogue with Jean-
Jacques. 
The hero, like the Socratic sage, finds happiness in the 
wisdom of the "true" covenant and remains as his governor 
has made him, faithful to "nature and the laws." Thus he 
ratifies the pledge of friendship again, before applying it in 
the intimate domain of the soul, and promises to be loyal as 
man and citizen to the "natural and political law" of the 
Contract. He discusses the two theoretical advantages: 
freedom and security of life or Rousseauist property. The 
freedom he enjoys is the Socratic liberation of his noblest 
faculties. But in the present order of things it entails de­
tachment from all property. This includes his coveted vine­
yard or "corner of earth," which would, he says, threaten 
his spiritual freedom through the intrigues of covetous de­
sire. It also includes his mysterious inheritance which, as I 
have said, is probably his birthplace and would constitute, 
in the terminology of the Contract "the public domain of 
the sovereign," if men were indeed sovereign in the land of 
their birth. But in the book they are not. And under the 
covenant of bondage a man's needs (Rousseauist property) 
are at the discretion of other men's passions. He explains 
his dilemma thus to his governor: "When you wanted me to 
be at once free and without needs you wanted two incom­
patible things for I cannot withdraw from dependence upon 
men except by returning to dependence upon nature."59 
Hence in an earthly society the two objects of the "true" 
covenant are incompatible, as we suspected from the first. 
In choosing the covenant that frees the spirit even for the 
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victim of other people's passions, Emile is forced to re­
nounce security in the matter of needs, which would in­
volve dependence upon men that enslaves. He withdraws 
from such dependence and declines to rely upon his inheri­
tance. If it subjects him, he will abandon it, providing for 
his needs as best he can and facing privations and death 
itself under nature's law of necessity. In his view submis­
sion to that law frees him from enslavement to men, so that 
his faculties can perform their appointed tasks, the wise will 
exercising its natural sway over desire. The same law is, of 
course, also that of Jean-Jacques, whose disciple again rec­
ognizes him as the "father" who begot him. Emile con­
cludes that all he needs to be happy is Sophia or what 
Socrates calls in the analogous text "divine wisdom dwel­
ling within." Such are the hero's conclusions about wisdom 
and happiness, imparted in the form of highly suggestive 
allegories that naturally lead a classical scholar to the 
Platonic myths. 
In his reply Jean-Jacques again commends the choice of 
wisdom. In his opinion the disciple is wise not to seek free­
dom under the sway of the laws of passion or property, 
which are those of bondage. It is to be found, says the 
governor confirming the young man's words, in obedience 
to the eternal laws of nature and of order, or rather, of 
conscience and of reason written in the heart of the sage 
and replacing all others in his life. Thus he describes the 
laws of the Contract, as readers are beginning to suspect,60 
and the sage is Emile. Those laws are kept, after the exam­
ple of the Mosaical stone tablets, in the ark of the covenant 
within the mythical temple where the city exists and Sophia 
resides. The hero, like Socrates and Cato or the citizens of 
Rousseau's new Poland, bears his city in his person. In­
deed, the author says in the Considerations that the true 
sanctuary of laws and government is not to be found in 
fortresses, which will forever be taken by tyrants, but in 
citadels within,61 by the effects of education or legislation 
answering to man's nature and the decrees of his highest 
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faculties. So far the ideal is basically the one in the Repub­
lic, however suffused with emotion. 
Subsequently Jean-Jacques appears to modify his disci­
ple's Socratic attitude. Unlike the Greek heroes Emile is 
not to withdraw completely to the city within. He must 
have something to do with other states. He has duties as a 
citizen in his birthplace, even if "his own city" and its laws 
do not exist in external reality. Here the speaker observes 
the Socratic distinction between the two: pays and patrie. 
The former allegedly has only a caricature of a contract, 
semblances of laws and appearances of government that are 
nevertheless traces of order to be found in actuality, reflec­
tions of the IDEA of harmony. They have therefore served 
to make him love the good and abhor evil. Moral action of 
that sort is possible only in human society, however imper­
fect. Of all men, says Jean-Jacques, the hero alone will 
sacrifice his interests to the common good, be just among 
the wicked, and rule like a philosopher-king over himself. If 
we ask why a man would practice virtue among anarchists 
and immoralists, the reply is to be found throughout Emile, 
the Contract, and the Republic and is restated by Socrates 
in the text that inspired the dialogue of Emile and his gover­
nor: the sage, unlike most of us, is convinced that justice 
and wisdom, by their very nature, suit the nature cf the 
soul, since he regards them as an orderly disposition of 
human faculties according to the proper or normal function 
of each, and finds happiness therein. The Rousseauist gov­
ernor, in representing his disciple as "the just man" among 
the wicked, implies like Socrates that injustice suffered by 
such a one is as powerful a motive for the harmonious and 
felicitous operations of the soul as justice obtained.62 
Nevertheless, the ancient sage favors withdrawal, whereas 
Emile is bidden to live among his compatriots and there to 
practice virtues fostered by the "true" covenant of whose 
nature and existence they are unaware. Unlike the writer, 
he is told, he need not live in exile since he has not assumed 
the sad task of speaking the truth to men, but his "example 
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will serve them better than all our books." That example is, 
however, enshrined in a book that is intended to provide an 
image of a kind of wisdom and happiness accessible to any­
one. 
The hero's return to his birthplace is explained in the 
novel not only by the need for the presence of a pattern of 
well-ordered life in a haphazard society but also by the hope 
that that pattern may materialize in visible form beyond the 
person of Emile. This faint hope is founded upon two un­
likely hypotheses: that the family may in some exceptional 
case become what it could be but paradoxically never will 
be, and that it may in turn expand its influence through a 
patriarchal pastoral life that Jean-Jacques now mysteri­
ously recommends to his disciple, who, however, has no 
farm in the material sense and never will have. Indeed, the 
governor having admitted that there is no corner of the 
earth where Emile may live in peace with Sophia, and hav­
ing counseled him to return to the land of his birth, paradox­
ically directs him back to that corner where she abides, 
although we know that they had to "travel" far from his 
birthplace tofind her. In the country where she dwells, says 
he, gentle natures are still to be found, benificence may yet 
bear fruit, and men may revive the desert solitudes. But 
the hero must always be ready to emulate his Roman fore­
bears and leave the ploughshare to serve his patria. To­
gether with Fenelon,63 Rousseau clung to his dream of a 
golden age of rural and family bliss. Yet the paradoxes in 
the text betray his skepticism and make a literal reading 
virtually impossible, though some readers may disagree. 
The question arises as to whether there is a real cleavage 
between him and Socrates in this context. Admittedly the 
Socratic philosopher withdraws altogether from our unruly 
world whereas Emile does not, although sometimes the lat­
ter's desert solitudes dangerously resemble withdrawal. 
Nevertheless, the Rousseauist hero does indeed have rela­
tions with a chaotic world, as we have seen; and their na­
ture, as illustrated earlier, underlines the other distinctions 
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between his creator's thought and that of the Greek master: 
Emile's city and its laws are enshrined in the heart as well 
as in the mind; they extend justice to include mercy, and 
enlarge the scope of sympathy to embrace enemies and men 
of lawless life. These are serious differences between the 
two thinkers. Moreover, the Rousseauist hope of material 
expansion through family or rural life and the emotional 
images of both are obviously quite foreign to Socrates. But 
even for the sage's modern disciple they are unrealistic and 
paradoxical; and in any case, as I said earlier in the chapter, 
images and settings do not change the essential identity of 
thought, which is, however, greatly christianized in Rous­
seau's case. 
To bring out more forcefully the close relationship bet­
ween his concept of the good life and the master's, despite 
their differences, we must look to the end of the tenth and 
last book of the Republic where the love of simplicity and 
"golden mediocrity" is also exalted. There in the Socratic 
vision of Er, Odysseus or Ulysses is reborn, as he and 
Telemaque are in Emile. Indeed, he is the last of a host of 
souls to be reborn into the world and to choose a new life 
among the "samples of lives" set before them. And he 
chooses the same simple life as the Rousseauist hero. The 
ancient text reads: " . .  . Disenchanted of ambition... he 
[Ulysses] went about for a considerable time in search of 
the life of a private man who had no cares; he had some 
difficulty in finding this which was lying about and had been 
neglected by everybody else; and when he saw it, he said 
that he would have done the same had his lot been first 
instead of last, and that he was delighted to have it." The 
choice of the wise Ulysses is also Emile's, though in the 
former case there is no question of family or farm. Rous­
seau's affinities with Socrates are visible even when he pre­
tends to oppose him. 
Jean-Jacques' circumspect advice to his disciple resem­
bles that of the vicar to the exile and further justifies my 
comparison of the religious and political creed. The similar­
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ity is impressive. In a far land the vicar confessed his 
natural faith to the outcast and disclosed a celestial pattern 
for the ordering of human life. But at the same time he 
urged his protege to return to his own land and faith even 
though neither conformed to the heavenly model, there to 
practice the lesson of detachment. Jean-Jacques teaches the 
same lesson. In some distant clime he reveals to the exiled 
Emile the principles of natural and political law, divinely 
inscribed in the heart of the sage, as a source of harmony in 
human affairs. Yet he sends him back to his own country 
where chaos allegedly prevails, that he might rise above it. 
The two texts are perfectly symmetrical. Moreover, the 
conservatism of both, which is, of course, that of the Con­
tract, is striking. Nothing could be less revolutionary than 
they are.64 There is no question of changing material things 
in objecive experience but only of changing life by the ac­
tion of the spirit. The writer's conservatism is further ac­
centuated by his lofty idealism and use of mythical forms, 
as well as by his skepticism. Not that he doubts the reality 
and feasibility of the version of moral truth proposed. But 
he has no faith in men's willingness to achieve it.65 
To conclude the story, the governor's happiest day 
dawns when his work is consummated and Emile is wedded 
to his bride. They are united "in the temple" by an indis­
soluble bond, after having loved one another for three years 
and sought one another for a lifetime. The "temple" is 
surely not the place of darkness in the second part, nor yet 
the symbolic hostel in the fourth. It must be the mythical 
one of the soul and of the book where the betrothal origi­
nated. As for the ceremony, it may be taken as a marriage 
in the literal sense if we wish. But Emile is a literary work 
wherein the symbolism of marriage, which has already 
emerged into the highest possible relief, can hardly be ig­
nored in the present context, especially since for the writer 
there is only one "indissoluble bond," namely, that which 
sanctifies all others and upon which fidelity to every other 
engagement depends. This is the Rousseauist covenant or 
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social contract, which finally takes the form of a civil con­
tract externalized in marriage in accordance with the Cal­
vinist view.66 These considerations are enough to make us 
suspect that we are now witnessing the sacred nuptials of 
the sage, corresponding to the mythical "marriage rite" of 
the Socratic philosopher-king and the Muse, his queen, an­
ticipated in the sixth book of the Republic, where the Greek 
master broaches the education of his kings, and consum­
mated at the end of the seventh. Indeed, we can hardly fail 
to see that Rousseau is portraying an initiation into the 
ultimate beatific vision of wisdom, a "foretaste" of which 
was previously granted. 
This interpretation is confirmed by the marriage cere­
mony itself, of which we have, in fact, a detailed account. 
The latter is to be found in a discourse of Jean-Jacques 
addressed to the lovers, wherein some of us have in the past 
accused the writer of questionable taste.67 In reality there is 
nothing salacious or unsavory in the text. The reason for 
the misunderstanding is that we have failed to recognize the 
monologue as an imaginative projection of the marriage rite 
performed by the ruler, as is the case in the Republic. In­
deed, it concludes with a sacramental "treaty." The word 
occurs twice as it did in the first part of the book in refer­
ence to the covenant of Jean-Jacques and Emile.68 It accen­
tuates the link between the beginning and end and is 
another clue to the mythical quality of the present scene 
where the governor himself presides over the "sacred" 
union of the true prince and wisdom, which is visualized in 
an allegorical manner outside the "temple." 
The controversial solemnities begin when he proposes to 
the bridal pair a way of prolonging the happiness of love in 
marriage to create a paradise, a diminutive city of the 
blessed, upon earth. The object can be achieved, he says, if 
those who engage themselves forever to "the most sacred 
of contracts" perpetuate their commitment by the constant 
action of enlightened love. In other words, Emile must con­
tinue to be a "lover of Sophia," or philosopher, while she, 
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for her part, must continue to suit and please him by pre­
serving the integrity of her nature. Socrates is of the same 
opinion.69 The Greek sage, having said that licentiousness is 
forbidden in his city where matrimony is sacred in the high­
est degree, contrives marriages between the best men and 
women at the prescribed age who "breed only with the 
sanction of the rulers," or rather, ruling faculties in the 
soul. These faculties, which have been formed in Emile to 
make him ruler of himself, are still personified in Jean-
Jacques, who is performing the last act of his Socratic mis­
sion. He still embodies the enlightened will that governs 
desire in the union of hero and heroine. And so he formu­
lates the covenant anew whereby Emile enters a select soc­
iety of just men who hold sway over themselves. 
It contains the same "clauses" as the one in the first part, 
which is definitively ratified now that the hero is of age. 
First, he and his bride are to remain faithful to the covenant 
that unites them since fidelity is "the most sacred of all 
rights." That is because it signifies obedience to the one 
and only fundamental law. But this clause has an essential 
corollary to provide for the correlative of obedience which 
is consent. The union of Emile and Sophia is not an effect of 
force. To illustrate his meaning, the governor objects to the 
"constraint" of so-called conjugal rights and contrives to 
make each of the consorts exclusively dependent upon the 
covenant's law of love or enlightened feeling. He would 
thereby avoid all "subjection." In that way, says he, a 
man's lawful love for his bride will be stronger than any 
lawless desire for the "stranger." That is the theme of an 
Old Testament passage already cited in the previous chap­
ter. It is also the theme of the Pauline allegory of the two 
covenants represented by the free woman and the 
bondmaid who are the covenant of promise and of bondage 
to which I have alluded, corresponding to the Rousseauist 
and historical one. Jean-Jacques' allegorizing expresses the 
idea that "hearts are bound" by the former "but bodies are 
not enslaved," for the enlightened love or act of consent 
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that gives rise to it becomes itself the only law.70 Under its 
sway, according to his words, the contractant remains 
"master of his person" and exercises his will freely in order 
to win for himself the only lawful happiness that leaves the 
human spirit intact and springs from wisdom herself. Such 
are the two clauses of the "treaty," which is not for that 
reason a "double" one as we have hitherto supposed.71 
Emile subscribes to it, and this may be taken as the "mar­
riage" ceremony. Since the covenant is in the very nature 
of Rousseauist wisdom whose spokesman is Jean-Jacques, 
he answers for Sophia without consulting her. He says so. 
The allegory portrays in a literary manner the civil rights 
of the Rousseauist citizen. 
After establishing the sovereignty of the will in his first 
discourse, the speaker institutes the ruling power in a sec­
ond one, addressed to Sophia alone. In the past it has met 
with the same fate as the other on our part. This time he is 
curiously careful to make a distinction between the usual 
relationship of a man and his bride and that of Emile and 
Sophia. Emile is the head whom the woman obeys, but 
since, in this case, she is Sophia, he is to be "led" or 
"conducted" by her. The word is the same one previously 
applied to Jean-Jacques' government of his disciple. The 
reason is clear enough, as we have seen. As the governing 
power of a city or moral person executes the sovereign will 
to give movement to the active thinking being, so Sophia 
makes an appeal to the heart to implement the commands of 
reason and ultimately secures them by fostering the habit of 
order as a principle of moral growth. The speaker exhorts 
her to reign over herself as well as Emile, for then she can 
recall him to "wisdom," to "virtue and reason," or rather, 
to herself, if he chances to stray. For the governor warns 
that the ecstasy of love does not last forever. One may 
observe that it lasts no longer than that of philosophy or 
virtue, which it is suited to symbolize. It is not a permanent 
state of soul, and in the end is replaced, says he, by a 
"sweet habit" that unites a man for all time with the bride 
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of his choice, corresponding to the Socratic "life of his 
choice." Such is the dialectic that leads to the establish­
ment of Sophia's reign, which may or may not be that of a 
woman but is surely that of Rousseauist wisdom. Again the 
basic "treaty" is confirmed and the little city set in motion, 
certainly within the soul and perhaps also within the family. 
Once the moral person is autonomous and the habit of 
order is secure enough to replace laws, Jean-Jacques with­
draws, like Mentor in Telemaque, the Socratic image of law 
in the Republic,72 or the Pauline one in the Epistle to the 
Galatians. He does so, he says, in favor of "another." The 
word is in the masculine gender, like the "child" that ruled 
Emile in an earlier text. Moreover, the governor, in retir­
ing, says to the hero: "Today I abdicate the authority you 
entrusted to me and here is your governor." The latter 
word, too, is masculine, gouverneur, instead of the fem­
inine equivalent.73 Nor is the name of Sophia even men­
tioned at this juncture. Again one is inclined to see in her a 
mystic companion who has entered the mythical temple 
where alone she belongs. Jean-Jacques' transports of emo­
tion and tears of joy as he beholds his work in the fullness of 
its consummation are comparable with those of Pygmalion. 
In Sophia he abides with Emile all the days of his life, like 
Telemaque's Mentor, who disappears into the empyrean 
promising the hero: "My wisdom will never leave you... 
It is time that you should learn to walk alone." One sus­
pects that Emile too is now walking alone in the midst of an 
invisible company of lofty spirits evoked in the essay on 
wealth, the letters to Malesherbes, the Confessions, and 
the Dialogues. 
However, the imagery of marriage provides the author 
with an opportunity to express once more his preference for 
private education. The book closes with Emile's an­
nouncement that he hopes soon to have the honor of being a 
father. Unlike other fathers he will educate his own son, to 
make him into a man and citizen. Again the ending stands in 
counterpoise to the beginning where Rousseau proclaimed 
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unequivocally that it is a father's duty to educate his chil­
dren and raise up citizens to the state, and that domestic 
training is the only hope of salvation for modern society. 
Yet even this turn of events may be taken in a literary 
rather than exclusively literal sense. It may be interpreted 
in the light of Socrates' discourse in the Symposium. If so, 
it would mean that Industry wedded to Wisdom begets not 
merely mortal children but an autonomous spiritual being 
generating the moral beautiful, temperance, justice, and all 
the virtues that may spring from such a union to perfect 
human society. In that case domestic education would rep­
resent the self-discipline of the autodidact, which trans­
formed the young scapegrace of the central pages into the 
wise Savoyard vicar and now promises to bear fruit in the 
life of some new disciple reborn of Emile. 
Before concluding, I should like to recall the role played 
by the Republic and the Symposium in this part, in order to 
accentuate the theme as that of the original plan. Under the 
title "Sophia," Rousseau objects to Socrates' ideas on the 
education of woman in the fifth book of the Republic but 
like the sage in another context uses her to personify wis­
dom as the object of his hero's love, a theme that he handles 
according to the teachings of the Symposium. He then re­
verts to the same fifth book to show that it is the ruler who 
decides upon the choice of Emile's bride. Since that deci­
sion implies the choice of a life that is the subject of the 
vision of Er in the conclusion to the Republic, he turns to 
the famous text for further inspiration. In the middle part 
where he deals with the courtship of Sophia, or foretaste of 
the beatific vision, he finds his point of departure in the 
climax of the formation of kings at the end of the seventh 
book of the great classic. In the pages on travel and the 
pattern of the city unlike all others, he goes to the eighth 
and ninth books to show that the world is full of false states 
and that the only true one is the "city within" where the 
hero finally takes refuge, though he lives in the world as we 
know it. At the end, where there are more echoes of the 
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vision of Er, the nuptials are those of the Socratic ruler and 
queen of the city, presided over by a true philosopher-king 
according to the Greek sage's advice. These affinities are 
impressive. Yet the substance bears the stamp of Rous­
seau's spirit wherein the heart and feelings play a role not 
accorded to them in the model. The sphere of action in his 
case is therefore less abstract and more familiar. He takes 
the Socratic world of dialectic, animates it with feeling, and 
brings it into the domain of ordinary life, transfigured by 
insight and poetic genius. 
Besides, however deeply his myths and ideas are rooted 
in Socratic tradition, they are just as deeply embedded in 
Judeo- Christian imagery and belief. An example of particu­
lar relevance here is the idealization of woman that is 
Judeo-Christian in tone and implications, in spite of the 
close affinities between Sophia and the Socratic Muse. The 
woman to whom Emile is dedicated is a combination of 
both strains of our culture. She is the mythical Sophia, that 
"chimerical" spiritual and social order of the Contract 
which, in the eyes of Rousseau, could alone restore peace 
to human life, but never will. 
1. Here we are led into what George Eliot, in Romola, calls "the inner 
chamber and sanctuary of life" or "the inmost cell of consciousness" (The 
World's Classics [London: Oxford University Press, n.d.], pp. 256, 347). 
2. One chapter of the Contract remains to be discussed: see the section entitled 
"Viaticum" in this chapter in the conclusion of the summary of the Contract. 
3. See, for example, O. C, 4:lxxxvi. 
4. See chapter 2 above. In the past, few of us have connected the beginning of 
Emile with the end, or taken the latter seriously. Broome, in Rousseau: A Study of 
His Thought (London: Arnold, 1963), pp. 100 ff., shows that past interpretations 
border on the ridiculous. 
5. Cf. Plato The Symposium (Diotima's speech reported by Socrates). 
6. Rousseau was seduced by the idea as he interpreted it in his early youth, but 
in his literary debut was already wondering about its value thus interpreted: see, 
for example, the dedication of the second "Discours." Cf. the discussion of the 
family early in chapter 2 above. 
7. In this context Burgelin, commenting upon the linking of love and perfec­
tion, refers to the Symposium and Phaedrus: O. C'., 4:743 n. 1. 
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8. In connection with the fifth part of "Emile" Burgelin recalls the Platonic 
theme of pedagogical love, but does not develop the idea since that is not his task: 
O. C  , 4:cxxvi. 
9. Cf. The Republic 4. 424; 6. 499. Cf. also Prov. 8:22-30, ending thus: "Then I 
was by him, as one brought up with him. . . . " 
10. Rousseau's guide is always the nature of things as he sees it: "Emile," p. 
837; "Contrat social," pp. 378, 393. In the present context (p. 712; cf. 714 and 
732) he quotes the maxim of Leibnitz and Pope: "Whatever is, is right." Cf. 
"Lettre a Philopolis," O. C, 3:233. For Socrates' warning against lawlessness in 
amusements see The Republic 4. 424. 
11. "Emile," p. 720. Cf. "Contrat social," pp. 360-61. Broome sees the sym­
bolic significance of the moral person formed by the union of the sexes: op cit., 
pp. 99-100. Cf. Burgelin, O. C, 4:720 n. 2, who also speaks of an analogy between 
the conjugal and social pacts. Cf. M. B. Ellis, Julie or La Nouvelle Heloise: A 
Synthesis of Rousseau's Thought (1749-1759) (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1949), p. 68. 
12. Cf. "Emile," p. 721, and Eph. 5:22 ff. 
13. We have hitherto observed the similarity of the two creeds but have not yet 
explored their relationship and its symbolic implications: see, for example, O. C, 
4:129 n. 1. 
14. See "Emile," p. 743. See also pp. 745 and 823. Cf. p. 599 where the vicar 
speaks of the man who dies for the public good. Cf. also p. 249 where Rousseau 
begins by depicting Spartan patriotic fervor in a context comparable to this con­
cluding passage upon feminine education. References in this note include all quo­
tations in the paragraph. 
15. F6nelon, Les A ventures de Telemaque (Liege: Grandmont-Donders, 
1865), bk. 22, and especially p. 400. 
16. Cf. The Republic 3. 400 ff.; 4. 421-25. Cf. Contrat social, pt. 4, chap. 7. See 
chapter 5 above and note 123. 
17. "Est-ce ma faute si j'aime ce qui nvest pas? Je ne suis point visionaire; je ne 
veux point un prince, je ne cherche point Telemaque, je sais qu'il n'est qu'une 
fiction: je cherche quelqu'un qui lui ressemble; et pourquoi ce quelqu'un ne peut-il 
exister, puisque j'6xiste, moi qui me sens un coeur si semblable au sien? Non, ne 
ddshonorons pas ainsi l'humanitd; ne pensons pas qu'un homme aimable et ver­
tueux ne soit qu'une chimeYe. II existe, il vit, il me cherche peut-etre; il cherche 
une ame qui le sache aimer. Mais qu'est-il? Ou est- i l? . . ." 
18. The Republic 6. 495-96. Cf. Emile et Sophie ou Les Solitaires. 
19. The Republic 6. 499. 
20. In the sequel to the novel Rousseau, like Socrates, envisages the dishonor­
ing of the Lady Philosophy and the decline of the little city, with the result that 
Emile, like the Socratic philosopher, is thrown back upon the order of friendship, 
and reason again replaces the habit of order. 
21. See P. Burgelin, La Philosophie de I'existence de J.-J. Rousseau (Paris: 
Plon, 1952), pp. 168-80; J. SidLrobmskx, Jean-Jacques Rousseau: la transparence 
et iobstacle (Paris: Plon, 1957), pp. 90-92. We have not in the past recognized the 
affinity of the piece with "Emile." See also L. Millet, La Pensee de Rousseau 
(Paris: Bordas, 1966), pp. 160-62. In the latter the unfinished statues are uniden­
tified, but Galatea is seen as "Absolute Beauty," which is, of course, true since 
Rousseau's apprehension of absolute beauty is to be found in Emile. The musical 
score of Rousseau's "Pygmalion," unworthy of the monologue, is, with the ex­
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ception of his own overture and andante, the work of Horace Coignet. The first 
Parisian performance is mentioned in the "Dialogues," O. C  , 1:964. For 
Rameaus work see "Confessions," O. C  , 1:383. 
22. The Republic 2. 361; 4. 420; 7. 540. For the Socratic artist: ibid., 3. 401. 
Note that the Symposium is said to possess a beauty "as of a statue." 
23. Pygmalion complains that his genius has deserted him, that the marble 
comes cold from his hands. Cf. C. C  , 15:132, letter to Rey. 29 January, 1763: 
"Les disgraces ont achev6 de m'oter le peu de g6nie qui me restoit... je le [cet 
ouvrage] trouve si froid.... " 
24. "Quand mon esprit 6teint ne produira plus rien de grand, de beau, de digne 
de moi, je montrerai ma Galath6e, et je dirai: Voila mon ouvrage!... la plus belle 
de mes oeuvres . . .  . Je ne sais quelle Emotion j'6prouve en touchant ce voile [qui 
le couvre]... je crois toucher au sanctuaire de quelque Divinit6 . . . . Pygmalion! 
c'est une pierre; c'est ton ouvrage. Qu'importe? On sert des Dieux dans nos 
temples... qui n'ont pas et6 faits d'une autre main." The latter words and the 
"sanctuaire de quelque Divinit6" are particularly significant in the light of the 
mythical temple of "Emile." 
25. " . . . Voyez cet objet, voyez mon coeur... celeste Venus . . . ou est la loi 
de la nature dans le sentiment que j 'eprouve.. . il me suffira de vivre en elle 
[Galath6e].... D6esse de la beaute, epargne cet affront a la nature, qu'un si 
parfait modele soit l'image de ce qui nest pas." The last words cited below read: 
"Oui, digne chef-d'oeuvre de mes mains, de mon coeur et des Dieux. .. je t'ai 
donn6 tout mon etre; je ne vivrai plus que par toi." 
26. Aus meinem Leben: Dichtung und Wahrheit, 2:ii. Starobinski and others 
follow Goethe. See note 21 above. It is not generally known that Goethe follows a 
rather flippant judgment of Diderot in the first of the latter's two Essais sur la 
peinture translated by the German poet. See Carl Hammer, Jr., Goethe and 
Rousseau (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1973), p. 40. 
27. "Emile," pp. 493-94, 798. 
28. "Cette feinte recherche n'est qu'un pr6texte pour lui faire connoitre les 
femmes, afin qu'il sente le prix de celle qui lui convient. Des longtemps Sophie est 
trouv6e.... " 
29. Cf. "Confession," loc. cit., p. 421. 
30. For this paragraph see The Republic 5. 458-61 (laws of marriage); 10. 619 
(regarding the choice of a life). 
31. The pilgrimage of life is mentioned in "Emile et Sophie," O. C  , 4:914. The 
"paladins" are mentioned above, chapter 5 and note 28. For the statement that 
Sophia is far from Paris: "Emile," pp. 691, 770, 773, 801-2. 
32. "Confessions," loc. cit., pp. 45-48, 57-59, 101-3, 143 ff., 161-73. 
33. Cf. Socrates' definition of the philosophic nature in The Republic 6. 485-87. 
A philosopher must love truth and learning, delight in "pleasures of soul" and be 
a spectator of all time and all existence." With regard to the Greek philosophers, 
see note x to second "Discours," O. C  , 3:213. 
34. "Emile," p. 783, where on their second visit they go astray for the third 
time. 
35. In this "house of peace" wisdom has sequestered herself in a secluded 
retreat where, according to the "man of peace," the vicar, the voice of conscience 
may still be heard: "Emile," pp. 601, and cf. 506-7. The Gospel story mentioned 
below is in Mark 14:13-16. For the banquet of wisdom: Prov. 9:1-5. 
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36. Burgelin also sees in Sophia a combination of Eucharis and Antiope: O. C, 
4:775 n. 1, 778 n. 1, 798 n. 2. For the beauty of the virtues that is Sophia^s: The 
Republic 6. 504. Cf. 7. 518: " . .  . The virtue of wisdom more than anything else 
contains a divine element which always remains." 
37. Rousseau often alludes to the symbolism of the book. Apart from the many 
examples already given there are two in the present context: pp. 777-78, where he 
calls his book a "novel" and refers to an earlier passage on the symbolism of 
Sophia's name. Cf. p. 657. Even the governor's comments on the name in the 
present case lend themselves to a symbolic interpretation: "N'y a-t-il qu'une 
Sophie au monde? Se ressemblent-elles toutes d'ame comme de nom? Toutes 
celles qu'il verra sont-elles la sienne?" To the reader of Plato these words contain 
veiled allusions to what Socrates calls the many "false forms" of wisdom as 
opposed to the one true form. 
38. For the effect of finance upon human faculties see chapter 5 above and The 
Republic 8. 553. 
39. For the parable of the pearl: Matt. 13:45-46; for that of the rich young man: 
Matt. 19:21. 
40. Burgelin explains the role of the governor here in a similar manner: O. C, 
4:789 n 1. 
41. "Comme l'idolatre enrichit des tresors qu'il estime l'objet de son culte, et 
pare sur l'autel le Dieu qu'il adore, l'amant a beau voir sa maitresse parfaite, il lui 
veut sans cesse ajouter de nouveaux ornemens . . .  . C'est un nouvel homage qu'il 
croit lui rendre . . .  . II lui semble que rien de beau n'est a sa place quand il n'orne 
pas la supreme beaute." Rousseau adds: "II se figure d'avance le plaisir qu'il aura 
de raisoner, de philosopher avec elle, il regarde comme inutile tout l'acquis qu'il 
ne peut point etaler a ses yeux: il rougit presque de savoir quelque chose qu'elle 
ne sait pas." The Socratic distinction between useful and useless studies, the 
latter unrelated to wisdom, further confirms the symbolism of Sophia. (Italics 
mine.) 
42. The references for the Socratic images are as follows: the good husband­
man is at the end of book 9 (referring to the method used from the first); the 
carpenter is in books 3 and 10; the Olympic victors appear in books 4, 5, and 
10, and the lover in books 6, 7, 9, and 10. Observe how Socrates too reviews 
his images. 
43. This is Rousseau's doctrine, however impractical it may be: "Emile," p. 
548 (opposes exclusive friendship). Cf. "Lettres a m. de Malesherbes," O. C, 
1:1144-45. He praises cosmopolitanism in the second "Discours," loc. cit., p. 
178, allegedly under Diderot's influence, but disapproves of it in "Emile": p. 249. 
It is important to define terms here. Patriotism is love of a man's "own city" in 
the Socratic sense; nationalism is love of one's birthplace; cosmopolitanism is 
love of the "false" states of this world. It is impossible to understand Rousseau 
without making the Socratic distinction between a man's "own city" and the land 
of his birth. 
44. O. C, 3:255. For Rousseau's perplexity mentioned below see "Morceau 
allegorique sur la rdvelation" in ibid., 4:1053. 
45. The Republic 6. 496-97. 
46. For nationalism: "Emile," pp. 635-36 (no concession is made to "national 
prejudice" in matters of religion), 828 and 831-32 (Emile travels to avoid the 
influence of national prejudice), 855 (he maintains correspondence abroad for the 
same purpose). For the problem of patriotism and humanitarianism see "Lettres 
de la montagne," O.C., 3:706 n. See chapter 5 above, n. 71. 
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47. Rousseau is opposing the "inner (or secret) doctrine" of his contem­
poraries that favored the inclinations of the heart: cf. his "Observations" on 
Stanislas' reply to the first "Discours"; O. C, 3:46 n. Cf. "Confessions," loc. 
cit., p. 468. He condemns it too in the first and third "Dialogues" and in the third 
of the "Reveries": see, for example, O C, 1:1022. Cf. C. C  , 4:162, letter to T. 
Tronchin, 27 February 1757, where he opposes the idea of following the inclina­
tions. Cf. "Lettre a m. de Franquieres," O. C, 4:1143. 
48. Jimack finds this turn of events strange: La genese et la redaction de 
I'Emile deJ.-J. Rousseau (Geneva: Institut et musee Voltaire, 1960), p. 202. But, 
of course, he interprets the book exclusively literally. The problem is greatly 
simplified by an appeal to Socrates. See below. 
49. Cf. "Reveries," loc. cit., pp. 1046-47. 
50. For the age: O. C, 4:lxxxv and 833 n. 3. 
51. See note 14 above. 
52. The Republic 9. 589-92. When Jean-Jacques asks Emile what kind of man 
he intends to be, he is quoting from ibid., 2. 365. 
53. Burgelin proposes the comparison: O. C, 4:836 n. 1. 
54. The phrase "what is not" is applied to Emile, Sophia, and, by implication, 
to the city of the Contrat in "Emile," pp. 762, 821, 836-37. 
55. Cf. p. 586, and "Contrat Social," pp. 369, 394. 
56. Seep. 311. Cf. "Etat de guerre," O. C, 3:610. For the question of federa­
tion and sovereignty, raised by Rousseau in this context ("Emile," p. 848), see 
"Contrat social," p. 431 n. 2. 
57. Contrat social, pt. 3, chap. 9. Cf. the second "Discours," n. ix, in O C, 
3:206; "Discours sur l'economie politique," loc. cit., pp. 258-59; "Fragments 
politiques," loc. cit., pp. 527-28; "Projet de constitution pour la Corse," O. C , 
3:904; "Considerations," loc. cit., p. 1005. Cf. Fenelon, op. cit., bk. 22. The fact 
that the travelers find no good government or laws has been used to illustrate the 
weakness of Rousseau's system. It is meant, of course, to illustrate the weakness 
of our "anti-society." 
58. Loc. cit., p. 919; cf. p. 941. 
59. The whole passage reads: "Je me souviens que mes biens furent la cause de 
nos recherches. Vous prouviez tres solidement que je ne pouvois guarder a la fois 
ma richesse et ma liberte, mais quand vous vouliez que je fusse a la fois libre et 
sans besoins, vous vouliez deux choses incompatibles, car je ne saurois me tirer 
de la dependance des hommes [in the matter of the necessities of life] qu'en 
rentrant sous celle de la nature." 
60. See, for example, O. C, 4:858 n. 1. But the laws are not defined. 
61. See "Considerations," loc. cit., pp. 1013-29 (especially 1018) on the milit­
ary system and the plan to subject members of the government to a very gradual 
system of promotions. 
62. Rousseau finally solves what seemed to him like a contradiction in Soc­
rates, who reveals true laws to men and then submits to false ones. 
63. Op. cit., bks, 2, 17, 22; pp. 38, 293, 300, 402, 438. 
64. Rousseau shows the same moderation in the "Considerations," regarding 
the admission of the middle classes to government and the freeing of peasants in 
Poland: loc. cit., pp. 1024 ff. 
65. He says this of the city and the age of gold: "Emile," pp. 250, 859 (begin­
ning and end of the book). 
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66. See chapter 5 above, note 94. 
67. See, for example, O. C, 1:201 n. 1. Burgelin, inO. C, 4:866 n. 1, is right to 
observe that "reason must necessarily play a part in everything." 
68. See pp. 267-68. 
69. The Republic 5. 459. 
70. Cf. "Considerations," loc. cit., pp. 960-61. Cf. Gal. 4:22-26. 
71. See, for example, O. C, 4:863 n. 1. 
72. The Republic 9. 590-91. The "habit of good order" that is Rousseau's 
object is also that of Socrates: ibid., 4. 425. 
73. See p. 867 and cf. p. 799, " . .  . Ici finit ma longue tache, et commence celle 
d'un autre. J'abdique aujourd'hui l'autorite que vous m'avez confiee, et voici 
desormais votre gouverneur." 
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Conclusion 
This commentary of Emile and the Social Contract reveals 
Rousseau in a new light by dwelling upon several aspects of 
his work that have not previously been explored. Yet they 
are significant enough not merely to modify rather seriously 
but also to enlarge and clarify his personal image and his 
place in the history of both literature and ideas. 
The collation has entailed study from three points of 
view; historical, ideological, and literary or aesthetic in­
cluding the mythological. I now propose to define briefly 
the advantages derived from each of thes#e aspects in turn. 
At the same time, in every case I shall recall once more that 
we have the authorization, or rather, invitation, of the wri­
ter himself to approach his books, and particularly those 
under discussion, in the ways enumerated. I have examined 
them on the basis of his own evidence in order to learn 
whether his words are true or false, and I have discovered 
that they are abundantly true. 
Let me deal first with the historical implications of my 
research. This comparison of Emile with the Contract, 
while accomplishing the initial purpose of investigating the 
Aemilian myths and their value to express the author's 
philosophy translated into abstract terms in the companion 
volume, has come upon and brought to attention some 
rather startling affinities between him and antiquity that 
help to situate him more precisely in the main currents of 
occidental civilization. The discoveries in question are a 
major feature of the collation and can hardly be lightly dis­
missed. That is especially true if, as Rousseau himself says, 
knowledge is mainly an awareness of relationships; for in 
that case not to know his affinities, herein revealed to a 
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vaster and fuller extent than ever before, is not to know 
him. The foregoing inquiry shows how scrupulously he cul­
tivates his classical and religious inheritance, especially in 
the two books it fuses into one. It demonstrates that he 
belongs to Greek and biblical tradition far more intimately 
than we have hitherto supposed. It proves that he who has 
been called "the first modern man" preaches a doctrine as 
old as Christ or Socrates or, rather, Solomon. I emphasize 
all three since, although his ties with Socrates. Plato, and 
classical Greco-Roman literature and philosophy emerge 
rather impressively from a collation of this kind, so do his 
aesthetic and ideological associations with Solomon and 
Christ. The Platonic dialogues, the Solomonic books of the 
Old Testament, the Gospel stories and apostolic epistles 
have all left their mark on his thought, which has profited 
thereby as much as his art as a writer is enhanced by Socra­
tic and biblical imagery. These are facts that we can no 
longer overlook and to which we can hardly remain indif­
ferent. It is imperative to know that some of the greatest 
works of our culture are inseparable from one another and 
that Rousseau is a vital link in the chain extending from 
ancient Judaical and classical pagan civilizations to their 
modern Judeo-Christian and romantic counterparts. 
By heeding his own admissions, we might long since have 
come to a better understanding of his affiliations, which, 
incidentally, I do not pretend to have exhausted in all their 
depth and immensity. Or we might at least have been 
alerted to their gravity, if we were too uninformed about 
Socrates, Plato, or the Bible to recognize them for what 
they are. For example, when he says that his writings are 
mere commentaries on the Scriptures, and that his masters 
are Plato, or Socrates, and Christ, to whom he repeatedly 
pays tribute in his books, we might have listened more sol­
icitously or taken him more seriously. But in order to 
fathom his meaning, it is not enough to scrutinize passages 
in his work where such open acknowledgments occur. It is 
necessary to go much deeper and commit to memory the 
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acknowledged sources so that we might discern their verifi­
able presence in Rousseauist texts where they are barely 
mentioned or not at all. 
Most readers will be especially struck by the enormous 
extent of his debt to Greek philosophy. Of course, this debt 
has not been completely ignored in the past. For example, 
the Spartan strain coming through Plutarch has always been 
known. But that is because it is so conspicuous and lacking 
in subtlety that it could hardly be disregarded. Some notice 
has also been taken of the influence of Socrates and Plato 
upon him, and small wonder since in the second Discourse 
that heralds his future he virtually begins thus: "I shall 
suppose myself in the Lyceum of Athens, repeating the 
lessons of my masters, with Plato and Xenocrates for 
judges, and the whole human race for my audience." This 
phrase might well be applied to his entire career as a writer. 
Yet the influence to which it testifies has never been probed 
and measured in its complex, far-reaching, and widespread 
ramifications throughout the very warp and woof of his 
greatest works. The main reason is probably that its im­
mense scope is most easily visible through an evaluation of 
myths; and although the Platonic and Socratic ones have 
been carefully appraised, Rousseau's have gone almost to­
tally unobserved. Unfortunately for us, since the similarity 
of his imagery to that of Socrates permits a most enlighten­
ing comparison of texts. 
In Emile he confesses his debt to Socrates or Plato at 
crucial points in every part of the book. We have hitherto 
closed our eyes to this fact, but it is nevertheless true. He 
begins with a moving tribute to the Republic and calls it the 
finest treatise of education that has ever been written. True, 
he puts us off the scent by saying that it gives one an idea of 
public education and then failing to add that in the dialogue 
the latter is merely an image of private education, which is 
the real theme of the book as it is of his own. But it be­
hooves us the readers to see that, for it is obvious to anyone 
who takes the trouble to familiarize himself with the great 
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classic. In the second part he makes an unmistakable ges­
ture of gratitude to his Greek master at the very moment 
when he is preparing to broach the education of his "guar­
dian of the constitution" and the laws. Suddenly he stops to 
hold up for our admiration the example he follows: "Plato 
in his republic who is considered so stern teaches children 
only through festivals, games, songs, and amusements." 
We have only to proceed from there and take the hint fur­
nished by himself to see that the Socratic guardian is the 
model of the Rousseauist and that their education is the 
same. At a critical juncture in the third part Socrates himself 
materializes in flesh and blood to teach Emile the most 
solemn lesson he has to learn, namely, that he requires to 
be governed by superior powers. As if this clue were not 
enough, at another turning point in the same part where the 
author proposes as a rule of instruction whatever it is useful 
to know, he goes out of his way to tell us that he is imitating 
Socrates. He says so undeniably. For, having induced 
Emile to want to know only what is useful and to ask, at 
every step taken by himself and his governor, "What is the 
use of that?", the author comments: "Anyone who is 
taught to want to know only what is useful interrogates like 
Socrates." This is a frank, outspoken assertion that he is 
using the word useful in the Socratic sense. He is actually 
referring to the Platonic text where the sage himself estab­
lishes this law of learning and defines what he means by it. 
If we go to the text indicated, as we are virtually invited to 
do, we literally fall upon the source material of his whole 
third part. It is disastrous to pass over these telling signs of 
the master's presence in Emile. There are more in the 
fourth part. In the pages on Plutarch we are told that Emile 
imitates no one, not even Socrates or Cato. We ought to 
have seen that Jean-Jacques does and so does the author, 
especially since throughout the book the former consis­
tently undertakes studies usually assigned to children. In 
the same fourth part, in the profession of faith, Socrates 
stands at the summit of both the affirmative and negative 
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phases of the piece. For instance, in the affirmative one, 
where Rousseau tries to identify the principle of consience, 
he professedly avoids any doctrine that, like La 
Rochefoucauld's, for example, would degrade Socrates or 
Regulus by attributing virtue to selfishness. Moreover, in 
discussing revelation in the negative phase of the creed, he 
reaches one of the greatest heights of eloquence in the book 
in the famous contrast between Christ and Socrates. Be­
sides, again in the fourth part, in facing the vital issue of 
aesthetics, he has recourse to Plato's Symposium as well as 
to Virgil and Tibullus to perfect Emile's taste. In the fifth 
part he begins with a new tribute to the master, however 
ambiguous. Again he makes a pretense of differing from 
him, this time in the matter of feminine education as discus­
sed in the Republic; but then he proceeds to display quite 
plainly that their differences in this case are simply a matter 
of imagery since he, unlike Socrates, uses the home and 
family to exteriorize the city. At the same time he borrows 
Socratic imagery to show that supposedly wise order of 
things embodied in the heroine. Later, when his heroes set 
out first in search of Sophia or wisdom and then in quest of 
the Rousseauist city, they are said to "travel" like Plato, 
which in both contexts is tantamount to admitting symboli­
cally that they follow him, as in fact they do. Thus through­
out the novel Rousseau loudly proclaims his debt to Soc­
rates and the Platonic dialogues, especially the Republic 
and Symposium. 
His own sayings are amply verified by an analysis of 
texts, where the evidence of close relationships between 
him and his Greek masters is overwhelming. The similarity 
of Socratic and Aemilian images, that first stirs the mind to 
suspect links between them, necessarily leads the classical 
scholar from one book to the other, and then the perception 
of ideological identity follows apace. Admittedly, many 
writers and thinkers have said the same things as Rousseau 
or Socrates. But it is by no mere coincidence, especially 
after the repeated avowals recorded above, that Socrates in 
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the Republic and Rousseau in Emile —and less obviously in 
the Contract—consistently convey the same ideas, usually 
in identical words and metaphors, and always according to 
an analogous pattern, with only the slightest variations from 
title page to colophon. The points of contact between them 
are too numerous to be accidental. Rousseau's debt turns 
out to be massive. From a confrontation of texts comes the 
astonishing realization that Emile in particular might well 
be taken for a Rousseauist version of the Republic. 
To admit this, it is enough to reflect upon only a few of 
the vast correspondences between them, even without in­
cluding the identical myths that I shall discuss below. The 
main problem of Emile and indeed of all Rousseau's works 
is Socratic. I refer to the sphinx-like riddle of wisdom and 
happiness that he makes a point of formulating four times in 
the novel, as Socrates does in the Republic, and each time 
he does so in exactly the same context as the sage. 
Moreover, in Emile and the Contract, as in the Republic, 
early reflections upon so-called morality and justice in our 
confused world lead to the institution of an ideal order of 
things. In addition, in the case of all three books the latter is 
presented by way of an analogy between the soul and the 
city. And in all cases the formation of the moral being is 
almost identical. More still: as we have seen, the three great 
"waves" that Socrates must first overcome before he can 
establish his city are closely linked with the triple-tiered 
foundation of the Rousseauist order of city or of soul. In 
fact, the dominant leitmotiv of Emile, which is greatly ex­
panded in the fourth part, is taken from the Republic. This 
is the idea of the friendship of reason for nature, used to 
represent the bonds that unite the freemen of the Rous­
seauist city. Finally, the entire fifth part is inspired by the 
Socratic lover of wisdom who alone can make the city a 
reality- These affinities are only a sampling of the many to 
be gleaned by following Rousseau as he makes his way 
through the Republic in the pages of the companion vol­
umes that form the central work of his career. 
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Again these are facts that we have never before sus­
pected and can hardly go on ignoring. If we continue to 
expound his philosophy without taking them into account, 
we renounce fruitful possibilities of comprehension, 
whether or not he construes his sources correctly. For here 
I must insist that, in pointing to his dependence upon Soc­
rates and Plato, I do not mean to imply that his interpreta­
tion of the Greek thinkers is orthodox. It may not be. That 
is for philosophers and political scientists to decide. My 
task is rather to add to our knowledge of the modern writer 
by bringing out affiliations hitherto unseen. 
Indeed, a perception of them leads to a new understand­
ing of Emile and the Contract, and broadens, deepens, and 
enriches our appreciation of both. We have formerly 
treated Emile as a pedagogical manual and the Contract as 
a political handbook in the narrowest sense of the words, 
whereas in fact both are philosophical works. They are 
quite as philosophical as the Republic, which, according to 
Rousseau, is not a political work at all but a treatise on 
education or, if we wish, on legislation. So are his own 
books. 
Let us consider the Contract first to see how our know­
ledge of the book has been expanded by an awareness of its 
Socratic origins. There the author's purpose is not to pro­
vide the pattern of an earthly city for founders to follow. By 
imagining that it is, we reduce the scope of the treatise and 
minimize its value. It is true that, like Socrates and for the 
same reasons of clarity, he fancies the city mythically tak­
ing shape in the book. It is also true that, in other publica­
tions and at the invitation of statesmen, he adapts his prin­
ciples to a new constitution for Corsica and a government 
for Poland. But it is he himself who assumes the formidable 
task, he who is the legislator of his own city of the Con­
tract, as Socrates is of his, or so he claims, and who alone 
knows the philosophical implications of his "system." 
Moreover, in doing so, he is obliged to make concessions 
and modifications to adjust the scheme to a sphere for 
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which it was not really meant. Furthermore, he has no illu­
sions at all about the practical or pragmatic usefulness of his 
ideas in that sphere, even in a mitigated form. In their origi­
nal idealistic cast they would be useful only in the Socratic 
sense. And so he says repeatedly that his city does not exist 
and never will, and that if it did, men would be like blocks 
of wood or, to use Socrates' word, like posts. He even says 
that, if he were a philosopher-king ("sage et roi") in our 
world and could found such a city and change men accord­
ingly, he would decline to do so.1 In other words, he does 
not seriously visualize a city in the ordinary sense of the 
word governed according to his abstract principles, any 
more than his Greek master does. The Rousseauist city, 
like the Socratic one, exists in idea only. Since its pattern is 
a concept of the soul in its pristine purity and made in the 
image of God, it is itself proposed as the true sage's pattern 
of educational or legislative processes, a pattern that is sev­
eral times evoked in the Republic and in matching passages 
of Emile. It is intended to reflect a sublime prototype or 
mythical model of civil or civilized life that "he who desires 
may behold, and beholding, may set his own house in or­
der." The Rousseauist sage, like the Socratic, does pre­
cisely that. He orders, preserves, and governs his own life 
after the manner of that ideal city, as God orders, pre­
serves, and governs the universe. He is a creator of order 
like the Maker or, rather, like the Socratic and Rousseauist 
carpenter who in the Republic is only once removed from 
the Artist of artists. 
He accomplishes his purpose, in the view of both Soc­
rates and his disciple, by no other means than an act of his 
own enlightened will. Nothing else can liberate a man's 
powers or "force him to be free" in Rousseau's own 
phraseology. For him as for his master nothing else is even 
lawful. To impose such restraint upon others is lawless, 
unless those "others" correspond Socratically to a man's 
own faculties imaginatively exteriorized. Such action is also 
futile since no one can be changed from the outside. Rous­
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seau's whole philosophy is built around this idea, which is 
entirely Socratic. In the vision of Er in the Republic, which 
I must again recall to the reader's mind, the Greek sage too 
shows the great danger of having men behave like posts. 
There we see souls, about to be reborn, ascend from earth 
and descend from heaven to a place where they are bidden 
to choose among samples of lives set before them and thus 
assume responsibility for their own destiny. Socrates ex­
plains that those who came from heaven and in a former 
life had dwelt in a well-ordered state made an unwise 
choice; their virtue was a matter of habit only, and they 
had no philosophy: "They had never been schooled by trial 
whereas the pilgrims who came from earth, having them­
selves suffered and seen others suffer, were not in a hurry 
to choose." Rousseau sees the same danger in any outward 
authority, except in the case of children, who must be 
taught to be sages and to need neither external laws nor 
government but only those of the Contract. That being so, 
what is the use of complaining, as we have been doing, that 
a city like his cannot exist on earth, since he was the first to 
say so, and that our fate would be worse if it did, since no 
one could agree more completely than he does? And what is 
the use of arguing about his demand for a unanimous whole 
and about the effects of such a demand upon majority rule, 
since he is simply saying that a true sage must be single-
minded? 
As for Emile, it too now appears in a fresh light since a 
study of its intimate affinities with Socrates throws into new 
and larger perspective the real theme of the book and true 
preoccupations of the author, which, as in the case of the 
Contract, are self-discipline and self-government. In the 
fifth of the Letters from the Mount Rousseau declares that, 
in the preface to the novel and several times in the text 
thereof, he indicates that such is his subject. There he 
writes: "It is a question of a new system of education [in 
the sense in which he applies the term to the Republic] 
whose plan I submit to the inspection of sages, and not a 
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method for fathers and mothers, which never even entered 
my mind. If sometimes, in common enough imagery, I seem 
to address them, it is to make myself better under­
s t o o d . . . .  " As we have witnessed, he makes himself 
thoroughly clear, whatever imagery he uses. For example, 
he says in the opening pages of Emile that his system would 
be effective only if employed by someone who had himself 
been educated according to it. The governor, he contends, 
must be formed for his pupil and may undertake only one 
education and no more. This can only mean, as Socrates 
says, that the governor, who is the embodiment of reason 
taught by experience, must foster and cultivate natural man 
within the human creature of which he is a part. The only 
education a man may pursue is his own. That is the lesson 
conveyed in Emile. There Rousseau appropriates this Soc­
ratic conclusion in a very personal way as we have seen. In 
speaking of the inner life of the sage, he is speaking of his 
own as well as ours, and his ideal story of the race is that of 
his own spiritual pilgrimage. Emile is natural man within 
himself and supposedly in us all, conceived on the road to 
Vincennes in 1749, or later in the forest of Saint-Germain, 
and finally born or reborn at Montmorency. Jean-Jacques is 
the "helmsman," or reason in the service of human nature, 
who has learned the secrets of spiritual life "in the school of 
misfortune" and who undertakes to guide the whole moral 
being to wisdom and happiness. As we now know and need 
not prove again, the writer admits the autobiographical 
value of his work at every critical turning point in the novel: 
when the governor subscribes to the oath of the covenant 
that commits him to respect the constitution and rule ac­
cordingly; when Emile for his part is drawn into the same 
conscious commitment; and finally when the moral or so­
cial person applies these principles in the conduct of life and 
particularly in the innermost recesses of the spirit where 
Sophia, or wisdom, abides. Rousseau implicitly admits it 
again when his hero, searching through the world for a city 
where alone he can live happily with her, is shown a pattern 
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of the writer's own city of the Contract whose laws and 
government, he learns, are enshrined within the sage since 
it is in fact a pattern for his formation. 
That formation, Socratic in almost every respect, goes 
much further than we have formerly thought. Usually, the 
first two parts of the book are understood to deal with the 
nature of the sensitive being, the third with the develop­
ment of judgment in the active being, the fourth with the 
growth of the reasonable being, and the fifth with a love 
story. This interpretation is, of course, true as far as it goes. 
But it overlooks the training of the Rousseauist will whose 
acts are Socratic laws and are defined accordingly, as it also 
overlooks the training of reason in the application of those 
laws or in the art of Socratic kingship. It overlooks too the 
fact that the author follows step by step the education of the 
Socratic guardian and philosopher-king, which is the discip­
line imposed by the sage upon himself. Besides, its exclu­
sively literal and even positivistic approach has led us to 
complain that he neglects to follow his original intention 
and deal with wisdom in the love story; but in truth there, as 
much as anywhere, he speaks of little else, although he does 
so in Socratic imagery. Any work on Emile that ignores 
this, as well as the laws and acts of kingship, requires to be 
supplemented by fresh study. We must come to terms 
philosophically with the fifth part. We must treat it as if it 
were as essential to the story of the Rousseauist sage's 
education as the corresponding phase in the case of the 
Socratic, since it really is. It is all the more so, not only 
because it contains more than a quarter of the book, but 
because it relates to the most important phase, namely, 
manners, customs, and opinion, which are the "keystone of 
the vault" of the Contract as they are in the Republic. It is 
therefore necessarily connected with earlier parts, notably 
the early training of taste through beautiful sights and 
sounds, the Socratic orientation of reason, Sophia's first 
portrait, Emile's studies in aesthetics, and the essay on 
wealth, or rather, on happiness, wisdom, and beauty. We 
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may conclude that insight into the historical relationships of 
the work enlarges our knowledge of it to the same extent as 
is the case with the Contract. 
Our knowledge of both is also increased by a comparison 
of the two books with one another. For this approach, too, 
we have the writer's authorization in his correspondence as 
well as in Emile itself. And his authorization proves to be 
justified. It is quite true, as he says in a letter of 23 May 
1762, that the Contract is a sort of appendix to Emile and 
that both together make a complete whole. With equal jus­
tification Jean-Jacques in the text of the novel implies the 
same thing. When he sets out to provide the hero with an 
archetype of the ideal city that is really a pattern to lead him 
autonomously to Sophia, he explains that he is motivated 
by an oath sworn at the beginning of Emile's education and 
binding him to find wisdom and happiness for them both. 
The results of that search are therefore to be found not only 
in his work heretofore but also in the synopsis of the Con­
tract, anticipated by his words and following thereafter. 
These assertions of the author have been verified in the 
foregoing collation. The two productions, far from repre­
senting a cleavage in his mind, as we have thought in the 
past, are essentially one and are consequently more closely 
bound together than has been supposed even by recent cri­
tics who have pointed to links between them. In fact, the 
affinities of both to the Republic are enough to arouse sus­
picions about their mutual connections. The same affinities 
make the reader more sensitive to the myths of Emile, 
which provide easier access to the ideas they convey and 
help to bring out the identity of the latter and those of the 
appendix. Indeed, the parables and myths of the novel con­
sistently turn out to be an allegorical version of doctrines of 
which the Contract is merely an abstract. The latter re­
duces the allegories to a state of disembodied ideas that in 
their turn are infused with fresh life by a collation with the 
imageries of the master work. My primary purpose herein 
has been to demonstrate this rather than to evaluate ideas 
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as such. I have sought to achieve that purpose not 
abstractly but as concretely as possible by means of a jux­
taposition and comparison of texts, a method suited to de­
tect and reveal their kinship. The results constitute another 
major aspect of this study. They show that both treatises 
evolve according to a single plan—which is that of the 
Republic—the Contract following the novel step by step 
and carefully respecting the order of its composition as the 
two move together through four parts without ever taking 
leave of each other. My research also proves that the fifth 
part of Emile is a synthesis and consummation of all that 
precedes. Moreover, the intimate relationship of texts has 
emerged as self-evident. In other words, the texts have lent 
themselves freely to collation and comparision without 
being beaten into submission or tortured in any way. That is 
further proof that they do indeed match one another per­
fectly, as the author says. 
It is, of course, important to be aware of this. Not that it 
matters in an absolute sense whether his thought actually 
possesses unity or does not. But it concerns cultured per­
sons in general and scholars in particular to know the facts 
of the case. 
The realization that the two books are basically one mod­
ifies our view of both as much as an understanding of their 
associations with the Republic does. It confirms that Emile 
is as certainly a treatise on citizenship, law, and self-
government as the Contract is. It also discloses that the 
latter, even though its principles are as universal, eternal, 
and therefore as static as those of Emile, presents them by 
way of a gradually evolving educational process as much as 
the so-called pedagogical work does. Rousseau like Soc­
rates "imagines the State in process of creation" to see 
"the justice and injustice of the State in process of creation 
also."2 Both his books describe one and the same process. 
A consciousness of this shows further what their affiliations 
with Socratic thought accentuates, namely, that each one 
deals with faculties of soul, their alleged natural or normal 
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constitution and proper administration to which every man 
of understanding is invited to accommodate his life. In both 
Rousseau proposes to sages a solemn spiritual commitment 
that integrates the entire person or human creature into a 
closely knit whole, subjects all its parts to the reasonable 
will, and thereby brings it into communion with great lead­
ers of the past and present, especially his own chosen mas­
ters. The intricate and presumably well-balanced moral re­
lationships that result in the inner realm are those of an 
ideal city, and for him they must prevail in civilized life, 
although they do not and cannot materialize in a political 
order in the external world. His ultimate and proper do­
main, like that of Socrates, is the soul, from which, in his 
eyes, all social reform must come. Consequently, the only 
remedy he favors to heal the disorders of the world is integ­
rated, humanistic man as opposed to the amoral savage or 
his immoral modern counterpart. Any other scheme is, in 
his opinion, sheer quackery. He proposes that solution 
even though such a man has never been seen since the time 
of Socrates or Christ. He is exhorting men to come out of 
the woods and abandon their primitive, unsocial, or anti­
social ways not by changing material things in the sphere of 
actuality but by changing life through the action of the 
spirit, as we have seen. For him that is the only way to 
create a real bond among them and to generate sympathy, 
friendship, and love in their midst, at least theoretically. 
Through that bond alone the unearthly new Geneva, Spar­
ta, or Aemilian Rome of his desires really existed in his 
imagination and filled him with characteristic ardor for "his 
own city" or ideal image of the soul. His patriotic fervor, 
undiminished after the renunciation of his Genevan citizen­
ship, has nothing to do with the Calvinist republic or na­
tional prejudice on behalf of the land of his birth. Theoret­
ically it may be combined with the love of human nature in 
mankind since that love is supposedly its very source, how­
ever difficult it may be in practice for most of us to embrace 
the race of men, including the most disordered souls, and 
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love them all with equal energy. On the other hand, the 
same fervor can hardly be reconciled with cosmoplitanism, 
which for Rousseau means a love of the false states of this 
world, states quite alien to his own view of the true one as 
seen in the two books under discussion. The interrelation­
ships of the companion volumes greatly clarify his 
philosophical and psychological aspirations in both. 
The consciousness of their intrinsic identity increases our 
knowledge of them in other ways too. For instance, a colla­
tion of the Contract with Emile explains the presence in the 
former of certain chapters in the second, third, and fourth 
parts hitherto deemed repetitious or regarded as useless 
padding. In fact, it reclaims for readers eight chapters of the 
treatise, formerly as lost to criticism as most of thefifth part 
of Emile. It reveals that, far from being expendable as we 
have always believed, they are among the most significant 
of all. For example, in the past—and this applies to all 
critics without exception who have written on the 
subject—we have been setting aside and eliminating from 
serious consideration chapters 8, 9, and 10 of the second 
part. Since in those chapters Rousseau defines his laws, as 
a study of the texts shows in the light of a collation with 
Emile and comparison with the Republic, we must now 
admit that we have heretofore failed to recognize the laws 
for what they are. In the third part we have hitherto been 
willing to dispense with chapter 8, where he discusses the 
effects of wealth on government and maintains that the 
freest men are those with fewest needs and equivalent 
material resources. That is one of the most vital and central 
chapters in the book, for he formulates therein a fundamen­
tal rule of the Rousseauist and Socratic order of life. In the 
fourth book we have in the past been disposed to treat 
lightly chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7. We have dismissed them as 
affording a rather irrelevant essay upon primitive Roman 
institutions. We may as well lop off the heads from what 
Socrates calls in the Republic the statues of his heroes. For 
in chapter 4 Rousseau brings his Socratic city to the birth, 
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as we can see if we decipher the imagery and compare it 
with Entile. In chapters 5 and 6 he deals with very real 
powers necessary for good government and indispensable 
to preserve a balance of faculties, which, in his Socratic 
view, is the mainspring of a felicitous inner life. The same 
may be said of chapter 7. Indeed, if we ignore it, we are 
ignoring what he himself calls the most important laws of 
all—manners, customs, and opinion, which are the "keys­
tone of the vault" not only of the Contract but of Entile too, 
or rather, of his whole philosophy. The reader can see for 
himself how urgent it is for political scientists and phil­
sophers to be informed of the bearing and scope of these 
chapters that correspond to some of the most significant 
parts of Emile. As a collation shows, the said chapters must 
be accepted as an integral part of the treatise, and their 
relevance and effectiveness must be recognized if we are to 
achieve even an elementary knowledge of the work and its 
author. 
There is still more to be said about the value of a collation 
of the two books in question. As we have seen, the method 
leads to a clearer conception of the subject of each part of 
Emile. The main themes are as follows: first, reflections 
upon the covenant of friendship; second, the training of the 
will and other powers through the application of the laws of 
necessity and freedom, the latter being that of negative 
education and including the one about the natural bent; 
third, the training of reason in the art of government or 
kingship; fourth, initiation into social order; and finally, the 
foretaste of wisdom and civil order, all within the precincts 
of inner life as in the case of the Republic. In the end the 
social contract of friendship is perfected by the civil con­
tract of marriage, which brings to fulfillment all principles 
and powers called into play from the first and symbolizes 
initiation into the ultimate beatific vision of wisdom. 
As I have said, the associations of Emile and the Con­
tract with one another and the Republic can best be recog­
nized by approaching Rousseau's masterwork through his 
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aesthetics, including his use of myths. The examination of 
this aspect of the novel is another basic contribution of the 
present study to Rousseauist scholarship. In the past what I 
have called the artistic, imaginative content of the book has 
been overshadowed by ideological theorizing or stylistic, 
positivistic analysis. To my knowledge it has never been 
the subject of a published commentary. The fact that it has 
been overlooked results in a serious lacuna in the Rous­
seauist bibliography. The omission is serious not only be­
cause the matter is interesting in itself but especially be­
cause a treatment of it leads to worthwhile historical and 
ideological disclosures. The omission is all the more grave 
by reason of the author's own statements in the text of the 
book where he underlines the role of aesthetics in his 
philosophy and also says quite frankly that he is using the 
language of symbolic expression in his writing. "All my 
ideas are in images," says he in the fourth book of the 
memoirs in a phrase comparable to others in Emile. His 
own words are an open invitation to consider the novel from 
a literary and artistic standpoint and to cope with the prob­
lems entailed therein. In order to see how imperative it is to 
do so, one has only to formulate a few conclusions from the 
foregoing study relating first to his aesthetics in general and 
finally to his use of myths. 
The aesthetic approach is authorized in both Emile and 
the companion volume, where Rousseau teaches that taste 
guides the course of human life. He does so especially in 
the second and fourth parts of each and in the fifth part of 
Emile. In the Contract his aforementioned "keystone of 
the vault" or law of opinion defines what is beautiful or 
pleasing, and honorable or admirable, and thereby shapes 
manners and customs of which the censor is custodian. For 
the author the secret of what we judge good or evil is to be 
found in what we believe beautiful and honorable or the 
reverse. The doctrine is that of Socrates, who contends, by 
an identical process of reasoning, that the city stands or 
falls on the nature of its pleasures. The same doctrine reap­
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pears in Emile where the law of opinion governing the 
beautiful or honorable is regarded as determining the suc­
cess of all others. For example, Rousseau is guided by this 
conviction in the second part where he broaches the educa­
tion of his guardian of the laws, and makes ethics and 
aesthetics as inseparable as they are for his master, who 
never dissociates the two. In the third part he professes to 
teach what is "useful" but openly admits that he is employ­
ing the word as does the Greek sage, for whom the only 
useful knowledge is whatever is related not to shopkeeping 
but to the pursuit of the beautiful and the good. In the 
fourth part the social and moral order is Socratically 
crowned by aesthetics, which are again linked with ethics in 
the first portrait of Sophia, and in Emile's studies in taste, 
culminating in the essay on the ecstatic contemplation of 
the beautiful and the good where the whole fifth part is 
foreshadowed. Obviously beauty is of primary concern to 
Rousseau in both Emile and the Contract. 
For that very reason he is far from indifferent to the 
imaginative content of the masterwork in particular. He 
takes to heart his own precept that it is important to please 
men in order to serve them, and that "the art of writing is 
no idle [or useless] pursuit when it is employed to proclaim 
the truth."3 The latter maxim is a Rousseauist form of the 
Socratic one that the useful is whatever leads toward truth, 
meaning moral truth or the beautiful and the good. In pursu­
ing this object and seeking to please, the author of Emile 
intends to behave like a Socratic artist. He never loses sight 
of the context of the Republic from which the leitmotiv of 
his book is taken. There the sage exhorts all artists to ex­
press in their works that grace and harmony which, like 
goodness and virtue, are said to depend on "the true 
simplicity of a rightly and nobly ordered mind and charac­
ter." He expels from his republic those who depict images 
of moral deformity and admits only the ones who are gifted 
to discern the beauty that is "the effluence of fair works" 
and draws the soul into likeness and sympathy or friend­
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ship with the beauty of reason. This passage and its sequel, 
to which Rousseau was so deeply indebted for the main 
theme of his book, was also decisive in shaping its artistic 
character, at least in his own intentions. As we saw in Pyg­
malion, he liked to imagine that his work was as faultless in 
beauty as the "statues" of Socrates' kings in the great clas­
sic. The Socratic concept of the artist who portrays only 
the beautiful and the good is clearly the ideal to which he 
aspires in Emile. 
The question arises as to how it is possible to reconcile 
those aspirations with the professed aim of his literary art, 
which is to portray the human heart in its folly and its mis­
ery, as well as moral and psychological truth in the absolute 
sense. The difficulty is more apparent than real. Every­
where in Emile, and even in the last part, we are constantly 
alive to the presence of an alien world that, although it 
never becomes obtrusive enough to overshadow the ideal 
order or usurp the center of the stage, is still the background 
of the story. Rousseau shows how its existence stirs the 
soul to life and moves it to exercise its powers, of which we 
are never really conscious until they are challenged. For 
example, the Savoyard vicar becomes aware of the soul 
only as a result of the contradiction between man's evil 
plight and the excellence of his nature. In Emile that con­
trast is something with which the human spirit must con­
tend, and this fact accentuates the psychological realism 
of the book in spite of its lofty idealism. 
For the author does, in fact, adhere therein to the main 
purpose of his "classical" aesthetic doctrine. He uses a 
variety of visual forms to portray his concept of universal 
and eternal human qualities and especially the inner world, 
its principles, orderly processes, threatened deviations, and 
existing and ideal relationships with the material and moral 
environment. The same is necessarily true of the Contract. 
In both, notwithstanding the rarified atmosphere that dis­
tinguishes them from his other works, he betrays exactly 
the same interest in human psychology as he does 
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everywhere else. In all of them he makes a profound and 
comprehensive study of inner man (including the actual and 
the "true"), which, like the "classical" writers of antiquity 
or of the French seventeenth century, he regards as the one 
theme worthy of literature. And in the two books in ques­
tion the results are as valid or as invalid as they are any­
where else in his work, since they are no different. It is only 
the external form that varies from the early Discourses to 
the last autobiographical compositions, his researches 
being presented in a variety of disguises. They may take on 
the air of a historical survey or a philosophy of religion or 
citizenship or a pedagogical treatise or even a story of his 
own life. But behind the disguises there is always a preoc­
cupation with man in general, which was consistently a 
prime motive of his writings however we may evaluate the 
results. In this respect, as in many others, he stands in 
direct antithesis to his famous contemporaries. The abyss 
between them lies largely in a difference in attitude toward 
literature. They use it as a pretext for moral, religious, or 
political theorizing and turn it into a glorified kind of prop­
aganda. He takes the opposite course. For example, in 
Emile he uses the social, religious, and political preoccupa­
tions of the day as pretexts for artistic creativity, and turns 
them into the mythical substance of literature in the tradi­
tional sense of the word with its psychological and spiritual 
implications. 
In doing so, he is guided not only by his readings but 
especially by a personal intuitive vision of man and the 
world, based upon observation and experience and 
supplemented by what we call "classical" common sense. 
His appeal to that faculty in the pedagogical novel and 
elsewhere also sets him apart, at least in his own eyes, from 
some of the other great literary men of his time. According 
to him, they constructed their theories and "philosophical" 
systems by means of speculative reason frequently di­
vorced from the facts of reality. Consequently he complains 
of their lack of psychological realism. By contrast he pro­
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fesses to rely upon knowledge and judgment acquired by 
personal contact with beings and things. In fact, Emile and 
the Contract testify to a richly varied cultivation of life and 
a long, patient, and tenacious application of the mind to 
arrive at a conception of spiritual truth on that basis. We 
may therefore conclude that his "classical" qualities are 
authentic. They result from a genuine effort on his part to 
adhere to his Greco-Latin aesthetic profession of faith. 
That is true even though when he carries the doctrine into 
the sphere of practical creative activity, his achievements 
may be unorthodox at the same time as they become suf­
fused with "romantic" lyricism. 
If they are thus transformed, it is because, as we have 
seen, his observation of the nature of man and the human 
condition is also largely based upon a close watching of his 
own soul and inner life. Of course, that was likewise the 
case with Montaigne, whom he greatly admired and who 
was the first French litterateur to probe the mysteries of the 
human spirit by plumbing the depths of his own. Rous­
seau's mode of procedure is much the same in Emile, 
where, however, he employs it rigorously enough to pass 
beyond the innermost recesses of the self and reach general 
characteristics that are common to us all and always have 
been. But it is largely the subjective approach that explains 
his peculiar view of the soul, as well as his emotional pre­
sentation of it in the two main parts of the novel. This 
emotional quality, typical of him, belongs to Judeo-
Christian art from the Middle Ages to the nineteenth cen­
tury. His " roman t i c" embrace of the "classical1 ' 
psychological object does not necessarily preclude a realis­
tic apprehension of human nature, at least in some aspects 
of it if not in all. His introspective attitude may even inten­
sify his grasp of the theme. The reader must decide that 
matter for himself. 
Rousseau, like his famous models, formulates the results 
of his psychological research, particularly in Emile, in the 
language of symbolic expression, as he himself says. Even 
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if he had not said so, we might have surmised that he was 
having recourse to myths and parables because of his pro­
fessed prediliction for Plato and the Bible, which swarm 
with both. Yet by comparison with the ancient ones, his 
own are practically unknown. The investigation of them is 
one of the foremost aims of this study, since, as I have 
hinted, a collation of Emile with the Contract would be 
virtually impossible without it. That inquiry has shown that 
the Aemilian myths are, almost without exception, identical 
with those of the writer's sources and, like his psychology, 
are "romantic" and "classical," Greek and biblical at 
once. They represent fragments of a past more than 2,500 
or rather 3,000 years old, rearranged and harmonized into a 
new organism designed to give outward expression to the 
author's intellectual purpose. The main reason we have not 
previously detected them or dealt with them on a large scale 
is that Rousseau transmutes their substance and character 
into his own and then handles them with the subtlety and 
unostentatiousness of a "classical" writer. But once we 
sense their existence, we discover that they make only the 
most reasonable demands upon the insight and sensitivity 
of anyone who tries to fathom them. 
By way of conclusion, it might be helpful to review a few 
of the salient images in the collation and bring out their 
Socratic and Judeo-Christian qualities and ideological im­
plications. This will provide an opportunity to gather to­
gether into a brief synthesis some of the results achieved in 
all three aspects of the work: the inquiry into Rousseau's 
Socratic and Judeo-Christian affinities in image and idea; 
the comparison of Emile and the Contract; and the explora­
tion of his use of mythical forms that leads to a revelation of 
the aforesaid affinities and thereby renews, expands, and 
enhances our knowledge of his writings and especially of 
these two. 
Apart from the Socratic and Judeo-Christian analogy of 
soul and city, the most impressive of all images is the bibli­
cal one of the temple that is the key to the structure of 
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Emile and turns into a Socratic "citadel of the soul" in the 
Contract. In spite of the origin of the image, the temple of 
the book is basically of Greek design. Indeed, the foregoing 
study shows that in form as well as content the novel is an 
outstanding monument of the Greek revival in French art. 
Yet this study also demonstrates that the mythical temple is 
gradually transfigured in character to conform with the bi­
blical nature of the image, especially in the innermost 
chamber where the intimate, inward mystic spirit of Christ­
ianity prevails as a powerful source of poetic lyricism and 
immense psychological expansion. In fine, the transcen­
dental concept of the temple structure, combining elements 
affiliated with both traditions, is eminently suited to convey 
the idea that some of the choicest features of occidental 
culture provide the framework of the author's art and 
thought. 
Within this architectonic ensemble innumerable other 
images testify to a similar accommodation of equally varied 
ingredients of artistic and intellectual inspiration. The few 
that are not Socratic and biblical are borrowed from Robin­
son Crusoe, Plutarch, La Fontaine, and Fenelon. I shall 
choose examples from each of the five parts of the master­
work and indicate their historical origins and ideological 
associations. 
In the first part, the dedication of the book to a mother, 
the new Geneva and city of Sophia or wisdom, whose citi­
zens are her children, provides an initial link not only with 
the Social Contract, written in honor of the same mythical 
city, but also with the Socratic republic, which is mother 
and nurse of its citizens and is personified in the Muse, its 
queen. This is Socrates' "royal lie" and the first "wave" 
that he must overcome to establish his city. However, the 
Aemilian image, idealizing womanhood from the first, is, of 
course, also Judeo-Christian. It is followed by the myth of 
the swaddling clothes analogous to the social fetters that 
prompted the writing of the Contract as well as the novel. 
Both metaphors are comparable with the Socratic myth of 
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prisoners burdened with chains in an underground den and 
awaiting their release and ascent into the upper world 
through the saving power of education or legislation. Rous­
seau recounts the same Socratic ascent in his companion 
volumes. In Emile he paradoxically imagines the possible 
release of his own "prisoners" through an impossible 
idealization of the home and family that becomes a non-
Socratic and Judeo-Christian symbol to foreshadow the 
perfect city of the Contract. The city is also anticipated in 
the latter treatise by corresponding reflections upon the 
family. Thereafter both books contain Socratic warnings 
against tyranny and slavery, a cipher of evil passions that 
threaten the natural or ideal order of things in soul or city. 
These admonitions are followed in each case by a concrete 
presentation of spiritual engagements regarded as ulti­
mately conducive to that order. For example, in Emile the 
Socratic personification of reason in Jean-Jacques, friendly 
to man or human nature in Emile, is motivated by friend­
ship to make a Socratic and biblical covenant of peace in­
stead of property, like that of the Contract, for the sake of 
human happiness. The covenant of friendship is, as we now 
know, an image of the lawful social bonds envisaged by the 
"royal lie." Its formulation leads in Emile to a Socratic 
attack upon charlatanical physician-statesmen who go 
about doctoring and complicating disorders instead of call­
ing upon the services of a true physician and renewing the 
constitution, as Rousseau professes to do in his two books. 
The austere felicity he visualizes in both is equally Socratic 
and Judeo-Christian and consists of the freedom of human 
faculties from slavish and tyrannical desires, and enjoy­
ment of the necessities of life or, if we wish, Rousseauist 
"property." 
As we have seen, the second part of Emile is divided into 
two sections, the first of which is the most theoretical of all 
and contains the substance of the entire corresponding part 
of the Contract. There, as in the latter, the author gives 
precedence to the discipline of the guardian will through the 
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agency of reason in the application of law, and provides for 
the imposition of narrow bounds upon vagrant desires to 
free the sovereign faculty. The idea of disciplining the will 
under the guidance of reason before dealing with the ruling 
power itself and entrusting the moral being to the en­
lightened will or habit of order to make the latter into an 
autonomous authority is Socratic, and so is its embodiment 
in law. And the Rousseauist laws of necessity, negative 
education, and the natural bent, or rather, of necessity and 
freedom, reinforced by the law of opinion are all defined, in 
the books herein collated, in exactly the same way as they 
are in the Republic. Their object in every case is also iden­
tical, namely, the common good or unity, which Socrates 
tries to secure by means of his second "wave," the control 
of every form of property, including the family, by the high­
est powers with a view to avoiding dissension in the moral 
being and fostering common feelings. Although Rousseau 
subsequently handles the latter in his own way, his ideas on 
property hardly differ for practical purposes from the Soc­
ratic and are no less favorable to the laws and their intent. 
These laws govern the educational process described in 
the second section of the same part of Emile where the 
Rousseauist "guardian" is trained after the manner of the 
Socratic, in spite of a contemporary facade. His formation 
consists of Greek "musical" education, including "false" 
myths that illustrate the law or "strain" of necessity, such 
as those of the Socratic husbandman, lawbreaker, and 
promise-breaker. The said myths have great ideological 
value. For example, they entail a confrontation of the 
Rousseauist covenant, or law of peace, with the historical 
one of property, a confrontation that accentuates the oppos­
ing attitudes of each toward material possessions. The au­
thor thereby contrasts what he regards as a "false" order of 
human life and a "true" one. Proceeding to describe the 
latter, he passes from the "strain" or law of necessity to 
that of peace and freedom (including the law of negative 
education and the natural bent) that fosters and cultivates 
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the natural constitution through "true" myths, harmony, 
and rhythm. The myths in question, such as nighttime 
games and miniature Olympics—both to a considerable de­
gree Socratic—teach the hero to see in the dark and have 
no fear, and to use his mind and will in the exercise of a 
primitive kind of justice. Other forms of "musical" educa­
tion in the Greek sense provide Socratic shadows of images 
of the beauty, harmony, and taste that are to characterize 
and safeguard the mythical city. The ultimate aim is always 
to ensure the same ascetic happiness promised in the begin­
ning. 
The third part of both books is mainly Socratic, although 
to some extent it is also Judeo-Christian. Yet in Emile it is 
dominated by the modern image of Robinson Crusoe, 
whose sovereignty and kingship are compared in the begin­
ning of the Contract with those of Adam or of man. The 
image is characteristic of the writer and gives those pages of 
the novel a contemporary air. Nevertheless, it is used to 
typify the Rousseauist student king, who is the real theme 
therein and who remains Socratic in spite of his Robinson­
ian garb. For this part of the two works, dealing with the 
governing faculty, is linked with Socrates' third "wave," 
which is the theory that philosophers must be kings, mean­
ing that reason must rule in soul or city. In both Rousseau's 
texts that faculty is regarded more or less Socratically as a 
"mean proportional" between subject desires and 
sovereign will, a middle power whose strength and purpose 
are those of the moral being. In Emile the author uses a 
sequence of similitudes to indicate that his object is indeed 
the cultivation of reason in the art of government or orienta­
tion, exactly as it is in the same part of the Contract. The 
myths are well contrived to exemplify concretely this phase 
of Emile's progress, which matches the Socratic prelude to 
the formation of philosopher-kings. In brief his education is 
that prescribed by the sage for his own student kings. The 
imageries in question begin with what I called the little 
similitude of the sun, since it prefigures the big one in the 
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next part and serves to symbolize the dawn of reason. It is 
followed by what I called the parable of the conjuror Soc­
rates and the myth of Montmorency forest, both of which 
are Socratic and portray the hero's need for positive gov­
ernment by an enlightened aristocracy of superior powers 
or the true kingship of Adam or of man, rather than of 
monarchs, if he is to find his way to civilized life. That 
Socratic and biblical kingship is foreshadowed in both 
Rousseau's books by the image of Robinson Crusoe, which 
is greatly expanded at this point in Emile. By way of prep­
aration for the more difficult exercise of the governing 
power in a social setting, each book sets forth the fatal 
effects of wealth upon that power and upon the whole moral 
being, and each exemplifies the duty of the ruling authority 
to anticipate such effects, ensure the preservation and 
prosperity of the human constitution and guard the latter 
against abuses and dissolution. These principles are illus­
trated in Emile by a new image of kingship, that of the 
Socratic and Judeo-Christian carpenter who learns "to do 
his own business" within a social framework and to execute 
a "shadow of justice" by paying his debt to society with the 
sweat of his brow. His best faculties are thereby schooled 
for the practice of real justice and higher forms of 
sovereignty and kingship. 
The fourth part of Emile is dedicated to the further for­
mation of the philosopher-king. There the author shows the 
enormous value of lawful social bonds to combat passions 
and sophisms. He does so by evolving the Socratic 
metaphor of friendship into a vast allegory at four crucial 
points occurring before and after the profession of faith. 
Each time he virtually quotes the words of Socrates that 
furnish, as I have said, the leitmotiv of the book. The Soc­
ratic passage in question concludes "musical" education in 
the Republic and is by now familiar to the reader of this 
study. According to the sage, a youth who has received the 
true education of the inner being will praise the good and 
hate the bad "even before he is able to know the reason 
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why; and when reason comes he will recognize and salute 
the friend with whom his education has made him long 
familiar." Mindful of this passage, Rousseau relies upon 
Emile's recognition of the voice of friendship to offset 
temptation at critical moments before the intervention of 
faith when the hero is initiated first into Plutarch's more 
tragic biographies, and then into harsh lessons of life con­
veyed through the enactment of fables inspired by La 
Fontaine. In both cases the acknowledged friendship of 
reason for human nature is conceived as effective armor 
against passions and errors that also haunt the writer of the 
Contract at exactly the same juncture. After the profession 
of faith the author has further recourse to the Socratic text 
when he comes to closer grips with the problems of desires 
and sophisms besetting the soul from within and allayed 
through the ministry of friendship that permits a harmoni­
ous ordering of inner life regarded as real justice. For 
example, in the great scene of the covenant where passion 
is made known to the hero in his own person, the leitmotiv 
recurs, reason comes and Emile definitively recognizes and 
salutes his familiar friend. Again later when sophist seduc­
ers make their appeal to the soul, he discomfits them by 
acknowledging the voice of friendship and responding to its 
call. Such are the four contexts wherein Rousseau alludes 
in Emile to the famous phrase of the Republic. This is a fact 
that has never before been even suggested in a published 
work, but which we need to know if the book is not to 
remain forever enigmatic. 
Many ideologically invaluable myths and other literary 
processes are also to be found in the middle section of the 
fourth part, the profession of faith. Indeed, it is itself one of 
the greatest myths in the book and contains the real 
similitude of the sun or the author's concept of revelation 
that is supposed to consecrate the philosophy of Emile and 
the Contract. It is both Socratic and Judeo-Christian. Since 
he calls it the "song of Orpheus," I concluded that it is 
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meant to tame the wild beast element in man and sustain the 
"friendly" voice of reason that favors human nature and 
the human will. It coincides essentially with the civic creed 
of the so-called "political" treatise. But in the masterwork 
religious faith is a profoundly personal experience, giving 
reality and incentive to the expanding inner life of a 
"leader" and strengthening both reason and will against 
lawless feelings and fallacies. In the appendix it is a creed 
for the common people (or subject desires) and, like the 
brief one in the last part of Emile, is added at the end of the 
book to sanctify a mythical city and its laws in the world of 
men and things where, however, that city can never be 
seen. In fine, it may not be said that in the matter of reli­
gion the Contract violates the order of the novel. 
In both books the creed favors the ratification of the 
Rousseauist Socratic and biblical covenant of peace and of 
freedom that is meant to liberate human beings from the 
tyranny and slavery of passion. In each case the sovereign 
ruler or philosopher-king suddenly appears in an awesome 
setting to bring about the "wise order" of the Contract by 
"doing his own business" and providing for the operation 
of lawful government. And in each case the governing fac­
ulty is reinforced by special devices that maintain the 
proper balance of powers within the moral person. Not the 
least of these, as we know, is the censor's Socratic law of 
true opinion concerning beauty and honor, as it is described 
in the Contract. The fact that it has already been mentioned 
above in various contexts underscores its immense impor­
tance. This "universal saving power of true opinion," as 
Socrates calls it, is alleged to guarantee the soul against 
dangers of every kind. Its action, hitherto discreet, now 
becomes almost obtrusive and is illustrated in Emile's in­
troduction to an image of Sophia and also in his study of 
aesthetics, which finally prepare him for participation in 
social life. At that stage the novelist takes great strides in 
carrying out his design, indicated in the ratification of the 
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covenant, to intensify the bonds of friendship through love 
and make the taste for moral beauty an irrevocable choice. 
He thereby uses the law of opinion to ensure the safety of 
an ideal order of things and secure the soul against threats 
from within or without. 
In Emile the fourth part concludes with the aforemen­
tioned Socratic and Judeo-Christian blessed vision of 
beauty and wisdom that is meant to enshrine the law of true 
opinion at a high point in the book, as keystone of the vault 
of the mythical temple. That vision is remote from the 
abstractions of esoteric philosophy and reaches its culmina­
tion in the ecstatic contemplation of the white house and its 
mysterious inhabitants. If, as Rousseau says, there is no­
thing beautiful—or honorable—but what is not, here we 
behold the moral beauty that "is not," except in the realm 
of inner experience in the case of richly endowed individu­
als. The piece is, of course, unmatched in the Contract, 
where such intimate personal fulfillment would be out of 
place in the imagery of an exteriorized city. 
The entire fifth part of Emile is also an intense spiritual 
adventure, and since, like the philosophic ecstasy at the end 
of the fourth, it is confined to the inner resources of 
philosopher-kings, there is no matching part in the appen­
dix. There the author's doctrine is clearly seen to belong to 
the only domain where men can be really autonomous if 
they so choose. 
This part, containing the great myth of Sophia and honor­
ing her, is full of other Socratic, Judeo-Christian, and 
Fenelonian myths that lead the reader through a maze of 
paradoxes to reach the ideas thus arrayed and discern 
therein the source and substance of the Contract. But with­
out an interpretation of imaginative forms, the writer's 
meaning would be puzzling to say the least. For instance, 
having relegated the city and its freemen, together with the 
family and its members, to the land of lost causes in the 
world of space and time, he now apparently resurrects them 
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all, as he does in the Contract, and fancies the little society 
of the home actually materializing to typify its larger coun­
terpart. The imagery is, as I have said, Judeo-Christian 
rather than Socratic. But in truth he uses it to portray the 
love of wisdom that consummates the education of his Soc­
ratic philosopher-king. For Sophia, like the Socratic Muse 
or her Judeo-Christian Solomonic and evangelical equiva­
lent, embodies the wisdom of the ideal civil order that is the 
goal of the hero's life. The symbolism of her person 
emerges from Rousseau's treatment of her formation, 
which is as enigmatic as his handling of her earlier portrait 
was, and resounds with telltale echoes of the Symposium. 
The symbolism of the heroine explains why the author, 
having said that Emile's feeling for Jean-Jacques is his one 
and only unfailing affection, recounts the hero's enduring 
love for Sophia. It also discloses why, having declared in 
Paris that wisdom and happiness are always "nearby," he 
announces paradoxically that she who promises both is 
very far thence, apparently referring to spiritual rather than 
spatial remoteness. The same literary device further reveals 
why, after admitting that Sophia is dead—like her unfortu­
nate prototype and like the wise order or city of his 
fancy—he brings her back to life again, as he does the 
Spartan city of the Contract. In speaking of her predeces­
sor, he clearly alludes to the Socratic Muse of Philosophy, 
whom he christianizes through the influence of his own 
persuasions combined with that of a vicar of Christ, the 
priestly Platonist, Fenelon. The new Rousseauist Sophia, 
resurrected for a skeptical age, is therefore the heir of both 
the Socratic and Judeo-Christian ones. The visionary ap­
parition of the heroine, presented as the object of a court­
ship, affords the hero a Socratic "foretaste" of the blessed 
contemplation of wisdom and beauty, consisting of an 
equally Socratic intercommunion of all studies previously 
undertaken and related thereto. 
The myth of Sophia, like the dream she incarnates, is 
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counterbalanced by a philosophical profession of faith con­
tained in an abstract of the Contract, or rather, of Political 
Institutions, and encompassing the teaching of both books 
from the first. It leads to Emile's fruitless search through 
the world of matter for the Aemilian and Fenelonian city, 
christianized like the heroine and matching not merely the 
aforesaid abstract but Rousseauist wisdom herself, for the 
order he seeks is the only one where he might live happily 
with her on earth and where the two worlds might fuse into 
one. But in the sphere of actuality it is as mythical as she 
appears to be. Emile learns that the city, and probably 
Sophia too, exist only in the kingdom within by virtue of an 
inner covenant of peace pledged to ensure the moral free­
dom essential to felicity. He also discovers that the neces­
sities of life, that other ingredient of austere Rousseauist 
happiness, belong to the domain of a very different pact— 
the pact of property—that allegedly favors the rich at the 
expense of the poor and sacrifices the weak to the strong, 
and the just to the unjust. Finally the governor, having 
proved that there is no corner in Europe where Emile may 
dwell with Sophia, directs him back to that corner where 
she abides, the human spirit where the Rousseauist city is 
enshrined. In case the anomalies already mentioned do not 
suffice to arouse our curiosity, the writer thrice refers to her 
in the masculine gender. Whatever else she may be for 
Emile, she is essentially Socratic "divine wisdom dwelling 
within him." She is the genius that has presided over his 
education from his birth and to which he is finally wedded 
in a mythical Socratic marriage or beatific vision that takes 
place in a spiritual world fashioned after the same prototype 
as the appendix. 
The interrelationships that permit this broader interpreta­
tion of Rousseau's works and include verifiable ties with 
Solomon, Christ, Socrates, and the Platonic dialogues, 
especially the Republic, bring to the surface two remarka­
ble characteristics of the way of life he teaches. Approp­
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riately enough they are respectively associated with his 
laws of freedom and necessity. 
The law of necessity accentuates his austerity. The very 
condition of the spiritual expansion he means to favor and 
foster is poverty. The cultivation and growth of man's nob­
lest powers as he visualizes those processes is, in his view, 
possible only for persons who are content to limit them­
selves in material things to the mere necessities of life and 
are willing to forgo all else. The age of gold he promises 
vanishes with the amassing of gold. Happiness for him 
springs only from his own concept of wisdom and beauty, 
which positively excludes the possession of property in the 
modern sense of the word or in any other sense, unless it be 
akin to Socratic or the earliest Judeo-Christian asceticism. 
Another aspect of his philosophy that looms large in this 
study is his extreme conservatism. The ideal order of 
things, born of his law of freedom, comes about through an 
act of the will on the part of privileged individuals who, far 
from thinking about reforming other people or indulging the 
desire for power or prestige, consider the main business of 
life to be the education of oneself, and the constant exercise 
of sovereignty and kingship in the domain of inner experi­
ence. We have seen that education thus conceived is the 
very theme of Emile and the Contract. It is a continuous 
and never ending effort at personal evolution, having no­
thing at all to do with revolution. That is so in spite of the 
disorders to which Rousseau's own startling statements, 
distorted by the licentious dispositions of men and colored 
by the follies of the time, have given rise. The conservative 
aspect of his thought, like his austerity, is typically Socratic 
as well as essentially Judeo-Christian. Both identify him as 
an authentic heir of the mainstreams of occidental tradition, 
however falsely he may interpret certain of their precepts. 
In fine, to be aware of his purpose and affinities as a 
writer is to understand the extent of the vandalism wrought 
by the perpetrators of the Emile case, whatever their inten­
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tions may have been. That the work is conceivably of a 
persuasion other than one's own, or of a design more or less 
suited to one's taste, is as irrelevant as one's private opin­
ion of the author. But, unfortunately, provocative works of 
art and of thought like Emile and the Contract will always 
be a prey to the extravagances of the religious, moral, or 
political temper of which mankind is so tragically a victim. 
1. "Emile," p. 849. 
2. Republic 2.369. 
3. "Emile," p. 673. 
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253, 260, 262, 263, 268, 282, 283, 
288, 318, 349, 359, 360, 367, 387 
Considerations upon the Government 
of Poland (Rousseau), 26, 42, 49, 
91, 125, 180, 185, 348, 367, 389 
"Constant will," 183, 215, 247. 251, 
268. See also Will 
Constitution of man or city, 22, 24, 48, 
51, 62, 63, 65, 66, 67, 69, 83, 85, 
86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 95, 96, 
97, 103, 104, 105, 106, 109, 110, 
111, 112, 113, 114, 126, 139, 140, 
150, 151, 160, 169, 171, 176, 177, 
178, 183, 188, 213, 215, 217. 232, 233, 
248, 250, 274, 275, 276, 278, 286, 
296, 307, 308, 312, 314, 322, 356, 
386, 392, 396, 406, 408 
Constraint, 46, 47, 107, 276, 315, 373 
Contract, 59, 62, 368, 372. See also 
Covenant 
Cosmopolitanism, 345, 397 
Courage, 82, 103, 112, 130, 131, 139, 
184, 187, 282, 311 
Courtship, 305, 337, 413 
Covenant,	 60, 61, 63, 64, 66, 68, 69, 
70, 93, 94, 95, 111, 120, 124, 139, 
140, 150, 177, 188, 203, 213, 215, 
227. 235, 237, 250, 251, 266, 267, 
268, 269, 277. 279, 305, 307, 308, 
313, 316, 317, 318, 323, 352, 359, 
362, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 371, 
372, 373, 374, 392, 407, 410, 411, 
412; of friendship, 54, 59, 61, 65, 
75, 140, 203, 215, 280, 349, 355, 
366, 398, 406; of peace, 316, 406, 
407. 411, 414; of promise, 59, 359, 
362, 373 
Creation, 154, 181, 238, 395 
Creator, 38, 97, 181, 238, 239, 244, 
390 
Curiosity, 147, 157, 221 
Death, 22, 46, 50, 84, 95, 96, 97, 128, 
177, 178, 240, 241, 243, 244, 250, 
251, 259, 267, 311, 312, 320, 325, 
330, 339, 342, 347, 348, 350, 352, 
367, 413 
224, 250, 251, 288, 318, 334, 375 [4191 
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Deception. See Duplicity 
Dedication: of Emile, 37-38, 45, 314, 
377, 405; of second Discourse, 69, 
272, 289 
Delay in education. See "Negative 
education" 
Delphi, 29, 30, 31, 197. 227, 229 
Democracy, 160-61, 174, 189, 269, 270, 
356,361, 362 
Denouement of Emile, 365 
Descartes, Rene, 187, 234, 237 
Desires: as enemy within, 263-64, 279­
80, 283, 349-50, 410-11; good distin­
guished from evil, 196, 213-14; and 
law of necessity, 84, 111, 415; and 
rulers, 139, 168-69, 269; and sov­
ereign will, 89, 93, 94, 96, 99, 103, 
149, 150, 151, 161, 170, 174, 333, 
352, 359, 361, 373, 407, 408; un­
reasonable, 74, 83, 84, 85, 88, 100, 
106, 176, 180, 185, 216, 233, 356, 
360, 366, 367, 406; woman as agent 
of control of, 311-12 
Despotism, 74, 95, 168, 174, 175, 232, 
253 
Detachment: from property, 366; from 
the world, 225, 249, 350, 371 
Dialogue of Inspiration and Reason, 
256-57 
Dialogues (Rousseau), 16,167,288, 375 
Dialogues of the vicar and apostles, 
255-56 
Dictatorship, 275, 276, 352 
Dictionary of Music (Rousseau), 16, 
17, 229 
Diderot, Denis, 238, 260 
Discourse upon the Arts and Sciences 
(Rousseau), 3, 6, 12, 16, 19, 28, 
44, 45, 65, 154 
Discourse upon Inequality (Rousseau), 
3, 6, 12, 16, 19, 37, 39, 45, 52, 
53, 62, 69, 72, 73, 119, 120, 124, 
171, 198,272, 334,385 
Doric influence, 30, 92, 135, 196 
Drawing and painting, 133, 134 
Duplicity, 95, 211,332 
104, 106, 107, 122, 138, 180, 204, 
249, 252, 287, 294 
Earning of bread, 157, 158, 173, 176, 
180, 182, 355 
Earthly paradise, 293, 337, 338, 372 
Ecclesia, 313, 317 
Ecclesiastes, 225, 255, 261 
Eclogues of Virgil, 318, 327 
Ecstasy, 292, 294, 314, 337, 339, 348, 
374, 400, 412 
Education: adapted to individual, 108; 
for citizenship, 15, 106, 139; and dis­
cernment of good from evil, 28, 
204-5; domestic vs. public, 42-43; 
Emile and Social Contract as treatise 
on, 23-27, 81-82, 101-4, 108-9, 113, 
176-77, 275, 277-78, 357, 389, 391-94; 
and family, 308-10; gymnastic in, 126, 
128-29; and legislation, 92, 100-103, 
112; literary, 206-8; on luxury, 172­
73; and nature, 28, 40; "negative," 
107-8, 111, 113, 125-26, 128, 197-99, 
407; of philosopher-kings, 152-55, 
166, 168-69, 185, 187, 203-4, 216­
21, 227, 236, 337, 372, 409; "pos­
itive," 122-25, 196, 340; reason and, 
105, 106, 107, 176; removed from 
passions, 91; Republic as finest 
treatise on, 285-86; sensorial, 71, 
129-38, 408; of Socratic heroes, 20­
22, 113-16, 155-56, 343; true aims 
of, 84, 85, 277, 400; of woman, 201, 
308-9, 312-21, 376, 387; and worldly 
society, 280-85 
Educator-legislator, 111, 115, 181, 273, 
275 
Elections by choice or lot, 270, 271 
Emile and Sophia (sequel to Emile), 
325 
Emile case, 4-11, 415 
Emotions, 195 ff., 266, 291, 327, 367, 
375. See also Feelings; Passions 
Enemies, 204, 205, 207, 211, 217, 223, 
251, 263, 264, 265, 267, 349, 370 
Enlightened will, 64, 65, 70, 72, 73, 
85, 86, 88, 93, 95, 99, 102, 126, 
268, 316, 352, 364, 373, 390, 407. 
See also Reasonable will 
Duties of man, 21, 56, 68, 82, 84, [420] 
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Environment, 55, 167, 171, 172, 200 
Equality, 46, 71, 73, 74, 75, 93, 94, 
110, 139, 160, 162, 172, 212, 213, 
270, 286, 290, 332 
Error, 46, 186-87, 209, 212, 215, 216, 
236, 279, 280,284,410,411 
Essay upon Theatrical Imitation, 208, 
296 n. 15 
Essay upon the Origin of Languages, 
16, 17 
Essay upon wealth, 288, 335, 337, 338, 
356, 375, 393, 400 
Ethics, 17, 316,400 
Eucharis, 336, 353 
Evangelical Christianity, 248, 249, 250, 
253, 259 
Evil, passim, esp. 205 ff. See also 
Errors; Passions 
Executive power, 149, 150, 159, 178, 
188, 275. See also Government; 
Reason 
Fables: in education, 115, 123, 124, 
125, 206, 210, 211, 212, 215, 216, 
279, 282, 410 
Faculties of man, 39, 52, 53, 56, 67, 
68, 69, 71, 75, 83, 84, 88, 90, 94, 95, 
99, 103, 104, 106, 110, 111, 112, 
120, 125, 133, 134, 139, 140, 150, 
158, 161, 162, 169, 174, 176, 180, 
184, 185, 200, 212, 221, 232, 240, 
247, 262, 268, 274, 275, 283, 317, 
318, 333, 357, 358, 361, 366, 367, 
368, 373, 390, 395, 398, 402, 406, 
408, 409, 411 
Fallacies. See Error; Sophisms 
False myths, 114, 115, 117-22, 407 
Family: as educational institution, 45­
46; and law of the strongest, 89-90; 
as miniature of ideal city, 24, 45, 
47, 307-10, 312, 316, 318, 319, 321, 
326, 348, 375, 387. 406, 412-13; 
Socrates on, 45, 50, 308-9, 407; as 
symbol of the good life, 369-70 
Father: as symbol, 49, 50, 51, 54, 
58, 60, 75, 90, 97, 138, 196, 267, 
282, 307. 308, 309, 310, 317, 323, 
331, 353, 359, 367, 375, 376, 392 
Fear, 202, 233, 282 
Federation, 183, 362, 363 
Feelings, 89, 107, 108, 154, 182, 196, 
198, 208, 213, 246, 263, 287. 331, 
337, 349, 373, 411, 413. See also 
Emotions; Passions 
Felicity, 61, 82, 83, 84, 85, 139, 147, 
148, 150, 163, 167, 168, 199, 202, 218, 
247, 270, 287. 288, 292, 294, 311, 
316, 343, 349, 356, 365, 406, 414. 
See also Happiness 
Fenelon, Francois de Salignac de La 
Mothe, 38, 154, 243, 265, 321, 322, 
324, 326, 329, 336, 352, 363, 364, 
405, 412, 413, 414 
Fidelity, 307, 308, 317, 318, 360, 365, 
371, 373 
Finance, 184, 324, 338, 355 
First occupancy, 70, 72, 118 
Force, 46, 54, 70, 273, 358, 373, 390 
"Foretaste" of paradise or wisdom, 
337. 339, 340, 341, 348, 350, 351, 
372, 376, 398, 413 
"Forget thyself," 30, 261, 269 
Formey, Jean-Louis-Samuel, 16 
Fortitude, 112, 128, 178. See also 
Courage 
France, 7. 9, 57, 230 
Freedom, 46, 51, 53, 62, 64, 70, 71, 
72, 74, 84, 85, 86, 89, 91, 92, 93, 94, 
95, 96, 99, 100, 105, 107, 109, 110, 
119, 120, 132, 139, 140, 150, 167, 169, 
173, 175, 177. 183, 185, 196, 207, 
215, 236, 241, 251, 260, 289, 290, 
292, 293, 331, 350, 352, 357. 358, 
359, 360, 361, 363, 366, 367. 406, 
411, 414, 415; and necessity as cor­
relatives, 177. 183. See also Law of 
freedom; Law of necessity 
Freudian methods, 230, 268 
Friends, 21, 59, 65, 111, 113, 118, 
126, 148, 157, 163, 167, 171, 173, 179, 
182, 189, 204, 209, 211, 216, 217, 
218, 219, 251, 259, 262, 264, 266, 
267, 268, 269, 278, 282, 290, 313, 
330, 346, 363 
Friendship, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64, 65, 
74, 86, 122, 128, 138, 139, 145, 179, 
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Friendship (continued) 
183, 186, 198, 199, 202, 203, 211, 
213, 217, 219, 246, 249, 263, 264, 
266, 267, 282, 283, 290, 306, 311, 
315, 337, 346, 349, 388, 396, 400, 
406, 409, 410, 412 
Future life, 22, 242, 243, 244, 246, 
250, 317, 350 
Gain, 93, 213, 289, 349, 355, 356, 365 
Gainful faculties, 21, 150, 162, 174, 
176, 177, 179, 180, 182 
Galatea, 318, 327, 328, 329 
Galilee, 181, 227, 344 
General will, 85, 215, 216. See also 
Enlightened will; Reasonable will; 
Sovereign; Sovereignty; Will 
Geneva, 5, 6, 10, 11, 37, 38, 41, 43, 55, 
189, 214, 219, 223, 271, 272, 289, 
396, 405 
Genevan, 224, 243, 271, 348, 396 
Geography, 115, 123, 125, 155 
Geometry, 115, 123, 133, 146, 147, 
154, 186, 361 
God, 7, 8, 9, 22, 59, 98, 99, 130, 
181, 182, 196, 208, 220, 221, 224, 226, 
227, 228, 229, 235, 236, 238, 239, 
242, 243, 244, 245, 247, 254, 255, 
256, 259, 260, 261, 262, 288, 313, 
317, 339, 345, 363, 390 
Godhead, 29, 195, 221, 256, 261 
Gold, 182, 206, 288, 290, 292, 293, 
360, 415 
Golden age, 292, 294, 350, 369, 415 
Golden mediocrity, 292, 370 
Good, passim. See also Wisdom 
Goodness, 239, 242, 247, 292, 293, 
365. See also Natural goodness 
Gospel, 10, 166, 175, 231, 259, 288, 
336, 384 
Government (or orientation), 21, 24, 
25, 30, 84, 97, 98, 104, 147, 148, 
149, 150, 151, 152, 155, 158, 159, 
160, 163, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 
173, 174, 176, 177, 183, 188, 189, 190, 
214, 216, 230, 249, 262, 266, 270, 
275, 276, 277, 286, 293, 309, 312, 
318, 352, 355, 358, 361, 364, 367, 
368, 374, 386, 391, 393, 398, 408, 
409, 411 
Governor, 16, 22, 43, 54, 55, 56, 58, 
59, 61, 67, 68, 74, 86, 97, 99, 104, 
105, 107, 108, 110, 112, 115, 116, 117, 
121, 122, 123, 126, 133, 139, 146, 
147, 148, 149, 152, 156, 157, 158, 
159, 161, 162, 164, 166, 168, 169, 
170, 171, 173, 176, 178, 179, 181, 
182, 183, 188, 189, 196, 198, 202, 203, 
206, 207, 209, 210, 211, 216, 262, 
263, 264, 266, 268, 269, 270, 271, 
275, 279, 281, 283, 284, 305, 310, 
332, 333, 343, 348, 350, 352, 355, 
357, 359, 360, 363,364,366,368,369, 
371, 372, 373, 375, 392, 414 
Greco-Roman influence, 20, 175, 384, 
403 
Greece, 18, 185, 324 
Greek culture, 19, 44 
Greek education, 43, 407, 408 
Greek heroes (Republic), 69, 119, 122, 
131, 134, 206, 288, 368 
Greek philosophers, 19, 42, 45, 138, 
385, 389 
Greek sculpture, 44, 286 
Greek temple, 29-31, 196, 227, 305, 
330, 405 
Greek writers, 17, 19, 45, 207 
Greeks, 183, 185, 259, 327 
Guardian(s), 21, 22, 53, 59, 64, 96, 
101, 103, 113, 114, 115, 125, 126, 
129, 131, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 
140, 152, 166, 176, 188, 202, 221, 
233, 244, 282, 333, 355, 356, 386, 
393, 400, 406, 407 
Gymnastic, 114, 115, 125, 126, 128, 
129, 136, 137, 163 
Habit, 71, 89, 128, 265, 363, 391; of 
good order, 112, 128, 277, 342, 374, 
375, 407 
Happiness, 3, 4, 16, 18, 21, 25, 27, 
28, 40, 48, 54, 57, 64, 65, 69, 71, 
81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 92, 93, 
94, 100, 103, 104, 105, 106, 110, 111, 
112, 118, 122, 123, 124, 125, 138, 
140, 146, 147, 148-49, 150, 153, 156, 
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163, 164, 165, 167, 174, 179, 184, 
185, 189, 199, 200, 202, 207, 208, 
209, 215, 216, 218, 223, 225, 232, 242, 
247, 248, 249, 250, 262, 266, 267, 
270, 278, 279, 285, 287, 288, 289, 
291, 292, 293, 294, 307, 311, 312, 
314, 315, 316, 319, 322, 323-24, 331, 
334, 341, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 
354, 356, 357, 360, 365, 366, 367, 
368, 369, 372, 374, 388, 392, 393, 
394, 406, 408, 413, 414, 415 
Harmony, 115, 116, 126, 129, 133, 134, 
315, 322, 327, 331, 339, 358, 368, 
371, 400, 408, 410 
Health, 84, 101, 103, 109, 134, 207, 
245, 267, 289, 292, 356 
Hearing, 134-35 
Heart, 16, 17, 18, 19, 24, 26, 29, 48, 
49, 50, 83, 99, 107, 123, 126, 154, 
178, 197, 198, 199, 203, 205, 206, 
207, 212, 219, 242, 245, 249, 254, 
259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 266, 267. 
277, 287, 289, 306, 307. 314, 318, 
322, 324, 325, 328, 329, 338, 339, 
341, 346, 347, 348, 349, 353, 354, 356, 
363, 367, 370, 371, 373, 374, 377, 401 
Heaven, 22, 244, 391 
Hell, 244 
Hellespont, 128, 342 
Helmsman: as symbol, 56, 57, 126, 
128, 155, 157, 159, 196, 217, 234, 269, 
392 
Hesiod, 114, 124, 125 
Hierarchy within the self, 62, 83, 85, 
105, 110, 161, 232, 274; equated to 
government of men, 105, 110, 161, 
274 
History, 18, 115, 123, 124, 125, 176, 
206, 211, 340, 354, 354-55, 362 
Home: as symbol, 45, 46, 47, 49, 52, 
319, 387,406,413 
Homer, 114, 124, 125 
Honor, 93, 104, 179, 276, 278, 279, 285, 
310, 312, 319, 323, 337, 357, 411 
Human beings, 26, 99, 171, 251, 255, 
264, 358, 411 
Human condition, 44, 83, 403 
Human constitution. See Constitution 
of man or city 
Human faculties. See Faculties of man 
Human feelings. See Feelings 
Human nature, 15, 27, 45, 46, 55, 60, 
61, 64, 86, 87, 206, 232, 268, 293, 
308, 329, 332, 336, 345, 346, 392, 
396, 403, 406, 410, 411. See also 
Nature of man 
Human rights, 251, 252, 345, 346, 347, 
348, 358 
Human spirit, 29, 45, 216, 283, 290, 
305, 306, 360, 364, 365, 374, 403, 414 
Humanism, 20, 60, 63, 65, 95, 273, 359, 
396 
Humanitarianism, 179, 198, 217, 251, 
294, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349 
Humanity, 16, 83, 116, 118, 162, 198, 
202, 203, 205, 218, 230, 231, 242, 
294, 323, 325, 328, 344, 348 
Husbandman, 75, 117, 119, 179, 180, 
265, 343, 356, 407 
Husbandry, 335, 356 
Hymn, 229, 233, 247 
IDEA of man, 44, 264 
IDEA of city, 44 
IDEA of harmony, 368 
Imagery, 12, 13, 14, 17. 20, 22, 23, 37, 
43, 50, 51, 56, 58, 59, 62, 65, 75, 
102,115, 121,123,124,127,129,131, 
136, 147, 155, 165, 174, 175, 176, 181, 
190, 204, 210, 226, 227, 228, 230, 234, 
238, 242, 245, 246, 253, 259, 265, 266, 
268, 269, 273, 278, 282, 283, 309, 317, 
320, 322, 323, 324,327,328,329,343, 
344, 351, 352, 354, 357,362,369,370, 
375, 377, 384, 387, 390,392,393,394, 
396,397,399,400,404,405,408,409, 
411, 412, 413 
"Images of virtue," 164, 187. 265, 328 
Imagination, 13, 17, 18, 76, 183, 198, 
227, 396 
Immortality. 244, 312, 313 
Impulse, 41, 68, 90, 161 
Individualist desires, 64, 65, 86, 94, 
99, 162 
Industrial and mechanical arts, 154, 
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Industrial (continued) 
170, 171, 182 
Injustice, 21, 118, 122, 217, 246, 281, 
365, 368, 395 
Inner feeling, 234, 235, 236, 237, 245, 
324 
Insight, 234, 236, 293, 377, 394, 404 
Instinct, 23, 41, 45, 62, 68, 87, 88, 
99, 247, 263, 283, 341 
Intellect, 17, 235, 331 
Intelligence, 146,235,237, 238,241,324 
Intercommunion of studies, 340, 341, 
344, 348, 350-51 
Intolerance, 88, 89, 249, 250, 251, 252, 
258, 260, 317 
Ionic mode, 30, 135 
Isaiah, 253, 255 
Italy, 175, 222, 224 
Ithaca, 324, 353 
Jesus, 10 n 
John the Baptist, 253, 255, 260 
Judeo-Christian tradition, 20, 59, 68, 
116, 228, 242, 244, 251, 253, 255, 259, 
291, 313, 320, 321, 325, 343, 356, 
377, 384, 403, 405, 406, 408, 409, 
410, 412,413,415 
Judgment, 133, 186, 235, 236, 241, 
245, 315, 393,403 
Julie, 3, 4, 12, 15, 16, 19, 28, 49, 84 
Justice, 5, 21, 26, 27, 52, 56, 68, 74, 
75, 91, 94, 98, 99, 100, 101, 103, 
112, 117, 121, 132, 137, 139, 149, 158, 
163, 165, 166, 167,173,176,179, 180, 
181, 182, 184, 185, 204, 205, 217, 218, 
219, 230, 239, 240, 242, 244,245,246, 
247, 259, 260, 263, 264, 265, 267, 268, 
274, 281, 311, 312, 317, 335, 341, 344, 
345, 347, 351, 356, 357, 358, 368, 370, 
376, 388, 395, 408, 409, 410 
Keystone of the vault, 113, 277, 323, 
393, 398, 399, 412 
Kingdom within, 72. See also City 
within 
Kings, 51, 52, 54, 55, 57, 63, 147, 149, 
150, 152, 153, 154, 160, 161, 163, 166, 
167, 168, 169, 176, 187,188,201,204, 
217, 218, 221, 227, 233, 236, 244, 273, 
289, 337. 351, 356, 363, 372, 376, 
401, 408 
Kingship, 55, 57, 147, 150, 152, 154, 
168, 169, 176, 183, 269, 270, 271, 363, 
393, 398, 408, 409, 415 
Knowledge, 27, 146, 197, 209, 210, 
215, 217, 229, 235, 236, 279, 310, 
318, 333, 334, 340, 383, 389, 394, 
400, 403 
"Know thyself," 30, 197, 261 
Lady Philosophy, 6, 8. See also Muse 
of Philosophy 
La Fontaine, 18, 124, 167, 210, 211, 
405, 410; "The Cricket and the 
Ant," 124; "The Fox and the 
Crow," 124, 211; "The Frog and the 
Ox," 211; "The Wolf and the Dog," 
124 
Land of chimeras, 25, 219 
Law, 21, 24, 25, 30, 49, 50, 52, 53, 
55, 56, 58, 59, 61, 63, 66, 72, 75, 
81, 82, 90, 92, 93, 94, 97, 98, 99, 
100, 101, 102, 103, 105, 106, 107. 108, 
109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 117, 119, 121, 
124, 125, 126, 138, 140, 148, 149, 
150, 152, 155, 172, 178, 182, 183, 
198, 200, 204, 205, 212, 213, 214, 215, 
217, 221, 227, 230, 231, 232, 233, 235, 
237, 238, 242, 245, 246, 247. 248, 249, 
250, 252, 255, 258, 259,260,261,262, 
263, 264, 266, 267. 268, 269, 270, 272, 
273, 274, 275, 276,282,284,285,286, 
292, 306, 308, 311, 313, 314, 315, 316, 
317, 320, 323, 341,347,352,354,355, 
356, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 
366, 367,368,370,373,374,375,386, 
391, 393, 394, 397, 400, 407, 411; 
of education, 275, 276; of freedom, 
85, 90, 97, 107, 108, 111, 112, 113, 
115, 122, 139, 213, 308, 324, 398, 
407, 415; of friendship, 213, 308; of 
love, 91, 202, 268, 307, 308, 323, 
341, 373; of marriage, 268; of nature, 
90, 267, 329; of necessity, 84, 85, 90, 
91, 92, 97, 106, 110, 111, 112, 113, 
115, 118, 119, 120, 122,139,146,163, 
175, 202, 213, 308, 324,349,350,367, 
398, 407, 415; of negative education, 
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107, 108, 109,110, 111, 112,113,115, 
125, 127, 128, 398, 407; of public 
opinion, 113, 276,318,399,400,411, 
412; of peace, 407; of poverty, 324; of 
reason, 60, 98, 106, 112, 139, 169, 
171, 263, 267. 307, 308, 315, 324, 
331, 341, 349; of the natural bent, 
108, 109, 111, 112, 213, 398, 407; of 
the reasonable will, 343; of religion, 
235, 250, 317; of the strongest, 52, 
89, 98, 205, 213; of wisdom, 337, 342 
Lawbreaker, 121, 407 
Lawful social bonds, 46, 203, 263, 409 
Lawgiver, 103, 104, 105, 109, 139, 221 
Lawlessness, 91, 98, 112, 117, 233, 283, 
315, 351, 411 
Legislation, 85, 91, 92, 100, 102, 107, 
108, 110, 172, 199, 214, 236, 251, 
276, 277, 286, 287, 367, 389, 406 
Legislative power, 149, 159, 178, 183, 
214, 275 
Legislator, 24, 42, 49, 100, 103, 104, 
105, 114, 125, 181, 201, 277, 389 
Legislator-educator, 25, 49, 69, 100, 
105, 217 
Leitmotiv: friendship as, 59, 166, 203-4, 
209, 263, 268, 283, 388, 400, 409, 410 
Letters from the Country, 10 
Letters from the Mount (Rousseau), 
10, 11, 19, 25, 26, 38, 48, 
85, 91, 214, 226, 248, 251, 252, 255, 
257. 347. 391 
Letter to Cristophe de Beaumont 
(Rousseau), 98, 230, 255, 347 
Letter to d'Alembert, 42, 49, 208, 287 
Levite of Ephraim (Rousseau), 5-9, 
19, 32, 226, 231, 326, 327 
Liberty, 47, 70, 74, 91, 92, 177, 216, 
282, 365. See also Freedom 
Lies, 114, 121-22, 124, 251, 260, 273 
Literary profession of faith. See 
Aesthetic doctrine; Aesthetics 
Love, 197, 201, 205, 230, 267. 268, 270, 
278, 279, 280, 282, 290, 306, 308, 
310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 316, 319, 
323, 324, 325, 329, 331, 337, 340, 
341, 342, 345, 360, 372, 396, 412; 
learning, 335, 354; of order, 247, 
319; of Sophia or wisdom, 279, 323, 
334, 337, 340, 344, 345, 350, 365, 
372, 388, 413 
Luxury, 172, 173, 174, 175 
Lydian mode, 135 
Lycurgus, 50, 105, 250 
Lyricism, 19, 403, 405 
"Maintainers," 96, 174, 214 
Majority rule, 88, 89, 215, 216, 286, 291 
Malesherbes, Chretien-Guillaume de 
Lamoignon de, 10, 293, 349, 375 
Mammon, 4, 180 
Man of understanding, 22, 73, 346, 396 
Manners and customs, 112, 139, 277. 
314, 361, 393, 398, 399. See also 
Law: of opinion 
Marriage, 201, 230, 231, 250, 258, 266, 
267, 268, 277, 281, 305, 308, 316, 
323, 325, 331, 333, 352, 364, 371, 
372, 373, 374, 375, 398, 414 
Master of self, 103, 200, 268, 284, 
293, 307, 349, 355, 359, 365, 374 
Materialism, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 
240 
Mathematics, 99, 146, 151, 155, 187, 
190, 236, 256, 257, 340; mean pro­
portional, 146, 147. 150, 151, 170, 
275, 408 
Mentor (Telemaque), 265, 321, 336, 
339, 353, 363, 375 
Mercy. 198, 199, 204, 246, 251, 317. 
345, 370 
Metairie (farm), 291, 356, 369, 370 
Metallurgy. 171 
Metaphors, 13, 22, 23, 37, 47, 96, 
338, 405, 409 
Middle Ages, 31, 403 
Mind, 17, 18, 23, 24, 57. 67, 107, 
115, 126, 129, 132, 134, 137, 145, 
153, 158, 163, 187, 212, 218, 219, 
220, 236, 238, 245, 256, 261, 267, 
285, 290, 291, 306, 311, 316, 318, 
319, 327, 333, 337. 344, 346, 354, 
370, 400, 402, 408 
Minerva {Telemaque), 265, 281, 315, 
of humanity, 344, 346; of law, 284; of [425] 
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Minerva (continued) 
321, 322, 336, 339, 353, 363 
"Minister of education," 268, 349 
Miracles, 158, 248, 254, 255, 256, 257, 
260 
Moderation, 282, 333 
Modesty, 282, 307 
Monarchy, 51, 86, 160, 168, 169, 409 
Money, 172, 180, 344 
Money-making arts, 180, 184 
Montaigne, Michel de, 44, 246, 403 
Montmorency, 16, 60, 67, 116, 163, 
166, 265, 293, 392 
Moral beauty, 246, 327, 328, 329, 330, 
376, 412 
Moral being, 82, 85, 86, 89, 93, 97, 
101, 103, 105, 111, 112, 118, 149, 
152, 159, 161, 163, 167, 170, 171, 
174, 197, 201, 202, 212, 213, 216, 
250, 269, 270, 272, 273, 288, 294, 
360, 376, 388, 392, 407, 408, 409 
Moral collective body, 63, 359 
Moral instinct, 245. See also 
Conscience 
Moral law, 98, 233, 249, 318 
Moral Letters (Rousseau), 121 
Moral life, 53, 60, 85, 86, 92, 99, 176, 
274 
Moral need, 238 
Moral order, 40, 53, 135, 197, 204, 
246, 263, 264, 289, 295, 308, 400 
Moral person, 63, 64, 65, 86, 88, 92, 
93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 102, 104, 
110, 111, 113, 149, 151, 178, 183, 
189, 195, 212, 215, 218, 241, 251, 
316, 360, 374, 375, 392 
Moral truth, 129, 155, 156, 165, 186, 
187, 225, 227, 235, 306, 358, 371, 
401, 411 
Moral will, 361 
Morality, 53, 68, 91, 92, 117, 185, 
198, 261, 323, 359, 363, 388 
Morceau allegorique sur la revelation 
(Rousseau), 10 n 
Moses, 50, 69, 105, 227, 250, 251, 
253, 255, 256 
Mother: as symbol, 37, 38, 39, 45, 
47, 48, 49, 50, 62, 75, 137, 307. 
308, 309, 314, 321, 392, 405 
Muse of Philosophy, 279, 310, 314, 
315, 322, 325, 326, 336, 339, 372, 
377, 405, 413 
Muses, 144, 339 
Music, 114, 115, 122, 125, 126, 129, 
135, 136, 229, 322, 339 
Musical education, 133, 134, 135, 136, 
157, 407, 408, 409 
Mysteries, 220, 221, 278, 317, 325, 
334, 335, 337, 354 
Mystical body, 23, 59, 313, 317 
Myth: of carpenter, 179-82; of hunter, 
265, 280; of husbandman, 343, 407; 
of lawbreaker, 121, 131, 407; of 
miniature Olympics, 131, 343, 408; 
of nighttime games, 130-31, 408; of 
promise-breaker, 121-22, 407; of 
Sophia, 412, 413; of Sophia and 
peasants, 344-46; of swaddling 
clothes, 47, 405; of window-breaker, 
120-21 
Mythology, 190, 211, 408, 410, 412 
Myths, 12, 18, 20, 37, 49, 62, 115, 117, 
118, 120, 130, 131, 133, 159, 163, 
165, 168, 169, 180, 204, 210, 244, 
257, 265, 273, 313, 320, 335, 339, 
340, 341, 344, 345, 365, 367, 377, 
383, 385, 388, 394, 399, 404 
Nationalism, 252, 341, 348, 355, 396 
Natural arts, 167, 170 
Natural constitution, 113, 232, 395-96, 
408 
Natural divine law, 249, 251, 253, 260, 
262 
Natural goodness, 40, 87. 107, 205 
Natural history, 335, 354-55 
Natural independence, 120, 363 
Natural law, 98, 247, 267, 345 
Natural man, 15, 19, 24, 41, 43, 44, 
57, 69, 70, 163, 165, 167, 186, 219, 
269, 331, 350, 392 
Natural order, 84, 92, 332, 363, 406 
Natural and political law, 51, 249, 262, 
346, 357, 366, 371 
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INDEX 
Natural religion, 231, 249, 262, 371 
Natural right, 72, 73, 93 
Natural sciences, 154, 163 
Natural self-interest, 94, 263 
Nature, 38, 73, 74, 134, 148, 178, 185, 
221, 231, 237, 238, 270, 278, 287, 
307, 309, 325, 328, 329, 330, 331, 
341, 365, 388; author of, 154, 244; 
as book of learning, 28, 335, 354; 
laws of, 90, 105, 215, 246, 248, 255, 
263, 267, 308, 323, 359, 367; order 
of, 232, 284; as subject of art, 18, 
286, 327 
Nature of man, 15, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 
25, 26, 27. 30, 40, 41, 43, 46, 49, 
51, 52, 53, 57, 58, 60, 63, 64, 65, 
68, 83, 86, 90, 98, 103, 106, 110, 114, 
126, 133, 161, 179, 197, 198, 213, 
216, 219, 230, 240, 241, 242, 245, 
246, 332, 337, 341, 354, 355, 359, 
367,368,401,403 
Nature of woman, 305, 306, 309, 313 
Nature of things, 111, 262, 358 
Necessary desires, 196, 213-14, 218 
Necessity, 72, 73, 74, 75, 89, 91, 94, 
95, 100, 101, 106, 107, 117, 140, 
148, 162, 167, 171, 174, 177, 182, 
196, 207, 214, 233, 265, 273, 292, 
311, 349, 356, 360, 363, 406, 414, 415 
Needs, 23, 54, 71, 72, 73, 74, 84, 
90, 101, 103, 106, 118, 120, 145, 163, 
165, 167, 168, 172, 174, 175, 176, 
220, 312, 366, 367, 409 
"Negative education," 107-8, 197 
New Testament, 96, 98, 227, 229, 257, 
313 
Numa, 50, 55, 105, 250, 273 
Obedience, 65, 86, 98, 150, 183, 203, 
268, 269, 273, 308, 314, 315, 318, 
332, 359, 367; and consent as corre­
latives, 58, 84, 188, 373; and love as 
correlatives, 311; and liberty as cor­
relatives, 185 
Odyssey, 353, 355 
Old Testament, 5, 8, 59, 229, 257, 
279, 313, 373, 384 
Olympic games, 131, 132, 137, 158, 
202, 206, 243, 244, 343, 408 
Olympus, Mount, 200, 227 
Opinion, 42, 43, 139, 173, 208, 209, 
215, 233, 234, 276, 277, 278, 280, 
281, 282, 286, 287, 293, 307, 308, 
311, 314, 318, 393, 398, 399, 411. 
See also Law: of public opinion 
Original sin, 87. See also Natural 
goodness 
Orphan: Emile as, 58, 59, 119 
Orpheus, 229, 239, 410 
Parable: of the conjuror Socrates, 157­
59, 163, 167, 187, 209, 209-10, 255, 
257, 409; of the kingdom of heaven, 
338; of the laborers in the vineyard, 
132; of Montmorency forest, 163, 
164-66, 167. 198, 204, 265, 335, 409; 
of the races, 131-33, 137, 343; of the 
sower, 117-20, 158, 172, 182, 343, 
357 
Parables, 17, 20, 115, 116, 126, 127, 
132, 159, 210, 345, 394, 404 
Parents, 58, 231, 323, 336. See also 
Family; Father; Mother 
Paris, 19, 165, 277, 280, 281, 287, 291, 
293, 314, 334, 413 
Parthenon, 29, 31 
Passions, 49, 63, 83, 88, 89, 91, 92, 
96, 97, 98, 100, 104, 116, 160, 168, 
175, 177, 185, 195, 196, 197, 199-200, 
207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 
214, 215, 216, 217, 220, 221, 233, 
240, 241, 246, 247, 251, 262, 263, 
264, 265, 269, 270, 276, 279, 280, 283, 
294, 311, 314, 328, 337, 342, 346, 
348, 349, 351, 363, 366, 367, 406, 
409, 410, 411 
Paternal authority, 51, 58, 59, 359. 
See also Father 
Patience, 187, 322 
Patriotism, 117, 251, 252, 309, 320, 325, 
341, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 3% 
Paul (apostle), 23, 24, 132, 181, 240, 
243, 247, 317, 343, 362, 373, 375 
Peace, 48, 62, 202, 213, 218, 224, 
225, 254, 259, 260, 264, 308, 311, 
335, 357, 362, 369, 377 
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Pedagogy: and politics, 15, 27 
Personification of reason and wisdom, 
279, 280, 313,406. See also Governor 
Philosopher-kings, 56, 113, 140, 147, 
152, 162, 168, 176, 190, 216, 219, 
221, 280, 310, 334, 340, 363-64, 368, 
372, 377, 390, 393, 408, 409, 411, 
412, 413 
Physicians, 65, 66, 75, 108, 109, 117, 
137, 169, 180, 311,406 
Physics, 28, 163, 255, 340 
Pilot, 43, 56, 65, 75, 126, 155, 156, 
159, 234, 269. See also Governor; 
Helmsman 
Pity, 74, 138, 198, 199, 200, 202, 208, 
209, 210,211, 346 
Place: as key idea, 83, 90, 107, 171 
Plato, 14, 18, 19, 20, 21, 27, 28, 42, 43, 
55, 56, 75, 99, 102, 111, 122, 134, 
152, 166, 185, 187, 200, 204, 205, 
208, 210, 212, 216, 221, 230, 234, 
268, 269, 279, 285, 287, 291, 292, 306, 
308, 309, 310, 320, 322, 327, 334, 
337, 339, 354, 355, 357, 364, 365, 
367, 384, 385, 386, 387, 389, 404, 
414. See also Socrates 
Pleasure(s), 4, 247, 277, 285, 286, 288, 
289, 291, 316, 352, 360, 399 
Plutarch, 18, 137, 207, 208, 212, 213, 
239, 243, 245, 279, 283, 385, 
386, 405, 410 
Poetry, 18, 233, 287 
Poland, 42, 49, 91, 125 
Politeness, 285, 316 
Political economy, 48, 171, 174 
Political Economy (Rousseau), 3, 22, 
47, 48, 346-47 
Political Institutions (Rousseau), 4, 
357, 362, 414 
Politico-moral laws, 99, 113 
Politics, 15, 22, 23, 24, 27, 309, 351 
Positive divine law, 249, 251, 253, 262 
"Posts" (Socratic), 265, 363, 390, 391 
Poverty, 10, 213, 288, 291, 312, 324, 
326, 332, 333, 338, 415 
Power, 4, 87, 110, 213, 239, 289, 290, 
307, 311, 331, 356, 357, 366, 415 
Prayer, 229, 230, 241, 242,243, 244, 248 
Preface of Emile and Social Contract, 
25-27, 94, 354, 391 
"Prelude to the chief strain," 152, 153, 
157, 185, 187. 408 
Primitive condition or state, 53, 62, 
68, 87. 396 
Prince, 53, 149, 182, 270, 271, 290, 
291, 318, 324, 353, 372 
Prisoners in Socratic den, 47, 69, 71, 
76, 121, 129, 131, 133, 146, 153, 406 
Private interests, 40, 86, 170, 205, 
213,217, 361 
Profession of faith, 4, 30, 130, 152, 
153, 154, 187, 220, 221, 222, 225, 
228, 230, 233, 235, 280, 353, 370, 
386, 409, 410 
Project on Corsica (Rousseau), 364, 
389 
Property, 48, 62, 63, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 
94, 95, 109, 110, 117, 118, 119, 120, 
139, 162, 170, 201, 290, 332, 355, 
357, 360, 365, 366, 367, 406, 407. 
414, 415 
Protestant(s), 223, 224, 226, 230, 253, 
260 
Providence, 235, 239, 243 
Psychological truth, 18, 401, 402. See 
also Human beings; Nature of man 
Pygmalion, 326-30, 375, 401 
Pythagorus, 334, 354 
Pythian oracle, 30, 245 
Rank, 325,332,333. See also Hierarchy 
within the self: equated to govern­
ment of men 
Reason, 279, 281, 282, 283, 290, 311, 
312, 314, 318, 322, 331, 334, 349, 
359, 367, 374, 392, 393, 398, 400, 
402, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411 
Reasonable will, 60, 63, 65, 97, 127, 
140,281,314,333,337,343,361,396. 
See also Enlightened will 
Reformation, 226, 257 
Regulus, 246, 387 
Religion, 131, 220, 221, 222, 224, 226, 
231, 233, 235, 248, 249, 250, 252, 
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258, 260, 316, 317, 340, 402, 411 
Representatives, 86, 184, 361 
Republic, 11, 20, 21, 24, 25, 26, 30, 
42, 43, 47, 52, 56, 63, 64, 65, 66, 
69, 75, 98, 100, 102, 104, 108, 110, 
113, 114, 115, 121, 122, 125, 128, 
131, 135, 136, 137, 152, 158, 160, 
164, 165, 166, 167, 170, 173, 180, 
181, 184, 187, 190, 204, 205, 206, 208, 
211, 213, 216, 219, 221, 222, 225, 
227, 229, 247. 248, 256, 259, 265, 
277, 281, 282, 289, 292, 294, 306, 
309, 310,322,325, 327, 328,331,332, 
333, 335, 340, 343, 344, 350, 352, 
354, 362, 364 365, 368, 370, 372, 
375, 376, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 
391, 393, 394, 395, 397, 398, 400, 
409, 410, 414 
Republic, 42, 55, 63, 99, 101, 160, 
190, 271, 279, 309, 310, 316, 337. 
396, 400, 405 
Resurrection, 242, 330 
Revelation, 130, 131, 225, 228, 229, 
236, 250, 253, 254, 255, 255-56, 257, 
259, 260, 387, 410 
Rhythm, 114, 126, 133, 134, 316, 408 
Robert the gardener, 117, 118, 184 
Robinson Crusoe, 52, 147, 164, 167, 
168, 169, 170, 171, 175, 176, 179, 
187, 197, 405, 408, 409 
Roman church, 224, 234, 253 
Roman institutions, 271, 272, 397 
Romans, ancient, 41, 122, 183, 207, 
209, 218, 246, 266, 273-75, 276, 284, 
319, 320, 347, 369 
"Romance of human nature," 336, 392 
Romanticism, 18, 228, 384, 403, 404 
Rome, 18, 44, 55, 185, 273, 314, 320, 
353, 396 
"Royal lie" (Socratic), 62, 63, 138, 
405, 406 
Rulers, 21, 22, 51, 56, 59, 64, 69, 
139, 149, 152, 154, 157, 162, 180, 
182, 185, 188, 189, 218, 262, 269, 
270, 271, 279, 311, 317, 331, 332, 
333, 339, 356, 361, 363, 366, 372, 
373, 376, 377. 411 
Rural life or society, 67, 183, 364, 369, 
370 
"Salute to friend," 166, 204, 209, 263, 
265, 266-67, 268, 283, 410. See also 
Leitmotiv 
Salvation, 220, 251, 376 
Samaritan woman at well, 254 
Savage state, 69, 186, 331 
Savoy, 224, 226 
Savoyard vicar, 5, 30, 130, 220, 222, 
228, 252, 280, 347, 376, 401 
Scriptures, 21, 29, 228, 241, 280, 384 
Sculptor or sculpture, 23, 286, 327, 
328, 329 
Security, 95, 177. 366, 367 
Self-education, 392, 415 
Self-esteem, 224, 239 
Self-government, 160, 161, 162, 179, 
268, 361, 391, 395 
Self-indulgence, 4, 282 
Self-interest, 94, 282 
Self-love, 107, 196, 197, 198, 209, 235, 
246, 263, 347 
Self-mastery, 86, 99, 139, 284, 292 
Self-rule, 189, 284, 321, 349, 355, 357, 
360, 364, 368, 373 
Self-sufficing, 109, 111, 182, 213 
Selfishness, 196, 387 
Seminarian: Rousseau as, 224, 226 
Sensationalist doctrines, 129, 138 
Sensations, 123, 186, 232, 236 
Senses, 63, 108, 121, 125, 129, 187, 
197, 235, 236, 240, 268, 283, 329, 
349 
Sensitive being, 236, 393 
Sensitive Morality (Rousseau), 71, 318 
Sensorial education, 71, 129, 138 
Sermon on the Mount, 9, 56, 131, 145, 
148, 205, 227, 229, 256, 288, 338 
Servants, 161-62, 189-90, 290 
Servius, 273, 274 
Shame, 202, 282 
Ship of soul or state, 57, 128, 196, 234 
Shopkeeping, 148, 153, 156, 206, 358, 
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Sight, 132, 134, 316 
Similitude of the sun, 96, 153, 154, 
156, 220, 227, 233, 236, 244, 280, 
294, 408, 410 
Skepticism, 226, 253, 261, 369, 371, 413 
Slavery, 46, 47, 49, 52, 53, 62, 70, 75, 
89, 91, 92, 93, 95, 97, 98, 99, 100, 
106, 121, 169, 175, 185, 216, 268, 
355, 359, 360, 365, 367, 406, 411 
Social life, 18, 41, 76, 246, 319, 411 
Social man, 15, 176, 359, 392 
Social order, 30, 40, 41, 46, 53, 74, 
197, 204, 220, 232, 246, 248, 264, 
266, 267, 271, 288, 289, 295, 377, 
398, 400 
Social state, 24, 186, 241, 331 
Society: moral value of, 15, 368, 376 
Socrates, 4, 6, 23, 25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 
34 n. 27, 40, 41, 69, 75, 121, 146, 
148, 175, 177, 225, 228, 241, 243, 261, 
265, 282, 283, 292,328,353,354,358, 
389, 392, 395, 396, 397, 399, 414; 
acknowledged as master by Rous­
seau, 19, 26, 60-61, 229, 384-87; 
on choice of life, 370, 391; on com­
mon happiness, 61, 63, 106, 201-2; 
as "conjuror," 158, 166, 187, 209; 
contrasted with Cato, 346-47, 386; 
denunciation of theater by, 19, 208; 
on education, 26, 39, 42, 55, 56, 84, 
94,111-12,113-40 passim, 156-57,187, 
277, 281, 285; on enlightened will 
as ruler, 85-86, 102, 213-14, 216, 409; 
on "false" states, 355-56, 376; on 
family and education, 45, 50; on 
friendship, 59, 263, 270, 327, 346, 
388, 411; on good and bad "phy­
sicians," 65-67, 406; on gymnastic as 
training, 128; on ignorant men, 47, 
121; on immoral passions, 96, 185, 
208, 229, 240, 280, 362-63; on inner 
conflict, 53-54, 92, 282, 362-63 (see 
also "on 'warfare'"); and "just 
man," 20, 259; on kingship, 150, 
152, 153, 169, 269, 271, 289, 409; 
Lady Philosophy of, 6, 7, 279, 314, 
315, 325, 326, 372, 377, 413; on law 
of the strongest, 52-53, 205; on laws, 
98, 99, 101, 107, 112, 119, 245, 250; 
as legislator-educator, 100, 104; on 
love and marriage, 200-201, 306, 308­
13, 320, 333, 334-35, 352, 373; "main­
tainers and foster fathers" of, 96, 
174, 214; on mathematics as training, 
123, 256-57; on money-making arts, 
54, 180-81, 184; on moral goodness, 
87-88, 219-20, 246-47; on music as 
training, 114, 133-34, 135, 152, 
315-16, 407. 408; on myths as train­
ing, 114-15, 407; on parental author­
ity, 50, 51, 282; philosopher-kings or 
"heroes" of, 56, 69, 71, 73, 76, 
124, 128, 131, 137, 138, 139, 168, 
190, 206, 218, 264, 340, 352, 364, 
368, 372, 376, 393, 401, 408-9; on 
reason, 107, 110, 112, 217; on reli­
gion, 221-22, 231, 233, 235, 244, 
250; on the republic, 99, 160; 
Rousseau likened to, 10-11; "royal 
lie" of, 62-63, 138, 405; on sensible 
vs. visible, 236; on the soul as city, 
21-22, 85, 103, 105, 111, 128, 150, 
178, 201-2, 212, 229, 367-70, 390, 
404; on sympathy, 201-2, 204; "true 
pilot" of, 43, 57, 65, 196, 234; on 
"warfare," 209, 210, 211, 240, 251, 
282, 362-63 (see also "on inner con­
flict"); on wealth and poverty, 111, 
138, 288, 289-90; on wisdom and 
happiness, 103, 163, 281, 339-40, 
341, 343, 350-51, 367, 388 
Solomon, 6, 27, 29, 169, 227, 228, 
229,254, 313,384,413,414 
Song, 115, 116, 126, 129, 135, 229, 
315, 386 
Song of Orpheus, 152, 229, 244, 259,

410

Son of man, 10, 20, 117, 118, 176,

229

Sophia. See Beauty: of Sophia or wis­
dom; Wisdom: Sophia as personifi­
cation of 
Sophisms, 216, 217, 220, 280, 282, 
294, 308, 409, 410 
Sophists, 229, 279, 281, 282, 410 
Soul, 15, 17, 38, 39, 40, 48, 49, 68, 
81, 119, 121, 176, 190, 197, 228, 
234, 239, 247, 294, 312, 324, 329, 
330, 331, 333, 343, 351, 358, 395, 
396, 400, 401, 403, 405,411,412; care 
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of body and, 66-67; effect of physi­
cal training on, 128-29, 137; effect of 
worldly goods on, 56, 366; enslaved 
by desire, 52-53, 86, 92, 180, 216, 
233, 240, 282, 283, 360, 361, 410; 
equated with city-state, 21-23,41, 45, 
52, 57, 67, 74, 85, 92, 94, 96, 101, 
102, 103, 104, 105, 110, 126, 128, 
140, 149, 170, 178, 181, 185, 188, 
202, 216, 229, 230, 238, 250, 267, 
309, 322, 344, 362, 364, 375, 388,390, 
404, 406, 408; freedom and, 177; 
future life of, 242-43, 244, 370, 391; 
institution of natural order in, 24, 84, 
92, 94, 106, 291, 406; justice and, 
101, 218, 230, 368; music and, 135, 
150, 229, 322; pursuit by, of truth 
or good, 148, 155, 156, 214-15, 240; 
reason or enlightened will as ruler 
of, 43, 53, 83, 96, 99, 114, 151, 
160, 170, 174, 188, 238, 241, 245, 
267, 333, 373, 374, 408; as temple of 
the Godhead, 29-30, 181, 261; "war­
fare" within, 52,96,97,114,233,366; 
wedded to wisdom, 323, 325-26, 327, 
328, 336, 337, 375 
Sovereign, 22, 52, 64, 72, 85, 147, 
149, 150, 160, 178, 183, 189, 269, 
270, 272, 275, 317, 361, 366, 411 
Sovereignty, 57, 63, 64, 85, 87, 93, 94, 
97, 99, 104, 149, 151, 154, 178, 183, 
184, 270, 272, 273, 275, 359, 360, 
361, 363, 374, 408, 409, 415 
Sovereign will, 63, 65, 70, 71, 73, 90, 
93, 96, 151, 160, 161, 170, 177, 178, 
185, 188, 203, 213, 214, 215, 218, 
237, 250, 264, 339, 341, 360, 361, 
374, 408 
Sparta, 42, 44, 49, 55, 314, 315, 320, 
395 
Sparta or Spartans, 30,41,42,43,44,46, 
49, 50, 55, 84, 101, 126, 137, 314, 
315, 319, 320, 349, 385, 296, 413 
"Spectator," 204, 206, 207, 210, 243 
Spirit (Socratic), 53, 101, 103, 111, 114, 
126, 130, 135, 137. 139, 150 
Spiritual ascent as theme, 39, 68, 69, 
71, 129, 146, 154, 156, 180, 227, 406 
Spirituality, 286, 288, 314, 332 
Spiritual order, 265, 377 
Statesman or statesmanship, 22,66, 75, 
169, 181, 184, 366, 406 
Steersman. See Helmsman 
Stoic or Stoicism, 84, 87, 92, 128, 291 
Stories. See False myths; Myths; True 
myths 
"Strain of peace and freedom," 115, 
125, 135, 152, 407 
"Strain of necessity," 115, 117, 125, 
135, 152, 407 
Strength, 84, 93, 94, 100, 104, 108, 
125, 126, 128, 139, 145, 148, 149, 
151, 182, 186, 267, 307, 314, 333, 349, 
356, 408 
Study or studies, 145, 146, 154, 156, 
163, 171, 312, 340, 341, 344, 348, 
351, 354, 355, 358, 400, 411 
Subjects, 64, 147, 150, 151, 170, 174, 
177, 183, 189, 275, 311, 316, 361, 
408, 411 
Subtitles in Emile, 353 
Suffering, 10, 116, 198, 205, 243, 246, 
287 
Suitability, 278, 279, 323, 332, 339, 342, 
352, 354, 355, 357, 361, 366, 372 
Supreme Being, 61, 220, 235, 255, 317 
Swaddling clothes, 47. 68, 405 
Symbolism, 17, 48, 49, 57, 63, 66, 
121, 155, 157, 165, 167, 173, 175, 
233, 226, 265, 266, 268, 270, 273, 
278, 290, 305, 306, 308,310,312,313, 
314, 315, 316, 318, 328, 332, 334, 
335, 337, 342, 351, 356, 371, 374, 
387, 399, 403, 409, 413 
Symbols, 13, 14, 24, 37, 38, 62, 132, 
154, 209, 231, 320, 259, 406 
Symmetry, 145, 196, 200, 206, 212, 305 
Sympathy, 74, 153, 198, 199, 201, 204, 
205, 208, 209, 285, 287, 322, 347. 
370, 396, 400 
Symposium, 18, 173, 287, 291, 292, 306, 
310-13, 319, 320, 323, 327, 331, 336, 
338, 339, 340, 352, 376, 387, 413 
Tableau of the "true runner," 344 
Taste, 17, 18, 115, 116, 126, 133, 135, 
136, 276, 277, 278, 280, 281, 285, 
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Taste (continued) 
286, 287, 289, 290, 314, 316, 319, 
323, 331, 337, 342, 387, 393, 399, 
400, 408, 412, 416 
Telemaque (Telemachus) or Tele­
maque (Fenelon), 196, 265, 321, 324, 
325, 326, 328, 329,336,352,353,363, 
370, 375 
Temperance, 103, 112, 128, 139, 187, 
282, 284,289, 311, 312, 376 
Temple: as image, 29, 30, 31, 59, 
75, 116, 125, 138, 167, 181, 190, 
195, 196, 223. 226, 228, 245. 250, 
261, 266, 277, 279, 282,305,327,344, 
357, 367, 371, 372, 375, 404, 405, 412 
Theater, 208-9, 287, 349 
Three R's, 115, 123, 125, 315, 316 
Travel, 334, 348, 352, 353, 354, 364, 
369, 376, 387 
Treaty, 58, 372, 374, 375 
True lie, 105, 211 
True myths, 114, 115, 116, 122, 126, 
129, 408 
True self, 196-97, 264 
Truth, 57, 153, 281, 285, 294, 312, 
340, 368, 371, 400 
Tyranny, 49, 52, 75, 88, 89, 91, 92, 
93, 94, 100, 106, 169, 170, 175, 185, 
233, 249, 311, 356, 406, 411 
Tyrants or tyrannical passions, 91, 124, 
150, 169, 174, 214, 283, 355, 362­
63, 367 
Ulysses, 196, 269, 282, 324, 353, 370 
Unanimous being, 88, 213, 215, 216, 
323, 391 
Union, 212, 213, 308, 317, 318, 323, 
337, 358, 359, 372, 373 
Unity, 46, 63, 92, 93, 99, 201, 218, 
232, 233, 395, 407 
Useful, 17. 94, 146, 147, 148, 153, 
154, 155, 156, 164, 165, 179, 228, 
233, 285, 308, 315, 340, 358, 359, 
386, 390, 400 
Utility, 94, 149, 164, 179, 202, 308 
Vanity, 46, 157, 209, 229, 341 
Venus, 315, 328, 329 
Virgil, 238, 287, 318, 336, 387 
Virtue, 48, 81, 82, 89, 100, 101, 102, 
103, 107, 112, 119, 124, 128, 130, 
131, 133, 139, 158, 160, 164, 173, 
181, 186, 187, 198, 207, 208, 218, 
219, 221, 224, 233, 241,242,244,245, 
246, 252, 259, 265, 267, 279, 280, 
286, 292, 310, 311, 312, 313, 319, 
320, 322, 333, 335, 341, 344, 349, 
351, 352, 358, 363, 365, 368, 374, 
376, 387, 391, 400 
Vision, 13, 291, 292; of Er, 222, 244, 
333, 370, 376, 377, 391 
Visionary, 25, 183, 324, 326, 328-29 
War, 22, 53, 62, 69, 92, 184, 204, 
209, 210, 231, 233, 269, 274, 309, 
320, 362 
Warfare, 22, 24, 53, 62, 89, 96, 97, 
114, 124, 208, 209, 210, 211, 215, 
216, 251, 294, 349, 352, 363 
"Waves" (Socratic): first, 29, 63, 388, 
405; second, 111, 407; third, 149, 
408 
Wealth, 4, 93, 110, 111, 151, 162, 170, 
171, 173, 174, 175, 213, 267, 274, 
279, 287-93, 311, 330, 331, 332, 333, 
338, 344, 356, 357, 366, 397, 409 
"What is not," 324, 326, 329, 350, 
358, 412 
Wild beasts, 116, 138, 207, 208, 229, 
240, 411 
Will, 24, 26, 41, 53, 60, 93, 94, 95, 
114, 128, 129, 133, 151, 155, 159, 
178, 183, 189, 190, 199, 231, 235, 
237, 239, 240, 242, 246, 248, 261, 
264, 267, 284, 307, 315, 323, 333, 
344, 352, 358, 359, 360, 361, 374, 
393, 408; and desire or the passions, 
89, 212, 213, 221, 241, 367; general 
and individual, 85-88, 182, 215, 216, 
276; for the good, 91, 99, 182, 214, 
216, 247; governors as servant of, 
161-62; as guardian of inner man, 21, 
101, 406; as law, 97, 99; and law of 
freedom, 85, 91, 92, 213, 398, 415; 
and law of necessity, 84-85, 213, 
398; precedence of, over reason, 
106, 132, 188; reason and, 139, 149, 
150, 161, 268, 273, 282, 283, 406-7, 
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411; reasonable or enlightened, 60, 
63, 64, 65, 83, 99, 126, 234, 238, 
245, 314, 343, 373; sensorial training 
of, 71; and sovereignty, 85-87 
Wisdom, 7, 21, 30, 65, 99, 105, 108, 
112, 121, 125, 137, 180, 184, 216, 
239, 242, 259, 270, 292, 305, 308, 309, 
310, 311, 312, 314, 318, 319, 324, 
325, 332, 333, 334, 343, 344, 357, 
360, 363, 365, 368, 372, 376, 393, 
412; associated with happiness, 3, 
18, 27, 69, 82, 84, 85, 100, 103, 
106, 123, 146, 147, 163, 179, 209, 
247, 288, 291, 293, 294, 307, 316, 
323, 350, 351, 352, 366, 367, 369, 
372, 374, 388, 392, 394, 413, 415; 
as discernment of good and evil, 
169, 281, 333; divine, 104, 159, 227, 
230, 238, 264, 327, 336, 339, 345, 
351, 367, 414; "false," 83, 84, 99; 
"foretaste" of 337, 339, 340, 341, 
348, 350, 351, 372, 376, 398, 413; 
as opposed to knowledge, 27-28; 
search for, by human soul, 16, 57, 
320, 323, 331; and Socratic symbol of 
hunt, 167, 335; Sophia as personifi­
cation of, 6, 82, 129, 132, 159, 277, 
278, 279, 280, 306, 313, 315, 322, 
327, 330, 336-38, 340, 342, 348, 352, 
367, 374, 375, 376, 387, 393, 405, 
413, 414 
Wise order of life or things, 38, 59, 
268, 307, 313, 315, 316, 317, 323, 
332,387,411,412,413,415 
Worldly society, 278, 284, 319 
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and injustice and their effects upon the human 
soul. To achieve this purpose, he deals with the 
ideal soul and city together, the soul being the 
pattern of the perfect city, and employs im­
agery that Rousseau in turn takes up in both 
his books, magnifying it in the Contract into 
an image of the ideal city, or wise order of 
things. It is in this ideal image of the soul 
present in both works that it becomes clear 
that the two productions evolve in obedience 
to a single and identical plan, the Contract 
following the novel step by step without once 
violating the order of the text, and the two 
moving side by side through the whole of their 
several parts. 
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